Filed 6/10/14 P. v. Ramirez CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E057173
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF1102660)
MIGUEL ANGEL RAMIREZ, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Jeffrey J. Prevost, Judge.
Affirmed with directions.
Paul J. Katz, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Lynne G. McGinnis, and Kristine
A. Gutierrez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1 I
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Miguel Angel Ramirez appeals from judgment entered following jury
convictions for four counts of battery (Pen. Code,1 § 242; counts 1-4) and assault (§ 240;
count 6), lesser included offenses of rape and sexual penetration of a minor (§§ 261,
subd. (a)(2), and 289, subd. (i)). The court dismissed count 5 (sexual battery) pursuant to
section 1118.1. Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 180 days in county jail,
and released with credit for time served.
Defendant contends the trial court committed prejudicial error by failing to give a
unanimity jury instruction, violating his right to a speedy trial, and depriving him of a
Marsden hearing. Defendant also contends his battery and assault convictions were time-
barred and his $100 restitution fine should be eliminated. We conclude there was no
prejudicial error and affirm the judgment, with the exception the trial court erred in not
eliminating his $100 restitution fine by crediting two of defendant’s excess days in
custody.
II
FACTS
In 2003, defendant began sexually abusing V.M. when she was 14 or 15 years old.
At the time, V.M.’s older sister, Y.M. was dating defendant, who was approximately six
1 Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 years older than V.M. Defendant subsequently married Y.M. When V.M. first met
defendant, she was living with her family in Rowland Heights, where she lived until she
was 15 or 16 years old. The first incident occurred at V.M.’s home in Rowland Heights,
in the hallway. As defendant walked past V.M., he rubbed her buttocks with his hand.
This happened again many times.
On another occasion, while defendant was in V.M.’s bedroom at the Rowland
Heights home using the computer, V.M. entered her bedroom. Defendant closed the door
and put his hand on V.M.’s leg and rubbed her thigh. V.M. objected but did not say
anything to defendant because she was scared, nervous, and did not know what to say.
Afterwards, V.M. left and defendant went back to the computer. V.M. was around 15
years old. Defendant subsequently touched V.M. many more times in her bedroom,
when he came to see Y.M. at the Rowland Heights home. He touched V.M.’s breasts,
buttocks, and “vagina.”2 He began putting his hands on her shirt and underneath it.
V.M. never said anything to defendant and did not tell anyone. Defendant told her,
“Better not say anything or no one is going to believe you,” and “I know this is what you
want.” It was not what V.M. wanted but she just sat silently and let him touch her, with
the exception of once, when she tried to walk away and defendant told her, “No one is
going to believe you, and this is what you want, and you better not say anything.” V.M.
2 V.M. used the word “vagina” but may have meant the genital area, if not also the vagina. Although the word “vagina” is used in the testimony, the vagina is an internal organ, defined as “a canal that leads from the uterus of a female mammal to the external orifice of the genital canal.” (Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict. (1993) p. 2528.)
3 then just stood there and did not know what else she could do. Defendant kept saying,
“You better not say anything.”
On one occasion, while living in Rowland Heights, on Thanksgiving Day, V.M.’s
mother told defendant to drive V.M. to the store to get something she needed. While on
the way to the store, defendant touched her. On the way back home, he pulled over in an
alley by a Jack-in-the Box, unzipped his pants, put V.M.’s hand on his penis, and forced
V.M. to masturbate him. Defendant told her not to tell anyone what he had done. When
defendant first grabbed her hand, she left her hand in her lap. When he then pulled her
hand harder, she moved it. V.M. did not recall saying anything to defendant when he did
this. She just sat in the car because she did not know what to do or where to go. V.M.
did not tell anyone what had happened when they returned home.
Defendant and Y.M. moved to an apartment in Upland. During the summer, when
V.M. was 15 or 16 years old, she visited Y.M. for the day or stayed at Y.M.’s home in
Upland for a couple days. This was when defendant’s sexual abuse escalated.
When V.M. was visiting Y.M. at defendant and Y.M.’s Upland apartment,
defendant came home from work in the afternoon, before Y.M. V.M. was sitting on the
couch watching TV. Defendant got up from another couch, moved to the couch where
V.M. was sitting, and started touching her. Defendant put his hand on her leg. In an
attempt to try to stop him from touching her, V.M. “scooted over.” Defendant told V.M.
to lie down. V.M. just sat there. Defendant moved her so he could take off her shorts.
4 She did not say anything or push him away. She just wiggled to try to move. She was
scared. Defendant unzipped his pants and put his penis inside her. V.M. just laid there.
Defendant withdrew his penis, and went to another room for awhile.
During the incident, V.M. did not say anything. She was afraid of defendant. She
feared he would hurt her sister. Defendant had told V.M. that if Y.M. disappeared, no
one would ever know he was responsible. He said there were many husbands who had
gotten away with killing their wives, and so could he. V.M. did not tell Y.M. defendant
had had intercourse with her.
In 2005, when V.M. was 16 years old and a junior in high school, her family
moved to Corona. V.M. temporarily lived with her aunt and continued going to school in
Rowland Heights. Because V.M.’s father wanted her to live at home, she moved from
her aunt’s home to her family’s home in Corona. V.M.’s father allowed defendant and
Y.M., who were married, to move in, conditional upon defendant driving V.M. to school
every day.
