People v. Quiroz

2024 IL App (1st) 232061-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: January 16, 2024
• Docket: 1-23-2061
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2024 IL App (1st) 232061-U FIRST DISTRICT, FIRST DIVISION January 16, 2024

No. 1-23-2061B

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). _____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT _____________________________________________________________________________

) Appeal from the THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Circuit Court of ) Cook County, Illinois. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) v. ) No. 23 CR 0781201 ) ANNA M. QUIROZ, ) Honorable ) Jill C. Marisie, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding. _____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE COGHLAN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Lavin and Pucinski concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The trial court’s order denying defendant’s pretrial release is affirmed where the court’s findings that defendant committed an eligible offense, posed a real and present threat to the safety of the victim and the community, and that no less restrictive conditions could mitigate that threat were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶2 Defendant Anna M. Quiroz appeals from the trial court’s order denying her pretrial

release pursuant to the recent amendments to article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of

1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/100-1 et seq. (West 2022)), commonly known as the Safety,

Accountability, Fairness and Equity-Today (SAFE-T) Act or Pretrial Fairness Act (Act). See No. 1-23-2061B

Pub. Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023); Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52 (lifting stay and

setting effective date as September 18, 2023). For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶3 BACKGROUND

¶4 Defendant was arrested and charged with aggravated domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-

3.3(a-5) (West 2022)) and aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(1) (West 2022)). On June

28, 2023, the day following her arrest, defendant was ordered held on a $350,000 “D” bond.

Defendant was unable to post bond and remained in pretrial detention.

¶5 On October 10, 2023, defendant filed a “Petition to Remove a Financial Condition of

Pretrial Release,” requesting a hearing under section 5/110-5(e) of the Code since she was

“ordered released with pretrial conditions,” but remained in pretrial detention after the

amendments to the Code took effect. See 725 ILCS 5/110-7.5(b) (West 2022); 725 ILCS 5/110-

5(e) (West 2022). On November 1, 2023, the State filed a verified petition to deny pretrial

release, alleging that defendant committed an eligible offense of aggravated domestic battery and

“poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community.” See

725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(4) (West 2022)).

¶6 A pretrial release hearing was held on November 1, 2023. According to the State’s

proffer, defendant and the 73-year-old victim met several years ago through work. The victim

allowed defendant to live with him “from time to time,” including while she was on electronic

home monitoring for an unrelated aggravated battery in 2018. In April of 2022, the victim served

defendant with an eviction notice, and she moved out. The defendant subsequently “reached out

to the victim to gather her belongings but ended up staying for more prolonged periods of time.”

The victim tried to get defendant to leave by calling the police, but “was advised the eviction

notice had expired.”

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¶7 A few weeks prior to June 7, 2023, defendant reached out to the victim and asked him to

bring her belongings down to the lobby of the apartment. While he did so, defendant entered the

victim’s unlocked apartment and “refused to leave.” The victim let her stay for the next few

weeks.

¶8 On the evening of June 26, 2023, the defendant “was drinking and became hostile

towards the victim.” The victim called the police, but he was told there was nothing they could

do since defendant lived there. After the police left, defendant “continued to drink and be

aggressive towards the victim.” She was “talking to herself and throwing items around” the

apartment. Defendant threw a bucket of water onto the floor. While the victim was cleaning up,

defendant “grabbed [him] around the neck.” She “used one hand to squeeze the victim’s neck

while using the other hand to strike [him] with a closed fist in a hammer like motion.” When the

victim “pushed” defendant off, she “grabbed” him by the shoulder and “kicked [him] about the

lower half of his body.” The victim was able to get away and call 911. He sustained “long thick

scratch marks near his collar bone,” which were observed by the police.

¶9 Defendant was convicted of aggravated battery to a police officer in 2018 and received

two years’ probation for that offense. Defendant also had two prior domestic battery arrests, one

from 2010, and another from 2022 involving the same victim as the instant case. Both charges

were dismissed.

