2020 IL App (2d) 170926-U No. 2-17-0926 Order filed March 18, 2020
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court OF ILLINOIS, ) of Kane County. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 16-CF-827 ) NATHANIEL PRYOR, ) Honorable ) M. Katherine Moran, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HUDSON delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Birkett and Justice Bridges concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court properly summarily dismissed defendant’s postconviction petition, which alleged that his guilty plea was induced by ineffective assistance of counsel: defendant’s claim that he was unaware that he was subject to mandatory supervised release (MSR) was refuted by the record, which showed that the court so admonished him, and therefore his assertion that he would have rejected plea offer of time served and MSR was not rational under the circumstances.
¶2 Defendant, Nathaniel Pryor, appeals the summary dismissal of his postconviction petition.
He contends that he stated the gist of claims that (1) he was denied due process and (2) his counsel
was ineffective during proceedings resulting in his guilty plea. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND 2020 IL App (2d) 170926-U
¶4 Defendant was charged with two counts of domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.2 (West
2016)). He agreed to plead guilty to one count in exchange for a one-year prison sentence and a
four-year term of mandatory supervised release (MSR). The one-year prison term was to be
concurrent with a six-year term imposed in an unrelated case. The trial court admonished
defendant that he would receive credit for 247 days already served “and then followed by four
years of [MSR] after you are released from the department of corrections.”
¶5 Defendant said that he “wasn’t aware of any of that.” The court allowed defendant to
consult with his attorney, following which the court again admonished him that he would “get a
year in the department of corrections *** with 247 days served *** and a four-year period of
[MSR].”
¶6 The court found that the plea was voluntary. The factual basis for the plea showed that
defendant and the victim had a relationship and shared a child. On April 23, 2016, defendant
argued with the victim and struck her, causing scratches and red marks on her face. The court
found defendant guilty and imposed the agreed-upon sentence. The court explained that the
sentence would be followed by a four-year MSR period and that “this sentence will run concurrent”
with the other sentence.
¶7 Defendant did not move to withdraw the plea or appeal. However, on July 24, 2017, he
filed a pro se postconviction petition. He alleged that his attorney had led him to believe that his
MSR term would run while he was serving his six-year sentence in the other case, meaning that
he would have to serve only the two-year MSR term attached to that sentence. He alleged that, if
he had known that the MSR term would not begin until his release from prison, he would not have
pleaded guilty and would have demanded a jury trial.
-2- 2020 IL App (2d) 170926-U
¶8 The trial court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that defendant did not establish
that he failed to understand the terms of his sentence. Defendant timely appeals.
¶9 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 10 Although defendant claims both a denial of due process and the ineffective assistance of
counsel, both contentions are based on the allegation that defense counsel gave him the mistaken
impression that he could serve his MSR term in this case while serving his prison sentence in the
unrelated case. He contends that, had he known that he would have to serve the four-year MSR
term after completing the six-year sentence, he would not have accepted the plea agreement and
would have insisted on a jury trial.
¶ 11 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2018)) permits a
defendant to challenge his conviction for violations of his federal or state constitutional rights.
People v. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d 177, 183 (2005). At the first stage of proceedings, the trial court
must independently review the petition within 90 days of its filing and decide whether “the petition
is frivolous or is patently without merit.” 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2018). To survive this
review, a petition need set forth only the gist of a constitutional claim. People v. Edwards, 197 Ill.
2d 239, 244 (2001). The petition “ ‘need only present a limited amount of detail.’ ” Id. (quoting
People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 418 (1996)).
¶ 12 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish that
(1) counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable and (2) the defendant was prejudiced
thereby. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); People v. Tucek, 2019 IL App
(2d) 160788, ¶ 14. In the guilty-plea context, a defendant must raise the gist of a meritorious
allegation that it is reasonably probable that, absent counsel’s error, defendant would not have
pleaded guilty but would have insisted on going to trial. Id., ¶ 17. This requires more than “ ‘[a]
-3- 2020 IL App (2d) 170926-U
conclusory allegation’ ” to that effect. Id. (quoting People v. Valdez, 2016 IL 119860, ¶ 29).
Rather, the petition must plead facts to show that the decision to reject the plea bargain would have
been rational under the circumstances. Id. While a defendant need not articulate a claim of
innocence or a plausible defense, he must raise more than a bare allegation that, absent counsel’s
errors, he would have rejected the plea offer and proceeded to trial. Id. ¶ 18. The potential
penalties and the probability of an acquittal (which contemplates the existence of a plausible
defense) are among the relevant circumstances. Id.
¶ 13 Here, the petition contained no more than a conclusory allegation that, but for counsel’s
allegedly faulty advice, defendant would have rejected the plea offer and insisted on a jury trial.
