OPINION OF THE COURT
Heidi C. Cesare, J.
Defendant is charged in an information with obstructing governmental administration in the second degree (Penal Law § 195.05), resisting arrest (Penal Law § 205.30), unlawful vending in a city park (56 RCNY 1-05 [b] [1]) and disorderly conduct (Penal Law § 240.20). In his omnibus motion defendant moves (1) to dismiss all counts in the information as facially insufficient, (2) to preclude unnoticed statement and identification testimony, (3) to preclude prior bad acts evidence, (4) to compel a bill of particulars and discovery, and (5) for the right to make further motions as necessary. In their response, the People also move for reciprocal discovery. For the reasons set forth below, defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied and the remaining motions of both parties are granted.1
I. Allegations
The factual allegations of the accusatory instrument provide that on or about May 27, 2015 at about 2:00 p.m., in front of 80 South Street in the County and State of New York:
“[Deponent is] informed by [informant patrolman] that he observed the defendant, on Pier 15 in front of 80 South Street, in the County and State of New York, approaching numerous pedestrians and offering to sell them tour tickets. [Deponent is] further informed that [informant patrolman] observed one individual give the defendant USC in exchange for tickets. [Deponent is] further informed by [informant patrolman] that the defendant did not have a valid New York City Parks permit displayed for selling the tickets.
“[Deponent is] further informed by [informant [624]*624patrolman], that when he approached the defendant to ask for the defendant’s identification and to issue him a summons for the above conduct, the defendant pushed the [informant patrolman] about the chest, turned and ran away from [informant patrolman].
“When [deponent] attempted to arrest the defendant for the above conduct, the defendant was standing on a public road and the defendant flailed his arms by swinging his arms around his body, refused to place his arms behind his back, and attempted to run away from myself and the other officers. The defendant’s actions made it difficult to place the defendant in handcuffs without the assistance of three other officers and the use of OC spray.
“[Deponent] further observed that while arresting the defendant, a crowd of at least thirty people formed a circle around [deponent] and the defendant, and that the crowd was yelling at [deponent] and other officers, and that the crowd was standing in a public road. [Deponent] further observed that the crowd blocked the public roadway preventing at least ten vehicles from proceeding on the road.”
II. Procedural History
On May 28, 2015, the defendant was arraigned on a criminal complaint charging him with obstructing governmental administration in the second degree (Penal Law § 195.05), resisting arrest (Penal Law § 205.30), unlawful vending in a city park (56 RCNY 1-05 [b] [1]), and disorderly conduct (Penal Law § 240.20). At the arraignment, the defendant was released on his own recognizance and the court adjourned the case to July 23, 2015 for the People to file a supporting deposition. Off calendar, on June 9, 2015, the People served and filed a corroborating affidavit, a certificate of readiness and a voluntary disclosure form. Subsequently, on July 21, 2015, the defendant served and filed his omnibus motion including the instant motion to dismiss. On July 23, 2015, the defendant and his attorney appeared before the court. The court noted the People’s plea bargain offer, continued parole, and adjourned the case to September 21, 2015 for the People’s response and the court’s decision. On September 21, 2015, the defendant and his attorney appeared before the court. The People served and filed their response to the defendant’s omnibus motion, the court [625]*625noted the People’s plea bargain offer, and adjourned the case to November 9, 2015 for the court’s decision on defendant’s motions.
III. Discussion
Charged with obstruction of justice, resisting arrest, unlawful vending in a city park, and disorderly conduct, defendant moves to dismiss all counts on the ground of facial insufficiency. Defendant argues principally that the unlawful vending in a city park (56 RCNY 1-05 [b] [1]) count is facially insufficient because the information fails to allege that defendant’s conduct was not within the “expressive matter” exception (56 RCNY 1-05 [b] [2]) to unlawful vending in a city park. Defendant further argues that the remaining counts are facially insufficient because the defendant’s arrest for unlawful vending in a park was itself unlawful. In response, the People argue that selling tour tickets does not come under the “expressive matter” exception and, additionally, that the language in the complaint “sufficiently negates the [expressive matter] exception.” With respect to unlawful vending in a city park, the court finds that the “expressive matter” exception operates as a “proviso” that need not be negated in the accusatory instrument but may be raised by the accused in his defense at trial. As this was the only challenge to facial sufficiency, the court finds that all four counts of the information are facially sufficient.
