People v. Raygoza

2024 IL App (1st) 240605-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: June 27, 2024
• Docket: 1-24-0605
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2024 IL App (1st) 240605-U

FIRST DIVISION June 27, 2024

No. 1-24-0605B

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT

) THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 2024110057401 ) VICENTE RAYGOZA, ) Honorable ) David Kelly, Defendants-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding. )

PRESIDING JUSTICE FITZGERALD SMITH delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Pucinski and Coghlan concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Although defendant was not brought before trial court for pretrial detention hearing within 48 hours of arrest, circumstances presented in record do not warrant reversal of detention order.

¶2 Defendant-appellant Vicente Raygoza (defendant) appeals from the circuit court’s order

granting the State’s petition for revocation of his pretrial release pursuant to section 110-6.1(a) of

the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code), as recently amended by Public Acts 101-652, §

10-255 and 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1), (6) (West 2022)), and No. 1-24-0605B

commonly referred to as the “Safety, Accountability, Fairness and Equity-Today (SAFE-T) Act”

or the “Pretrial Fairness Act” (Act). See also Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h) (eff. Oct. 19, 2023); Rowe v.

Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52 (lifting stay and setting effective date as September 18, 2023). On

appeal, he contends that he is entitled to release because he was not brought before a judge for

his initial appearance until over 48 hours after his arrest. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶3 BACKGOUND

¶4 Defendant was arrested at approximately 6:30 p.m. on February 20, 2024, and charged

with attempted first-degree murder and aggravated battery-discharge of a firearm while on

parole. The Felony Review Unit approved the charges at 5:22 p.m. on February 22 and the

Chicago Police Department gave its final approval of the charges at 6:35 p.m. The next day,

February 23, defendant was brought before the court for his initial appearance. Court call began

at 1 p.m., and defendant’s case was the last called of the day, following 10 other detention

matters. His hearing began at approximately 6:10 p.m.

¶5 In the petition it filed to deny pretrial release, the State alleged that defendant, who is 40

years old, and the victim, his 18-year-old neighbor, got into another of many previous verbal

altercations, this time while the victim was waxing his car which was parked on the street

between their residences on South Marshfield Avenue in Chicago. The State proffered that

defendant began shouting at the victim and then the victim began to walk over toward defendant,

whereupon defendant pulled a firearm from his waistband, fired a shot, and hit the victim in his

abdomen/lower torso. Defendant ran into his residence; police were called. Officers arrived and

spoke to one witness, who directed them to defendant’s home. Defendant refused to come

outside, and officers called SWAT; defendant exited approximately one hour later and was taken

into custody. Officers found two shell casings, one inside defendant’s home and one outside;

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ballistic testing showed that both were fired from the same firearm. Additionally, a second

witness identified defendant as the shooter and picked him out of a photo array the next day.

During the ensuing investigation, officers attempted to speak to the victim; however, he was in

the hospital undergoing multiple surgeries and could not speak at the time they tried to interview

him. The State further proffered that, at the time of his arrest, defendant was a three-time

convicted felon who was currently on parole for a conviction for felony possession of a firearm;

he also had a felony conviction for aggravated discharge of a firearm, a felony conviction for

knowingly causing property damage, and a misdemeanor conviction for resisting arrest.

¶6 Before addressing the State’s proffer, defendant argued that he should be released

because he was not brought before a judge within 48 hours of his arrest. He noted he was

arrested at 6:30 pm on February 20 and that “in court today is the 23rd,” and that “court here

starts at 9:00 a.m.”

¶7 The court addressed and rejected defendant’s initial argument regarding the timing of his

presentment. Significantly, the court stated that while defendant was arrested on the evening of

February 20, “there’s an ongoing investigation;” that it was “now 6:10 [p.m.];” and that “[t]his

court call didn’t start until 1:00 o’clock, [and] we also had 10 detentions.” The court concluded

that “while it is late here today, there’s nothing that the [c]ourt knows, contrary to belief” that

would indicate the State was derelict in its duty of bringing defendant to court in a timely fashion

under the Act.

¶8 The trial court proceeded with the detention hearing and allowed defendant to address the

pertinent issues. Ultimately, at the conclusion of the hearing, defendant was detained.

¶9 ANALYSIS

¶ 10 On appeal, defendant does not raise any challenge to the trial court’s denial of pretrial

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release based on the evidence of his safety risk. Rather, his principle argument is that he is

entitled to release because he was brought before a judge for his initial appearance over 48 hours

after his arrest in violation of section 109-1(a) of the Act, which provides, in relevant part: “A

person arrested *** for an offense for which pretrial release may be denied *** shall be taken

without unnecessary delay before the nearest and most accessible judge in that county, ***

within 48 hours, and a charge shall be filed.” 725 ILCS 5/109-1(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 2023). 1 Again,

the record reflects that he was arrested on February 20 at 6:30 p.m. and his matter was heard by a

judge on February 23 at approximately 6:10 p.m., about 24 hours after the statutory deadline.