Defendant drove V.M. to school every day until she got sick and stopped going to
school. When defendant drove V.M. to school, he touched her every day. He touched
her on her legs, between her legs, and in her shirt. He touched her over and under her
clothing while driving. V.M. did not say anything to him or move his hand away because
she was scared. She did not know what he would do. He told her not to tell anyone. He
5 told her he would hurt her sister if she told anyone, and said no one would believe her
and they would think she was lying.
Defendant had intercourse with V.M. three times after V.M. moved to Corona.
The first incident occurred when V.M. was 16 years old, several months after the incident
in Upland. Defendant followed V.M. into her bedroom, closed the door, and locked it.
No one else was home at the time. Defendant told V.M. to lie down. V.M. did not want
to but did not tell defendant. After she lay down, defendant took off her pants, took off
his pants, and put his penis in her. V.M. did not remember what she said. She only
remembered defendant telling her to be quiet and shut up. She thinks she said, stop, or
moved, and defendant got mad at her. V.M. was scared. Afterwards, she cried.
There were two additional times defendant had intercourse with V.M. The second
incident in Corona was also in her bedroom. It occurred a few weeks after the previous
incident. As V.M. was going into her room wearing just a towel, defendant came in her
room and closed the door. V.M. had been unaware defendant was home then. No one
else was at her home. Defendant told her to lie down. As she sat on her bed wearing her
towel, defendant took off his pants, removed her towel, moved V.M.’s hand to her side,
and had intercourse with her. V.M. was scared. She did not try to push him away
because he was holding her arm.
The third and last time defendant had intercourse with V.M. in Corona, occurred
in 2005, several months after the previous incident. V.M. was 16 years old. When V.M.
6 went to her brother’s upstairs bedroom to look for a movie, defendant followed her into
the room. V.M.’s mother and siblings were outside on the driveway. Defendant grabbed
V.M.’s shoulder, pushed her onto the lower bunk bed, and forced her to lie down. While
lying down, defendant pulled off her shorts, pulled down his pants, and then started to
have intercourse with V.M. Several times he inserted his penis in her but stopped to look
out the window to see where V.M.’s family was. Defendant then returned and reinserted
his penis in V.M. V.M.’s family had just gotten home.
The first time defendant digitally penetrated her vagina was when she was 15
years old. She was 16 years old during the last of the four times defendant had
intercourse with her. V.M. had no contact with defendant after he left in 2006. During
the four incidents of intercourse, defendant did not punch her, physically hurt her, or use
a weapon. He threatened her when she lived in Corona. While defendant was in the
kitchen, he picked up a big knife, twirled it, and then looked towards V.M., and smiled.
V.M. took this as a threat. She thought that if she said anything, he would use the knife
on her sister.
In 2006, defendant and Y.M. separated, and divorced in 2007. In late 2008, V.M.
disclosed the abuse for the first time to her girlfriend, V.R. V.M. first told Y.M. about
defendant’s sexual abuse when Y.M. asked V.M. in a text message if she had had
intercourse with defendant. V.M. texted her back, stating that defendant had raped her.
7 V.M. then told Y.M. everything that had happened. V.M. told Y.M. a few days before
she told the police at Y.M.’s urging.
Sheriff’s investigator Joel Pabelico testified that when he interviewed V.M., she
was very distraught and shy. Pabelico also interviewed defendant, who denied ever
touching V.M. Defendant claimed Y.M. and V.M. made up the sexual assault and rape
allegations because Y.M. and defendant were in the midst of a child custody battle.
Defendant also denied having consensual sex with V.M.
III
UNANIMITY INSTRUCTION
Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to give a unanimity instruction,
which defendant argues was necessary because the jury could have disagreed on the act
supporting each conviction. Defendant contends there was evidence of numerous
encounters between defendant and V.M. that could have supported each of defendant’s
five convictions for battery and assault. The People argue a unanimity instruction was
not necessary and, even if it was, any such error was harmless.
In a criminal case, a jury verdict must be unanimous. (People v. Russo (2001) 25
Cal.4th 1124, 1132.) The unanimity requirement is founded on the constitutional
principle that a criminal defendant is entitled to a verdict in which all 12 jurors agree,
beyond a reasonable doubt, as to each count charged. (People v. Brown (1996) 42
Cal.App.4th 1493, 1499-1500, citing Cal. Const., art. I, § 16 and People v. Jones (1990)
8 51 Cal.3d 294, 305, 321; see also People v. Hernandez (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 559, 570
[“The importance of the unanimity instruction is rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution’s requirement that all criminal defendants are afforded due
process of law.”].) “‘When the evidence tends to show a larger number of distinct
violations of the charged crime than have been charged and the prosecution has not
elected a specific criminal act or event upon which it will rely for each allegation, the
court must instruct the jury on the need for unanimous agreement on the distinct criminal
act or event supporting each charge. . . .’” (People v. Whitham (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th
1282, 1295.)
When there is evidence “jurors might disagree as to the particular act defendant
committed, the standard unanimity instruction should be given. [Citation.] But when
there is no reasonable likelihood of juror disagreement as to particular acts, and the only
question is whether or not the defendant in fact committed all of them, the jury should be
given a modified unanimity instruction which, in addition to allowing a conviction if the
jurors unanimously agree on specific acts, also allows a conviction if the jury
unanimously agrees the defendant committed all the acts described by the victim.”
(People v. Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 321-322.) Whether a particular instruction
should have been given in a case is a predominantly legal question reviewed under the de
novo standard. (See People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 733.)
