Filed 8/8/25 P. v. Ransom CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E083988
v. (Super.Ct.No. FSB702709)
TYWAN RENE RANSOM, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Michael A. Smith,
Judge. Reversed with directions.
James R. Bostwick, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina, Elizabeth
M. Renner, and Genevieve Herbert, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
1 Jason Anderson, District Attorney (San Bernardino), and Brent J. Schultze,
Deputy District Attorney, as Amicus Curiae.
Tywan Ransom was convicted of murder for a killing that he committed in 2007
when he was 16 years old. Ransom appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition to
recall his 50-years-to-life sentence and resentence him under Penal Code section 1170,
subdivision (d). (Unlabeled statutory citations refer to this code.) The court ruled that he
was ineligible for resentencing because he was not serving life without the possibility of
parole (LWOP) and thus did not meet the requirements of section 1170, subdivision
(d)(1) (§ 1170(d)(1)), and he had not satisfied other requirements for eligibility under
section 1170, subdivision (d)(2) (§ 1170(d)(2)). The court declined to apply People v.
Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608 (Heard), which held that juvenile offenders sentenced
to the functional equivalent of LWOP are entitled to relief under section 1170(d)(1)
because of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. (Heard, at p. 612.)
On appeal, Ransom argues that his sentence was the functional equivalent of
LWOP, so he is eligible for relief under Heard. He also argues that he otherwise
demonstrated his eligibility under section 1170(d)(2). We agree with Ransom that he is
eligible for recall of his sentence and resentencing. And because the recall of his
sentence will result in a nonfinal judgment, he also is entitled to a juvenile court transfer
hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707. (People v. Padilla (2022) 13
Cal.5th 152, 158 (Padilla).) We therefore reverse the order denying his petition and
remand for a transfer hearing.
2 BACKGROUND
I. Ransom’s offense, conviction, and sentencing
On July 16, 2007, when Ransom was 16 years old, he shot and killed 15-year-old
Cecil Scott. (People v. Ransom (July 11, 2012, E052215) [nonpub. opn.].) Ransom was
arrested in 2009 in North Carolina. (Ibid.) He was in possession of a gun and over 50
Ecstasy pills. (Ibid.) In recorded jailhouse phone calls, Ransom threatened to beat his
girlfriend if she told the police anything. (Ibid.) He also asked a family member to
ensure that his girlfriend did not talk to the police. (Ibid.) Ransom denied that he was the
shooter and testified at trial that he was at his aunt’s apartment when Scott was shot.
(Ibid.)
In September 2010, a jury convicted Ransom of first degree murder and found true
the allegation that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, causing great
bodily injury or death. (§§ 187, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (d).) In November 2010, the
court sentenced Ransom to a total of 50 years to life in prison, consisting of 25 years to
life on the murder count and a consecutive term of 25 years to life on the firearm
enhancement. Ransom appealed, and we affirmed the judgment in an unpublished
opinion. (People v. Ransom, supra, E052215.)
II. Ransom’s petition under section 1170(d)(1)
In December 2023, Ransom filed a petition for recall and resentencing under
section 1170(d)(1). The provision permits a juvenile offender who “was sentenced to
imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole” and has been incarcerated for at
3 least 15 years to “submit to the sentencing court a petition for recall and resentencing.”
(§ 1170, subd. (d)(1)(A).) Ransom’s form petition cited Heard.
Ransom checked boxes on the form petition indicating that (1) he did “not have a
juvenile adjudication for assault or other felony crime(s) with a significant potential for
harm to victims prior to this offense,” and (2) he had “performed acts that tend to indicate
rehabilitation or the potential for rehabilitation,” including “availing [himself] of
rehabilitation, educational or vocational programs, using self-study for self-improvement,
and/or showing evidence of remorse.”
Ransom submitted a brief with the form petition. He argued that his 50-years-to-
life sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP and that Heard’s equal protection
holding was binding on the trial court. He further argued that he satisfied the other
eligibility requirements under section 1170(d)(1) and section 1170(d)(2), so the court had
to recall his sentence. Ransom contended that once the court recalled his sentence, he
was entitled to a juvenile court transfer hearing under Proposition 57.
Ransom also submitted written statements, including one “letter of remorse and
apology,” three “insight letter[s],” and an essay entitled, “‘Thou Shall Not Kill.’”
(Capitalization omitted.) In the letter of remorse and apology, he apologized to Scott and
Scott’s family “for being responsible for [Scott’s] murder” and for his lack of remorse
during his trial and sentencing. The first insight letter described Ransom’s troubled
childhood and relationship with his father and the absence of his mother from his life.
The second insight letter described how Ransom was in “a mental state of denial” about
4 his crime for the first several years of his prison sentence; he eventually started attending
church services, “stopped running from [the] truth,” and accepted “full responsibility for
[his] senseless, violent and impulsive crime against” Scott. The third insight letter
described his work toward rehabilitation. In the essay, Ransom “acknowledged that [he]
killed” Scott and “sinned against God by breaking his commandment.”
