NOTICE 2026 IL App (4th) 250908-U FILED This Order was filed under NO. 4-25-0908 June 16, 2026 Supreme Court Rule 23 and Carla Bender is not precedent except in the 4th District Appellate limited circumstances IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) McLean County DEAMONTAE D. PRUITTE, ) No. 21CF979 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) William A. Yoder, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE VANCIL delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Steigmann and Justice Lannerd concurred in the judgment.
ORDER ¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed defendant’s 14-year prison sentence for unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2020)), finding the trial court did not consider a factor inherent in the offense at sentencing and did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to the maximum allowable sentence.
¶2 On remand for resentencing, the trial court sentenced defendant, Deamontae D.
Pruitte, to 14 years in prison on one count of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (UPWF),
a Class 2 felony (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2020)).
¶3 Defendant appeals, arguing the trial court erroneously considered the general risks
of firearms as an aggravating factor and, in doing so, improperly considered a harm inherent in the
offense. Defendant further argues the court abused its discretion in sentencing him to the maximum
allowable sentence.
¶4 We affirm. ¶5 I. BACKGROUND
¶6 In May 2023, defendant was tried on four counts of UPWF. The key witness at trial
was Brishia Adams, defendant’s ex-fiancée. She testified that on August 21, 2021, she showed
police officers a video on a Snapchat account she had created in defendant’s name. Adams told
the officers the account was defendant’s, but, at trial, she admitted that this was not true. She
allowed an officer to record the video, which depicted defendant holding two handguns. The
recording was admitted into evidence. Adams testified she recorded the video in 2019, but she
admitted that in August 2021, she told the police officers that it was a recent recording. Adams
also showed officers text messages defendant had sent her. The messages, which were admitted
into evidence, showed two handguns and magazines.
¶7 The prosecutor asked Adams, “[D]o you recall the officer asking, have any idea
why [defendant] is trying to get a hold of some firearms? Do you remember the officer asking you
that?” She answered, “No.” The prosecutor then asked,
“Do you remember telling the officer yes, actually, I do, because him and
his twin brother, they got into a situation two weeks ago. His twin brother shot at
him so he was—has been on this angry binge for like the last two weeks about how
he shot at him and how retribution is inevitable in all of that.
That is in the text messages. Do you remember that conversation, or do you
remember saying that to the officer?”
Adams answered, “I remember saying that.” On cross-examination, Adams admitted that she had
spoken to police that day because she wanted defendant removed from her home.
¶8 Officer Hunter Clark testified that he met Adams at her apartment in August 2021.
Adams showed him the messages and pictures on her phone, as well as the Snapchat video, which
-2- Officer Clark recorded. When Clark arrested defendant, defendant had a cell phone in his
possession. Police searched the cell phone and recovered a picture of defendant holding two
firearms. On cross-examination, Clark admitted that police did not recover any firearms during the
investigation.
¶9 Defendant and the State stipulated that defendant had a prior felony conviction and
was on parole or mandatory supervised release at the time of the alleged offense. Defendant
introduced no other evidence.
¶ 10 The jury found defendant guilty of all four counts. At sentencing, the trial court
merged the four counts into two counts. The State highlighted defendant’s criminal history,
beginning with a 2011 conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW). In
sentencing defendant to 14 years in prison, the court discussed both the 2011 AUUW conviction
and a 2017 conviction for robbery.
¶ 11 Defendant appealed. See People v. Pruitte, 2024 IL App (4th) 240013-U. He argued
that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; the Illinois UPWF statute
violated the second amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. II); his
convictions violated the one-act, one-crime rule; the trial court improperly increased his sentence
based on the same robbery conviction that elevated his offense to a Class 2 felony; the court
improperly relied on a void ab initio AUUW conviction at sentencing; and the court abused its
discretion at sentencing. Id. ¶ 2.
¶ 12 We rejected the defendant’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim. Id. ¶¶ 37-44. We
also found that his convictions for UPWF did not violate the second amendment, and the trial court
did not err by discussing the robbery conviction that elevated his sentence to a Class 2 felony at
sentencing. Id. ¶¶ 31-36, 58-64.
-3- ¶ 13 However, we agreed with defendant that his two convictions violated the one-act,
one-crime rule. Although the evidence at trial showed defendant possessed two firearms, the State
failed to apportion the firearms among the different charges. Relying on People v. Crespo, 203 Ill.