A. Facial Sufficiency in General
A valid and sufficient accusatory instrument is a nonwaivable jurisdictional prerequisite to a criminal prosecution (People v Jackson, 18 NY3d 738, 741 [2012]). Since this defendant has not waived his right to be prosecuted by information, the court must assess his motion on the standards governing an information (People v Kalin, 12 NY3d 225, 228 [2009]).
An information is “sufficient on its face” when three requirements are met (CPL 100.40 [1]). One, the information must be in substantial conformity with CPL 100.15 which prescribes the form and content for informations, misdemeanor complaints and felony complaints (100.40 [1] [a]). Two, the “the reasonable cause” requirement demands that the factual allegations in the information and any supporting depositions “provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged” (People v Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133, 136 [1987]; CPL 100.40 [1] [b]). Reasonable cause to believe that a person has committed an offense “exists when evidence or information [626]*626which appears reliable discloses facts or circumstances which are collectively of such weight and persuasiveness as to convince a person of ordinary intelligence, judgment and experience that it is reasonably likely that such offense was committed and that such person committed it” (CPL 70.10 [2]). Three, the “prima facie case” requirement demands that the nonhearsay allegations of the information and supporting depositions “establish, if true, every element of the offense charged and the defendant’s commission thereof” (Alejandro at 136; CPL 100.40 [1] [c]).
A court reviewing for facial insufficiency must subject the allegations in the information to a “fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading” (People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 [2000]). The court must assume that the allegations are true (People v Konieczny, 2 NY3d 569, 575 [2004]; CPL 100.40 [1] [c]), and consider all “reasonable inferences” that may be drawn from them (Jackson at 747).
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OPINION OF THE COURT
Heidi C. Cesare, J.
Defendant is charged in an information with obstructing governmental administration in the second degree (Penal Law § 195.05), resisting arrest (Penal Law § 205.30), unlawful vending in a city park (56 RCNY 1-05 [b] [1]) and disorderly conduct (Penal Law § 240.20). In his omnibus motion defendant moves (1) to dismiss all counts in the information as facially insufficient, (2) to preclude unnoticed statement and identification testimony, (3) to preclude prior bad acts evidence, (4) to compel a bill of particulars and discovery, and (5) for the right to make further motions as necessary. In their response, the People also move for reciprocal discovery. For the reasons set forth below, defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied and the remaining motions of both parties are granted.1
I. Allegations
The factual allegations of the accusatory instrument provide that on or about May 27, 2015 at about 2:00 p.m., in front of 80 South Street in the County and State of New York:
“[Deponent is] informed by [informant patrolman] that he observed the defendant, on Pier 15 in front of 80 South Street, in the County and State of New York, approaching numerous pedestrians and offering to sell them tour tickets. [Deponent is] further informed that [informant patrolman] observed one individual give the defendant USC in exchange for tickets. [Deponent is] further informed by [informant patrolman] that the defendant did not have a valid New York City Parks permit displayed for selling the tickets.
“[Deponent is] further informed by [informant [624]*624patrolman], that when he approached the defendant to ask for the defendant’s identification and to issue him a summons for the above conduct, the defendant pushed the [informant patrolman] about the chest, turned and ran away from [informant patrolman].
“When [deponent] attempted to arrest the defendant for the above conduct, the defendant was standing on a public road and the defendant flailed his arms by swinging his arms around his body, refused to place his arms behind his back, and attempted to run away from myself and the other officers. The defendant’s actions made it difficult to place the defendant in handcuffs without the assistance of three other officers and the use of OC spray.
“[Deponent] further observed that while arresting the defendant, a crowd of at least thirty people formed a circle around [deponent] and the defendant, and that the crowd was yelling at [deponent] and other officers, and that the crowd was standing in a public road. [Deponent] further observed that the crowd blocked the public roadway preventing at least ten vehicles from proceeding on the road.”
