People v. Posey

2026 IL App (5th) 250808-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: January 12, 2026
• Docket: 5-25-0808
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2026 IL App (5th) 250808-U NOTICE Decision filed 01/12/26. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-25-0808 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to not precedent except in the the filing of a Petition for IN THE limited circumstances allowed Rehearing or the disposition of under Rule 23(e)(1). the same. APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Jefferson County. ) v. ) No. 25-CF-230 ) DARIOUS J. POSEY, ) Honorable ) Matthew E. Vaughn, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

PRESIDING JUSTICE CATES delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Sholar and Bollinger concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The trial court’s orders granting the State’s verified petition to deny pretrial release and denying the defendant’s motion for relief due to dangerousness are affirmed. The trial court’s finding of willful flight was in error and is vacated.

¶2 The defendant, Darious J. Posey, appeals the September 29, 2025, order from the trial court

of Jefferson County that granted the State’s petition to deny pretrial release and the October 6,

2025, denial of his motion for relief and immediate release. For the following reasons, we affirm

in part and vacate in part.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On September 26, 2025, the defendant was charged by information with one count of

criminal sexual assault, a Class 1 felony, in violation of section 11-1.20(a)(1) of the Criminal Code

of 2012 (Criminal Code) (720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(a)(1) (West 2024)) (count I), and one count of

1 aggravated criminal sexual abuse, a Class 2 felony, in violation of section 11-1.60(d) of the

Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/11-1.60(d) (West 2024)) (count II). The charges allege that, as to

count I, the defendant committed an act of sexual penetration against E.O. and used force during

the commission of the offense. As to count II, the State alleged that the defendant committed an

act of sexual conduct with E.O., who was at least 13 years of age but under 17 years of age when

the act was committed, in that the defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with E.O. and the

defendant was more than five years older than E.O.

¶5 The State filed a verified petition to deny defendant pretrial release the same day, alleging

that the defendant was charged with a detainable offense and that his release posed a real and

present threat to the safety of any person or persons in the community, pursuant to section 110-

6.1(a)(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code). 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(5) (West

2024). The trial court held a hearing on the State’s petition on September 29, 2025.

¶6 Before the hearing began, the State said that there was a “necessary amendment” to be

added to the verified petition. The State sought to amend its petition by interlineation to add the

following language: “No condition or combination of conditions exist which are less restrictive to

prevent the defendant from committing further criminal conduct or appearing for further court

dates.” Defense counsel had no objection to the amendment. The amendment by interlineation is

set forth in the report of proceedings; however, a pleading with the amendment is not contained

within the common law record.

¶7 The State then proceeded by proffer and stated it would be referencing the following

documents: a police report, a laboratory report from the Illinois State Police, and a pretrial

investigation report. The State proffered that Officer West of the Mt. Vernon Police Department

(MVPD) would testify that on January 10, 2025, he took a statement from E.O., stating that on

2 January 9, 2025, she stayed at her sister’s residence and was sexually assaulted by the defendant.

She said that the defendant, who lived upstairs at her sister’s residence, proceeded downstairs and

appeared to be intoxicated. He then held her down before penetrating her vaginally without consent

and through the use of force. E.O. stated that the defendant pushed down on her chest, and she told

him to stop at least 12 times. E.O. was 15 years old at the time of the incident, and the defendant

was 28 years old. She collected the clothes she wore during the incident and provided them to law

enforcement. She additionally went to the hospital to have a sexual assault kit performed, which

was sent off for further analysis. Officer Majors of the MVPD would also testify that he made

phone contact with the defendant on January 10, 2025, and the defendant claimed that he went

downstairs one time on January 9, 2025, but no sexual contact occurred.