2d 335 (2001), we found that one of defendant’s two convictions should be vacated. We also found
that defendant’s 2011 conviction for AUUW was void ab initio, pursuant to People v. Aguilar,
2013 IL 112116, ¶¶ 20-22, and People v. Burns, 2015 IL 117387, ¶¶ 22-25. Pruitte, 2024 IL App
(4th) 240013-U, ¶ 68. Finally, because the trial court erroneously considered the void 2011
conviction at sentencing, we found that resentencing was required. Id. ¶¶ 69-74.
¶ 14 Ultimately, we vacated one of defendant’s convictions for UPWF but affirmed the
other. We also vacated defendant’s 2011 AUUW conviction. Finally, we remanded for
resentencing. Id. ¶ 78.
¶ 15 In July 2025, following defendant’s appeal, an updated presentence investigation
report was filed for defendant. That report detailed defendant’s prior convictions. In 2013,
defendant was convicted of driving on a revoked license and criminal trespass to land. In 2015, he
was convicted of AUUW and sentenced to three years in prison. After his release, he violated his
parole. In 2017, he was convicted of robbery. He was sentenced to three years in prison, paroled,
and violated his parole. In 2019, he was convicted of aggravating fleeing. He was sentenced to two
years in prison. He was released on parole and violated that parole twice. In 2020, he was convicted
of resisting a peace officer, and in 2022, he was convicted of battery.
¶ 16 The report further stated that in January 2023, defendant violated rules at the
McLean County Detention Facility (MCDF) against theft, interference with facility personnel,
misuse of appliances, and making false statements by “using another inmate’s account information
on the MCDF-issued tablet.” In March 2023, he violated MCDF rules against disobeying
-4- reasonable orders and “unnecessary talking on headcount position or procedure.”
¶ 17 Defendant’s full presentence investigation report added that he was transferred to
Jacksonville Correctional Center, where he participated in adult basic education classes and
“Inside Out Dads.” He worked in “dietary” and had no disciplinary reports during his residence at
Jacksonville Correctional Center. Defendant reported that he used cannabis daily from ages 13 to
21.
¶ 18 Jami Hays, the mother of one of defendant’s children, submitted a character
reference letter, stating that her father had an employment opportunity available for defendant at
his construction business after defendant’s release from prison. She also stated that defendant’s
family was relying on him for financial support and as a caregiver. Defendant’s brother submitted
another letter, offering defendant employment.
¶ 19 Defendant’s resentencing took place on July 8, 2025. The trial court merged the
two counts of UPWF into one. The court also acknowledged that the 2011 AUUW conviction had
been vacated.
¶ 20 The State argued that multiple aggravating factors were present. The State reviewed
defendant’s criminal history, highlighting defendant’s failure to satisfactorily complete multiple
community-based sentences and noting that he committed the UPWF offense at issue here while
he was on parole for a previous offense. The State also referred to defendant’s violations at the
MCDF. The State recommended a sentence of 13 years in prison.
¶ 21 Defense counsel argued that defendant’s age was a mitigating factor, stating he was
31 at the time of sentencing and almost 28 when he committed this offense. She noted defendant
entered foster care at age 13, and he was “exposed to violence by his mother in the home at an
early age.” Counsel represented that she spoke to defendant’s foster mother, who said that
-5- defendant was “respectful” and a “rule follower” while under her care and that defendant’s
biological family negatively influenced him.
¶ 22 Defense counsel argued that defendant’s conduct in this case “neither caused nor
threatened serious physical harm to another.” Defendant was convicted based on only images of
guns, and no individuals were harmed. Defense counsel claimed defendant was unlikely to
reoffend, noting that he had no disciplinary reports during his incarceration at Jacksonville
Correctional Center. Instead, he participated in an educational program and worked as a janitor
and an inmate dietary specialist. Defense counsel argued that another 14-year sentence would be
inappropriate because the trial court could not consider defendant’s vacated 2011 AUUW
conviction this time and defendant showed positive behavior during his incarceration. Ultimately,
defense counsel recommended a sentence of three years in prison.
¶ 23 In allocution, defendant stated, “If there’s any possibility that you guys can show
some type of form of—just consider just my reform, my conduct throughout [the Illinois
Department of Corrections], and how I just took my own personal initiative to just grow, I’d truly
appreciate it.”