Ransom additionally submitted his high school equivalency certificate; his high
school equivalency test results; certificates of completion for courses in job preparation
and career exploration, writing, yoga and meditation, life skills, financial literacy,
cognitive awareness, anger management, nonviolent conflict resolution, and recovery
maintenance; and community college materials showing that he had taken a number of
courses. Ransom also included documentation showing that he was engaged in a
treatment program for substance use disorders.
The court appointed counsel for Ransom and set a hearing on the petition. The
People filed an opposition brief arguing that Ransom was ineligible for relief because he
was not sentenced to LWOP, Heard was wrongly decided and was inconsistent with
People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin), and Heard involved nonhomicide
offenses and therefore was distinguishable. In addition, the People asserted that
Ransom’s sentence was not the functional equivalent of LWOP, because he was entitled
to a youth offender parole hearing under section 3051, which gave him a meaningful
opportunity for release during his 25th year of incarceration. (§ 3051, subd. (b)(3) [“A
person who was convicted of a controlling offense that was committed when the person
5 was 25 years of age or younger and for which the sentence is a life term of 25 years to
life shall be eligible for release on parole at a youth offender parole hearing during the
person’s 25th year of incarceration”].) The People also argued that Ransom was
ineligible for relief because he “failed to appropriately describe his remorse and work
toward rehabilitation” (capitalization and boldface omitted), he had a 2017 conviction for
possession of a deadly weapon by a prisoner (§ 4502, subd. (a)), and he had a juvenile
adjudication for possession of a concealed weapon by a minor (former § 12101, subd.
(a)(1)), a felony.
III. The court’s ruling
The hearing on Ransom’s petition occurred in May 2024. Scott’s family members
were present and wanted to present victim impact statements. The court heard their
statements but noted that the statements would not affect whether Ransom was eligible
for recall and resentencing as a legal matter.
After hearing the victim impact statements and the parties’ arguments, the court
denied Ransom’s petition, concluding that he was statutorily ineligible for resentencing
under section 1170(d)(1) and (d)(2). The court reasoned that Ransom’s sentence would
be the functional equivalent of LWOP were it not for section 3051. But he was entitled
to a youth offender parole hearing during his 25th year of incarceration under section
3051, so his sentence was “basically now 25 years to life” and not the functional
equivalent of LWOP. The court indicated that it also agreed with the People that Heard
was inconsistent with our Supreme Court’s decision in Franklin.
6 The court further found that Ransom did not meet the requirements for
resentencing under section 1170(d)(1) and (d)(2) for the following reasons: He was on
juvenile probation for possession of a firearm at the time of the present offense, he
committed the present offense with a firearm, and he fled to North Carolina where he
evaded arrest for two years. He again was found in possession of a firearm in North
Carolina. He threatened his girlfriend to prevent her from testifying or making
statements to law enforcement, and at trial he denied that he was the killer. He was
convicted of possessing a deadly weapon in prison. And his statements of remorse did
“not adequately show insight into the true nature of the harm that [he] caused” and the
harm expressed by Scott’s family members.
The court observed that if Ransom were eligible for recall of his sentence and
resentencing, then he would be entitled to a juvenile court transfer hearing. But if the
juvenile court were to transfer the matter back to criminal court, then the court would
reimpose the same 50-years-to-life sentence. The court reasoned that, for all the reasons
already explained, the sentence was appropriate even accounting for Ransom’s age at the
time of the offense.
DISCUSSION
Relying on Heard, Ransom argues that the trial court erred by concluding that he
is ineligible for relief under section 1170(d)(1). He further argues that he otherwise
demonstrated his eligibility under section 1170(d)(2). We agree on both counts. The
court erred by denying his petition, and the error was prejudicial. Once Ransom
7 demonstrated his eligibility, the court was required to recall his sentence. Ransom then
would have been entitled to a juvenile court transfer hearing.
I. Section 1170(d)(1) and related juvenile sentencing law
In 2010, Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48 (Graham) “held that the Eighth
Amendment categorically ‘prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a
juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.’ [Citations.] Graham explained that a
juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime need not be guaranteed eventual
release, but if a sentence of life is imposed on such a juvenile offender, then that offender
must be provided ‘some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated
maturity and rehabilitation.’” (People v. Superior Court (Valdez) (2025) 108
Cal.App.5th 791, 797.)
In Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 (Miller), the United States Supreme
Court “extended Graham’s reasoning (but not its categorical ban) to juvenile offenders
who commit homicide. [Citation.] Miller held ‘that mandatory life without parole for
those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments”’ [citation] and that a judge or jury
sentencing a juvenile offender for a homicide crime must have the opportunity to
consider certain specified mitigating circumstances related to the offender’s youth before
imposing LWOP.” (Valdez, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at pp. 797-798.)
