People v. Randle

Michigan Court of Appeals

People v. Randle

170 N.W.2d 302, 17 Mich. App. 607, 1969 Mich. App. LEXIS 1259

CourtMichigan Court of Appeals

DecidedJune 23, 1969

DocketDocket No. 3,955

StatusPublished

This text of 170 N.W.2d 302 (People v. Randle) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Randle, 170 N.W.2d 302, 17 Mich. App. 607, 1969 Mich. App. LEXIS 1259 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969).

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Opinion

Per Curiam.

Defendant Walter Randle was tried without a jury and convicted of sale of narcotics contrary to MCLA § 335.152 (Stat Ann 1957 Rev § 18.1122), and sentenced under the statute, which provides for a 20-year minimum sentence, to 20 to 21 years in prison. Subsequently, his motion for a new trial was granted. Randle then pled guilty to the charge of unlawful possession of narcotics contrary to MCLA § 335.153 (Stat Ann 1957 Rev § 18.1123) and he was sentenced to a term of three to ten years in prison. On appeal defendant conteuds that the “first offense” penalty provision¹ of MCLA § 335.153 (Stat Ann 1957 Rev § 18.1123) is [609]*609constitutionally infirm, and that the grant of a new trial constituted an inducement to plead guilty. The appellee has filed a motion to affirm the conviction.

There is no substance in the defendant’s arguments that the “first offense” penalty provision is a denial of equal protection of the laws and due process of law. Our examination of the record convinces us that the defendant’s plea of guilty was accepted in accordance with OCR 1963, 785.3.

Defendant’s conviction of unlawful sale of narcotics and his 20-21 year sentence became final upon denial of his application for leave to appeal by the Michigan Supreme Court (People v. Randle [1966], 378 Mich 744). The grant of a new trial on condition that the defendant plead guilty to a lesser offense where his conviction for the originally charged offense had become final and, as was the case here, no meritorious ground appeared for granting a new trial other than the defendant’s and the court’s desire to avoid the mandatory mini mum 20-year sentence for the offense of which the defendant had been convicted is no more objectionable than the acceptance of a plea of guilty to a lesser included or added offense in exchange for a plea of guilty. Cf. People v. Byrd (1968), 12 Mich App 186.

The questions presented are unsubstantial and require no formal argument or submission. The motion to affirm² the defendant’s conviction is granted.

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Per Curiam.

Defendant Walter Randle was tried without a jury and convicted of sale of narcotics contrary to MCLA § 335.152 (Stat Ann 1957 Rev § 18.1122), and sentenced under the statute, which provides for a 20-year minimum sentence, to 20 to 21 years in prison. Subsequently, his motion for a new trial was granted. Randle then pled guilty to the charge of unlawful possession of narcotics contrary to MCLA § 335.153 (Stat Ann 1957 Rev § 18.1123) and he was sentenced to a term of three to ten years in prison. On appeal defendant conteuds that the “first offense” penalty provision¹ of MCLA § 335.153 (Stat Ann 1957 Rev § 18.1123) is [609]*609constitutionally infirm, and that the grant of a new trial constituted an inducement to plead guilty. The appellee has filed a motion to affirm the conviction.

There is no substance in the defendant’s arguments that the “first offense” penalty provision is a denial of equal protection of the laws and due process of law. Our examination of the record convinces us that the defendant’s plea of guilty was accepted in accordance with OCR 1963, 785.3.

Defendant’s conviction of unlawful sale of narcotics and his 20-21 year sentence became final upon denial of his application for leave to appeal by the Michigan Supreme Court (People v. Randle [1966], 378 Mich 744). The grant of a new trial on condition that the defendant plead guilty to a lesser offense where his conviction for the originally charged offense had become final and, as was the case here, no meritorious ground appeared for granting a new trial other than the defendant’s and the court’s desire to avoid the mandatory mini mum 20-year sentence for the offense of which the defendant had been convicted is no more objectionable than the acceptance of a plea of guilty to a lesser included or added offense in exchange for a plea of guilty. Cf. People v. Byrd (1968), 12 Mich App 186.

The questions presented are unsubstantial and require no formal argument or submission. The motion to affirm² the defendant’s conviction is granted.

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Bluebook (online)

170 N.W.2d 302, 17 Mich. App. 607, 1969 Mich. App. LEXIS 1259, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-randle-michctapp-1969.

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