II. Procedural History
On May 28, 2015, the defendant was arraigned on a criminal complaint charging him with obstructing governmental administration in the second degree (Penal Law § 195.05), resisting arrest (Penal Law § 205.30), unlawful vending in a city park (56 RCNY 1-05 [b] [1]), and disorderly conduct (Penal Law § 240.20). At the arraignment, the defendant was released on his own recognizance and the court adjourned the case to July 23, 2015 for the People to file a supporting deposition. Off calendar, on June 9, 2015, the People served and filed a corroborating affidavit, a certificate of readiness and a voluntary disclosure form. Subsequently, on July 21, 2015, the defendant served and filed his omnibus motion including the instant motion to dismiss. On July 23, 2015, the defendant and his attorney appeared before the court. The court noted the People’s plea bargain offer, continued parole, and adjourned the case to September 21, 2015 for the People’s response and the court’s decision. On September 21, 2015, the defendant and his attorney appeared before the court. The People served and filed their response to the defendant’s omnibus motion, the court [625]*625noted the People’s plea bargain offer, and adjourned the case to November 9, 2015 for the court’s decision on defendant’s motions.
III. Discussion
Charged with obstruction of justice, resisting arrest, unlawful vending in a city park, and disorderly conduct, defendant moves to dismiss all counts on the ground of facial insufficiency. Defendant argues principally that the unlawful vending in a city park (56 RCNY 1-05 [b] [1]) count is facially insufficient because the information fails to allege that defendant’s conduct was not within the “expressive matter” exception (56 RCNY 1-05 [b] [2]) to unlawful vending in a city park. Defendant further argues that the remaining counts are facially insufficient because the defendant’s arrest for unlawful vending in a park was itself unlawful. In response, the People argue that selling tour tickets does not come under the “expressive matter” exception and, additionally, that the language in the complaint “sufficiently negates the [expressive matter] exception.” With respect to unlawful vending in a city park, the court finds that the “expressive matter” exception operates as a “proviso” that need not be negated in the accusatory instrument but may be raised by the accused in his defense at trial. As this was the only challenge to facial sufficiency, the court finds that all four counts of the information are facially sufficient.
A. Facial Sufficiency in General
A valid and sufficient accusatory instrument is a nonwaivable jurisdictional prerequisite to a criminal prosecution (People v Jackson, 18 NY3d 738, 741 [2012]). Since this defendant has not waived his right to be prosecuted by information, the court must assess his motion on the standards governing an information (People v Kalin, 12 NY3d 225, 228 [2009]).
An information is “sufficient on its face” when three requirements are met (CPL 100.40 [1]). One, the information must be in substantial conformity with CPL 100.15 which prescribes the form and content for informations, misdemeanor complaints and felony complaints (100.40 [1] [a]). Two, the “the reasonable cause” requirement demands that the factual allegations in the information and any supporting depositions “provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged” (People v Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133, 136 [1987]; CPL 100.40 [1] [b]). Reasonable cause to believe that a person has committed an offense “exists when evidence or information [626]*626which appears reliable discloses facts or circumstances which are collectively of such weight and persuasiveness as to convince a person of ordinary intelligence, judgment and experience that it is reasonably likely that such offense was committed and that such person committed it” (CPL 70.10 [2]). Three, the “prima facie case” requirement demands that the nonhearsay allegations of the information and supporting depositions “establish, if true, every element of the offense charged and the defendant’s commission thereof” (Alejandro at 136; CPL 100.40 [1] [c]).
A court reviewing for facial insufficiency must subject the allegations in the information to a “fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading” (People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 [2000]). The court must assume that the allegations are true (People v Konieczny, 2 NY3d 569, 575 [2004]; CPL 100.40 [1] [c]), and consider all “reasonable inferences” that may be drawn from them (Jackson at 747). Allegations are sufficient for pleading purposes where they provide adequate notice to enable a defendant to prepare a defense and protect against double jeopardy (People v Kasse, 22 NY3d 1142 [2014]). That other, innocent inferences could possibly be drawn from the facts is irrevelant on this pleading stage inquiry. (People v Deegan, 69 NY2d 976, 979 [1987].) A valid information need not disprove every potential defense. (People v Cox, 44 Misc 3d 134[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 51162 [U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2014].)