Essentially, defendant pleaded guilty in exchange for time served. In practical terms, the only
benefit of an acquittal, which was by no means a certainty, was the avoidance of the additional
MSR period. Defendant does not articulate a plausible defense he could have raised at trial. Nor
does he allege that he contemporaneously informed either his attorney or the court that the MSR
issue was of singular importance to him. As the plea agreement required defendant to serve no
additional prison time, it would, without additional facts, appear irrational to risk more prison time
solely to avoid additional time on MSR. Defendant alleges no facts to show that, due to unusual
circumstances, the issue was particularly important to him.
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2020 IL App (2d) 170926-U No. 2-17-0926 Order filed March 18, 2020
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court OF ILLINOIS, ) of Kane County. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 16-CF-827 ) NATHANIEL PRYOR, ) Honorable ) M. Katherine Moran, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HUDSON delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Birkett and Justice Bridges concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court properly summarily dismissed defendant’s postconviction petition, which alleged that his guilty plea was induced by ineffective assistance of counsel: defendant’s claim that he was unaware that he was subject to mandatory supervised release (MSR) was refuted by the record, which showed that the court so admonished him, and therefore his assertion that he would have rejected plea offer of time served and MSR was not rational under the circumstances.
¶2 Defendant, Nathaniel Pryor, appeals the summary dismissal of his postconviction petition.
He contends that he stated the gist of claims that (1) he was denied due process and (2) his counsel
was ineffective during proceedings resulting in his guilty plea. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND 2020 IL App (2d) 170926-U
¶4 Defendant was charged with two counts of domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.2 (West
2016)). He agreed to plead guilty to one count in exchange for a one-year prison sentence and a
four-year term of mandatory supervised release (MSR). The one-year prison term was to be
concurrent with a six-year term imposed in an unrelated case. The trial court admonished
defendant that he would receive credit for 247 days already served “and then followed by four
years of [MSR] after you are released from the department of corrections.”
¶5 Defendant said that he “wasn’t aware of any of that.” The court allowed defendant to
consult with his attorney, following which the court again admonished him that he would “get a
year in the department of corrections *** with 247 days served *** and a four-year period of
[MSR].”
¶6 The court found that the plea was voluntary. The factual basis for the plea showed that
defendant and the victim had a relationship and shared a child. On April 23, 2016, defendant
argued with the victim and struck her, causing scratches and red marks on her face. The court
found defendant guilty and imposed the agreed-upon sentence. The court explained that the
sentence would be followed by a four-year MSR period and that “this sentence will run concurrent”
with the other sentence.
¶7 Defendant did not move to withdraw the plea or appeal. However, on July 24, 2017, he
filed a pro se postconviction petition. He alleged that his attorney had led him to believe that his
MSR term would run while he was serving his six-year sentence in the other case, meaning that
he would have to serve only the two-year MSR term attached to that sentence. He alleged that, if
he had known that the MSR term would not begin until his release from prison, he would not have
pleaded guilty and would have demanded a jury trial.
-2- 2020 IL App (2d) 170926-U
¶8 The trial court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that defendant did not establish
that he failed to understand the terms of his sentence. Defendant timely appeals.
¶9 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 10 Although defendant claims both a denial of due process and the ineffective assistance of
counsel, both contentions are based on the allegation that defense counsel gave him the mistaken
impression that he could serve his MSR term in this case while serving his prison sentence in the
unrelated case. He contends that, had he known that he would have to serve the four-year MSR
term after completing the six-year sentence, he would not have accepted the plea agreement and
would have insisted on a jury trial.
¶ 11 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2018)) permits a
defendant to challenge his conviction for violations of his federal or state constitutional rights.
People v. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d 177, 183 (2005). At the first stage of proceedings, the trial court
must independently review the petition within 90 days of its filing and decide whether “the petition
is frivolous or is patently without merit.” 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2018). To survive this
review, a petition need set forth only the gist of a constitutional claim. People v. Edwards, 197 Ill.
2d 239, 244 (2001). The petition “ ‘need only present a limited amount of detail.’ ” Id. (quoting
People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 418 (1996)).
¶ 12 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish that
(1) counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable and (2) the defendant was prejudiced
thereby. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); People v. Tucek, 2019 IL App
(2d) 160788, ¶ 14. In the guilty-plea context, a defendant must raise the gist of a meritorious
allegation that it is reasonably probable that, absent counsel’s error, defendant would not have
pleaded guilty but would have insisted on going to trial. Id., ¶ 17. This requires more than “ ‘[a]
-3- 2020 IL App (2d) 170926-U
conclusory allegation’ ” to that effect. Id. (quoting People v. Valdez, 2016 IL 119860, ¶ 29).
Rather, the petition must plead facts to show that the decision to reject the plea bargain would have
been rational under the circumstances. Id. While a defendant need not articulate a claim of
innocence or a plausible defense, he must raise more than a bare allegation that, absent counsel’s
errors, he would have rejected the plea offer and proceeded to trial. Id. ¶ 18. The potential
penalties and the probability of an acquittal (which contemplates the existence of a plausible
defense) are among the relevant circumstances. Id.