In response to Graham and Miller, the Legislature created the section 1170,
subdivision (d), recall and resentencing procedure for juvenile offenders sentenced to
8 LWOP. (People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435, 442 (Sorto); People v. Bagsby
(2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1048 (Bagsby); former § 1170, subd. (d)(2), enacted by
Stats. 2012, ch. 828, § 2.) Section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A), states: “When a
defendant who was under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense for
which the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of
parole has been incarcerated for at least 15 years, the defendant may submit to the
sentencing court a petition for recall and resentencing.”
Shortly after Miller, the California Supreme Court decided People v. Caballero
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 262 (Caballero). Caballero “held that ‘a 110-year-to-life sentence
imposed on a juvenile convicted of nonhomicide offenses contravenes Graham’s
mandate against cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.’
[Citation.] Because the juvenile defendant was not eligible for parole for 100 years, the
court reasoned that the indeterminate sentence ‘with a parole eligibility date that falls
outside the juvenile offender’s natural life expectancy’ amounted to the ‘functional
equivalent’ of a sentence to LWOP, which the Eighth Amendment prohibits for juvenile
offenders convicted of nonhomicide crimes.” (Valdez, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 798.)
The Legislature enacted section 3051 to bring juvenile sentencing into conformity
with Graham, Miller, and Caballero. (Valdez, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 798.)
Section 3051 took effect on January 1, 2014. (Ibid.) The statute “requires the Board of
Parole Hearings ‘to conduct a “youth offender parole hearing” during the 15th, 20th, or
25th year of a juvenile offender’s incarceration’ (§ 3051, subd. (b)), depending on the
9 offender’s ‘“controlling offense”’ (id., subd. (a)(2)(B)). [Citation.] Although section
3051 originally excluded juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP from youth offender
parole eligibility, the Legislature subsequently amended the statute to provide that such
offenders are eligible for youth offender parole hearings in the 25th year of
incarceration.” (Valdez, at p. 798.)
II. Heard and the equal protection challenge to section 1170(d)(1)
By its terms, relief under section 1170(d)(1) is limited to juvenile offenders who
were sentenced to LWOP. (§ 1170, subd. (d)(1)(A).) Heard held that constitutional
principles of equal protection require that relief under section 1170(d)(1) be extended to
juvenile offenders who were sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP. (Heard,
supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at pp. 633-634.) We agree with Heard.
“We independently review equal protection claims.” (Sorto, supra, 104
Cal.App.5th at p. 442.) “[W]hen plaintiffs challenge laws drawing distinctions between
identifiable groups or classes of persons, on the basis that the distinctions drawn are
inconsistent with equal protection,” the “pertinent inquiry is whether the challenged
difference in treatment is adequately justified under the applicable standard of review.”
(People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 850-851.) Because section 1170(d)(1) does not
involve a suspect classification or a fundamental right, the applicable standard of review
is the rational basis test. (Hardin, at p. 847; Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 631.)
“Under this deferential standard, we presume that a given statutory classification is valid
‘until the challenger shows that no rational basis for the unequal treatment is reasonably
10 conceivable.’ [Citation.] The underlying rationale for a statutory classification need not
have been ‘ever actually articulated’ by lawmakers, nor ‘be empirically substantiated.’
[Citation.] Evaluating potential justifications for disparate treatment, a court reviewing a
statute under this standard must ‘treat the statute’s potential logic and assumptions far
more permissively than with other standards of constitutional or regulatory review.’
[Citation.] ‘If a plausible basis exists for the disparity, courts may not second-guess its
“‘wisdom, fairness, or logic.’”’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he logic behind a potential justification
need [not] be persuasive or sensible—rather than simply rational.’” (Hardin, at p. 852.)
The Heard court concluded that there was no reasonably conceivable rational
basis “for making juvenile offenders sentenced to explicit terms of life without parole
eligible for resentencing under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), while denying the same
opportunity to juvenile offenders sentenced to terms that amount to the functional
equivalent” of LWOP. (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 631.) The court rejected
several potential justifications for the disparate treatment.
First, the concern that an LWOP sentence for juvenile offenders “‘could be
excessive’” was not a rational basis for the statute’s disparate treatment—“the same
concern applies equally to juveniles sentenced to the functional equivalent” of LWOP.
(Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 632.)
Second, “the relative culpability of each group” does not justify the disparate
treatment. (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p 632.) “Resentencing under section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1), is available to juvenile offenders convicted of first degree murder
11 whose cases involve a special circumstance finding. [Citation.] Special circumstances
murders are considered ‘the most heinous acts’ proscribed by law. [Citation.] They are
‘more severe and more deserving of lifetime punishment than nonspecial circumstance
first degree murder. . . . Section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), thus has the incongruous effect
of extending sentencing leniency exclusively to the category of offenders generally
regarded as the least deserving of it.” (Id. at p. 633.)