B. The Proviso/Exception Distinction
Essential allegations are generally determined by the statute defining the crime. Where the defining statute contains an exception, the People, generally, must plead the absence of the exception in the accusatory instrument (People v Santana, 7 NY3d 234, 236 [2006]; see also People v Kohut, 30 NY2d 183, 187 [1972]). However, “if the exception is enacted later in the statute or in a subsequent statute, it is a proviso which the People need neither plead nor prove the negative of in order to make out a prima facie case” (People v Sylla, 7 Misc 3d 8, 12 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2005]). Distinguishing “exceptions” from “provisos” is a “murky” process “long . . . subject [to] debate” (People v Davis, 13 NY3d 17, 31 [2009]). The goal of the analysis is to “discover the intention of the enacting body,” and in doing so the court must comply with “common sense and reasonable pleading” {id.). The proviso/exception distinction, however, “should not be so mechanically applied that substance yields to form and that the burden of pleading [627]*627and proof is determined solely by the accidental position in which the clauses of the statute are drafted” (Sylla at 12). The conventional distinction between a proviso and an exception will be “wholly disregarded ... if necessary to give effect to the manifest intention of the Legislature” (Davis at 31).
C. The expressive matter defense is a proviso that need not be pleaded in the information.
The defendant raises the novel issue of whether the “expressive matter” defense to unlawful vending in a city park is an “exception” to the statute that must be pleaded in the accusatory instrument or a “proviso” that need not be pleaded by the prosecution but may be raised as a defense at trial by the accused.
Rules of City of New York Department of Parks and Recreation (56 RCNY) § 1-05 (b) (1) provides:
“No person in or on any property under the jurisdiction of the Department shall sell, offer for sale, hire, lease or let anything whatsoever, including, but not limited to goods, services, or entertainment, or provide or offer to provide services or items, or entertainment in exchange for a donation (hereinafter ‘vend’), except under and within the terms of a permit, or except as otherwise provided by law.”
“Expressive matter” is defined as “materials or objects with expressive content, such as newspapers, books, or writings, or visual art such as paintings, prints, photography, sculpture, or entertainment” (56 RCNY 1-02). The “expressive matter” defense, enacted in a subsequent section of the same chapter, provides: “Persons may vend expressive matter ... on property under jurisdiction of the Department without a permit, but must comply with all applicable provisions of these rules” (56 RCNY 1-05 [b] [2]). The rules an expressive matter vendor must comply with under the regulated uses of a New York City park are legion (see 56 RCNY 1-05 [b] [2]-[8]).2
[630]*630Here, the expressive matter defense is defined in a separate and subsequent paragraph from the paragraph defining unlawful vending (see 56 RCNY 1-05 [b] [1], [2]). As a matter of common sense and reasonable pleading, it is clear that the enacting body’s intent was to create a “proviso” that the accused could raise as a defense at trial (see Sylla at 13). Further, it would be impracticable and unreasonable to require the prosecution to plead either the lack of expressive content, or alternatively, the presence of expressive content, but then the [631]*631failure to comply with the myriad rules governing expressive-matter vendors (see e.g. People v Torres, 47 Misc 3d 24 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015]). For these reasons the court finds that the “expressive matter” defense to unlawful vending in a city park is a “proviso” which need not be negated in the information.
IV. Conclusion
The court finds that the “expressive matter” defense (see 56 RCNY 1-05 [b] [2]) to unlawful vending in a city park (see 56 RCNY 1-05 [b] [1]) is a “proviso” that need not be negated in the information. Since the “expressive matter” defense need not be negated in the information, the allegations are sufficient for pleading purposes to establish reasonable cause to believe and a prima facie case that the defendant committed the crimes charged in the information. For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss for facial insufficiency is denied.
V. Remaining Motions
Defendant’s motion to preclude unnoticed statement and identification testimony at trial is granted pursuant to CPL 710.30 (3).
Defendant’s motion to preclude the prosecutor from using at trial evidence of defendant’s prior convictions, arrests or bad acts pursuant to People v Sandoval (34 NY2d 371 [1974]) is reserved for the trial court.
Defendant’s motion for a bill of particulars and pretrial discovery is granted to the extent provided by the People in their voluntary disclosure form. CPL 240.20 (1) delineates the items discoverable from the prosecutor and CPL 240.20 (2) provides for the defendant’s securing by subpoena any of these items not in the possession of the prosecutor. The People are reminded of their continuing obligations under Brady v Maryland (373 US 83 [1963]) and People v Rosario (9 NY2d 286 [1961], cert denied 368 US 866 [1961]).
Defendant’s motion seeking the right to make further motions is granted to the extent provided by CPL 255.20 (3).
The People’s request for reciprocal discovery is granted to the extent required by CPL 240.30.