Opinion
GATES, J.
Following a determination that he had carried a concealed dagger upon his person, Reginald C. appeals from an order that declared him a ward of the court, but allowed him to remain at home with his parents. (See Pen. Code, § 12020, subd. (a).) He contends:
“A. The court’s recall of the police officer to testify further after the prosecution had submitted its case and after the police officer had been a party to the colloquy between the court, the prosecution and defense counsel was error. B. The pat-down performed on appellant by Officer Stocks was done without probable cause and exceeded the scope of a detention search. C. The incorporation of all testimony and evidence adduced at the [Welfare and Institutions Code, section] 700.1 hearing into the adjudication hearing record was error because there was no knowing waiver by the juvenile of his constitutional rights.”
The determinative facts were undisputed. On May 28, 1984, Jill Bogan, a security agent at Nordstrom’s department store located in the Glendale Galleria, had conducted a surveillance of appellant and another minor after she had been informed by sales personnel that the two youths had been in the store the previous day looking at expensive merchandise but refusing assistance. She observed appellant, apparently acting as a lookout, “watching the salespeople and customers in the area” after his companion, Jimmy L., “had selected several pairs of expensive tennis wear and had gone into the fitting room.” After L. had exited he hung up certain of the pieces he had removed from the rack but when Bogan checked the fitting room he had used, she discovered “several empty hangers,” suggesting that other items had been stolen.
Bogan followed the two youths from Nordstrom’s to the Broadway store, also located in the Galleria. There she watched as this time appellant’s companion took a turn as lookout while appellant entered a stockroom that was closed to the public. Though Bogan attempted to contact a Broadway official, she had not succeeded in doing so before Officer Mark Stocks of
the Glendale Police Department arrived on the scene in response to her earlier call. Bogan, who was known to Stocks, advised him of what had transpired and her belief that the two youths had stolen Nordstrom’s property.
When appellant came out of the stockroom, his companion L. exited the building itself but was immediately stopped by Officer Stocks’ partner. Appellant had started to follow L. out the same doorway but when he looked outside and saw L. in the custody of a police officer, appellant promptly “turned around and began to reenter the store.” At this point Officer Stocks approached and advised appellant he was being detained in connection with his possible shoplifting. In addition, because appellant “was wearing a jacket and the jacket was almost entirely all the way zipped up and [although the store itself was airconditioned] the temperature outside that day was very hot, 95 degrees,” the officer concluded it was advisable to pat the jacket to be certain appellant was not in possession of a lethal weapon. When he did so Officer Stocks immediately detected the dagger appellant carried concealed in his waistband.
Juvenile proceedings should, so far as is compatible with due process, strive to maintain that informal character that has always been their laudable goal
(In re Winship
(1970) 397 U.S. 358, 366-367 [25 L.Ed.2d 368, 377, 90 S.Ct. 1068];
In re Gault
(1967) 387 U.S. 1, 27 [18 L.Ed.2d 527, 545-546, 87 S.Ct. 1428]) to the end that the truth regarding the subject minor’s conduct may be ascertained, and, if necessary, appropriate steps taken to nip budding character defects before they blossom into adult criminal behavior. Lamentably, however, as so often is the case today, the processing of the instant petition ignored the appellant and concentrated solely on an arcane effort to classify and pigeonhole Officer Stocks’ actions.
In the light of the uncontested facts it would seem clear that the officer was entirely justified in touching the exterior of appellant’s zipped-up jacket before proceeding with his investigation in order to guard against a very real danger which, in fact, existed. (See
Terry
v.
Ohio
(1968) 392 U.S. 1, 23 et seq. [20 L.Ed.2d 889, 907 et seq., 88 S.Ct. 1868].)
Unfortunately, rather than so holding, the trial court concluded that certain unspecified appellate decisions required it to reach a contrary conclusion. That is, it announced its belief to be that unless there existed probable cause to “arrest,”, rather than merely to “detain,” the superficial frisk
which had disclosed the presence of appellant’s deadly weapon had been an improper, albeit most providential, action. Nonetheless, it continued, in light of the undisputed evidence regarding Officer Stocks’ own observations, and the detailed report given him by the security agent Bogan, there existed a reasonable basis for believing a crime had been committed.
The court still remained concerned, however, since Officer Stocks had declared it had not been his intention to effect a formal arrest prior to completing his investigation. The officer’s anticipated sequence of events was, of course, both understandable and commendable, i.e., rarely will it be the wisest or most economical course of action to transport and “book” even the most strongly suspected criminal until at least some effort has been made to determine whether or not his apparent crime was actually consummated.
