People v. Redd

2024 IL App (2d) 240532-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: December 16, 2024
• Docket: 2-24-0532
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2024 IL App (2d) 240532-U No. 2-24-0532 Order filed December 16, 2024

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court OF ILLINOIS, ) of De Kalb County. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 23-CF-590 ) ANTHONY L. REDD, ) Honorable ) Marcy L. Buick, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court. Justices McLaren and Birkett concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The evidence supported the trial court’s findings that that no set of conditions would mitigate the danger defendant posed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State’s petition for pretrial detention.

¶2 Defendant was charged by indictment with (1) home invasion with a firearm (720 ILCS

5/19-6(a)(3)), (2) armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2)), (3) aggravated unlawful restraint (720

ILCS 5/10-3.1(a)), (4) home invasion with a dangerous weapon (720 ILCS 5/19-6(a)(1)), and

(5) aggravated robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2)). On September 4, 2024, following the grant of the 2024 IL App (2d) 240532-U

State’s petition to detain, the trial court denied defendant’s motion for relief. He appeals from that

order. We affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On October 26, 2023, the State filed a verified petition to detain defendant pursuant to 725

ILCS 5/110-6.1. The petition sought detention due to defendant’s charges for the forcible felonies

of home invasion and armed robbery, and alleged that defendant poses a real and present threat to

the safety of the victim, J.D., which no set of pretrial release conditions can mitigate.

¶5 At the pretrial detention hearing, the State introduced the De Kalb Police Department’s

synopsis of facts. The synopsis stated that De Kalb police officers responded to an armed robbery

that occurred on October 2, 2023. The victim, J.D., told police that he left his apartment and began

walking to his car. When he attempted to open his car, he felt an object press against the back of

his head. He turned around and saw a black male pointing a handgun at him. He was told to hand

over his phone and money or he would be shot. J.D. told the man that he did not have any money.

The man said, “let’s go” and pushed the handgun into J.D.’s back, leading him back into his

apartment. The man followed J.D. into his bedroom where he retrieved his wallet and gave the

man his money. Both men exited the apartment and walked back to J.D.’s car. The man told J.D.

that if he called the police, he would kill him. J.D. got into his car and drove away. He described

the perpetrator as a black male, approximately 5 feet 7 inches tall, slim build, wearing a dark-

colored long jacket and a black durag.

¶6 During review of surveillance video from the area, De Kalb police observed J.D. walking

towards his residence in front of a black man holding a shiny object in his right hand and wearing

clothes that matched J.D.’s description. The man can be heard on video saying, “let’s go mother

f***” and “I am going to pop yo ass.” De Kalb police also reviewed video from a nearby Shell

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station that showed the same man, wearing the same clothing, on the night of the incident. The

man can be seen walking up the porch of 117 East Locust Street.

¶7 On October 5, 2023, De Kalb police made contact with a male for an unrelated case who

identified himself as Lamar Webb. Officers ultimately determined that the man was Anthony

Redd, the defendant. Redd matched the description of the suspect in the October 2, 2023, incident.

He resides at 117 East Locust Street.

¶8 Officers executed a search warrant at defendant’s residence on October 25, 2023, and

discovered the clothing worn by the man in the surveillance videos. Defendant confirmed to the

officers that he is the man seen in the Shell station video. He stated that he knows someone that

lives near J.D.’s residence. He further stated that he may have had a conversation with someone in

the backyard of a residence in the alley on the night of the incident.

¶9 The State argued that defendant is a danger to J.D. and the community and there exists no

“indication that this defendant would follow orders of the Court.” The State argued that no set of

conditions could mitigate his dangerousness as defendant is a multiple-time felon whose criminal

history is indicative of violent, abusive, or assaultive behavior. Defendant has a lengthy criminal

record with convictions for domestic battery, felon in possession of firearm, and multiple drug

crimes. Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon and aggravated

assault in 2010, but those charges were ultimately dismissed.

¶ 10 Defendant argued that J.D. had not identified him as the perpetrator. He took issue with the

argument that his prior criminal history was indicative of violent behavior, as most of his charges

and convictions were drug related. He argued that electronic home monitoring would mitigate any

risk of his dangerousness as it would allow him to stay home so he could care for his ailing mother.