¶ 13 Here, the petition contained no more than a conclusory allegation that, but for counsel’s
allegedly faulty advice, defendant would have rejected the plea offer and insisted on a jury trial.
Essentially, defendant pleaded guilty in exchange for time served. In practical terms, the only
benefit of an acquittal, which was by no means a certainty, was the avoidance of the additional
MSR period. Defendant does not articulate a plausible defense he could have raised at trial. Nor
does he allege that he contemporaneously informed either his attorney or the court that the MSR
issue was of singular importance to him. As the plea agreement required defendant to serve no
additional prison time, it would, without additional facts, appear irrational to risk more prison time
solely to avoid additional time on MSR. Defendant alleges no facts to show that, due to unusual
circumstances, the issue was particularly important to him.
¶ 14 In Tucek, the defendant pleaded guilty to criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(a)(3)
(West 2012)) and, by agreement, was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. He was informed
that, after his release, he would have to serve an MSR term of three years to life. Tucek, 2016 IL
App (2d) 160788, ¶ 5. The defendant filed a postconviction petition alleging that he later learned
that, if he could not obtain suitable housing upon his release, he would have to serve his MSR in
-4- 2020 IL App (2d) 170926-U
prison, which would effectively result in a life sentence. He alleged that, had he known this, “ ‘he
would not have pleaded guilty and would have proceeded to trial.’ ” Id. ¶ 10.
¶ 15 We affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the petition, as the defendant cited no specific
facts to show that a decision to reject the plea offer and proceed to trial would have been rational.
We noted that losing at trial would have subjected the defendant to a potentially much longer
sentence, following which he would have been subject to the same MSR conditions anyway.
Moreover, the defendant did not articulate a plausible defense other than attacking the
complainant’s credibility. Thus, the defendant had little to gain and much to lose by going to trial.
He alleged no additional facts to show that, due to unique circumstances, such a decision made
sense.
¶ 16 By contrast, in People v. Hoare, 2018 IL App (2d) 160727, the defendant pleaded guilty to
a drug offense and was sentenced to first-offender probation. Under that program, if the defendant
successfully completed probation, the charges would be dismissed and the disposition would not
be considered a conviction under state law. Id. ¶ 2 (citing 720 ILCS 570/410 (West 2012)). Trial
counsel advised the defendant, a citizen of Belize, that his probation “could result in adverse
consequences for his immigration status,” but did not tell him that the plea and resulting probation
would inevitably lead to deportation. Id. ¶ 10.
¶ 17 When the defendant was deported, he filed a postconviction petition. He alleged that he
would rather have gone to trial than face certain deportation. He had been married to a United
States citizen and had a 5-year-old daughter and 13-year-old stepdaughter who were United States
citizens. Both the defendant and his wife were employed in the United States and had no intention
of living elsewhere. The defendant “would have done everything he could have to keep his family
together in this country.” Id. ¶ 12.
-5- 2020 IL App (2d) 170926-U
¶ 18 We reversed the petition’s dismissal. We held that the petition did not articulate a plausible
defense to the charges, but given the defendant’s strong ties to this country, it could have been
rational to pursue even a small chance of acquittal rather than face certain deportation. Id. ¶¶ 47-
48.
¶ 19 Hoare followed Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017). There, the
defendant pleaded guilty to drug charges. His attorney had advised him that he would not be
deported. When he learned that he was subject to mandatory deportation, he instituted
postconviction proceedings. He alleged that deportation was the determinative issue in deciding
whether to go to trial. Although the defendant had been born in South Korea, he had lived in the
United States for 25 years and had built successful businesses. The Court concluded that, under
the “unusual circumstances” of the case, it would not have been irrational for the defendant to
choose even a remote chance of avoiding deportation by being acquitted at trial. Id. at ___, 137
S. Ct. at 1967-68. The Court cautioned, however, that a court “should not upset a plea solely
because of post hoc assertions from a defendant about how he would have pleaded but for his
attorney’s deficiencies.” Id. at 1967.
¶ 20 Here, as in Tucek, but unlike in Hoare and Lee, defendant alleges no additional facts to
show that risking more prison time to avoid a longer MSR term would have been a rational decision
for him. In his reply brief, he argues that Tucek is distinguishable because additional prison time
was merely a possibility while the additional MSR time is statutorily mandated. The distinction
is not dispositive because the viability of the petition turns on defendant’s decision-making
process, not on the actual outcome. In Hoare, deportation was certain, indeed it had already
happened, yet the defendant was required to allege specific facts showing that it would have been
rational to choose a trial rather than the plea agreement, which he did.
-6- 2020 IL App (2d) 170926-U
¶ 21 Because defendant did not allege facts showing that it would have been rational to reject
the plea offer and risk a trial, he failed to show that he was prejudiced by the allegedly faulty
advice, and the trial court properly dismissed the petition.
¶ 22 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 23 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County.
¶ 24 Affirmed.
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