¶ 24 The trial court acknowledged that defendant was “involved in some positive things”
during his incarceration. It also recognized defendant’s “difficult childhood,” including his
involvement in the foster care system, and his daily cannabis use during his youth. Nevertheless,
the court determined “[t]here’s not a lot of mitigating evidence in this case.” Defendant had four
children, but he still committed many criminal offenses. The court reasoned, “[I]t would seem that
if you are having children, you’d want to be home with them as opposed to being out committing
new offenses and going to prison repeatedly during their formative years.”
¶ 25 The trial court emphasized defendant’s criminal record. It explained, “[T]here’s not
-6- a period of time where he has not been somewhat engaged in the justice system. He has, the best
of my knowledge, never successfully completed a period of parole. He’s been paroled from the
Department, violates, returned, sometimes multiple times on any one offense.” The court found
that defendant’s history “put the public at extreme risk.” It added,
“And, although counsel has indicated that there was no threat of harm in this case—
he just had pictures of him holding firearms—the testimony at trial involved
assertions that the defendant wanted a gun because a few weeks earlier his brother
had shot him and he had talked about how retribution was inevitable. And so there
is a question about this being more than just taking pictures holding firearms.”
The court also referred to defendant’s refusal to comply with MCDF rules.
¶ 26 The trial court concluded that a term of imprisonment was “necessary for the
protection of the public.” After confirming that it had considered all the appropriate factors, the
court sentenced defendant to 14 years in prison and 1 year of mandatory supervised release.
¶ 27 Defendant filed a motion to reconsider, asserting that the sentence was excessive.
At a hearing in August 2025, defense counsel argued the trial court unduly discounted the factors
in mitigation, including defendant’s foster mother’s characterization of defendant. The court stated
that it considered all the appropriate information and evidence and denied defendant’s motion.
¶ 28 This appeal followed.
¶ 29 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 30 Defendant appeals his sentence. First, he argues the trial court improperly
considered a factor inherent in his offense by considering the risks posed by firearms. Second, he
argues the court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence that was manifestly disproportionate
to the nature of his offense.
-7- ¶ 31 A. Factor Inherent in the Offense
¶ 32 First, we address defendant’s argument that the trial court considered an improper
factor at sentencing. “Whether the trial court relied on improper factors in fashioning a defendant’s
sentence is a question of law, which we review de novo.” People v. Brown, 2023 IL App (4th)
220476, ¶ 43. “There is a strong presumption that the trial court based its sentencing determination
on proper legal reasoning, and a court of review should consider the record as a whole, rather than
focusing on a few words or statements by the trial court.” People v. Canizalez-Cardena, 2012 IL
App (4th) 110720, ¶ 22. Indeed, it is the defendant’s burden “to affirmatively establish that the
sentence was based on improper considerations.” People v. Dowding, 388 Ill. App. 3d 936, 943
(2009). If this burden is met, “[a] sentence based on improper factors will not be affirmed unless
the reviewing court can determine from the record that the weight placed on the improperly
considered aggravating factor was so insignificant that it did not lead to a greater sentence.” People
v. Heider, 231 Ill. 2d 1, 21 (2008).
¶ 33 Defendant contends that the trial court improperly considered a factor inherent in
his offense. “Generally, a factor implicit in the offense for which the defendant has been convicted
cannot be used as an aggravating factor in sentencing for that offense.” People v. Phelps, 211 Ill.
2d. 1, 11 (2004). “Such dual use of a single factor is often referred to as a ‘double enhancement.’ ”
Id. (citing People v. Gonzalez, 151 Ill. 2d 79, 85 (1992)). “This double-enhancement rule is
premised on the assumption that the legislature considered the factors inherent in the offense in
determining the appropriate range of penalties for that offense.” People v. Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d 364,
390 (1995).
¶ 34 Defendant concedes he did not raise this issue in a postsentencing motion and has
forfeited this claim. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). He asks us to review this
-8- issue under the plain-error rule, which allows us to review a forfeited claim when either
“(1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that
the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant,
regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurred
and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and
challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the
evidence.” People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007) (citing People v.
Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 186-87 (2005)).
See Ill. S. Ct. R. 615 (eff. Jan. 1, 1967). “The first step in any plain-error analysis is to determine
whether a clear, obvious, or plain error has been committed.” People v. Mitok, 2018 IL App (3d)
160743, ¶ 8.