Therefore, over the quite impassioned objections of appellant’s trial counsel,
the court recalled Officer Stocks as its own witness in order to assure
itself that not only had there existed objective grounds to justify an arrest, but further that the officer, “subjectively,” had been aware thereof. Anticipatably, this seven-year veteran confirmed his knowledge of the law and his ability to draw reasonable inferences from known data.
Appellant’s initial contention that the court should not have examined Officer Stocks further in order to enlighten itself on a point it considered significant, necessarily fails. It is true, of course, that, wisely or unwisely, most of the maze-like rules that now enmesh our penal system have been injected, bit by bit, into juvenile wardship proceedings. (See
In re Issac G.
(1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 917, 920-921 [156 Cal.Rptr. 123];
In re Michael S.
(1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 814, 818 [190 Cal.Rptr. 585].) Nonetheless, even in our most vexed adult forum, reality has not been declared anathema.
An adversary system, despite its acknowledged shortcomings as a method for ascertaining the truth, has much to commend it whenever there are sincerely disputed questions of guilt or innocence to be resolved.
Where,
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Opinion
GATES, J.
Following a determination that he had carried a concealed dagger upon his person, Reginald C. appeals from an order that declared him a ward of the court, but allowed him to remain at home with his parents. (See Pen. Code, § 12020, subd. (a).) He contends:
“A. The court’s recall of the police officer to testify further after the prosecution had submitted its case and after the police officer had been a party to the colloquy between the court, the prosecution and defense counsel was error. B. The pat-down performed on appellant by Officer Stocks was done without probable cause and exceeded the scope of a detention search. C. The incorporation of all testimony and evidence adduced at the [Welfare and Institutions Code, section] 700.1 hearing into the adjudication hearing record was error because there was no knowing waiver by the juvenile of his constitutional rights.”
The determinative facts were undisputed. On May 28, 1984, Jill Bogan, a security agent at Nordstrom’s department store located in the Glendale Galleria, had conducted a surveillance of appellant and another minor after she had been informed by sales personnel that the two youths had been in the store the previous day looking at expensive merchandise but refusing assistance. She observed appellant, apparently acting as a lookout, “watching the salespeople and customers in the area” after his companion, Jimmy L., “had selected several pairs of expensive tennis wear and had gone into the fitting room.” After L. had exited he hung up certain of the pieces he had removed from the rack but when Bogan checked the fitting room he had used, she discovered “several empty hangers,” suggesting that other items had been stolen.
Bogan followed the two youths from Nordstrom’s to the Broadway store, also located in the Galleria. There she watched as this time appellant’s companion took a turn as lookout while appellant entered a stockroom that was closed to the public. Though Bogan attempted to contact a Broadway official, she had not succeeded in doing so before Officer Mark Stocks of
the Glendale Police Department arrived on the scene in response to her earlier call. Bogan, who was known to Stocks, advised him of what had transpired and her belief that the two youths had stolen Nordstrom’s property.
When appellant came out of the stockroom, his companion L. exited the building itself but was immediately stopped by Officer Stocks’ partner. Appellant had started to follow L. out the same doorway but when he looked outside and saw L. in the custody of a police officer, appellant promptly “turned around and began to reenter the store.” At this point Officer Stocks approached and advised appellant he was being detained in connection with his possible shoplifting. In addition, because appellant “was wearing a jacket and the jacket was almost entirely all the way zipped up and [although the store itself was airconditioned] the temperature outside that day was very hot, 95 degrees,” the officer concluded it was advisable to pat the jacket to be certain appellant was not in possession of a lethal weapon. When he did so Officer Stocks immediately detected the dagger appellant carried concealed in his waistband.
Juvenile proceedings should, so far as is compatible with due process, strive to maintain that informal character that has always been their laudable goal
(In re Winship
(1970) 397 U.S. 358, 366-367 [25 L.Ed.2d 368, 377, 90 S.Ct. 1068];
In re Gault
(1967) 387 U.S. 1, 27 [18 L.Ed.2d 527, 545-546, 87 S.Ct. 1428]) to the end that the truth regarding the subject minor’s conduct may be ascertained, and, if necessary, appropriate steps taken to nip budding character defects before they blossom into adult criminal behavior. Lamentably, however, as so often is the case today, the processing of the instant petition ignored the appellant and concentrated solely on an arcane effort to classify and pigeonhole Officer Stocks’ actions.
In the light of the uncontested facts it would seem clear that the officer was entirely justified in touching the exterior of appellant’s zipped-up jacket before proceeding with his investigation in order to guard against a very real danger which, in fact, existed. (See
Terry
v.