¶8 Detective Moreland of the MVPD conducted another interview with E.O. on February 6,

2025. She informed Detective Moreland that when the defendant came downstairs and appeared

intoxicated, E.O. was uncomfortable because the defendant became “touchy” with her and she

attempted to move away. The defendant, however, moved closer to E.O. and got on top of her,

held her down, then proceeded to do “whatever he wanted” to E.O. sexually until she was able to

push him off of her after about 25 minutes. E.O.’s sister took her back home the following morning,

and E.O.’s boyfriend encouraged her to contact the police. On May 29, 2025, Detective Moreland

received the DNA and sexual assault kit test results, which showed a male’s DNA, but there was

no known substance to cross-reference the results from the kit.

¶9 After multiple phone call attempts, the defendant agreed to come to the police department

in July, but he failed to appear. Detective Moreland continued calling the defendant and his family

members, but the defendant did not return the calls or go to the police department. On September

10, 2025, Detective Moreland made physical contact with the defendant while he was at work. The

3 defendant told Detective Moreland that E.O. did stay at the home with her sister and that he lived

in the upstairs portion of the home with his girlfriend and their children. He stated that his girlfriend

informed him that E.O. accused him of sexual assault and he denied the allegations. He told

Detective Moreland that there were multiple individuals present in the house at the time, and the

layout of the house would make it “difficult” for any significant activity to go unnoticed. The

defendant denied any physical contact with E.O. and agreed to provide a DNA sample, which

Detective Moreland then collected.

¶ 10 On September 23, 2025, Detective Moreland received the results from the defendant’s

DNA swab, which indicated a “hit” on the sexual assault kit. On September 25, 2025, Detectives

Moreland and Kane went to the defendant’s residence, and he agreed to go with them to the police

station to give a statement. After being advised of his Miranda 1 rights and agreeing to speak with

the officers, the defendant told the officers again of the living arrangements in the residence and

that E.O. was babysitting her sister’s children that evening. The detectives asked the defendant

three times if he ever had intercourse with E.O., which he denied each time. He stated that

previously, E.O. made “advances” toward him several times, and that she would change or remove

her clothing when no other household members were home. Detective Moreland then informed

the defendant of the DNA results they received from the Illinois State Police Lab. The defendant

initially continued his denials, but then told officers that he was smoking and drinking with E.O.,

and she began to make physical advances toward him. He claimed to have told E.O. “no” several

times but then engaged in sexual intercourse with her. The defendant told the detectives that he

was afraid of getting in trouble because he had a girlfriend, and after the incident, he discovered

E.O. was underage.

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 4 ¶ 11 The State presented no further evidence and proceeded to argument, stating that the

defendant committed a detainable offense, being criminal sexual assault, which is a forcible felony

enumerated in the Code. E.O. cooperated completely, including reporting the offense, and

participating in a sexual assault examination and kit. The sexual assault kit then identified the

defendant’s DNA, corroborating E.O.’s account. The State said that when questioned by

detectives, the defendant denied any form of sexual contact with E.O. seven times, and he only

admitted to any contact after he was informed of the sexual assault kit results.

¶ 12 The State argued that the defendant’s release would be detrimental to E.O. because the

defendant could potentially reoffend, attempt to coerce a statement from E.O., or threaten E.O.

The State said that no conditions would sufficiently ensure that the defendant would not reoffend,

that he would make all his court dates, or would prevent any harm, physical or emotional, to E.O.

The State argued that even though the defendant did not have any prior convictions and only one

pending case, 2 the defendant’s pretrial release should be denied.

¶ 13 The defendant’s counsel proffered that the defendant was 29 years old, resided in Mount

Vernon, Illinois, with his girlfriend, two of her children, and two children that they shared together,

aged 2, 9, 12, and 13. The defendant completed high school and had lived in the area for five years.

He was employed, with two jobs. The defendant was not on pretrial release, parole, or work

release, did not have any prior convictions, and had no failures to appear. The defendant scored a

4 out of 14 on the Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment Tool (VPRAI-R), which was the second

lowest category for recidivism. The defendant’s counsel requested release with conditions,

specifically home confinement with electronic monitoring, and a no contact order with E.O.

