People v. Quinata

• Court: Superior Court of Guam
• Decided: December 22, 2009
• Docket: CF0458-09
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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3 C1-TUTT

6 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 1

I PEOPLE OF GUAM. CRIMINAL CASE NO. CFO458-09 9 Plaintiff. 10

11 vs. DECISION AND ORDER (Motion to Dismiss) 72

13 ROLAND SALAS QUINATA,

1A Defendant.

76 INTRODUCTION 71 This matter came before the Honorable Anita A. Sukola on November 27, 2009, for 18 motion hearing on Roland Salas Quinata's ("Defendant") Motion to Dismiss. Alternate Publi 19 Defender Stephen P. Hattori represented Defendant. Assistant Attomey General Shane Bl 20

27 represented the People of Guam ("the People"). Upon review of the evidence, oral and wri

22 arguments, and legal authorities presented by both attorneys, the court hereby issues thi

23 Decision and Order. 24 BACKGROUND 25 On November 19. 2009. Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss. In his motion, Defendant 26

2"1 asked the Court to dismiss this case because his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is

28 violated. Defendant more particularly states that, if the a defendant is in custody, 8 G.C.A. $

CF0239-08: People of Guam v. Roland Salas Quinata Page I of8 Decision and Order - Motion to Dismiss 80.60(a)(2) gives 45 days from the arraignment to bring the case to trial. Defendant argued that 1

2 the 45 days have been exhausted, and therefore, this matter must be dismissed. On November

3 25, 2009, Defendant filed a Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. Defendant argued that court 4 congestion was not "good cause" under 8 G.C.A. $ 80.60(bX3). 5 On November 27,2009, the People filed an Opposition to Defendant's Motion to 6

Dismiss. The People argued that the Court being occupied in three asserted matters is good 1

8 cause under 8 G.C.A. $ 80.60(bX3). The People also argued that the Court informed Defendant

9 on two separate occasions, and more importantly, the Defendant failed to make any objections. 10 The Court now addresses Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 11 DISCUSSION L2

13 I. Motion to Dismiss

l-4 Defendant argued that his right to speedy trial was violated by the delay in bring the

15 matter to trial. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 1 (November 19,2OO9). Defendant argued that 76 he should have been afforded a tt''.al within 45 days after his arraignment. 8 G.C.A. $ 1,1

80.60(a)(2). Defendant also argued that there was no "good cause" in delaying his right to a 1B

I9 speedy trial. 8 G.C.A. $ 80.60(bX3).

20 The Sixth Amendment requires that "the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 2I public trial. United States Constitution Amendment VI. The Court must decide whether the 22 Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial has been violated. The Court must consider: (1) the 23 length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of the right to a 24

25 speedy trial; and (4) whether or not prejudice resulted from the delay. People v. Stephen,2009

26 Guam 8,11 14 (citing People v. Mendiola,1999 Guam 8, fl 10). 2'7

CF0239-08: People of Guam v. Roland Salas Quinata Page 2 of 8 Decision and Order - Motion to Dismiss a. Assertion of the Right to a Speedy Trial 1

2 The Defendant was arraigned and asserted his right to a speedy trial on September 23,

3 2009. Therefore, under 8 G.C.A. $ 60(a)(2), Defendant's trial would have to commence before 4 November 6,2009. On September 25,2009, the Court set this matter for trial on November 5, 5 2009. Criminal Trial Scheduling Order (September 25,2009). The Court finds that Defendant 6

asserted his right to speedy trial in September 23, 3009. 1

8 b. The Length of Delay

9 On November 3,2009, the Court advised both the People and Defendant that trial in this 10 matter would have to toll another asserted matter before the Court at that time. Continued 11 Prehial Hearine at 10:28 a.m. (November 3, 2009). While it has been recognized that a 72

13 continuance which is apparently entered on the trial court's own motion may not be chargeable

1A to defendant, it is incumbent upon the defendant or his counsel to object to the continuance. 15 People v. Hickman,56lll.2d175,l79,306 N.E.2d 32,35 (I11. 1973). L6 In Walker v. Commonwealth, the judge indicated that the case was continued without 11 objection by the Commonwealth or defendant but the record was otherwise silent on the issue, 18

79 the Walker court found the record insufficient to support a finding that the defendant concurred

20 in the granting of the continuance. 225 Va. 5, 11 (Va. 1983). But in the instant case Defendant's 27 attorney did not raise any objection to continuing Defendant's trial due to the court being 22 occupied in another asserted criminal trial - People of Guam v. Soneeni, CF246-08. Continued 23 Pretrial Hearine at 10:28 a.m. (November 3, 2009). Defendant raised no objections to the 24

25 continuance; therefore, Defendant agreed to the continuance. Id. The Court at that point

26 determines Defendant's 45-day clock stopped when Defendant's counsel agreed to continue 21 trial. 28