¶ 10 The State argued that the proof is evident and the presumption great that defendant

committed aggravated domestic battery, which is an eligible offense under the Act. Further,

defendant’s “history of domestic battery arrests and history of aggravated *** battery to a police

officer does show that she also serves a threat to the community and that she is violent.” The

State also argued that “no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the real and

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present threat to the safety of any person *** or the community based on the specific articulable

facts of the case.”

¶ 11 Defense counsel responded that it is “disingenuous for the State to say [defendant] must

be detained” since the State “has offered probation.” Counsel further asserted that the State failed

to meet its burden of showing that the proof is evident and the presumption great that defendant

committed the charged offense because defendant is claiming self-defense and there were no

other witnesses besides the two parties involved. Counsel also argued that the victim “told [him]

that he does feel safe around [defendant]” and has “dropped the other case,” which creates “some

issues of credibility *** with the complaining witness.”

¶ 12 The trial court found that the State proved by “clear and convincing” evidence that

defendant committed aggravated domestic battery. The court noted that defendant was “not

taking” the State’s offer of probation and “the Court has not been privy to the offer or other facts

or circumstances and may not go along with probation.” The court found that defendant’s prior

conviction for aggravated battery to a police officer and her “two prior domestics, one of which

was the same victim,” shows “her propensity for violence.” And in the instant case, defendant

“kicked, strangled, punched, [and] obstructed the 73 year old victim’s breathing.” The trial court

declined to grant defendant pretrial release where she “continu[ed] to show up when she’s

previously been evicted” and poses “a threat to the community or anyone else when she’s under

the influence of alcohol.”

¶ 13 The court further found that it “[did not] have any information about where she would go

and live or stay away from the victim” and that there are no “conditions that will prevent her

from going back there [or] from not consuming alcohol which could have been a precursor in

this case.” Defense counsel requested that defendant be placed on electronic monitoring with

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GPS and that she would stay with “family *** in the community.” The trial court stated that the

family needs to be “notified first and see if the sheriffs are going to allow her or if they’re going

to allow her to stay there” and that counsel could bring it up at the next court date, but the court

wanted it “verified before [it] release[d] her.”

¶ 14 ANALYSIS

¶ 15 Forfeiture

¶ 16 Rule 604(h), which governs appeals under the Act, provides that “the Notice of Appeal

shall describe the relief requested and the grounds for the relief requested.” (Emphasis added.)

Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h) (eff. Sept. 18, 2023). The form notice of appeal prescribed by Rule 606(d)

requires that defendant describe those grounds in detail. Ill. S. Ct. R. 606(d) (eff. Sept. 18, 2023).

“ ‘Supreme Court Rules have the force of law. They are not suggestions, nor are they

aspirational.’ ” People v. Martin, 2023 IL App (4th) 230826, ¶ 18 (quoting Keefe v. Freedom

Graphic Systems, Inc., 348 Ill. App. 3d 591, 593 (2004)). “Although we liberally construe the

contents of the notice of appeal, this court does not have authority to excuse compliance with the

filing requirements of the supreme court rules governing appeals.” Estate of Young v.

Department of Revenue, 316 Ill. App. 3d 366, 373 (2000); see also People v. Lyles, 217 Ill. 2d

210, 220 (2005) (noting that the appellate court is not “empowered to take it upon itself to excuse

violations of [supreme court] rules regarding appeals”).

¶ 17 Defendant argues, for the first time in her appellate memorandum, that (1) a first offense

of aggravated domestic battery is not a detainable offense under the Act because it is

probationable, (2) section 110-6.1(a)(4) of the Code violates the bail clause of the Illinois

Constitution (Ill. Const. art. 1, § 9) as applied to her because it permits the denial of pretrial

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release for a probationable offense, and (3) the State’s petition to deny pretrial release was

untimely.