Third, the “number of offenses theoretically committed by each group of offenders
. . . fails to justify their disparate treatment.” (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p 633.) A
juvenile offender who commits multiple offenses and receives a lengthy aggregate prison
sentence might be viewed as more culpable than a juvenile offender who commits “a
single, albeit more serious offense” and receives an LWOP sentence. (Ibid.) But nothing
in section 1170(d)(1) precludes relief for juvenile offenders who received an LWOP
sentence plus additional terms for additional offenses or enhancements. (Heard, at
p. 633.) Both groups of juvenile offenders may have committed multiple offenses, but
only those who received LWOP sentences are eligible for relief under the statute.
The defendant in Heard received a sentence of 103 years to life. (Heard, supra,
83 Cal.App.5th at p. 612.) The court concluded that the sentence was the functional
equivalent of LWOP. (Id. at p. 629.) And because the court could not identify a rational
basis for the disparate treatment of the two groups—juvenile offenders sentenced to
LWOP and those sentenced to the functional equivalent—the court held that denying the
defendant the opportunity for resentencing under section 1170(d)(1) violated his right to
12 equal protection of the law. (Heard, at p. 633.) Sorto involved a juvenile offender
sentenced to 140 years to life (Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 440), and that court
agreed with Heard that section 1170(d)(1) “violates the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection by denying relief to juvenile offenders sentenced to functionally equivalent
LWOP terms” (Sorto, at p. 454). The Heard court reaffirmed its holding in Bagsby, a
case involving a juvenile offender sentenced to 107 years to life. (Bagsby, supra, 106
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1046, 1054-1063.) Sorto and Bagsby considered and rejected several
more potential justifications for the disparate treatment of juvenile offenders sentenced to
LWOP and those sentenced to the functional equivalent. (Sorto, at pp. 450-454; Bagsby,
at p. 1061.)
We find the analysis in Heard persuasive and likewise conclude that section
1170(d)(1) violates principles of equal protection by denying relief to juvenile offenders
sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP. The Attorney General concedes that
Heard was correctly decided and that the trial court erred by declining to follow it. But
the San Bernardino County District Attorney submitted an amicus brief arguing that
Heard was wrongly decided and urging us not to follow it. The district attorney’s
arguments lack merit.
The district attorney argues that the Legislature enacted section 1170(d)(1) to
address the constitutional problems with an LWOP sentence identified by the Eighth
Amendment case law, and because that case law did not initially involve sentences that
were the functional equivalent of LWOP, the Legislature had a plausible basis for
13 limiting section 1170(d)(1) to LWOP offenders. It is true that the bill enacting section
1170(d)(1) “‘was inspired by concerns regarding sentences of life without parole for
juvenile offenders’” and that the bill was introduced or enacted after Graham and Miller,
which involved LWOP sentences. (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 617.)
The developing case law provided a reason to grant relief to LWOP juvenile
offenders, but it did “not provide a reason to deny the same relief to functionally
equivalent LWOP offenders.” (Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 451.) Graham held
that states must give “the juvenile offender a ‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release
based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation,’ and that ‘[a] life without parole
sentence improperly denies the juvenile offender a chance to demonstrate growth and
maturity.’” (Caballero, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 266.) “[T]he same concern applies
equally to juveniles sentenced to the functional equivalent” of LWOP. (Heard, supra, 83
Cal.App.5th at p. 632.) Indeed, that is why Caballero extended Graham’s reasoning to
juvenile offenders sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP. (Caballero, at
p. 268.)
The district attorney further argues that even assuming that section 1170(d)(1)
violates principles of equal protection, the proper remedy is to invalidate the provision for
all juvenile offenders rather than extend the provision to juvenile offenders sentenced to
the functional equivalent of LWOP. “It is true that ‘[w]hen a court concludes that a
statutory classification violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the
14 laws, it has a choice of remedies.’” (Bagsby, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 1062.) But the
Legislature’s preference must guide the court’s choice of remedies. (Ibid.)
The district attorney contends that the Legislature has shown its preference by
extending youth offender parole hearings to juvenile offenders serving LWOP sentences.
The argument fails for reasons explained in Bagsby. (Bagsby, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1062-1063.) The Legislature extended section 3051 to LWOP juvenile offenders in
2017, and it has amended section 1170 several times since then. (Bagsby, at p. 1062.)
Yet the Legislature has not eliminated the recall and resentencing provision in section
1170, subdivision (d). (Bagsby, at p. 1062.) Moreover, since Heard was decided in
2022, the Legislature has continued to amend section 1170 without eliminating section
1170, subdivision (d). (Bagsby, at p. 1063.) If the Legislature wanted to eliminate the
recall and resentencing procedure in response to section 3051 or Heard’s equal protection
holding, then the Legislature could have accomplished that result itself. By leaving the
provision intact, it has signaled its preference. (Bagsby, at p. 1063.)