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¶ 11 In granting the State’s petition to detain defendant, the trial court found, in relevant part,

as follows:

“In looking at the factors that the Court is to consider on whether to deny pretrial

release, I’ve just indicated the nature and circumstances of the offense charged are serious

offenses involving the use of a firearm.

The history and characteristics of the defendant, his prior criminal history includes

convictions for drug offenses, including in February of 2020 for possessing a controlled

substance where he was sentenced to one year in prison; on July 8th of 2015, four years in

prison for manufacture or delivery of cocaine; January 18th of 2011, three years;

imprisonment for possessing a firearm as a felon ***[.]

Then on May 16th of 2006 he was convicted of manufacture and delivery of cocaine

and was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment; August 24th of 2006, manufacture or

delivery of a controlled substance or a look-alike substance, six years’ imprisonment; and

in 2002 he was convicted of manufacture or delivery of a controlled substance and

sentenced to four years’ imprisonment; and in 2001 he was convicted of domestic battery

and sentenced to conditional discharge.

***

Any statements made or attributed to the defendant and the circumstances

surrounding them, the court is to consider. Based on the report of the victim which is

corroborated by the video surveillance, the defendant made threats to shoot or kill the

victim during the offense.

Whether defendant is known to possess or have access to weapons, he has a prior

conviction for possession of a firearm as a felon. In addition, in this case it is alleged that

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he used a firearm, and the police department synopsis does not indicate that the firearm has

been recovered.

Weighing all [the statutory] factors, I find that the nature of the offense, the

seriousness of it, the fact that the defendant has access to weapons, and the defendant’s

history and characteristics, numerous prior convictions and sentences to the Department of

Corrections for drug offenses, all establish that there is clear and convincing evidence that

the defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of a specific person, in this case

the complaining witness [J.D.], as well as the community by his conduct which I’ve gone

through, and there are no conditions or conditions that can mitigate that real and present

threat to the safety of any person or persons, and therefore, I will grant the petition to deny

release.”

In addition to its statements on the record, the trial court’s written order further elucidated its

reasons for concluding that less restrictive conditions would not avoid a real and present threat to

the safety of J.D. or the community, including (1) the nature and circumstances of the offenses

charged; (2) defendant’s prior criminal history is indicative of violent, abusive or assaultive

behavior; (3) the identity of J.D., a person whose safety defendant is believed to pose a threat, and

the fact that defendant threatened to kill him; (4) statements made by defendant, or attributed to

defendant, together with the circumstances around those statements; and (5) defendant is known

to possess or have access to weapons. The trial court included those factors in its oral

pronouncement as well.

¶ 12 On July 11, 2024, defendant filed a motion to reconsider the need for continued detention.

A hearing on the motion was held on July 18, 2024, and denied. Defendant then filed a pro se

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notice of appeal which was dismissed because defendant had not filed the obligatory motion for

relief in the trial court. See People v. Redd, No. 2-24-0418 (dismissal allowed Aug. 1, 2024).

¶ 13 On August 22, 2024, defendant filed a motion for relief pursuant to Rule 604(h)(2).

Relevant here, defendant argued that the State failed to meet its burden of proving that no condition

or combination of conditions can mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of J.D. or the

community, based on the specific, articulable facts of the case. Defendant maintained that the trial

court did not include a summary of its reasons for denying pretrial release, including why

lessrestrictive conditions would not mitigate his dangerousness.

¶ 14 On September 4, 2024, a hearing was held on defendant’s motion for relief. The trial court

denied the motion and stated that it “re-affirms all its previous findings and orders regarding

[defendant’s] detention.”

¶ 15 This appeal followed.

¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 17 In Illinois, all persons charged with an offense are eligible for pretrial release. 725 ILCS

5/110-2(a), 110-6.1(e). Pretrial release is governed by article 110 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure of 1963 (the Code). Id. § 110-1 et seq. Under the Code, a defendant’s pretrial release

may only be denied in certain statutorily limited situations. Id. §§ 110-2(a), 110-6.1(e).

¶ 18 Upon filing a verified petition requesting denial of pretrial release, the State has the burden

to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the proof is evident or the presumption great

that the defendant has committed a qualifying offense (id. § 110-6.1(e)(1)), (2) the defendant’s

pretrial release poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the

community (id. § 110-6.1(e)(2)), and (3) no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate

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the real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community or prevent the defendant’s

willful flight from prosecution (id. § 110-6.1(e)(3)).