9 In the instant case, defendant was charged with four counts of rape (§ 261, subd.
(a)(2); counts 1-4) and one count of sexual penetration of a minor. (§ 289, subd. (i);
count 6). The People specified in the information that count 1 occurred between January
1, 2003, and July 29, 2004, in San Bernardino County; count 2 occurred between January
1, 2003, and July 29, 2004, in Riverside County; and counts 3 and 4 occurred between
July 30, 2004, and July 29, 2005, in Riverside County. Rowland Heights is in Los
Angeles County, Upland is in San Bernardino County, and Corona is in Riverside
County. Therefore, count 1, which was committed in San Bernardino County, was
limited to defendant’s acts in Upland. The other three counts pertain to intercourse
committed in Riverside County, which would have been limited to the three acts of
intercourse committed in Corona.
Although the jury found defendant guilty of four counts of battery, as lesser
included offenses of the four counts of rape, the People specified in the complaint that
counts 1 through 4 pertained to the four incidents of intercourse, one of which occurred in
Upland and three which occurred in Corona. There was no evidence of any other acts of
intercourse.
In addition, during closing argument, both the prosecutor and defense counsel
indicated that counts 1 through 4 for rape concerned the four incidents in which
defendant allegedly had intercourse with V.M. During rebuttal, the prosecutor explained
that the four charged rapes consisted of one in Upland and three in Corona. The
10 prosecutor further stated that two of the rapes in Corona were committed in V.M.’s
bedroom and the third rape in Corona was committed in her brother’s bedroom. A
unanimity instruction was not required for counts 1 through 4, since the evidence does
not tend “‘to show a larger number of distinct violations of the charged crime than have
been charged.’” (People v. Whitham, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 1295.) Also, the
prosecution made clear the four specific criminal acts or events upon which it relied for
each of the four counts of rape. (Ibid.)
As to count 6 for sexual penetration (§ 289, subd. (i)), the only evidence presented
to support this charge was testimony that defendant inserted his fingers in V.M.’s vagina.
The court instructed the jury that “To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the
People must prove that: [¶] 1. The defendant participated in an act of sexual penetration
with another person; [¶] 2. The penetration was accomplished by using a foreign object,
or substance, or instrument, or device, or unknown object; [¶] 3. The defendant was at
least 21 years old at the time of the act; [¶] AND [¶] 4. The other person was under the
age of 16 years at the time of the act.”
V.M. testified that defendant had digitally penetrated her vagina. She was 15
years old when he first did this. There was no other evidence of any specific incidents or
when they occurred. Therefore, there would not have been juror disagreement as to any
particular acts. The only question was whether or not defendant digitally penetrated
11 V.M.’s vagina and her age at the time of the offense. (People v. Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d
at pp. 321-322.) Under these circumstances, a unanimity instruction was not required.
Even if a unanimity instruction was necessary, any such error was harmless under
both the Watson3 and Chapman4 harmless error standards. The jury’s guilty verdicts for
the lesser included offenses of battery (counts 1-4) and assault (count 6) indicate that,
although the jury concluded the prosecution had not proven the charged offenses, the jury
did not believe defendant’s defense that he did not touch V.M. during the four incidents
charged as rape or during the digital penetration. The verdicts also show that the jury
likely found that, as to counts 1 through 4, the prosecution failed to prove the element of
using force or fear when defendant committed the four acts of intercourse. As to count 6,
the jury quite likely concluded that the prosecution failed to prove the requisite element
that defendant was over the age of 21 when he committed the alleged digital penetration.
The absence of a unanimity instruction therefore was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, since the battery and assault verdicts would have been entered even if a
unanimity instruction had been given.
3 People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836-837. 4 Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.
12 IV
RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL
Defendant argues the trial court violated his federal and state Constitutional rights
to a speedy trial by granting several trial continuances without good cause. We conclude
there was no violation of defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial since there was
good cause to continue the trial and defendant has not established prejudicial harm.
A. Procedural Background
In the instant case, defendant did not initially object personally to the trial court
continuing the court proceedings and trial. Defendant was arraigned on the charges on
June 3, 2011. At the felony settlement conference on June 14, 2011, the court granted
defendant’s substitution of attorney motion and the public defender was relieved as
defendant’s attorney. Defendant retained private counsel who requested a continuance of
the matter. The trial court granted the continuance and continued the matter to July 7,
2011, on the ground defense counsel needed additional time for preparation of the
defense. On July 7, 2011, the court ordered the amended complaint filed and set
arraignment for July 29, 2011. On July 29, 2012, the parties stipulated to continue the
arraignment hearing. The court accordingly granted a continuance of arraignment to
August 30, 2011. Defendant waived the time for arraignment to August 30, 2011.
On August 30, 2011, the prosecution moved to continue the hearing, and
defendant did not oppose the motion. The trial court continued the matter to September
13 28, 2011. On September 28, 2011, the prosecution moved to amend the complaint. The
court granted the motion and arraigned defendant on the second amended complaint.
Defendant waived the time for the preliminary hearing to October 28, 2011, plus 10 court
days. The court set a felony settlement conference on October 28, 2011.
On October 28, 2011, the parties stipulated to continuing the felony settlement
conference to November 18, 2011, because the parties believed the case would be
resolved. Defendant waived the time for continuing the preliminary hearing to
November 18, 2011, plus 10 court days. At the felony settlement conference on
November 18, 2011, the parties stipulated to continue the hearing to December 16, 2011,
and defendant waived the time for the preliminary hearing to December 16, 2011, plus 10
court days. At the felony settlement conference on December 16, 2011, the court set the
preliminary hearing for January 24, 2012, and defendant waived the time, plus five court
days.