For these reasons, we conclude that constitutional principles of equal protection
require that relief under section 1170(d)(1) be extended to juvenile offenders who were
sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP.
III. Functional equivalent of LWOP
We further conclude that when Ransom was sentenced in 2010, his sentence of 50
years to life was the functional equivalent of LWOP. Whether Ransom’s sentence “is the
functional equivalent of LWOP presents a question of law on undisputed facts, which we
15 independently review.” (Valdez, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 800.) In the context of the
Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, our Supreme
Court concluded in People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349 (Contreras) that two 16-
year-old defendants received the functional equivalent of LWOP when they were
sentenced to 50 years to life and 58 years to life.1 (Id. at pp. 356, 368-369.) The
Contreras court reasoned that the defendants’ earliest possible release at age 66 or age 74
did not give them a meaningful incentive to rehabilitate or a meaningful opportunity for
redemption and reentry into society. (Id. at pp. 368-369.)
Ransom similarly was sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP. He
committed his offense when he was 16 years old, but he was not taken into custody until
he was nearly 18 years old. With a sentence of 50 years to life, he would be almost 68
years old on his earliest possible release date. Even assuming that his earliest release date
fell within his expected lifespan, that chance for release would come near the end of his
life, and he “will have spent the vast majority of adulthood in prison.” (Contreras, supra,
4 Cal.5th at p. 368.)
The Attorney General concedes that Ransom’s 50-years-to-life sentence is the
functional equivalent of LWOP under Contreras. But the district attorney argues
otherwise. The district attorney asserts that section 3051 has effectively abrogated
1 Both Contreras defendants were convicted under the one strike law and consequently were ineligible for youth offender parole under section 3051. (Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 359; § 3051, subd. (h).)
16 section 1170(d)(1) because no juvenile offender to whom section 3051 applies is serving
an LWOP sentence or the functional equivalent.
Section 3051 “supersede[s]” the juvenile offender’s sentence and “change[s] the
manner in which the juvenile offender’s original sentence operates by capping the
number of years that he or she may be imprisoned before becoming eligible for release on
parole.” (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 278.) Accordingly, our Supreme Court held in
Franklin that juvenile offenders eligible for relief under section 3051 are not serving an
LWOP sentence or its functional equivalent, because section 3051 makes them eligible
for parole during their 15th, 20th, or 25th year of incarceration. (Franklin, at pp. 277,
280.) The district attorney contends that Heard is inconsistent with Franklin because
Heard concluded that the defendant’s sentence of 103 years to life was the functional
equivalent of LWOP.
Heard addressed Franklin and explained why the district attorney’s argument fails
with respect to defendants like Ransom, who were sentenced before the effective date of
section 3051. Section 1170(d)(1) makes a defendant who “was sentenced” to LWOP
eligible for relief. (§ 1170, subd. (d)(1)(A).) Because the statute “‘“refers to the past,”’
the relevant inquiry under the provision is the sentence that was originally imposed,
which might not be the same as the sentence currently being served by the defendant.”
(Valdez, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 800.) Like Ransom, the defendant in Heard was
sentenced before the effective date of section 3051. (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at
p. 614.) Heard thus reasoned: “Although under Franklin, Heard’s sentence as it
17 currently operates is no longer the functional equivalent of life without parole, this does
not change the fact that the sentence was a de facto life without parole sentence at the
time it was imposed.” (Id. at p. 629.) Sorto rejected the argument that Heard “‘runs
roughshod’” over Franklin for the same reason. (Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 447-448.) And Bagsby reaffirmed Heard’s analysis, again concluding that Franklin
does not undermine Heard. (Bagsby, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1056-1057; but see
People v. Ortega (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1252, 1264 [disagreeing with Heard and
concluding that “Heard cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s analysis in
Franklin”].)
We agree with Heard, Sorto, and Bagsby that the relevant inquiry under section
1170(d)(1) “is the sentence that was originally imposed” (Valdez, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th
at p. 800), and Franklin does not require a contrary result. In 2010, section 3051 did not
exist, so Ransom “was sentenced” to the functional equivalent of LWOP within the
meaning of section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A).