2 The defendant was charged with battery in Jefferson County case No. 25-CM-38. The offense occurred after the sexual assault but before the defendant was charged in the present case. 5 Further, defense counsel stated that the defendant could reside at an address other than his home,

if requested. The defendant also argued that he was not a flight risk because he had no driver’s

license, passport, or vehicle. He needed to continue working to support his girlfriend and their

children. The parties presented no further evidence.

¶ 14 The trial court found that there was clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident

or the presumption great that the defendant committed both offenses, which were qualifying

offenses under the Code. The trial court also found that no condition or combination of conditions

existed to prevent the defendant from committing further criminal conduct or appearing for further

court dates. The trial court’s oral pronouncements specifically highlighted the evidence of the

defendant’s DNA on the test kit and that no conditions, including home confinement, would

prevent further criminal conduct. The trial court also stated that the defendant was a flight risk due

to his minimal contacts in the area. The trial court ordered the defendant detained pending trial.

The trial court’s written order indicated that the court’s reasons for concluding that the defendant

should be denied pretrial release was to “protect E.O. physically and emotionally,” and to “secure

presence for court.” Additionally, the trial court indicated less restrictive conditions would not

assure the defendant’s appearance in court because of the defendant’s “lack of long term ties to

the community, nature of the offense, risk of flight given the potential sentencing range.”

¶ 15 On October 1, 2025, the defendant filed a motion for relief and immediate release. The

motion alleged that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is

evident or presumption great that the defendant committed a qualifying offense, that he posed a

real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, that no combination

of conditions can mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons, that he

posed a real and present threat of willful flight, and that no condition or conditions could mitigate

6 the threat of dangerousness or willful flight. The motion argued that the trial court erred in failing

to consider the defendant’s ties to the community being his two children, his employment at two

separate jobs to support his family, his lack of criminal history, his willingness to abide by any

terms of release, that no weapon was used, and that the defendant did not have a license or vehicle,

as to his willful flight.

¶ 16 On October 6, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on the defendant’s motion for relief. The

defendant’s counsel proffered that the defendant lived in Mount Vernon with his significant other,

her children, and his two biological children. He was 29 years old, a high school graduate, and was

employed with two jobs. The defendant had no criminal history, was not on pretrial release, parole,

or work release, had never failed to appear at a court proceeding, and did not possess a driver’s

license or passport.

¶ 17 Defense counsel then argued that the defendant did not pose a flight risk because he had

“virtually no way to flee the jurisdiction” due to not having a driver’s license or passport. The

defendant additionally worked two jobs to support his family. The defendant scored in the second

lowest ranking for recidivism in the VPRAI-R, and the defendant argued that he was not a danger

to repeat the alleged act. As such, the defendant’s counsel asked that the defendant be released

with the condition of home confinement with electronic monitoring, and a no contact order with

the victim. Also, the defendant had an alternative address where he could reside, apart from the

address that was involved in the alleged offense, where the victim did not reside.

¶ 18 The State proffered the same information from the original detention hearing, stating that

E.O., a 15-year-old, reported that the defendant sexually assaulted her when he came into the part

of the shared home where she was babysitting. The defendant appeared intoxicated and, as he

made advances toward E.O., he did not listen to E.O. when she told him “no,” and he proceeded

7 to sexually assault her. E.O. subsequently submitted her clothing to law enforcement and went to

the hospital to complete a sexual assault kit, which ultimately tested positive for the defendant’s

DNA. When detectives questioned the defendant, he denied any sexual contact with E.O.

whatsoever, until he was presented with the DNA results from the sexual assault kit.

¶ 19 The State argued that the defendant continued to remain a threat to E.O., both physically

and emotionally. The State said that the defendant’s release would cause emotional damage to

E.O. and a lack of confidence in the legal system if the defendant was released after E.O. completed

all the steps necessary for law enforcement to identify the defendant and link him to the offense.