On January 24, 2012, the trial court conducted a preliminary hearing in the case,
held defendant to answer the charges, and set arraignment on the Information for
February 7, 2012. On February 7, 2012, the trial court granted defendant’s private
attorney’s motion to substitute out and defendant’s request to be represented by the
public defender. The court also granted defendant’s unopposed motion to continue the
arraignment hearing, and defendant waived time for arraignment on the Information to
February 21, 2012. The arraignment hearing was continued to that date.
14 On February 21, 2012, defendant waived formal arraignment and pled not guilty to
the charges. Trial was set for April 17, 2012. At the trial readiness conference on April
5, 2012, the parties stipulated to continuing the trial and defendant waived time for trial
to April 10, 2012, plus 30 days. On April 10, 2012, the trial court granted defendant’s
unopposed motion to continue the hearing to April 12, 2012, and defendant waived time
for trial to April 12, 2012, plus 30 days.
On April 12, 2012, the parties stipulated to continuing the trial readiness
conference to May 15, 2012, and defendant waived time for trial to May 15, 2012, plus
30 days. On May 15, 2012, the trial court set trial for June 12, 2012, with the last day for
trial to begin on June 22, 2012.
It was not until June 12, 2012, that defendant personally objected to any further
trial continuances. On June 12, 2012, defendant’s attorney, Douglas Miranda, requested
a trial continuance because he was engaged in trial in another case, defendant had
requested a Marsden5 hearing and the court clerk had said there were no available
courtrooms available at the present time. Miranda also told the court defendant was not
willing to waive time to try the charges against him. The trial court granted defense
counsel’s request for a trial continuance up to July 30, 2012, noting that defendant had a
constitutional right to a prepared attorney. The court ordered the trial was continued to
5 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.
15 July 20, 2012, concluding Miranda “wouldn’t ask for it if it wasn’t reasonable. You’ve
got to have a prepared attorney; no two ways about it.”
On July 19, 2012, Miranda filed a motion requesting continuance of the trial to
October 1, 2012, on the grounds Miranda’s office needed additional time to finalize
several transcripts for the trial and Miranda would be attending a previously scheduled
death penalty seminar from July 20 to July 27, 2012. In addition, Miranda stated in his
supporting declaration that he would not be prepared to represent defendant adequately if
the trial was not continued.
On July 20, 2012, the trial court explained to defendant that his attorney had
requested continuing the trial until October 1, 2012, because Miranda needed a little more
time to prepare for trial, since it was a complicated case. Defendant objected. The trial
court continued the hearing to July 25, 2012, for an update on Miranda’s status, since
Miranda was unavailable at the hearing on July 20. On July 25, 2012, the trial court
granted Miranda’s motion to continue the trial, over defendant’s objection, and continued
the matter to August 1, 2012.
On August 1, 2012, Miranda explained to the court that defendant’s case had been
sent out for trial that day but the judge had suggested continuing the trial to August 14,
2012. The court then asked defendant if he agreed to waive time so that the trial could
begin on August 14, 2012. Miranda told the court defendant objected to continuing the
trial but Miranda was nevertheless requesting a continuance because he was engaged in
16 trial, which he anticipated completing on August 10. The trial court granted a
continuance until Miranda completed trial in the other case, and ordered the case to trial
on August 14, 2012. On August 14, 2012, the court heard motions in limine, ordered the
trial to trail one day, and began jury selection on August 15, 2012.
B. Applicable Law
Defendant’s right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right “guaranteed by the state
and federal Constitutions. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) The
Legislature has also provided for ‘“a speedy and public” trial as one of the fundamental
rights preserved to a defendant in a criminal action. (§ 686, subd. 1.)’ [Citation.] To
implement an accused’s constitutional right to a speedy trial, the Legislature enacted
section 1382. [Citation.]” (Rhinehart v. Municipal Court (1984) 35 Cal.3d 772, 776.)
Section 1382 “‘constitutes a legislative endorsement of dismissal as a proper
judicial sanction for violation of the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial and as a
legislative determination that a trial delayed more than [the prescribed period] is prima
facie in violation of a defendants constitutional right.’ [Citation.] Thus, an accused is
entitled to a dismissal if he is ‘brought to trial’ beyond the time fixed in section 1382.
[Citation.]” (Rhinehart v. Municipal Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 776.)
Under section 1382, subdivision (a)(2), a defendant accused of a felony must be
brought to trial within 60 days of arraignment on an information. If the defendant
requests or consents to trying the case beyond the 60-day period, the defendant must be
17 brought to trial on the date set for trial or within 10 days thereafter. (§ 1382, subd.
(a)(2).)
C. Forfeiture
On four occasions, defendant personally objected to the trial court continuing the
trial. He objected on June 12, 2012, July 20, 2012, July 25, 2012, and August 1, 2012.