People v. Munoz (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 499 (Munoz), review granted June 25,
2025, S290828, recently held that, even without a youth offender parole hearing under
section 3051, a sentence of 50 years to life for a 15-year-old defendant is not the
functional equivalent of LWOP. (Munoz, at pp. 502-503, 507.) The Munoz defendant,
who was convicted of first degree murder, was eligible for release at age 65. (Id. at
pp. 503, 508.) He argued that he was eligible for relief under section 1170(d)(1) and
Heard. (Munoz, at p. 507.) The Munoz court distinguished Heard, Sorto, and Bagsby on
18 the ground that in those cases the minimum periods of incarceration before parole
eligibility were “much greater than 50 years.” (Munoz, at p. 507.) Munoz also
acknowledged Contreras’s holding that a sentence of 50 years to life is the functional
equivalent of LWOP. (Munoz, at p. 510.) But Munoz concluded that Contreras did not
control, because the Contreras defendants “did not commit murder, which was an
integral part of the Supreme Court’s analysis” in Graham, and Contreras “considered
only whether the defendants’ sentences violated the Eighth Amendment” and not an
equal protection challenge to section 1170(d)(1). (Munoz, at pp. 510-511; accord, People
v. Thompson (July 15, 2025, B333097) __ Cal.App.5th __ [2025 Cal.App. LEXIS 453, at
p. *20] [agreeing with Munoz “that the Contreras notion of functional equivalence does
not answer” whether a juvenile homicide offender sentenced to 50 years to life is eligible
for relief under section 1170(d)(1) as a matter of equal protection].)
Munoz does not persuade us that Contreras is inapplicable. We agree with the
dissent in Munoz that although Contreras was an Eighth Amendment case, “its reasoning
must inform our decision whether a 50-years-to-life sentence is likewise functionally
equivalent to an LWOP sentence for purposes of an equal protection challenge.” (Munoz,
supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 513 [dis. opn. of Feuer, J.]; accord, People v. Cabrera
(2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 650, 654 [conc. opn. of Hoffstadt, P.J.] [Contreras’s holding
“that ‘a sentence of 50 years to life is functionally equivalent to LWOP’” is “inescapable
and indistinguishable” for purposes of the defendant’s equal protection challenge to
section 1170(d)(1)].) The Contreras court’s reasoning is particularly relevant to
19 challenges to section 1170(d)(1), “which was enacted in response to the principles
articulated in [Graham, supra, 560 U.S. 48]—the decision at the heart of Contreras.”
(Munoz, at p. 513 [dis. opn. of Feuer, J.].) In addition, the fact that the Contreras
defendants committed nonhomicide offenses is not a good reason to distinguish
Contreras in this context. (Munoz, at pp. 518-519 [dis. opn. of Feuer, J.].) Although the
Contreras defendants did not commit murder, their crimes nevertheless “were egregious,
including multiple counts of forcible rape and other sex crimes against two minor
victims.” (Munoz, at p. 518 [dis. opn. of Feuer, J.].) Our high court described the crimes
as “‘awful and shocking’” and emphasized that it was “not minimiz[ing] the gravity of
defendants’ crimes or their lasting impact on the victims and their families.” (Contreras,
supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 380; Munoz, at p. 518 [dis. opn. of Feuer, J.].) Contreras’s
reasoning—that the length of the sentences failed to give the defendants a meaningful
incentive to rehabilitate or a meaningful opportunity for redemption and reentry into
society—still applies to long sentences for relatively more serious homicide offenses.
For all of these reasons, we conclude that Ransom’s sentence of 50 years to life
was the functional equivalent of LWOP. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection
requires that the court extend to him eligibility for relief under section 1170(d)(1).
IV. Other eligibility requirements under section 1170(d)(2)
The trial court concluded that regardless of whether Ransom was sentenced to
LWOP or its functional equivalent, he did not satisfy the other eligibility requirements
20 under section 1170(d)(2). Ransom argues that the court erred in that respect as well. We
agree.
Under section 1170(d)(2), the defendant’s petition must include a statement that
the defendant was under 18 at the time of the offense, “a statement describing their
remorse and work towards rehabilitation,” and a statement that “one of four qualifying
circumstances is true” (Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 443). Those four qualifying
circumstances are the following: “(A) The defendant was convicted pursuant to felony
murder or aiding and abetting murder provisions of law. ¶ (B) The defendant does not
have juvenile felony adjudications for assault or other felony crimes with a significant
potential for personal harm to victims prior to the offense for which the sentence is being
considered for recall. ¶ (C) The defendant committed the offense with at least one adult
codefendant. ¶ (D) The defendant has performed acts that tend to indicate rehabilitation
or the potential for rehabilitation, including, but not limited to, availing themselves of
rehabilitative, educational, or vocational programs, if those programs have been available
at their classification level and facility, using self-study for self-improvement, or showing
evidence of remorse.” (§ 1170, subd. (d)(2)(A)-(D).)
The defendant has the burden of showing that one of the four qualifying
circumstances is true. (People v. Harring (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 483, 488 (Harring).)
“If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that one or more” of the four
qualifying circumstances is true, then “the court shall recall the sentence and commitment
previously ordered and hold a hearing to resentence the defendant in the same manner as
21 if the defendant had not previously been sentenced, provided that the new sentence, if
any, is not greater than the initial sentence.” (§ 1170, subd. (d)(5).)
