People v. Quitugua

• Court: Superior Court of Guam
• Decided: September 8, 2014
• Docket: CF0078-14
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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6 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM

7 THE PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) 8 ) CRIMINAL CASE NO. CF0078-14 9 vs. ) ) DECISION AND ORDER 10 ANTONIO ROKE QUITUGUA, ) ) 11 Defendant. ) 12 --------------------------~) 13 INTRODUCTION 14 This matter came before the Honorable James L. Canto II on Defendant Antonio Roke 15 Quitugua's motion to suppress, filed April 14, 2014. Oral arguments were heard on June 23, 16 2014 and August 8, 2014. Assistant Attorney Generals J. Basil O'Mallan III and Brian D. 17 Gallagher appeared on behalf of the Government, Assistant Public Defender Shane F.T. Black 18 represented Defendant. Having considered the parties' briefs, oral arguments, and the 19 applicable law, the Court now issues the following Decision and Order. 20 BACKGROUND 21 Defendant is charged with the offense of (1) Burglary, as a second degree felony; (2) 22 Conspiracy to Commit Burglary, as a second degree felony; (3) Theft of a Firearm, as a third 23 degree felony; (4) Theft Receiving a Motor Vehicle, as a second degree felony; and (5) 24 Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle, as a misdemeanor. Each are alleged to have occurred on 25 or about February 2, 2014. (Indictment, 1-3, Feb. 25, 2014). 26 On February 18, 2014, Guam Police Detective Richard B. Veluz (hereinafter "Detective 27 Veluz") was assisting in a suspect check of Defendant in the follow-up investigation of a 28

Page 1 of7 burglary complaint where firearms were stolen from a residence in Yigo. (Testimony of 2 Richard B. Veluz, Record Log at 9:12:23, Jun. 23, 2014). Upon arrival at Defendant's 3 residence with other detectives around 9:30a.m. and after splitting up to survey the residence, 4 Detective Veluz witnessed another detective speaking to Defendant. !d. The detective told 5 Defendant that his presence was needed and asked if he would go to their office for questioning. 6 !d. Defendant complied with the Detective's request and gave verbal consent to search the 7 residence for weapons related to the burglary complaint, but no weapons were found. !d. At 8 around 9:49 a.m. in front of Defendant's residence, Detective Veluz read Defendant the 9 Custodial Rights Form and advised Defendant of his Miranda rights. !d.; (Testimony of 10 Richard B. Veluz, Record Log at 9:43:40, Aug. 4, 2014). Defendant appeared to have 11 understood his rights when he signed the form. (Testimony of Richard B. Veluz, Record Log at 12 9:17:12, Jun. 23, 2014). The detectives then asked Defendant to come down to their office for 13 further questioning related to the case, and Defendant agreed. !d. The detectives patted 14 Defendant down and transported him to the Criminal Investigation Section (hereinafter "CIS"). 15 !d. Defendant was never handcuffed. !d. 16 At an interview room in CIS, the detectives reminded Defendant of his Miranda rights. 17 !d. The detectives asked Defendant why he was brought in for questioning, whereupon 18 Defendant responded that he knew the reason and consented to the interview. !d. At no time 19 during the interview did Defendant express that he wished to speak to an attorney. !d. During 20 the interview, Defendant stated that he was involved in the burglary and there were two other 21 people involved: Joshua and Jathan Tedtaotao. !d. Defendant informed the detectives that he 22 was with Joshua and Jathan Tedtaotao on the day the burglary took place, that he was in a 23 vehicle with Joshua at the residence that was burglarized, and that Defendant received a call 24 from Jathan to bring the vehicle closer to the residence. !d. Defendant said that he assisted in 25 moving the firearms into the vehicle. !d. Defendant indicated that he went to a residence in 26 Okkodo and saw an individual holding the same rifle that they took from the Yigo residence. 27 !d. Based on Defendant's statements, a search warrant was issued. !d. The weapon that 28 Defendant mentioned was found at the Okkodo residence. !d. Sometime after lunch, Defendant