On each occasion, Miranda did not file a motion to dismiss the case based on a violation
of defendant’s speedy trial rights in the lower court. “A defendant’s consent that his trial
be set for a date beyond the limit prescribed ‘is equivalent to a postponement upon his
application’ [citation] and hence constitutes a waiver of the right; and consent will be
presumed if the defendant fails to take the necessary procedural steps of making timely
objection to such delay and thereafter moving for dismissal [citation].” (People v. Wilson
(1963) 60 Cal.2d 139, 146; original and added italics.) Hence, “[t]he right to a speedy
trial must therefore be asserted, if at all, in the court where the prosecution is pending,
and prior to the commencement of trial. [Citation.] It is too late to raise the point for the
first time on appeal. [Citations.]” (Ibid.) This includes if a defendant objects to the date
set but fails to file a timely motion to dismiss. (Ibid.) A defendant must demand a
motion to dismiss. (Id. at p. 147; Castaneda v. Municipal Court (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d
588, 593-594.) Defendant thus forfeited any claim of violation of his rights to a speedy
trial by failing to take the necessary steps to file a motion to dismiss the charges as
required.
18 D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant alternatively argues that, if his speedy trial objection was forfeited
because he did not file a motion to dismiss, forfeiture does not apply because his attorney
was ineffective in not filing a motion to dismiss and not challenging the rulings
continuing the trial. Defendant asserts that, in this regard, his attorney’s conduct “fell
below the standard of reasonableness and that he was prejudiced by that conduct.”
(People v. Espiritu (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 718, 725.)
To secure the reversal of a conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must show (1) his counsel’s performance was deficient when measured against
the standard of a reasonably competent attorney, and (2) counsel’s deficient performance
so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be
relied on as having produced a just result. The appellate court must presume counsel’s
conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and accord great
deference to counsel’s tactical decisions. (People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 674.)
Further, because it is inappropriate for a reviewing court to speculate about the
tactical reasons for counsel’s actions, when the reasons are not readily apparent in the
record, the court will not reverse unless the record discloses no conceivable tactical
purpose. (People v. Lewis, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 674-675.) If the record sheds no light
on the reasons for counsel’s actions, a claim of ineffective assistance is more
19 appropriately decided in a habeas corpus proceeding. (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997)
15 Cal.4th 264, 266-267.)
Here, the record shows that each of the four continuance requests was reasonable
and founded on conceivable tactical reasons, which included being available and
prepared for trial. In addition, the continuances were relatively brief (38 days, five days,
seven days, and 13 days); the case was not a relatively old case, as noted by the court; the
trial began within six months of defendant’s arraignment on the second amended
information on February 12, 2012, and within approximately 60 days after expiration of
the last period of time defendant had personally agreed to (June 15, 2012).
Under these circumstances and, according great deference to counsel’s tactical
decisions, we cannot say defense counsel’s conduct of requesting the four brief trial
continuances and not filing motions to dismiss, fell below the standard of reasonableness
or that defendant was prejudiced by Miranda’s conduct. (People v. Espiritu, supra, 199
Cal.App.4th at p. 725.) Defendant argues he was prejudiced by being deprived of his
right to a speedy trial because he ultimately served 267 days of “dead time” in jail, which
could have been avoided had his attorney filed a successful motion to dismiss. But it is
highly unlikely that the trial court would have granted a motion to dismiss based on the
brief continuances, which were necessary in order for defense counsel to be present and
fully prepare for trial. Defendant has not demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel.
20 E. Good Cause for the Continuances
Defendant contends there was not good cause for the four continuances in June,
July, and August 2012. He argues that the trial court erred in finding good cause for
delaying trial based on Miranda being engaged in another trial, attending a previously
scheduled legal seminar, and needing additional time to prepare for trial. Defendant also
asserts that courtroom congestion is not a valid basis for violating his right to a speedy
trial. Defendant argues that there was nothing in the record suggesting that these
scheduling conflicts and factors were unexpected or out of the ordinary.
We note that it was not until June 12, 2012, that defendant personally objected to
any further continuances of the trial. Up until that time, defendant had agreed to the
continuances and to waive his right to a speedy trial. As discussed above, the subsequent
four continuance requests by Miranda were because Miranda was engaged in trial,
Miranda needed additional time to prepare, additional time was needed to complete
transcripts for trial, and Miranda wanted to attend a previously planned legal seminar.
The record does not show that defendant’s trial was continued because of courtroom
congestion.
“‘A continuance granted at the request of counsel normally constitutes . . . good
cause [citation], at least in the absence of evidence showing incompetency of counsel
[citation] or circumstances where counsel’s request for a continuance is prompted only by
the need to [serve] other clients and the defendant himself objects to the delay.
21 [Citation.]’” (People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 852-853, quoting People v.
Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 389.) Here, there was no showing Miranda was
incompetent or that the continuances were solely based on his need to serve other clients.
The record shows that the continuances were based on, not only Miranda being engaged
in trial, but also on Miranda needing additional time to prepare for trial.
While some of the reasons for requesting the four continuances, alone, might not
constitute good cause to continue the trial, there was a sufficient basis for finding good
cause for the four continuances based on the totality of the circumstances. Miranda
indicated he needed additional time to adequately prepare for defendant’s trial. In
addition, the continuances were relatively brief; the case had not been pending very long;
and the trial had been continued once before the request for a continuance on June 12,
2012. “If counsel seeks reasonable time to prepare a defendant’s case, and the delay is
for defendant’s benefit, a continuance over the defendant’s objection is justified.”
(People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 556.)
We conclude there was good cause for granting the four brief continuances when
counsel announced he was engaged in another trial and not ready to try defendant’s case.