Ransom’s petition stated that he was 16 years old at the time of his offense and
included several statements describing his remorse and work toward rehabilitation. He
thus satisfied those threshold requirements for eligibility under section 1170(d)(2).
In addition, Ransom’s petition declared under penalty of perjury that (1) he did not
have a prior juvenile adjudication for assault or other felony crimes with a significant
potential for harm to victims, and (2) he had performed acts tending to indicate
rehabilitation or the potential for rehabilitation. Ransom made the required showing
regarding a prior juvenile adjudication.
To determine whether a felony crime has “a significant potential for personal harm
to victims” (§ 1170, subd. (d)(2)(B)), the court examines the elements of the offense
alone. (Harring, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at pp. 498, 502-503.) The court does not engage
in “a broader inquiry into [the] underlying conduct” constituting the commission of the
offense in the particular case. (Id. at p. 498.) Nor does the court “assess an imagined
typical case of the crime at issue and evaluate whether it involves conduct that creates
and poses the requisite risk of harm to victims.” (Id. at p. 502.)
The court assesses the conduct necessary to constitute the elements of the offense
“in relation to assault, the single enumerated crime within the category.” (Harring,
supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 502.) Assault “requires an act that by its nature would
directly and probably result in the application of physical force to a person.” (Id. at
22 p. 503.) “Viewed in light of assault, a crime risking harm to victims within the meaning
of” section 1170(d)(2) “necessarily involves an act that by its nature creates the risk of
physical harm to another, even if no physical injury actually occurs.” (Harring, at
p. 503.)
The determination of the elements of an offense is a question of law that we
independently review. (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988.) Likewise, whether
that offense involves a significant potential for personal harm to victims is a question of
law that we independently review. (See People v. Aguilar (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1010,
1017 [whether a crime involves moral turpitude is determined by the elements of the
offense alone and “is a question of law for the court to resolve”].)
According to the probation report, Ransom had a single prior juvenile adjudication
for possession of a concealed weapon by a minor. (Former § 12101, subd. (a)(1); see
Cal. Law Revision Com. com., Deering’s Ann. Pen. Code (2025 ed.) foll. § 29610
[noting that § 29610 continues former § 12101, subd. (a)(1) without substantive change].)
The relevant statutory provision stated that “‘[a] minor shall not possess a pistol,
revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person.’” (In re D.D.
(2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 824, 829.) Possession means having control, care, and
management of the firearm. (In re Charles G. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 945, 951.)
“Possession may be actual or constructive. [Citation.] It does not require that a person
be armed or that the weapon be within a person’s immediate vicinity. [Citation.] Rather,
23 it encompasses having a weapon in one’s bedroom or home or another location under his
or her control, even when the individual is not present at the location.” (Ibid.)
Possession of a concealable firearm by a minor does not “necessarily involve[] an
act that by its nature creates the risk of physical harm to another.” (Harring, supra, 69
Cal.App.5th at p. 503.) The offense does not require the firearm to be loaded or even
operable. (People v. Nelums (1982) 31 Cal.3d 355, 358 [possession of a concealable
firearm does not require proof that the firearm is operable]; compare § 29610 [possession
of a firearm by a minor] with § 25850 [carrying a loaded firearm in public].) Nor does it
require the firearm to be used in any particular manner. (See, e.g., § 12022.53, subds.
(b)-(d) [sentence enhancements for using a firearm during the commission of enumerated
felonies].) And Ransom could have committed the offense even if the unloaded or
inoperable firearm was nowhere near him or anyone else but was merely in his bedroom
or another location under his control. The elements of the offense alone fall far short of
showing “a significant potential for personal harm to victims.” (§ 1170, subd. (d)(2)(B);
see Harring, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 503 [elements of burglary do not involve an act
that necessarily creates a potential for harm to victims].)
The district attorney asserts that the possession offense “did have potential for
harm to victims, as demonstrated by the later murder of Cecil Scott.” Those case-specific
facts are not relevant to our inquiry under section 1170(d)(2). And the mere potential for
harm to victims is not the applicable standard. The district attorney’s arguments have no
24 tendency to show that the elements of the possession offense involve an act that
necessarily creates the risk of physical harm to another.
In short, Ransom’s only prior juvenile adjudication does not fall within the
category of crimes described by section 1170, subdivision (d)(2)(B), and the People
submitted no evidence of any other juvenile adjudications. As a matter of law, the record
compelled a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Ransom’s statement under
section 1170, subdivision (d)(2)(B), was true. (See In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th
1517, 1528 [when the issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof, “the question for a
reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the
appellant as a matter of law”], disapproved on other grounds by Conservatorship of O.B.