The State also argued that the defendant resides with other minor children, aged 13, 12, 9, and 2,

only two of whom were his own children. The State argued that no less restrictive means existed

to ensure that the defendant would not flee the jurisdiction or commit any further crimes. As such,

the defendant should be denied pretrial release. The defendant briefly responded, stating that while

the alleged offense occurred on January 9, 2025, the defendant was not arrested until September

2025, over eight months later, and “the alleged victim survived that period of time.” Further, there

was no evidence “that there were any problems during that period of time.”

¶ 20 The trial court stated that it had considered all of the factors listed in the motion for relief.

The trial court also considered that the offense was expressly identified in the Code as a qualifying

offense. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for relief. The defendant timely appealed.

¶ 21 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 22 The defendant filed his motion for relief on October 1, 2025, arguing the points referenced

above. The Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) was appointed to represent the

defendant. OSAD filed a memorandum pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h)(7) (eff.

Apr. 15, 2024) on behalf of the defendant. On appeal, the defendant argues that the State failed to

8 prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the defendant poses a real and present threat to the

safety of any person or persons or the community, (2) he has a high likelihood of willful flight,

and (3) no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate any risk posed by his release. The

defendant does not challenge the fact that the State proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that

the proof is evident or the presumption is great that the defendant committed a qualifying offense.

This issue has thus been abandoned on appeal. See People v. Drew, 2024 IL App (5th) 240697,

¶ 21; Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(7) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024) (“If a memorandum is filed, it must identify which

issues from the motion for relief are being advanced on appeal.”).

¶ 23 Pretrial release—including the conditions related thereto—is governed by Public Act 101-

652, § 10-255 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023). See Pub. Act 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) (amending

various provisions of the Act); Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52 (lifting stay and setting

effective date as September 18, 2023). A defendant’s pretrial release may be denied only in certain

statutorily limited situations. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2024). Upon filing a timely, verified

petition requesting denial of pretrial release, the State has the burden to prove by clear and

convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant has

committed a qualifying offense, that the defendant’s pretrial release poses a real and present threat

to the safety of any person or the community or a flight risk, and that less restrictive conditions

would not avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community and/or

prevent the defendant’s willful flight from prosecution. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e), (f) (West 2024).

The State or the defendant may present evidence to the trial court by way of proffer based upon

reliable information. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(2) (West 2024). The trial court may order a defendant

detained pending trial if the defendant is charged with a qualifying offense, and the trial court

concludes the defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the

9 community (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1)-(7) (West 2024)) or there is a high likelihood of willful

flight to avoid prosecution (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(8) (West 2024)).

¶ 24 Our standard of review of pretrial release determinations is twofold. Where the trial court

is asked to consider the testimony of live witnesses, and make factual findings, such as the State’s

burden of presenting clear and convincing evidence that conditions of pretrial release would not

protect any person or the community, the defendant has a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid

prosecution, or the defendant failed to comply with previously ordered conditions of pretrial

release, our standard of review is the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Morgan, 2025 IL

130626, ¶ 54. “A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite

conclusion is clearly evident or if the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the

evidence presented.” People v. Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d 322, 332 (2008). Alternatively, where the parties

to a pretrial detention hearing proceed solely by proffer or submission of documentary evidence,

this court stands in the same position as the trial court and may conduct its own independent review

of the proffered evidence, thus reviewing the record de novo. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 54. In

the present matter, the parties proceeded solely by proffer, so we will employ de novo review.

¶ 25 The pertinent statute provides a nonexhaustive list of factors courts should consider in

determining whether a defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any individual(s)

or the community. Those factors include (1) the nature and circumstances of the offenses charged,

including whether they are crimes of violence or a sex offense; (2) whether the defendant’s prior

criminal history indicates “violent, abusive, or assaultive behavior, or lack of such behavior”;

(3) the identity of any individual to whose safety the defendant may pose a threat and the nature

of any such threat; (4) the defendant’s age and physical condition; (5) the age and physical

condition of the victim or complaining witness; (6) whether the defendant possesses or has access

10 to any weapons; (7) whether the defendant was on probation, parole, or mandatory supervised

release when arrested on the underlying charges or any other offense; and (8) any other factor that

has a reasonable bearing on the defendant’s propensity for violent, abusive, or assaultive behavior

(725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g)(1)-(9) (West 2024)). No one factor is determinative, and the court must

base its decision on an individualized assessment. People v. Atterberry, 2023 IL App (4th) 231028,

¶ 15 (citing 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(7) (West 2022)).