“‘Although a criminal defendant may not be deprived of a speedy trial because the
prosecution—or the defense—is lazy or indifferent, or because the prosecution seeks to
harass the defendant rather than bring him fairly to justice, a criminal defendant may not
juggle his constitutional rights in an attempt to evade prosecution. He may not demand a
22 speedy trial and demand adequate representation, and, by the simple expedient of
refusing to cooperate with his attorney, force a trial court to choose between the two
demands, in the hope that a reviewing court will find that the trial court has made the
wrong choice.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 556.) Based on
the totality of the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in
determining good cause existed to grant the brief trial continuances. (People v.
Sutton (2010) 48 Cal.4th 533, 546.)
F. Prejudice
Defendant has also not demonstrated he was prejudiced by the four continuances
of his trial in June, July, and August 2012. Post conviction review of a speedy trial claim
requires that the defendant show prejudice flowing from the delay of the trial. (People v.
Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 750, 769; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 574.)
Defendant argues he does not have to show prejudice since remand is required based on
other reversible errors raised in this appeal, such as the trial court’s failure to give a
unanimity instruction and provide a Marsden hearing. Defendant further argues that,
assuming this court rejects those errors, the trial delay was prejudicial because he was
incarcerated for 56 days in excess of his sentence, resulting in (1) unwarranted prolonged
imprisonment and (2) anxiety and public suspicion of defendant facing untried
accusations.
23 The four continuances, amounting to a total of 63 days, did result in extending
defendant’s incarceration, resulting in defendant remaining in custody for 56 days in
excess of his sentence but this was attributable in large part to delays up until June 12,
2012, defendant and his attorney agreed to. Furthermore, as discussed above, the four
continuances defendant objected to were for good cause and relatively brief.
The state constitutional right to a speedy trial “‘“serves a three-fold purpose . . . .”’
[Citation.] ‘“It protects the accused . . . against prolonged imprisonment; it relieves him
of the anxiety and public suspicion attendant upon an untried accusation of crime; and . . .
it prevents him from being ‘exposed to the hazard of a trial, after so great a lapse of time’
that ‘the means of proving his innocence may not be within his reach’—as, for instance,
by the loss of witnesses or the dulling of memory.”’ [Citation.] The question posed in
evaluating a speedy trial claim is whether delay at the state’s hands unreasonably
prejudices these interests. [Citations.] The test is necessarily a balancing one: ‘prejudice
to the defendant resulting from the delay must be weighed against justification for the
delay.’ [Citation.]” (Craft v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1533, 1540.)
Similarly, once the federal constitutional speedy trial right attaches, courts balance
four criteria to determine whether the right has been violated: (1) the length of the delay;
(2) whether the government or the defendant is more to blame for the delay; (3) whether
the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial in due course; and (4) whether the
defendant suffered prejudice from the delay. (Doggett v. United States (1992) 505 U.S.
24 647, 651-652; Vermont v. Brillon (2009) 556 U.S. 81, 90.) Under the federal
Constitution, an uncommonly long delay creates a rebuttable presumption of prejudice.
(People v. Lowe (2007) 40 Cal.4th 937, 942.) In contrast, when only the state
constitutional speedy trial right applies, the defendant has the initial burden to
affirmatively show prejudice; the burden then shifts to the prosecution to show
justification for the delay; and then the court weighs the justification against the actual
prejudice suffered by the defendant. (Ibid.)
The length of the delay “is actually a double enquiry. Simply to trigger a speedy
trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has
crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from ‘presumptively prejudicial’ delay, [citation]
since, by definition, he cannot complain that the government has denied him a ‘speedy’
trial if it has, in fact, prosecuted his case with customary promptness. If the accused
makes this showing, the court must then consider, as one factor among several, the extent
to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial
examination of the claim. [Citation.] This latter enquiry is significant to the speedy trial
analysis because . . . the presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused
intensifies over time.” (Doggett v. United States, supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 651-652.)6 By
requesting continuances or waiving time, a defendant relinquishes the federal right to a
6 In Doggett, the period of delay between accusation and trial was eight years six months.
25 speedy trial. Consequently, those periods are not included in calculating the length of the
delay. (People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 633-634.)
Here there was no violation of defendant’s federal right to a speedy trial. (1) The
length of the delay totaling 63 days and each of the four continuances were relatively
brief; (2) both the government and defendant were equally responsible for the delay,
since both the prosecution and defense requested and stipulated to several continuances,
up through June 12, 2012; (3) defendant did not assert his right to a speedy trial until
almost a year after the original felony complaint was filed and the case was tried about
two months after defendant first objected to further continuances; and (4) as to prejudice,
defendant has not established prejudice sufficient to constitute a violation of his federal
right to a speedy trial because, although his time in custody exceeded his sentence, this
was not solely attributable to the four continuances, and the delay from continuances was
not uncommonly long. (Doggett v. United States, supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 651-652;
Vermont v. Brillon, supra, 556 U.S. at p. 90.) There also is no evidence or claim that the
four trial continuances resulted in an unfair trial.
We therefore simply cannot say, given the circumstances of this case, the 63-day
delay constituted a violation of defendant’s state or federal constitutional rights to a
speedy trial.
26 V
MARSDEN HEARING
Defendant maintains that the court’s failure to conduct a Marsden hearing to
explore the reasons for his dissatisfaction with his trial attorney requires reversal of the
judgment.