Page 2 of7 traveled with the detectives to identify the residence, and he was not handcuffed during this 2 time. /d. After the identification, Defendant was taken back to the interview room. /d. 3 The Government asserts that Defendant was not taken to a magistrate in the afternoon on 4 February 18, 2014 because he was being interviewed regarding the burglary. (Testimony of 5 Richard B. Veluz, Record Log at 9:41:40, Aug. 4, 2014). Defendant was placed under arrest at 6 5:24 p.m. on February 18, 2014. !d. Defendant was not questioned any further, and the 7 investigation was concluded after Defendant was placed under arrest. Id. After Defendant was 8 advised of his Miranda rights at around 9:49 a.m. on February 18, 2014, Defendant never 9 invoked his right to counsel. /d. It is undisputed that Defendant was brought before a 10 magistrate sometime in the early afternoon, after 1:00 p.m., on February 20, 2014. (Opp'n

11 Mot., Exhibit 3, Apr. 28, 2014); (Reply, 3, May 7, 2014). 12 On April 14, 2014, Defendant filed a motion to suppress statements made by Defendant

13 to law enforcement agents on February 18, 2014. Defendant argues that his statements should 14 be suppressed because: (1) they were made after unnecessary delay; and (2) they were made 15 outside an attorney's presence after he invoked his right to an attorney. (Mot. Suppress, 5-11,

16 Apr. 14, 2014). 17 On April 29, 2014, the Government filed an opposition. The Government contests that

18 many of the facts alleged by Defendant are untrue. (Opp'n Mot., 2, Apr. 29, 2014). 19 Furthermore, the Government argues that there was no unnecessary delay in presentment to a 20 magistrate when the time between Defendant's formal arrest and Defendant's presentment to

21 the magistrate occurred within forty eight (48) hours. /d. at 6. In support of this argument, the 22 Government cites the Supreme Court of Guam's decision in People v. Santos, 2003 Guam 1 'If 23 62 and People v. Camacho, 1999 Guam 27 'If 34. /d. In those decisions, the Supreme Court of 24 Guam determined 48 hours as the outer limit for the time of presentment to a magistrate. /d. As

25 to Defendant's argument that the officers questioning him violated his Miranda rights, refusing 26 to cease questioning after he invoked his right to counsel, the Government contends that 27 Defendant did not invoke his right to counsel during the interview and thus there was no

28 constitutional violation. /d. at 7.

Page 3 of7 On May 7, 2014, Defendant filed a reply. Defendant contends that the present case can 2 be distinguished from the Supreme Court of Guam's custody analysis in People v. Santos and 3 People v. Camacho. (Reply, 2, May 7, 2014). Defendant asserts that the period of delay with 4 which Defendant was brought before a magistrate should be measured from the morning of 5 February 18, 2014 because this was the time ofhis actual arrest under 8 GCA § 20.10. !d. at 5. 6 Because he was not brought to a magistrate for over 48 hours in violation of 8 GCA § 45.10 (c), 7 Defendant argues that, despite any rights waiver, the delay was unreasonable under the 8 McNabb-Mallory rule, where voluntary confessions are inadmissible if given after an 9 unreasonable delay in presentment. !d. 10 DISCUSSION 11 Under Guam law, "[a]n officer making an arrest under a warrant or any person making 12 an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before a l3 judge of the Superior Court." 8 GCA § 45.10(a) (2013). Unless the government can 14 demonstrate that a bona fide emergency or an extraordinary circumstance existed, "[t]he person 15 arrested shall in all cases be taken before the judge within forty-eight (48) hours after the 16 arrest." 8 GCA § 45.10(c) (2013) (emphasis in original). Under the McNabb-Mallory rule, 17 "any evidence obtained by police during interrogation after arrest, may not be used against that 18 arrestee at trial where there was an unreasonable delay in bringing the arrestee before a 19 magistrate for arraignment." People v. Santos, 2003 Guam, 61 (internal footnote and citations 20 omitted) (emphasis added). The Court shall first determine when Defendant was arrested. 21 Thereafter, the Court shall determine whether the evidence obtained by police after his arrest, if 22 any, warrants suppression under the McNabb-Mallory rule. 23 I. The Arrest 24 The parties dispute when Defendant was arrested. Defendant argues that he was arrested 25 at some point between 9 a.m. and 10 a.m. on February 18, 2014 when the detectives appeared in 26 front of his residence, read him his rights pursuant to the Custodial Rights Form, and 27 transported Defendant to CIS. (Reply, 2-3, May 7, 2014). Accordingly, his presentment to a 28 magistrate after 1:00 p.m. on February 20,2014 was outside the maximum time period set out in