¶ 26 We now consider, as the trial court did, the record presented by the State. In the present

matter, the defendant was charged with one count of criminal sexual assault, a Class 1 felony, and

aggravated criminal sexual abuse, a Class 2 felony. Both charges are sex offenses, which the Code

explicitly states may be considered when determining dangerousness. See 725 ILCS 5/110-

6.1(g)(1) (West 2024). The defendant was a 28-year-old man at the time of the offense, capable of

physically overtaking the victim, which may also be considered under the Code. 725 ILCS 5/110-

6.1(g)(4) (West 2024). The victim was a 15-year-old girl who was babysitting for her sister when

the offense occurred, unable to leave the home until her sister returned from work the following

day. The disparity in age between the defendant and the victim created a violent and abusive

encounter, where the defendant was said to have held the victim down against her will. The

defendant’s release would also pose a risk to E.O. in that he could continue to act as a threat toward

her or harm her. Further, the defendant denied any sexual contact with the victim until presented

with the DNA test results, after which the defendant then accused the victim of making advances

toward him, claiming she initiated the sexual offense.

¶ 27 The defendant was employed at two jobs at the time of his arrest and did not have any

previous convictions. However, these facts, along with the other factors presented during the

hearings, do not overcome the threat the defendant posed to the victim and to the community. The

11 defendant’s conduct toward E.O. and the continued risk that he posed to E.O., because he was

well-acquainted with her and knew her sister, supported a finding of a threat to E.O. and the

community. Viewing the evidence in its entirety, we find that the State met its burden of proving

by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant posed a real and present threat to the safety

of an individual or the community.

¶ 28 Once a court determines that the defendant poses a threat to the safety of any individual or

the community, the trial court must determine whether the State has met its burden of proving by

clear and convincing evidence, what pretrial release conditions, “if any, will reasonably ensure the

appearance of a defendant as required or the safety of any other person or the community and the

likelihood of compliance by the defendant with all the conditions of pretrial release.” 725 ILCS

5/110-5(a) (West 2024). In reaching its determination, the trial court must consider (1) the nature

and circumstances of the offense charged; (2) the weight of the evidence against the person; (3) the

history and characteristics of the person; 3 (4) the nature and seriousness of the specific, real, and

present threat to any person that would be posed by the person’s release; and (5) the nature and

seriousness of the risk of obstructing or attempting to obstruct the criminal justice process. 725

ILCS 5/110-5(a) (West 2024). The Code lists no singular factor as dispositive. See 725 ILCS

5/110-5(a) (West 2024). The nature and circumstances of the underlying offense is “just one factor

to consider in determining whether the threat posed can be mitigated by conditions of release.”

People v. Lopez, 2025 IL App (2d) 240709, ¶ 19.

3 The defendant’s history and characteristics include: “the defendant’s character, physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, community ties, past relating to drug or alcohol abuse, conduct, *** criminal history, and record concerning appearance at court proceedings,” as well as “whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the defendant was on probation, parole, or on other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence for an offense under federal law, or the law of this or any other state.” 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a)(3)(A), (B) (West 2024). 12 ¶ 29 The defendant argues that sufficient conditions exist that would mitigate his risk, namely,

home confinement with electronic monitoring and no contact with the victim. The defendant was

charged with criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual abuse, both felonies and

serious offenses. The State presented significant evidence to substantiate the defendant’s

involvement in the offense, including a positive DNA identification of the defendant related to the

sexual assault kit. The defendant’s release would pose a risk to the victim’s emotional and physical

safety, even with a no contact order. The offense occurred within the defendant’s home, where he

resided with other children, two of his biological children, and two of his girlfriend’s children.