¶ 11 As statutory interpretation is at issue here, our review is de novo. See People v. Ramirez,

2023 IL 128123, ¶ 13. Statutory interpretation requires that we “ascertain and give effect to the

intent of the legislature” (People v. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d 336, 348 (2001)), the most reliable

indicator of which is “the language of the statute, give its plain and ordinary meaning” (Evans v.

Cook County State’s Attorney, 2021 IL 125513, ¶ 27).

¶ 12 Markedly, this Court has held that the 48-hour rule is satisfied if the defendant is brought

to the courthouse within 48 hours of his arrest, even if he does not appear before a judge until

after the deadline has passed. See People v. Williams, 2024 IL App (1st) 232219-U, ¶ 23. In the

instant cause, while there are many different entries in the record tracking the dates and times of

defendant’s arrest process, such as when his fingerprints were taken, when he was photographed,

when he was transported to and received into lock-up, when he was fed, when he made various

phone calls, when police conducted their investigation, and when the charges were approved and

1 In conjunction with this argument, defendant further argues that the appropriate remedy for this time violation is his release (though he admits the statute does not provide for this) and asks that we remand for further hearing. -4- No. 1-24-0605B

finalized, there is no evidence in the record of what time, exactly, on February 23 defendant was

brought to the courthouse. It tells only that he appeared before a judge by 6:10 p.m.

¶ 13 Solely based on the number of hours that elapsed between his arrest at 6:30 p.m. on

February 20 and the time of his hearing at 6:10 p.m. on February 23, defendant asserts there was

an “unnecessary delay” which would automatically require his release under the Act. Based on

the record before us, we disagree.

¶ 14 First, defendant does not cite to any viable case law in support of his argument that the

delay in his presentment to the court automatically constituted “unnecessary delay” under the

statute, or that once at the courthouse the State had the duty, or the ability, to change his place on

the court’s docket. In addition, he does not argue how the delay he experienced prejudiced him

or the outcome of his pretrial detention hearing, particularly based on the State’s proffer.

¶ 15 More significantly, the facts and circumstances here simply do not bare out an

“unnecessary delay” that violates the Act which would, in turn, warrant reversal of defendant’s

detention. We are cognizant that the time between defendant’s arrest and when a judge ruled on

his petition was almost 72 hours. However, the measure is not the time between arrest and

decision but, rather, arrest and presentment to the courthouse. See Williams, 2024 IL App (1st)

232219-U, ¶ 23. Defendant was arrested in the evening on February 20, at 6:30 p.m. Officers

were aware that two witnesses had been involved; one had called police after the shooting when

defendant ran into his residence, and another identified defendant at the scene, as well. That

second witness volunteered to view a photo array line-up, which, presumably, officers needed

time to compile; the identification occurred the next day, February 21. Additionally, police notes

in the record that detail investigatory efforts reveal that officers went to the hospital in order to

interview the victim. When they arrived and were finally able to see him, he had just finished a

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surgery. Though officers attempted to interview him, the victim could not speak; again, this took

time. Further investigatory notes demonstrate that police were “aware of the arrestee’s time in

custody” and that they were “continu[ing] to [i]nvestigate to determine the appropriate charges.”

There was also ballistics testing on recovered shell casings from the scene occurring at this time.

While the Felony Review Unit approved defendant’s charges at 5:22 p.m. on February 22, the

Chicago Police Department did not give final approval of those charges until 6:35 p.m. on that

same date. Thus, it was impossible for defendant to be transported to a courthouse for

appearance before a judge on February 22.

¶ 16 The record demonstrates that defendant was brought to the courthouse at some point the

next day, on February 23, although we do not know at what time. However, the trial court makes

clear during defendant’s hearing that the time is “now 6:10 [p.m.].” In response to defendant’s

48-hour violation argument, the court explicitly explains that, contrary to his assumption and

assertion in his argument, court that day did not begin at 9 a.m. Rather, as the court stated,

“[t]his court call didn’t start until 1:00 o’clock.” Moreover, the court noted that “we also had 10

detentions,” and defendant’s matter was the “[l]ast case.” This, combined with the time

documented in the arrest processing report which detailed that police were continuing in their

investigation, which saw them conduct a photo-array identification for a witness, conduct

ballistics testing for shell casings recovered at the scene, and attempt to get corroboration from

the victim at the hospital, does not amount to an “unnecessary delay” so as to justify reversal of

defendant’s pretrial detainment order.