Ohio
(1968) 392 U.S. 1, 23 et seq. [20 L.Ed.2d 889, 907 et seq., 88 S.Ct. 1868].)
Unfortunately, rather than so holding, the trial court concluded that certain unspecified appellate decisions required it to reach a contrary conclusion. That is, it announced its belief to be that unless there existed probable cause to “arrest,”, rather than merely to “detain,” the superficial frisk
which had disclosed the presence of appellant’s deadly weapon had been an improper, albeit most providential, action. Nonetheless, it continued, in light of the undisputed evidence regarding Officer Stocks’ own observations, and the detailed report given him by the security agent Bogan, there existed a reasonable basis for believing a crime had been committed.
The court still remained concerned, however, since Officer Stocks had declared it had not been his intention to effect a formal arrest prior to completing his investigation. The officer’s anticipated sequence of events was, of course, both understandable and commendable, i.e., rarely will it be the wisest or most economical course of action to transport and “book” even the most strongly suspected criminal until at least some effort has been made to determine whether or not his apparent crime was actually consummated.
Therefore, over the quite impassioned objections of appellant’s trial counsel,
the court recalled Officer Stocks as its own witness in order to assure
itself that not only had there existed objective grounds to justify an arrest, but further that the officer, “subjectively,” had been aware thereof. Anticipatably, this seven-year veteran confirmed his knowledge of the law and his ability to draw reasonable inferences from known data.
Appellant’s initial contention that the court should not have examined Officer Stocks further in order to enlighten itself on a point it considered significant, necessarily fails. It is true, of course, that, wisely or unwisely, most of the maze-like rules that now enmesh our penal system have been injected, bit by bit, into juvenile wardship proceedings. (See
In re Issac G.
(1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 917, 920-921 [156 Cal.Rptr. 123];
In re Michael S.
(1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 814, 818 [190 Cal.Rptr. 585].) Nonetheless, even in our most vexed adult forum, reality has not been declared anathema.
An adversary system, despite its acknowledged shortcomings as a method for ascertaining the truth, has much to commend it whenever there are sincerely disputed questions of guilt or innocence to be resolved.
Where,
however, the only issue before a court is whether or not it should subject society to the self-immolation of the exclusionary rule in order to penalize, and thereby hopefully to educate, an offending officer and inspire him to improve
(People
v.
Lara
(1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 237, 241 [166 Cal.Rptr. 475]), it behooves every trial judge to do his utmost to determine
exactly what it was the officer did.
The high price our citizens must pay whenever we in the judiciary blind ourselves to the truth, should never be exacted merely because counsel have failed to ask sufficient appropriate questions. No possible gain occurs when (1) a court refuses to consider evidence acquired in a perfectly lawful manner, or (2) an officer is “punished” despite the complete propriety of his conduct, or (3) a youthful offender is misled concerning his countrymen’s expectations of him by being spared the consequences of his own indisputably antisocial behavior. (See generally
United States
v.
Leon
(1984) 468 U.S. 897, — et seq. [82 L.Ed.2d 677, 696 et seq., 104 S.Ct. 3405].)
In sum, the court’s determination here to fully satisfy itself as to the facts was entirely correct; any other course of action would have constituted an inappropriate abandonment of its responsibilities.
“ '. . . “It apparently cannot be repeated too often for the guidance of a part of the legal profession that a judge is not a-mere umpire presiding over a contest of wits between professional opponents, but a judicial officer entrusted with the grave task of determining where justice lies under the law and the facts between the parties who have sought the protection of our courts. Within reasonable limits, it is not only the right but the duty of a trial judge to clearly bring out the facts so that the important functions of his office may be fairly and justly performed.” [Citation.]”’
(People
v.
Carlucci
(1979) 23 Cal.3d 249, 256 [152 Cal.Rptr. 439, 590 P.2d 15].)
Appellant’s final contention derives from the fact that, as the trial court announced at the outset, “This is the matter of Reginald C. . . . And this is set today for an adjudication, also for a 700.1 hearing . . . .” Since the same judge was to hear both issues essentially simultaneously, there obviously was nothing to be achieved by having the witnesses redundantly repeat their testimony twice before the same trier of fact. That defense counsel agreed to this sound approach and, thereafter, appellant chose to rest at the close of the combined hearing, in no way rendered this proceeding analogous to the submission of a criminal case in the superior court upon the transcript of an accused’s preliminary examination in a municipal court or upon some other form of written record made at an earlier time in a different forum. In any event, since appellant’s possession of a concealed
dagger was an uncontested and incontestable fact, no possible prejudice resulted from the adoption of a dual format.
The judgment is affirmed.
Roth, P. J., and Beach, J., concurred.