People v. Powell

37 P.3d 545, 2001 Colo. Discipl. LEXIS 110, 2001 WL 1636751
CourtSupreme Court of Colorado
DecidedDecember 10, 2001
Docket01PDJ049
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 37 P.3d 545 (People v. Powell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Colorado primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Powell, 37 P.3d 545, 2001 Colo. Discipl. LEXIS 110, 2001 WL 1636751 (Colo. 2001).

Opinion

*546 Opinion by

Presiding Disciplinary Judge ROGER L. KEITHLEY and Hearing Board members, SISTO J. MAZZA and BETH L. KRULEWITCH,

both members of the bar.

REPORT, DECISION AND IMPOSITION OF SANCTION

SANCTION IMPOSED: ONE YEAR AND ONE DAY SUSPENSION

A sanctions hearing pursuant to C.R.C.P. 251.15 was held on October 11, 2001, before the Presiding Disciplinary Judge ("PDJ") and two hearing board members, Sisto J. Mazza and Beth L. Krulewitch, both members of the bar. Charles E. Mortimer, Jr., Assistant Attorney Regulation Counsel, represented the People of the State of Colorado (the "People"). Evan Shawn Powell ("Pow *547 ell"), the respondent, did not appear either in person or by counsel.

The Complaint in this action was filed April 27, 2001. Powell did not file an Answer to the Complaint. On June 26, 2001, the People filed a Motion for Default. Powell did not respond. On July 19, 2001 the PDJ issued an Order granting default, stating that all factual allegations set forth in the Complaint were deemed admitted pursuant to C.R.C.P. 251.15(b), and all violations of The Rules of Professional Conduct ("Colo.RPC") alleged in the Complaint were deemed established.

At the sanctions hearing, exhibit 1 was offered by the People and admitted into evidence. The PDJ and Hearing Board considered the People's argument, the facts established by the entry of default, the exhibit admitted, and made the following findings of fact which were established by clear and convincing evidence, and reached the following conclusions of law.

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

All factual allegations set forth in the Complaint were deemed admitted by the entry of default. The facts set forth therein are therefore established by clear and convincing evidence. See Complaint attached hereto as exhibit 1. The Order entering default also granted default as to the violations of The Rules of Professional Conduct.

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The respondent has taken and subscribed the oath of admission, was admitted to the bar of this court on October 15, 1992, and is registered upon the official records of this court, registration No. 22148. He is subject to the jurisdiction of this court in these disciplinary proceedings.

Claims I and II

On January 12, 2000, Jovoni Mercado ("Mercado") hired Powell to represent her in a dissolution of marriage action, and paid him a retainer of $300. Powell did not file the petition for dissolution of marriage on Mercado's behalf until March 26, 2000, and thereafter took no other action on her case. Consequently, Powell violated Colo. RPC 1.83(a lawyer shall act with reasonable dili-genee and promptness in representing a client) by neglecting Mercado's legal matter. Powell also violated Colo. RPC 1.4(a)(a lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information) by failing to communicate with Mercado, by failing to keep Mercado reasonably informed about the status of her legal matter and failing to comply with Mercado's reasonable requests for information, despite Mercado's repeated attempts to communicate with Powell.

Claims III and IV

In February 1999, Norma Eastridge ("Eastridge") hired Powell to assist her in acquiring title to three separate retirement assets that had been awarded to her in a dissolution of marriage action and to represent her interests in connection with marital property in a bankruptey proceeding filed by her former spouse. When Eastridge contacted Powell on November 12, 1999, Powell had done nothing on Eastridge's legal matters. After her meeting with Powell in November 1999, Eastridge called Powell four to five times a month and received only voice mail. On November 1, 2000, Eastridge hired a new attorney to represent her. Powell violated Colo. RPC 1.8(a lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client) by failing to file an adversary proceeding with regard to the bankruptcy matter filed by Eastridge's former spouse, and by failing to prepare documentation to divide two retirement plans between Eastridge and her former spouse. Powell violated Colo. RPC 1.4(a)(a lawyer shail keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information) by failing to keep Eastridge reasonably informed about the status of her legal matters and failing to promptly comply with Eas-tridge's reasonable requests for information.

Claims V, VI, VII and VII

In 1997, Jim Lottig ("Lottig") retained Powell on a contingency fee basis to sue *548 certain individuals who built Lottig's residence. Powell commenced the civil action and engaged in some investigation and discovery. In May 2000, Lottig settled with one of the defendants, and the civil action against the other defendants continued. 1 By September 2000, Lottig had not heard from Powell concerning the case, and he attempted to contact Powell to learn its status. Thereafter, Lottig called Powell and insisted that Powell dismiss the case against the remaining defendants. Powell did not agree. Approximately one week later, Lottig again called Powell and told him to dismiss the case. Once again Powell expressed his disagreement. Lottig never heard from Powell again. On October 20, 2000, Lottig learned that the case had been set for trial and had been vacated. Powell had not provided notice to Lottig of a pre-trial conference nor of the trial date. The case was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute. Lottig tried repeatedly to contact Powell concerning the matter, but Powell did not return Lot-tig's messages or otherwise contact Lottig. Lottig requested that Powell return his files and documents. Powell neither responded to the request or returned the documents. Powell violated Colo. RPC 1.3(neglect of a legal matter) by failing to keep Lottig apprised of the status of the case, failing to advise Lottig of the pre-trial conference and trial dates, and failing to notify Lottig of the dismissal of the case. Powell violated Colo. RPC 1.4(a)(failure to communicate) by failing to communicate with Lottig concerning the status of his legal matter and failing to promptly comply with Lottig's reasonable requests for information.

The facts established by the entry of default demonstrate that after Lottig instructed Powell to dismiss the case, Powell effectively deserted and/or rejected Lottig, the case he had filed on Lottig's behalf and his professional responsibilities to his client. Such misconduct is abandonment. Abandonment was defined in People v. Carvell, No. 99PDJ096 (Colo. PDJ September 11, 2000), 29 Colo. Law. 187 (November 2000), 2000 Colo. Discipl. LEXIS 26 as follows:

To find abandonment rather than merely neglect, there must be proof that the attorney-during a given time period-was required to accomplish specific professional tasks for the client, failed to accomplish those tasks, and failed to communicate with the client. The proof must objectively indicate that the attorney has deserted, rejected and/or relinquished the professional responsibilities owed to the client.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

People v. Roye
66 P.3d 1282 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 2003)
People v. Weisbard
59 P.3d 858 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 2002)
People v. Stillman
42 P.3d 88 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 2002)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
37 P.3d 545, 2001 Colo. Discipl. LEXIS 110, 2001 WL 1636751, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-powell-colo-2001.