¶ 18 Even liberally construing defendant’s notice of appeal, it does not implicate these three

arguments. The form notice of appeal utilized by defendant specifically includes a section to

argue that she “was not charged with an offense qualifying for denial or revocation of pretrial

release,” but defendant left this section blank. And nowhere in the notice of appeal does she

challenge the State’s authority to file its petition to deny pretrial release on timeliness grounds

(or otherwise), or the constitutionality of her pretrial detention under the Act. Defendant cannot

circumvent the requirements of Rule 604(h) by raising numerous additional “grounds for the

relief requested” for the first time in her appellate memorandum. Defendant’s failure to include

these arguments in her notice of appeal renders them forfeited. See Martin, 2023 IL App (4th)

230826, ¶ 19 (holding that “any challenge to the propriety of the trial court’s holding of a

detention hearing has been forfeited, and we must limit our review to the issues fairly raised by a

liberal construction of defendant’s notice of appeal”); see also People v. Crago, 2023 IL App

(2d) 230323-U, ¶16 (cited as persuasive authority pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule

23(e)(1) (eff. Feb. 1, 2023)) (finding that “[b]ecause defendant only raises the argument that the

State’s Petition was insufficient based on its timing in his memorandum, we find that he waived

this issue for appellate review” and limiting appellate review to those arguments made “in the

circuit court and in his notice of appeal”).

¶ 19 Defendant’s Pretrial Detention Hearing

¶ 20 Defendant argues that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the

proof was evident or the presumption great that she committed aggravated domestic battery; that

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she posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community; and that no less

restrictive conditions could mitigate that threat.

¶ 21 Pursuant to article 110 of the Code, as amended, “[a]ll defendants shall be presumed

eligible for pretrial release” and pretrial release may only be denied in certain statutorily limited

situations. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West 2022). After filing a timely verified petition requesting

denial of pretrial release, the State has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that:

the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant has committed a qualifying

offense; defendant’s pretrial release poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or

the community or that defendant is a flight risk; and that less restrictive conditions would not

mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community and/or prevent

the defendant’s willful flight from prosecution. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e), (f) (West 2022).

¶ 22 Factors that the trial court may consider in making a “dangerousness” determination, i.e.,

that the defendant poses a real and present threat to any person or the community (725 ILCS

5/110-6.1(g) (West 2022)), include, but are not limited, to (1) the nature and circumstances of

any offense charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence, involving a weapon,

or a sex offense; (2) the history and characteristics of the defendant; (3) the identity of any

person or persons whose safety the defendant is believed to pose a threat, and the nature of the

threat; (4) any statements made by, or attributed to, the defendant; (5) the age and physical

condition of the defendant; (6) the age and physical condition of any victim or complaining

witness; (7) whether the defendant is known to possess or have access to any weapons; (8)

whether at the time of the current offense or any other offense, the defendant was on probation,

parole, or supervised release from custody; and (9) any other factors, including those listed in

section 110-5 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-5 (West 2022)). 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g) (West 2022).

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¶ 23 If the trial court finds the State proved a threat to the safety of any person or the

community, the court must determine which pretrial release conditions, “if any, will reasonably

ensure *** the safety of any other person or the community and the likelihood of compliance by

the defendant with all the conditions of pretrial release.” 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a) (West 2022). In

making this determination, the trial court must consider: (1) the nature and circumstances of the

offense charged; (2) the weight of the evidence against the defendant; (3) the history and

characteristics of the defendant;1 (4) the nature and seriousness of the specific, real and present

threat to any person that would be posed by the defendant’s release; and (5) the nature and

seriousness of the risk of obstructing or attempting to obstruct the criminal justice process. 725

ILCS 5/110-5(a) (West 2022). No singular factor is listed as dispositive. Id.

¶ 24 Section 110-5 also provides that if the defendant is charged with aggravated domestic

battery, the court may consider “additional factors” to determine what conditions, if any, should

be imposed upon pretrial release “regardless of whether an order of protection has been issued

against the person.” 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a)(6) (West 2022). The court may consider the severity

of the alleged incident, which encompasses: the duration of the current incident, whether the

alleged incident involved the use of a weapon, physical injury, sexual assault, and strangulation.