On June 12, 2012, defendant’s attorney, Miranda, told the court a continuance of
the trial was warranted in part because defendant had requested a Marsden hearing. The
court continued the trial without holding a Marsden hearing at that time.
On July 25, 2012, the trial court again granted a week continuance of the trial over
defendant’s objection. After the court granted the continuance, defendant complained:
“Ever since June I’ve asked you if I can fire Mr. Miranda and back in June you didn’t
want to hear me out. You told me you were gonna ask for a Marsden hearing, that there
was no courtroom available to even hear me out. I’m tired of these little games Mr.
Miranda keeps on playing. He’s purposely not subpoenaing any records I’m asking him
to. He just started interviewing my witnesses.” In response, the court noted defendant
had the option of hiring a private attorney or representing himself but that would likely
result in delaying the trial to allow additional time for trial preparation. Alternatively,
defendant could wait for Miranda, who was already familiar with the case and a “pretty
27 senior attorney,” to try his case. Noting that the case was not old, the trial court ordered
the case continued to August 1, 2012.
The principles set forth in People v. Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118, are well
settled. “‘“‘When a defendant seeks to discharge his appointed counsel and substitute
another attorney, and asserts inadequate representation, the trial court must permit the
defendant to explain the basis of his contention and to relate specific instances of the
attorney’s inadequate performance. [Citation.] A defendant is entitled to relief if the
record clearly shows that the first appointed attorney is not providing adequate
representation [citation] or that defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an
irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result.’” [Citation.]’”
(People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 487-488; People v. Vines (2011) 51 Cal.4th 830,
878.) Under Marsden, if the “‘defendant complains about the adequacy of appointed
counsel,’ the trial court has the duty to ‘permit [him or her] to articulate his [or her]
causes of dissatisfaction and, if any of them suggest ineffective assistance, to conduct an
inquiry sufficient to ascertain whether counsel is in fact rendering effective assistance.’
[Citations.]” (People v. Mendez (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1362, 1367.)
“‘[A] criminal defendant, at any stage of the trial, must be given the opportunity to
state reasons for a request for new counsel.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lopez (2008) 168
Cal.App.4th 801, 814.) “After hearing from the defendant, a trial court is within its
28 discretion in denying the motion unless the defendant establishes substantial impairment
of his right to counsel. [Citation.] On appeal we review the denial for an abuse of
discretion.” (People v. Vera (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 970, 979.)
C. Analysis
Defendant contends that on two occasions, on June 12 and July 25, 2012, the trial
court violated his constitutional right to effective counsel by not holding a Marsden
hearing. We disagree. Although at the June 12, 2012 hearing, Miranda mentioned that
defendant had requested a Marsden hearing and the court clerk had said a courtroom was
not available at that time for hearing his Marsden request, the request was abandoned.
The record indicates that neither defendant nor Miranda made a subsequent request for a
Marsden hearing. A request for a Marsden hearing was not unequivocally renewed after
the June 12 hearing. Defendant did not request a Marsden hearing at the July 20 or July
25, 2012 hearings.
During the July 25, 2012 hearing, defendant’s attorney requested a trial
continuance. In response, defendant complained that a courtroom had not been available
on June 12 to hold a Marsden hearing and that he was annoyed with his attorney and the
trial delays. Defendant, however, did not make an unequivocal request for a new
attorney or request a Marsden hearing. (People v. Dickey (2005) 35 Cal.4th 884, 920.)
“‘“Although no formal motion is necessary, there must be ‘at least some clear indication
by defendant that he wants a substitute attorney.”’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
29 Defendant’s complaints about his attorney and reference to a Marsden hearing on
July 25, were made in the context of complaining about the trial court granting his
attorney’s request to continue defendant’s trial. Defendant complained that his attorney
was playing games. In response, the court told defendant he could hire another attorney
or represent himself, which would likely cause additional delay of the trial, or,
alternatively, defendant could wait for his current attorney, who was familiar with
defendant’s case and an experienced attorney. Since defendant did not indicate he
wanted another attorney, the trial court granted a brief trial continuance. Under such
circumstances, the trial court did not violate defendant’s constitutional right to effective
counsel by not holding a Marsden hearing.
VI
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS CHALLENGE
Defendant contends he should be acquitted of his convictions for the lesser
included offenses of battery and assault because the charges were time-barred. We
disagree. Defendant forfeited his statute of limitations challenge by requesting the trial
court to instruct on the lesser included offenses.
Defendant was charged with rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2); counts 1 - 4) and sexual
penetration by a person over the age of 21, with another person under the age of 16
(§ 289, subd. (i)). The charged offenses allegedly took place between January 1, 2003
and July 29, 2005. A felony complaint, filed on June 3, 2011, and the information, filed
30 on February 6, 2012, were both filed more than one year after the date of the alleged
offenses.
Prosecution for a felony described in section 290, subdivision (a)(2)(A), which
includes rape (§ 261) and sexual penetration (§ 289, subd. (i)), “shall be commenced
within 10 years after commission of the offense.” (§ 801.1, subd. (b).) Commencement
of prosecution occurs when a case is certified to the superior court—that is, when a
defendant is held to answer after a preliminary hearing. (See § 804, subd. (c); see, e.g.,
People v. Angel (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1145-1146.) On January 24, 2012,
defendant was held to answer for the rape and sexual penetration charges, which led to
defendant’s convictions for the lesser included offenses of battery and assault.