¶ 17 Defendant’s argument to the contrary is one we have seen before, and one which we

reject just as we have before. He urges us to turn our back on our previous holding in People v.

Garduno, 2024 IL App (1st) 240405-U, because it “renders the statutory language 725 ILCS

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5/109-1(a) impotent,” and that we instead follow a distinguishable decision by a sister district in

People v. McCarthy-Nelson, 2024 IL App (4th) 231582-U, that reviewed a different statute.

This, we will not do.

¶ 18 To the contrary, we find this case analogous to Garduno and find no reason to depart

from its holding. There, 56 hours elapsed from the time the defendant was arrested at 4:50 a.m.

on February 6, 2024 to when he was brought for his pretrial detention hearing at 12:40 p.m. on

February 8. See Garduno, 2024 IL App (1st) 240405-U, ¶ 4. But, as the Garduno court noted,

the charges were not finalized until late in the evening on February 7, making it impossible for

him to be transported to a courthouse to appear on that day. See Garduno, 2024 IL App (1st)

240405-U, ¶ 4. Therefore, we concluded, the circumstances of record demonstrated that the

defendant was brought before a judge “with all reasonable promptness” and section 5/109-1(a)

had not been violated. See Garduno, 2024 IL App (1st) 240405-U, ¶ 13. Additionally, we

further held that even if it could be concluded otherwise, pretrial release was not required, since

the statute specifies no remedy for a violation of the 48-hour rule. See Garduno, 2024 IL App

(1st) 240405-U, ¶ 14. As the facts and circumstances here, which we have already described at

length, mirror Garduno, we find no reason to depart from that well-reasoned decision. Cf.

People v. Ballard, 206 Ill. 2d 151, 177 (2002) (in determining whether presentment is “without

unnecessary delay,” we are to consider all the facts and circumstances of the case) (quoting 725

ILCS 5/109-1(a) (West 1996)).

¶ 19 Meanwhile, as noted, McCarthy-Nelson, on which defendant relies, is clearly

distinguishable, as it dealt with section 110-6.1 of the Code which, unlike section 109-1(a),

prescribes a strict 48-hour presentment limit without the qualifying proviso that it must be

“without unnecessary delay.” Compare 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(c)(2) (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) with 725

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ILCS 5/109-1(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 2023). The different language used makes McCarthy-Nelson, and

defendant’s reliance on it in support of his argument here, nugatory.

¶ 20 Ultimately, we hold there was no violation of section 109-1(a). In Ballard, 206 Ill. 2d at

177-78, our supreme court held that section 109-1(a) requires presentment before a judge “only

with such reasonable promptness as the circumstances permit” and police are given “reasonable

latitude” to process and investigate a crime. In this case, the court’s call did not begin until 1

p.m. and 10 other detention cases preceded defendant’s; someone must be last, and on that date,

it was defendant. Moreover, there was no possibility that he could have been brought before a

judge within 48 hours of his arrest on the evening of February 20. Rather, he would have needed

to have been brought to the courthouse the day before he eventually was. Yet, his charges were

not approved until 6:35 p.m. on that date, February 22, at which time it would have been too late

to transport him to the courthouse for presentment to a judge. Instead, he was brought the next

day, February 23. Although the 48-hour deadline was exceeded, his case was heard before the

end of that business day and there is no showing of prejudice here. Again, this cause mirrors

Garduno and Williams, as well as our subsequent decisions in People v. Austin, 2024 IL App

(1st) 240922-U (although the defendant did not appear for pretrial detention hearing within 48

hours due to late-evening approval of charges, he was brought promptly thereafter and, thus,

there was no unnecessary delay and reversal of detention was not warranted), and People v.

Hernandez-Pernalete, 2024 IL App (1st) 240734-U (excess of 48 hours between arrest and

presentment did not violate section 109-1(a) under circumstances, where investigation was

clearly ongoing and included police interviewing complainant, obtaining and reviewing security

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camera footage, evaluation and approval of charges, and court was not in session at night). We

continue to be in lock-step with those holdings.2

CONCLUSION

¶ 21 Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the circuit court of Cook

County denying pretrial release.

¶ 22 Affirmed.

2 In light of our disposition, we need not address defendant’s additional argument concerning the appropriate remedy for a section 109-1(a) violation because we find no violation. See Hernandez- Pernalete, 2024 IL App (1st) 240734-U, ¶ 25.

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