Page 4 of7 8 GCA § 45.10(c). !d. at 3. The Government contends that Defendant was formally arrested at 2 5:24 p.m. on February 18, 2014, and that he was presented to a magistrate within forty eight 3 (48) hours after the arrest. (Opp'n Mot., 6, Apr. 28, 2014). 4 Under Guam law, "[a]n arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person." 8 GCA § 5 20.1 0. Handcuffs curtail the freedom of movement by actual restraint and constitute an arrest. 6 People v. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 ~~ 19-20 (quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 67 7 (1968)). An arrest may also occur even if police have not formally arrested the person, or if 8 there is no physical restraint when, "in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the 9 incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." !d. at 20 IO (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)). II Based upon the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing, the Court finds that I2 Defendant was arrested at 5:24p.m. on February 18, 2014. Defendant was never handcuffed 13 before 5:24 p.m. and the detectives only asked Defendant for his cooperation, to which he I4 complied. Furthermore, evidence was presented at the suppression hearing to support a finding I5 that Defendant was never actually restrained. Thus there is a lack of sufficient evidence to show I6 that, considering all the circumstances presented, a reasonable person in Defendant's situation I7 would have believed that he or she was not free to leave. !d. In addition, this Court's decision I8 as to the time of arrest is supported by Guam Supreme Court precedent. I9 In People v. Camacho, upon de novo review, the Supreme Court of Guam affirmed the 20 trial court's decision that the defendant was arrested at 6:20 p.m. People v. Camacho, 1999 2I Guam 27 ~~ 17, 34. Prior to the arrest, the defendant agreed to accompany the police officers to 22 CIS at approximately 7:39a.m. on the same date, gave incriminating statements during one of 23 two interviews, drew sketches of the events in question, and reenacted the incident. Camacho, 24 1999 Guam 27 ~~ 6-10. Like the defendant in Camacho, who cooperated with the police in 25 various ways for approximately 11 hours, Defendant in the present case cooperated for a shorter 26 period of approximately 8 hours. Because the Guam Supreme Court found that the defendant in 27 Camacho was not under arrest during his approximately 11 hour cooperation with the police 28 where the Camacho defendant was asked to cooperate in more ways than Defendant here, the

Page 5 of7 Court is bound by precedent to find that Defendant was not under arrest in this case until his

2 formal arrest at 5:24p.m. 3 II. The Effect of the McNabb-Mallory Rule 4 Having found that the arrest occurred at 5:24 p.m. on February 28, 2014, suppression 5 under the McNabb-Mallory rule is not warranted in this case because Defendant did not make 6 any statements pertaining to the investigation after his arrest. Santos, 2003 Guam ~ 61. 7 Moreover, there was no violation of 8 GCA § 45.10(c) because Defendant was presented to a 8 magistrate within 48 hours ofhis arrest. 8 GCA § 45.10(c) (2013) 9 It bears noting that Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights on at least two 10 occasions before his arrest. (Testimony ofRichard B. Veluz, Record Log at 9:12:23, Jun. 23, 11 2014); (Testimony of Richard B. Veluz, Record Log at 9:43:40, Aug. 4, 2014). Even after he 12 was advised of his rights, Defendant agreed to cooperate with the detectives. (Testimony of 13 Richard B. Veluz, Record Log at 9:12:23, Jun. 23, 2014). The Supreme Court of Guam has 14 acknowledged that "the fundamental concerns that led to the Mallory and McNabb decisions are 15 adequately addressed by compliance with the requirements of Miranda." People v. Santos, 16 2003 Guam 1 ~ 63 (quoting United States v. Bell, 740 A.2d 958, 964 (D.C.1999)). 17 Consequently, in light of Defendant's waiver, questions regarding the voluntariness of 18 Defendant's statements and related concerns stemming from the McNabb-Mallory rule are not

19 disputable in this case. !d. 20 For these reasons, Defendant's motion to suppress under the McNabb-Mallory rule is 21 denied. Defendant alternatively sought suppression by arguing that Defendant invoked his right 22 to an attorney and was subjected to interrogation outside of an attorney's presence. (Mot. 23 Suppress, 10, Apr. 14, 2014). However, evidence was presented during the suppression hearing 24 indicating that Defendant never invoked his right to counsel. No evidence to the contrary was 25 presented. Therefore, Defendant's motion to suppress under this alternately theory is also

26 denied. 21 Ill 28 Ill

Page 6 of7 CONCLUSION 2 Based upon the foregoing, Defendant's motion to suppress is hereby DENIED. 3

4 SO ORDERED this _1TH~_...J.....__ day of September, 2014. 5

8 Judge, Superior Court of Guam 9

Deputy rl<, superior Court of '3uam

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