CF0239-08: People ofGuam v. Roland Salas Quinata Page 3 of8 Decision and Order - Motion to Dismiss The Court articulated that Defendant's trial would trail the asserted criminal trial of 1

2 CF246-08. Id. The Court on that date vacated the trial scheduled on November 5. 2009.Id. The

3 Court informed the parties that when the trial in CF246-08 is concluded the Court would hold a 4 continued pretrial conference to determine when Defendant's trial will be scheduled. Id. The 5 Court also articulated that it was not the Court's intention to delav Defendant's trial in "anv 6

'7 shape or form." Id. at 10:36 a.m. The Court advised Defendant that he would be notified as soon

B as possible regarding his trial date. Id. Again, there was no objection by Defendant. Continued

9 Pretrial Hearing at 10:28 a.m. (November 3, 2009). Therefore, two days remained before 10 Defendant's 45 days expired, if Defendant decided to assert or object to a continuance. 11 On November 13, 2009, the Court again informed the people and Defendant that the T2

13 Court was still occupied in trial with CF246-08, and again, Defendant did not raise any

74 objection to the continuance. Further Proceedings at 10:27 a.m. (November 13, 2009). The 15 Court also set a tial date for Defendant on December 22, 2009, and a scheduled a pretrial I6 conference and a hearing on all motions on December 14,2009.Id. Defendant's 45-day clock 11 continued to stopped when Defendant's counsel agreed to continue trial. Therefore, two days 18

19 continued to remain before Defendant's 45 days expired, if defendant decided to assert or object

20 to a continuance. 2L On November 19,2009, Defendant filed this Motion to Dismiss. At the time this motion 22 to dismiss was filed, Defendant had two days remaining before his 45 days expired. In Carver v. 23 Super Ct. (People), the Supreme Court of Guam held that there was good cause for the delay of 24

25 petitioner's trial because a non-frivolous motion was pending and that petitioner's statutory

26 right to a speedy trial was not violated. 1998 Guam 23,11 16. The Court finds Defendant's 21 motion to dismiss is non-frivolous. On November 27.2009. the Court heard Defendant's motion 28

CF0239-08: People ofGuam v. Roland Salas Quinata Page 4 of 8 Decision and Order - Motion to Dismiss to dismiss - eight days after Defendant's motion was filed - and took the matter under 1

2 advisement. The Court informed Defendant that Defendant's assertion time tolled as a result of

3 Defendant's Motion. Motion Hearins at 1 1:00 a.m. (Novemb er 27, 2009). The Court used due 4 diligence in researching and issuing its decision and order on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 5 Therefore, two days continue to remain before Defendant's 45 days expire. 6

On the same November 27,2009 motion hearing, the Court also entertained Defendant's 1

8 Motion for Bail. The Court granted the motion, and Defendant was released to a third-party

9 custodian. Defendant at that time executed a waiver of speedy trial. Waiver of Speedy Trial 10 (November 27,2009). 11 On December 11, 2009, Defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial. Assertion of I2

13 Speedlu Trial (December 11,2009). Since Defendant's assertion time tolled as a result of

I4 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The Court finds that Defendant's right to a speedy trial has not 15 been violated. As of Decemb er 22, 2009, Defendant has 2 days left before his 45 days expires, 76 due to tolling caused by Defendant since the Motion to Dismiss was filed on November 19, 71 2009. Therefore, the Court will deny Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 18

t9 c. The Reason for Delay

20 Although the Court determined that Defendant's statutory period of 45 days was not 27 exceeded, the Court will still discuss the reason for a delay. Assuming arguendo there was a )) delay that exceeded the statutory 45-day period after Defendant's arraignment, the Court still 23 finds that it had good cause for any delay. Guam law codified the Sixth Amendment by 24

25 requiring that a criminal case be dismissed unless good cause for delay is shown. 8 G.C.A. $

26 80.60 provides for when a criminal case is to be dismissed for reasons of time. The court shall 21 dismiss a criminal action if the trial of a defendant. who is in custodv at the time of his 2B

CF0239-08: People of Guam v. Roland Salas Quinata Page 5 of8 Decision and Order - Motion to Dismiss arraignment, has not commenced within 45 days after his arraignment. 8 G.C.A. $ 80.60(a)(2). 1

2 But a criminal action shall not be dismissed if good cause is shown for the failure to commence

3 the trial within the prescribed period. 8 G.C.A. $ 80.60(bX3).