¶ 35 Defendant argues that his offense, UPWF, is necessarily related to firearms. See
720 ILCS 5/24-1.1 (West 2020). According to defendant, the offense itself reflects the legislature’s
determination that felons possessing firearms present a threat to public safety. See People v.
Crawford, 145 Ill. App. 3d 318, 321 (1986) (stating that the purpose of this statutory provision is
“to protect the health and safety of the public by deterring possession of weapons by convicted
felons, a class of persons that the legislature has determined presents a higher risk of danger to the
public when in possession of a weapon”). Defendant insists that a sentencing court may not
consider the general risks of firearms as an aggravating factor.
¶ 36 Defendant further argues the trial court here relied on this generalized risk to
increase his sentence. Defendant asserts, “At resentencing, however, the trial court repeatedly
emphasized the generalized dangerousness of firearms and framed the offense as posing a risk to
public safety, even while acknowledging ‘the absence of any recovered firearm.’ ” Defendant also
-9- points to the court’s statement that this case involved “more than just taking pictures holding
firearms.” He contends that he did not threaten anyone, publicly brandish the guns, or pose any
specific threat of increased harm. According to defendant, the only threat of harm the court
discussed was the generalized risk from firearms.
¶ 37 The record does not support defendant’s argument. Contrary to defendant’s
assertion, we find no repeated references to any general dangers from firearms. The trial court
determined that defendant’s criminal history “put the public at extreme risk,” but this risk is clearly
specific to this defendant, with his many prior convictions. In stating that this case involved “more
than just taking pictures holding firearms,” the court discussed Adams’s reference during the trial
to defendant’s brother shooting him and defendant’s comment that “retribution was inevitable.”
Once again, this is not a general or abstract risk. Instead, the court discussed the specific facts of
this case and the increased risk posed by this defendant, based on his history of recurring criminal
activity over the previous decade and his intent to retaliate for a previous shooting.
¶ 38 Defendant has not established that the trial court relied on an improper factor.
Accordingly, we find no error, and therefore no plain error.
¶ 39 B. Manifestly Disproportionate to the Nature of the Offense
¶ 40 Alternatively, defendant contends his sentence was manifestly disproportionate to
the nature of his offense. The Illinois Constitution requires that a defendant’s sentence be
determined “according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring [him]
to useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. “The trial court has broad discretionary powers
in imposing a sentence, and its sentencing decisions are entitled to great deference.” People v.
Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212 (2010). “The trial court’s sentence must be based upon the
particular circumstances of the case, including (1) the defendant’s history, character, and
- 10 - rehabilitative potential; (2) the seriousness of the offense; (3) the need to protect society; and
(4) the need for punishment and deterrence.” People v. Sturgeon, 2019 IL App (4th) 170035, ¶ 102.
We review the trial court’s sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion. Id. ¶ 104. We presume
that a sentence within the statutory range is proper. Klein, 2022 IL App (4th) 200599, ¶ 37. “[A]
sentence within statutory limits will be deemed excessive and the result of an abuse of discretion
by the trial court where the sentence is greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law,
or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 210
(2000).
¶ 41 Defendant argues that his sentence of 14 years in prison, the statutory maximum,
was manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense. Defendant emphasizes that police
recovered no firearms. Instead, the State presented only images of firearms. Defendant contends
that his conduct did not cause or threaten harm. He highlights the evidence of his rehabilitative
potential, including his education and employment during his incarceration. According to
defendant, the trial court’s statement that “there’s not a lot of mitigating evidence” indicates the
court failed to give due consideration to the factors in mitigation.
¶ 42 Defendant further claims the trial court should not have relied on his supposed
retaliatory motive. At trial, the State asked Adams on cross-examination if she told police that
defendant’s brother shot at him and defendant indicated that “retribution [was] inevitable.” This
was the only reference to defendant’s violent intent. Defendant observes that no messages or
communications demonstrating this intent were introduced into evidence. Defendant does not
argue on appeal that Adams’s statement should not have been admitted at trial. Instead, defendant
argues only that the court placed undue weight on Adams’s claim at sentencing.