The jury acquitted defendant of the felony rape and sexual penetration charges and
convicted him of the lesser included misdemeanor offenses of battery (§ 242; counts 1-4)
and assault (§ 240; count 6), which are subject to a one-year statute of limitations (§ 802,
subd. (a)). “The limitation of time applicable to an offense that is necessarily included
within a greater offense is the limitation of time applicable to the lesser included offense,
regardless of the limitation of time applicable to the greater offense.” (§ 805, subd. (b);
see People v. Statum (2002) 28 Cal.4th 682, 699.)
Defendant asserts that, since he was convicted of misdemeanor battery and assault
as lesser included offenses, the applicable limitations period is one year and the
conviction time-barred. We disagree.
31 In People v. Williams (1999) 21 Cal.4th 335, our high court held that a defendant
may raise at any time the statute of limitations for conviction of a charge that in the
charging document is, on its face, untimely. But the Williams court expressly declined to
address what rules “apply to convictions of time-barred lesser offenses when the charged
offense is not time-barred.” (Id. at p. 338.)
In People v. Stanfill (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1137 (Stanfill), the court addressed this
question. In Stanfill, the defendant requested instructions on a lesser included offense
and was convicted of the same. (Id. at pp. 1139, 1142.) On appeal, he claimed the lesser
offense was time-barred. (Id. at pp. 1142, 1144.) The Stanfill court held that “a
defendant forfeits the right to complain on appeal of conviction of a time-barred lesser
included offense where the charged offense was not time-barred and the defendant either
requested or acquiesced in the giving of instructions on the lesser offense.” (Id. at p.
1150.)
Here, the charged offenses of rape and sexual penetration were not time-barred but
the lesser included misdemeanor offenses of assault and battery were barred by the one-
year statute of limitations. Nevertheless, reversal of the convictions is not required
because defendant forfeited his statute of limitations objection by requesting jury
instructions on the lesser included offenses, including CALCRIM Nos. 915 (assault), 960
(battery), and 3517 (verdict forms for lesser included offenses).
32 While reviewing the jury instructions, the trial court granted defendant’s request to
dismiss count 5 on the ground it was barred by the three-year statute of limitations.
Defense counsel made no objections to counts 1 through 4, count 6, or the lesser included
offenses of battery and assault, based on the statute of limitations. Defendant thus
acquiesced on the lesser included offense instructions by not objecting to them. To
acquiesce is to “accept, comply, or submit tacitly or passively.” (Webster’s Collegiate
Dict. (10th ed. 1993) p. 10.) Defendant has therefore forfeited his right to raise on appeal
the statute of limitations on the lesser offenses. (Stanfill, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p.
Defendant argues that People v. Beasley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1078 controls the
issue here and urges this court not to follow Stanfill. In Beasley, the court reversed the
defendant’s conviction on the time-barred lesser included offenses. (Beasley, at p. 1090.)
The court found Stanfill inapplicable because “nothing in the record indicates Beasley
requested or acquiesced in the instruction on assault as a lesser included offense of
assault with a deadly weapon . . . .” (Ibid.) But as we discussed above, the record here
indicates that defense counsel acquiesced in the giving of the lesser offense instructions
by requesting instructions on the lesser included offenses and by not objecting to them
based on the statute of limitations. Defendant has therefore forfeited his right to raise the
statute of limitations on the lesser offense on appeal. (Stanfill, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1150.)
33 We decline defendant’s urging that, despite defendant failing to preserve the
statute of limitations objection for review, this court nevertheless exercise its discretion to
review the issue.
VII
RESTITUTION FINE
Defendant correctly asserts that the trial court imposed an improper restitution
fine. Defendant argues that the trial court should have credited two of his excess days in
custody to eliminate his $100 restitution fine. Defendant was incarcerated for 56 days in
excess of his sentence. The trial court appropriately converted 20 of his excess days to
satisfy his $1,000 conviction fine, at a rate of $50 per day, but did not similarly satisfy his
$100 restitution fine under section 1202.4, subdivision (b), as well.
Under former section 2900.5, subdivision (a), in effect at the time of sentencing,
“when the defendant has been in custody . . . , all days of custody of the defendant,
including days . . . credited to the period of confinement pursuant to Section 4019, . . .
shall be credited upon his or her term of imprisonment, or credited to any fine, including,
but not limited to, base fines, on a proportional basis, that may be imposed, at the rate of
not less than thirty dollars ($30) per day, or more, in the discretion of the court imposing
the sentence. If the total number of days in custody exceeds the number of days of the
term of imprisonment to be imposed, the entire term of imprisonment shall be deemed to
have been served. In any case where the court has imposed both a prison or jail term of
34 imprisonment and a fine, any days to be credited to the defendant shall first be applied to
the term of imprisonment imposed, and thereafter the remaining days, if any, shall be
applied to the fine on a proportional basis, including, but not limited to, base fines and
restitution fines.”
The People agree, as does this court, that the trial court should have used two
additional days of custody credit to satisfy defendant’s $100 restitution fine. The trial
court thus must modify defendant’s sentence accordingly.
VIII
DISPOSITION
The trial court is directed to modify defendant’s judgment to reflect that
defendant’s $100 restitution fine is ordered converted to two days in custody, at the rate
of $50 a day, and the fine is ordered suspended. In all other regards, the judgment is
affirmed. The superior court is ordered to issue a modified abstract of judgment and to
forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. As
modified, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS CODRINGTON J. We concur:
RICHLI Acting P. J.
MILLER J. 35