4 Guam Law also provides that a criminal action shall not be dismissed if good cause is 5 shown for the failure to commence within the 45 days after his arraignment. 8 G.C.A. $ 6

1 80.60(b)(3). It is within the discretion of the Superior Court of Guam to prepare its trial

B calendar; although, a defendant's right to a speedy trial should not be unreasonably delayed to

9 accommodate an individual judge's calendar. People of Guam Territor), of Guam v. okada, 10 1980 WL 18235, *2 (D.Guam App. Div. 1980). The determination of good cause for the delay 11 of a criminal trial is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. Carver v. Superior Court of L2

13 Guam, 1998 Guam 23, 11 11 (citing People v. Ibanez, 1992 wL 97221, 2 (D.Guam App.

I4 Div.I992). Good cause is established by a clear showing that the delay was the result of 15 defendant's own acts. The Court finds that there exists "good cause" required by 8 G.C.A. $ 76 80.60(bX3) for failing to commence Defendant's trial within the 45 days after his arraignment. 7'7

It has been held that when a trial docket is filled and no available trial dates exist until 18

I9 after the required statutory time after the arraignment, this is sufficient cause for delay. Sate v.

20 Dunn, 70 Wash.2d 572, 576, 424 P.2d 897, 899 (Wash. 1969). A trial court may take judicial 2L notice of the conditions of its trial calendar. Id. at 576, 900 (citing State v. Gilcrease, 63 22 Wash.2d 731,388 P.2d962 (Wash. 1964)). 23

z4 The Court determines that the Court was occupied the asserted trial in People of

25 Guam v. Songeni , CF246-081 - which commenced on Novemb er 3, 2009 and did not conclude

26 December I0,2009 - was good cause for the delay in Defendant's trial not commencing t1

2B 1 Mr. Songeni asserted his right to a speedy trial on September 22,2008- before Defendant's assertion of September 23,2009 On November 3,2009, jury selection commenced for CF246-08.

CF0239-08: People of Guam v. Roland Salas Quinata Page 6 of 8 Decision and Order - Motion to Dismiss within 45 days after his arraignment. On November 3, 2009, the Court advised both the People 1

2 and Defendant that trial in this matter would have to toll another asserted matter before the

3 Court atthat time Defendant raised no objects to the continuance. Continued Pretrial Hearins at 4 10:28 a.m. (November 3,2009). The Court articulated that Defendant's trial would trail the 5 asserted criminal trial of CF246-08.Id. The Court, on that date, vacated the trial scheduled on 6

November 5, 2009. Id. The Court informed the parties that when the trial in CF246-08 1

B concluded the Court would hold a continued pretrial conference to determine when Defendant's

9 trial will be scheduled. Id. The Court also articulated that it was not the Court's intention to 10 delay Defendant's trial in "any shape or form." Id. at 10:36 a.m. The Court advised Defendant 11 that he would be notified as soon as possible regarding his trial date. Id. I2

13 On November 13, 2009, the Court again informed the people and Defendant that the

1A Court was still occupied in trial with CF246-08, and again, Defendant did not raise any 15 objection the continuance. Further Proceedines at 10:27 a.m. (November 13, 2009). The Court 76 also set a trial date for Defendant on December 22,2009, and a scheduled a pretrial conference I1 and a hearing on all motions on Decemb er 14, 2009. Id. The Court determines - if there was a 18

L9 delay of the statutory 45-day period - that there was good cause for the delay. Therefore, the

20 Court will deny Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 27

22 d. Whether or not Defendant was Prejudice by the Delay 23

24 Finally, the Court must look at whether Defendant was prejudiced by the delay.

25 Sometimes, the delay itself can be long enough to be "presumptively prejudicial." Doqgett v.

26 United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-652 (1992). The United States Supreme Court noted "courts 21

2B

CF0239-08: People of Guam v. Roland Salas Quinata Page 7 of 8 Decision and Order- Motion to Dismiss have generally fund post accusation delay'presumptivelyprejudicial' at least as it approaches 1

2 one year." Dosgett, 505 U.S. at 652 n. I.

3 However, in this case, the Court found no delay between the arraignment and the 4 December 22,2009. Even if there is a delay, the delay in this case is far less than other delays 5 found to be constitutional. See United States v. Dirden,38 F.3d 1131, 1138 (10th Cir. 1994\ 6

(seven and one half months between arraignment and trial not presumptively prejudicial under a 1

B speedy trial analysis). In fact, the Court determined that Defendant has 2 day left before his

9 statutory period expired. Lastly, Defendant has not demonstrated how he was prejudiced by the 10 alleged delay. Therefore, the court will deny Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 11

1) CONCLUSION

13 By preponderance of the evidence and based on the foregoing reasons, the Court 74 DENIES Defedant's Motion to Dismiss.

15 SO ORDERED this 2L dayof P-c-t- . ,2009. L6

T1

1B

19 HONORABLE ANITA A. SUKOLA 20 Judge, Superior Court of Guam

2I

I dotrereby cerrrfy tlrdt the foregoing 25 rs a lull lruc dnd coilect copy of the original on file in the offiie of tne 26 clerk ofthe Supenor Court ofGuam

Dated at Hagatna, Guam 2'7 Dt{l - 1: ?009 ,V 20_- 2B - E A.flugue, ;)Enrique Jn Deputy Clerk Superior Court of Guim

CF0239-08: People ofGuam v. Roland Salas Quinata Page 8 of8 Decision and Order- Motion to Dismiss