¶ 43 Finally, defendant contends that the trial court should not have imposed the same
- 11 - sentence after remand as it imposed at his first sentencing hearing. Before defendant’s first appeal,
the trial court sentenced defendant to 14 years in prison on two counts of UPWF. We vacated one
of those convictions and his sentence. We also vacated his 2011 conviction for AUUW. Defendant
claims that his criminal record on remand was less significant than the trial court believed at his
initial sentencing. He adds that he demonstrated greater rehabilitative potential through his
behavior at Jacksonville Correctional Center. According to defendant, in imposing the same
sentence it imposed at the first sentencing hearing, the trial court demonstrated that it failed to
sentence him based on the specific evidence in this case.
¶ 44 We find no abuse of discretion. First, we reject defendant’s claim that the State’s
inability to locate an actual firearm is mitigating. The State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant illegally possessed a firearm. If it had not, his conviction could not stand. See Pruitte,
2024 IL App (4th) 240013-U, ¶¶ 37-44. Defendant is not entitled to a lesser sentence because he
successfully concealed contraband firearms from law enforcement.
¶ 45 Likewise, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in placing little weight on the
factors in mitigation. “The weight to be given to any proper factor *** is left to the sound
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.”
(Emphasis in original.) Sturgeon, 2019 IL App (4th) 170035, ¶ 104. Defendant offered as
mitigating evidence that he was employed and had no documented behavioral issues during his
incarceration at Jacksonville Correctional Center. However, the court found that defendant’s long
criminal history, his frequent parole violations, and his violation of jail rules at the MCDF were
stronger evidence against defendant’s prospects for rehabilitation. Indeed, based on this evidence,
the court rightly concluded that defendant’s history “put the public at extreme risk.”
¶ 46 Furthermore, although the trial court acknowledged defendant’s difficult childhood
- 12 - and frequent marijuana use as mitigating factors, the court was not obligated to impose a lesser
sentence if it assigned little weight to these factors. Indeed, “the court is not required to give greater
weight to mitigating factors than to the seriousness of the offense, and the presence of mitigating
factors neither requires a minimum sentence nor precludes a maximum sentence.” People v. Jones,
2014 IL App (1st) 120927, ¶ 55. The court did not abuse its discretion in finding the seriousness
of the offense and aggravating factors so outweighed these mitigating factors as to justify the
maximum sentence.
¶ 47 We reject defendant’s assertion that the trial court misvalued Adams’s statement
about defendant’s plan to retaliate against his brother because the statement was uncorroborated.
“The ordinary rules of evidence governing a trial are relaxed at the sentencing hearing.” People v.
Williams, 2018 IL App (4th) 150759, ¶ 17. “Moreover, ‘a sentencing judge is given broad
discretionary power to consider various sources and types of information so that he can make a
sentencing determination within the parameters outlined by the legislature.’ ” Id. (quoting People
v. Williams, 149 Ill. 2d 467, 490 (1992)). Through live, in-court testimony, Adams admitted telling
the officer about defendant’s statement. Defense counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine her
to contest her claim about defendant’s intent to retaliate against his brother. Other than highlighting
Adams’s motive to have defendant removed from the home, defense counsel did not question
Adams about her claim. Defendant also introduced no evidence disputing his retaliatory intent.
Defendant did not refute Adams’s claim, and the trial court reasonably believed it.
¶ 48 Lastly, the trial court was not required to impose a lesser sentence on remand.
Although defendant has fewer felony convictions than the court thought at the initial sentencing
hearing, the court still could have determined that defendant’s multiple prior felony convictions
warranted the maximum sentence. As explained above, the court was not required to view
- 13 - defendant’s good behavior during his most recent incarceration as more probative than his years
of criminal behavior and his consistent disregard for the rules of parole. Finally, on remand, the
court still had before it evidence that defendant purchased two firearms and stated that he intended
to retaliate against his brother for shooting at him. The court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that these factors warranted the maximum sentence, even if it also imposed the same
sentence at the previous sentencing hearing.
¶ 49 Ultimately, defendant’s arguments amount to a claim that the trial court should have
weighed the sentencing factors differently. “The appellate court may not substitute its judgment
for that of the trial court merely because it might have weighed those factors differently.” Klein,
2022 IL App (4th) 200599, ¶ 37. The trial court’s decision was not manifestly disproportionate to
the nature of the offense. We find no abuse of discretion, and we affirm defendant’s sentence.
¶ 50 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 51 For the reasons stated, we affirm defendant’s sentence.
¶ 52 Affirmed.
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