People v. Purrier
Opinion
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Bureau Thomas J.K. Smith, State Reporter
People v Purrier
2026 NY Slip Op 04681
July 24, 2026
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,
v
CHEZERE PURRIER, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
Decided on July 24, 2026
510 KA 23-00587
Present: Lindley, J.P., Montour, Ogden, Nowak, And Delconte, JJ.
JULIE CIANCA, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (SABRINA A. BREMER OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
BRIAN P. GREEN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (RYAN P. ASHE OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (Michael L. Dollinger, J.), rendered February 22, 2023. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.
[*1]It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law, the plea is vacated, those parts of the omnibus motion seeking to suppress tangible property and statements are granted, the indictment is dismissed, and the matter is remitted to Monroe County Court for proceedings pursuant to CPL 470.45.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Defendant contends that County Court erred in refusing to suppress evidence obtained as the result of an unlawful arrest or seizure. We agree.
At the suppression hearing, the People called a New York State Trooper (Trooper) who was assigned to a task force known as Operation GIVE (Gun Involved Violence Elimination) in the City of Rochester on the date of defendant's arrest. On that day, at approximately 2:40 p.m., he was patrolling with his partner when he noticed a vehicle with a tinted windshield. The troopers initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle. The partner approached the driver's side of the vehicle, and the Trooper approached the passenger's side of the vehicle. They asked the occupants to roll down the windows, and the Trooper observed an "orange pill bottle with no markings on it in the center console of the vehicle." After a brief conversation between the troopers, the Trooper "had the occupants exit the vehicle for [a] probable cause search"—a determination that, according to the Trooper, was made by his partner. Defendant was handcuffed as soon as he was removed from the vehicle. The Trooper was not sure why his partner "said [they] ha[d] a probable cause search." The Trooper was unaware of what the driver had told his partner. As the Trooper began walking defendant to the back of the vehicle, his partner alerted him to a handgun on defendant's person.
We agree with defendant that, under these circumstances, by placing him in handcuffs after directing him to exit the vehicle, the troopers transformed the traffic stop into, at minimum, a "forcible stop and detention" (People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 223 [1976]; see People v Williams, 79 AD3d 1653, 1654 [4th Dept 2010], affd 17 NY3d 834 [2011]; People v Hernandez, 240 AD3d 1208, 1209 [4th Dept 2025]), which "must be justified by some additional circumstances, such as a threat of evasive conduct . . . ; a need to transport the defendant for a showup procedure . . . ; a fear that the suspect may interfere with the execution of a search warrant . . . ; or a concern for officer safety" (People v Hernandez, 187 AD3d 1502, 1505 [4th Dept 2020]; see People v Harrison, 57 NY2d 470, 476 [1982]; Hernandez, 240 AD3d at 1209).
Although, as noted above, the Trooper testified that he observed an "orange pill bottle with no markings on it in the center console of the vehicle," that alone is insufficient to justify the forcible stop and detention (see generally People v Yancy, 86 NY2d 239, 246 [1995]; Hernandez, 240 AD3d at 1209). The Trooper conceded that he could not see inside the bottle and did not know what was inside. He also did not observe any other indicia of criminality and did not see defendant acting in a suspicious manner. Although a conversation took place between the Trooper and his partner, defendant challenged that information under the fellow officer rule. The People were thus required to establish at the hearing that the partner, who imparted information to the Trooper, in fact possessed the requisite level of suspicion to act (see People v Ramirez-Portoreal, 88 NY2d 99, 113 [1996]; People v Mobley, 120 AD3d 916, 918 [4th Dept 2014]; see generally People v Gonzalez, 91 NY2d 909, 910 [1998]). Here, however, the Trooper's partner did not testify, and the Trooper testified that his partner did not relay the substance of the conversation with the driver to him. We are therefore unable to infer that the Trooper received information sufficient to justify his subsequent actions (see People v Palacios, — NY3d —, —, 2026 NY Slip Op 02360, *2 [2026]).
We therefore reverse the judgment, vacate the plea, and grant those parts of defendant's omnibus motion seeking to suppress tangible property and statements. Because our conclusion results in the suppression of all evidence in support of the crime charged (see People v Turner, 248 AD3d 1772, 1776 [4th Dept 2026]), the indictment must be dismissed. In light of our determination, we do not address defendant's remaining contention.
Entered: July 24, 2026
Ann Dillon Flynn
Clerk of the Court
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