725 ILCS 5/110-5(a)(6)(H) (West 2022). The court may also consider “whether the person has

been, or is, potentially a threat to any other person” and “any other factors deemed by the court

1 The defendant’s history and characteristics include: “the defendant’s character, physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, community ties, past relating to drug or alcohol abuse, conduct, *** criminal history, and record concerning appearance at court proceedings,” as well as “whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the defendant was on probation, parole, or on other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence for an offense under federal law, or the law of this or any other state.” 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a)(3)(A), (B) (West 2022). -8- No. 1-23-2061B

to have a reasonable bearing upon the defendant’s propensity or reputation for violent, abusive,

or assaultive behavior, or lack of that behavior.” 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a)(6)(E), (L) (West 2022).

¶ 25 In order to reverse a trial court’s denial of pretrial release, the reviewing court must

conclude that the trial court’s findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence. See In

re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 208 (2001) (setting a similar standard of review for clear and convincing

evidence requirement by the State in juvenile proceedings). “A finding is against the manifest

weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or if the finding itself is

unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented.” People v. Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d

322, 332 (2008). We “give deference to the trial court as the finder of fact because it is in the

best position to observe the conduct and demeanor of the parties and witnesses.” Id.

¶ 26 Questions concerning whether the trial court properly considered one or more of the

aforementioned “dangerousness” factors are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See People v.

Simmons, 2019 IL App (1st) 191253, ¶¶ 9, 15 (the reviewing court will not substitute its

judgment for that of the trial court in denying bail merely because it would have balanced the

appropriate factors differently). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is “

‘arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable,’ or where ‘no reasonable person would agree with the

position adopted by the trial court.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Becker, 239 Ill. 2d 215, 234 (2010)).

¶ 27 Based on our review of the record, the trial court’s finding that the State proved by clear

and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant

committed aggravated domestic battery was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 725

ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(4) (West 2022); 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(1) (West 2022). The “clear and

convincing” standard of proof requires more than a preponderance of the evidence but less than

proof beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Clay, 361 Ill. App. 3d 310, 322 (2005). The State’s

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proffer showed that defendant punched, kicked, and strangled the 73-year-old victim, who

suffered physical injuries that were observed by the police. The State’s proffer was sufficient to

show by clear and convincing evidence that defendant committed the charged offense. See 720

ILCS 5/12-3.3(a-5) (West 2022).

¶ 28 In determining that defendant posed a real and present threat to the safety of the victim

and the community, the trial court properly considered defendant’s prior conviction for

aggravated battery of a police officer, her two prior arrests for domestic battery (one of which

involved the same victim as the instant case), the age of the victim, and the risk of defendant

returning to the victim’s home, as she had done repeatedly. Defendant argues that the State “had

no issue with the defendant being released” since the State offered defendant probation. As the

trial court noted, it “[had] not been privy of the offer or other facts or circumstances and may not

go along with probation.” The trial court’s ruling was not against the manifest weight of the

evidence.

¶ 29 Defendant argues that the trial court failed to “engage in an analysis of the relevant

pretrial release conditions” and erroneously based its ruling on verifying where defendant would

be staying upon release. We disagree. The record shows that the trial court wanted to ensure that

defendant had somewhere to stay “away from the victim,” especially considering her repeated

unsolicited return to his residence following her eviction. This was not unreasonable in light of

defendant’s violent criminal history, alcohol use, and the severe and violent nature of the offense

against the 73-year-old victim.

¶ 30 The record shows that the trial court heard, considered, and rejected defense counsel’s

arguments based on the facts of the case. Therefore, defendant was not “denied an opportunity

for a fair hearing.”

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¶ 31 CONCLUSION

¶ 32 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 33 Affirmed.

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