¶ 19 We review the trial court’s decision to deny pretrial release under a bifurcated standard.

People v. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13. Specifically, we review under the manifest-

weight-of-the-evidence standard the trial court’s factual findings as to dangerousness, flight risk,

and whether conditions of release could mitigate those risks. Id. A finding is against the manifest

weight of the evidence only where it is unreasonable or not based on the evidence presented. Id.

We review for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s ultimate determination regarding pretrial

release. Id. An abuse of discretion also occurs only when the trial court’s determination is arbitrary,

fanciful, or unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial

court. Id.

¶ 20 In this appeal, defendant argues that the State did not show clear and convincing evidence

that any purported threat could not be mitigated with conditions of relief. “Evidence is clear and

convincing if it leaves no reasonable doubt in the mind of the trier of fact as to the truth of the

proposition in question.” Chaudhary v. Department of Human Services, 2023 IL 127712, ¶ 74. He

further argues that the trial court erred in granting the petition to detain without sufficiently

addressing less restrictive conditions of release.

¶ 21 Under section 110-6.1(g)(3) of the Code, an order for pretrial detention must be based on,

among other things, clear and convincing evidence that “no condition or combination of

conditions” of pretrial release can mitigate the real and present threat to safety posed by the

defendant. Id. § 110-6.1(g). If the trial court finds that the State proved a valid threat to someone’s

safety or the community’s safety, it must then determine what pretrial release conditions, “if any,

will reasonably ensure the appearance of a defendant as required or the safety of any other person

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or the community ***.” Id. § 110-5(a). In making this determination, the trial court should consider

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, (2) the weight of the evidence against the

defendant, (3) the history and characteristics of the defendant, (4) the nature and seriousness of the

specific, real and present threat to any person that would be posed by the defendant’s release, and

(5) the risk that the defendant will obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process Id.

No single factor is dispositive. Id. As with the finding of dangerousness, we review the trial court’s

findings regarding whether the imposition of conditions on a defendant’s pretrial release would

mitigate the safety risk posed by the defendant under the manifest weight of the evidence standard.

Indeck Energy Services, 2021 IL 125733, ¶ 56.

¶ 22 As stated above (supra ¶ 11), the trial court considered every factor enumerated in section

110-5(a). Additionally, the trial court noted that defendant’s pretrial services report rated his risk

of pretrial misconduct an 8 out 14. The trial court further stated that it was concerned, based on

the specific articulable facts of the case, that defendant would not comply with any conditions of

release. As its findings were made in complete harmony with the enumerated factors within section

110-5(a), we cannot agree that the trial court’s granting of the State’s petition to detain were against

the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 23 We next consider defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in granting the petition to

detain without sufficiently addressing less restrictive conditions of release, specifically electronic

home monitoring. Again, we disagree with defendant on this issue. At the hearing on defendant’s

motion for relief, he argued that he had taken steps while in custody to treat his drug addiction,

become a trustee at the jail, and could care for his ailing mother if released with electronic home

monitoring. The trial court explicitly spoke to these issues in denying his motion, stating, “while,

yes, I agree that it is good that [defendant] is taking positive steps towards bettering himself ***

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while he is in custody, that does not alleviate the Court’s reasons for denying defendant’s pretrial

release in this case.” The trial court went on to note that electronic home monitoring doesn’t tell

the Court if defendant violates conditions of relief in real time. The trial court reiterated its concern

that defendant would follow conditions of release due to his status as a convicted felon under

permanent restriction from possessing firearms. Further the trial court noted that defendant had

already been convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon and stands accused of that crime again.

As such, we cannot agree that the trial court erred on this issue as it did specifically reject

defendant’s electronic home monitoring arguments. Defendant’s history of firearm possession as

a felon, demonstrated ability to obtain a firearm, the specific facts of the present case including

defendant’s explicit threats to J.D., all support the trial court’s properly exercised discretion in

determining that no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the real and present threat

defendant poses to J.D. and the community.

¶ 24 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 25 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of De Kalb County.

¶ 26 Affirmed.

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