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 989.) Given that conclusion, we need not decide whether Ransom also
proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he had “performed acts that tend to
indicate rehabilitation or the potential for rehabilitation.” (§ 1170, subd. (d)(2)(D).) He
needed to show only that one of the four qualifying circumstances was true.
For all of these reasons, the court erred by concluding that Ransom was ineligible
for relief under section 1170(d)(2).
V. Prejudicial error
We lastly consider whether the trial court’s errors prejudiced Ransom. The equal
protection violation is prejudicial unless the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. (People v. Taylor (1982) 31 Cal.3d 488, 499, 501-502.) The error in applying the
eligibility requirements of section 1170(d)(2) is prejudicial if it is reasonably probable
25 that Ransom would have obtained a more favorable result absent the error. (People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) We conclude that Ransom was prejudiced under
either standard.
Once Ransom demonstrated his eligibility for relief, section 1170, subdivision
(d)(5), required the court to recall his sentence and hold a resentencing hearing. The
recall of a sentence “‘effectively vacate[s] [the defendant]’s original sentence and
commitment.’” (People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, 360.) The recall thus
would result in a nonfinal judgment entitling Ransom to the ameliorative benefits of
Proposition 57, namely, a hearing in the juvenile court to determine whether to transfer
his case to the criminal court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707). (Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 158; People v. Montes (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 35, 47-48; Bagsby, supra, 106
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1064-1065.) Indeed, the trial court acknowledged that if Ransom were
eligible for recall of his sentence and resentencing, then he would be entitled to a juvenile
court transfer hearing. Such a hearing has the potential for reducing his punishment if the
juvenile court decides that criminal adjudication of his case is not appropriate. (Padilla,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 170.) The court’s errors consequently deprived Ransom of a more
favorable result, and the errors were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Attorney General concedes that if Ransom is eligible to have his sentence
recalled, then the recall would trigger the retroactive application of Proposition 57, and
Ransom “may seek a transfer hearing in juvenile court.” However, the Attorney General
26 argues that a prejudice assessment is “premature” and urges us to remand for a “full
hearing” as to Ransom’s eligibility under section 1170(d)(2). The argument lacks merit.
First, we generally may not reverse an erroneous order without considering
prejudice. “Indeed, in California, harmless error review is a matter of constitutional
mandate: ‘The California Constitution imposes upon this court an obligation to conduct
“an examination of the entire cause” and reverse a judgment below for error only upon
determining that a “miscarriage of justice” has occurred.’” (People v. Hendrix (2022) 13
Cal.5th 933, 941.) A consideration of prejudice thus is necessary in any appeal involving
an erroneous order, and the assessment cannot be characterized as premature.
Second, the Attorney General bases his argument on the incorrect premise that the
trial court did not decide whether Ransom was eligible for relief under section
1170(d)(2). The record shows that the court did so, and Ransom’s opening brief argued
that the court’s ruling on the section 1170(d)(2) eligibility requirements was erroneous.
The Attorney General does not address that argument in the respondent’s brief (and raises
the claimed lack of a ruling only in supplemental briefing on the issue of prejudice).
Instead, the respondent’s brief cites Heard for the proposition that we should “remand[]
for a recall and resentencing hearing pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (d).” That was
the disposition in Heard because the trial court denied the defendant’s petition solely on
the ground that he was not sentenced to LWOP. (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at pp.
621-622.) The trial court did not otherwise “consider the merits of the petition,” so the
27 appellate court remanded for the trial court to consider “whether, ‘by a preponderance of
the evidence,’” one or more of the qualifying circumstances was true. (Id. at p. 634.) But
there would be no point in such a remand here—the trial court has already ruled on the
merits of the petition under section 1170(d)(2), and the record on appeal shows that
ruling was erroneous.
In sum, Ransom was prejudiced by the court’s erroneous determination that he
was not eligible for recall of his sentence and resentencing under section 1170(d)(1) and
(d)(2). Ransom demonstrated that he was eligible for relief, and the court was required to
recall his sentence. The recall would have triggered his right to a juvenile court transfer
hearing. We consequently remand with directions to grant Ransom’s petition, recall his
sentence, and refer the case to the juvenile court for a transfer hearing. (Montes, supra,
70 Cal.App.5th at p. 49.)
DISPOSITION
The order denying Ransom’s petition for recall of his sentence and resentencing is
reversed. On remand, the superior court shall enter an order granting the petition,
recalling Ransom’s sentence, and referring the case to the juvenile court for a transfer
hearing. If the juvenile court determines that it would not have transferred Ransom to
criminal court under current law, then it shall treat Ransom’s conviction as a juvenile
adjudication as of the date of his conviction and impose an appropriate disposition. If the
juvenile court determines that it would have transferred Ransom to criminal court, then it
28 shall transfer the matter back to criminal court, which shall hold a resentencing hearing
under section 1170, subdivision (d).
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MENETREZ J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
CODRINGTON J.