Considering that the sexual offenses alleged involved the violent and abusive behavior toward a

young woman, and the weight of the evidence is great, we find that no condition or combination

of conditions would mitigate the defendant’s risk to the victim and the community.

¶ 30 In addition to his foregoing arguments, the defendant argues that the State failed to show

by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant had a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid

prosecution. In order to fully review this claim, we must first address the State’s verified petition

to deny pretrial release. The petition stated that the defendant was charged with a detainable

offense, and that his release posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons

or the community, also known as the “dangerousness” standard. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(5) (West

2024). The verified petition, however, does not allege that the defendant had a high likelihood of

willful flight. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(8) (West 2024).

¶ 31 Looking to the plain language of section 110-6.1(d)(1), the Code states:

“The petition shall be verified by the State and shall state the grounds upon which it

contends the defendant should be denied pretrial release, including the real and present

threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific

13 articulable facts or flight risk, as appropriate.” (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/110-

6.1(d)(1) (West 2024).

Our primary objective when construing a statute is to give effect to the legislature’s intent, best

determined by giving the statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning. People v. Hunt, 234

Ill. 2d 49, 59 (2009). The word “shall” has been construed as a clear expression of legislative intent

to impose a mandatory obligation. People v. O’Brien, 197 Ill. 2d 88, 93 (2001). The language of

the Code thus requires that the verified petition state the grounds upon which the defendant shall

be denied pretrial release.

¶ 32 In the present case, the verified petition does not allege that the defendant should be denied

pretrial release because the defendant was a flight risk. The petition only alleges the dangerousness

standard as the basis for denial of pretrial release. As such, the trial court erred in considering any

factors related to the detention of the defendant based upon him being a flight risk. Further, the

trial court erred in making any finding that the defendant was a flight risk, as this was not an

allegation in the verified petition, although we recognize that both parties argued whether the

defendant should be considered a flight risk.

¶ 33 Assuming arguendo, even if the verified petition had included the allegation that the

defendant posed a willful flight risk, and the arguments of counsel were appropriately considered,

the present record indicates that the trial court erred in entering any findings based upon the

defendant being a willful flight risk. When the State seeks to deny pretrial release on the basis that

a defendant poses a risk of willful flight from prosecution, the State must establish by clear and

convincing evidence (a) that the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant

committed a detainable offense; (b) that defendant “has a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid

14 prosecution,” if released; and (c) and that no condition or combination of conditions case mitigate

the defendant’s risk of willful flight. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(8), (e)(1)-(3) (West 2024).

¶ 34 The Code defines “willful flight” as:

“intentional conduct with a purpose to thwart the judicial process to avoid prosecution.

Isolated instances of nonappearance in court alone are not evidence of the risk of willful

flight. Reoccurrence and patterns of intentional conduct to evade prosecution, along with

any affirmative steps to communicate or remedy any such missed court date, may be

considered as factors in assessing future intent to evade prosecution.” 725 ILCS 5/110-1(f)

(West 2024).

When determining whether a defendant may be detained based on a “high likelihood of willful

flight to avoid prosecution,” the circuit court is to consider only “intentional conduct with a

purpose to thwart the judicial process to avoid prosecution,” as provided in the Code’s definition

of “willful flight.” 725 ILCS 5/110-1(f) (West 2024). A thwarting of the judicial process generally

refers to “a defendant’s willful avoidance of prosecution in court by failing to appear at court

hearings and similar behaviors.” People v. Quintero, 2024 IL App (1st) 232129-U, ¶ 22; People v.

Sims, 2024 IL App (4th) 231335-U, ¶¶ 28-30.

¶ 35 In the present case, before the detention hearing began, the State indicated that there was a

“necessary amendment” to be made to the verified petition, and that the State wanted to add the

following language to the petition: “No condition or combination of conditions exist which are

less restrictive to prevent the defendant from committing further criminal conduct or appearing for

further court dates.” It is important to note that this language is not the standard language for

proving willful flight at a detention hearing. If it was the intent of the State to prove willful flight,

15 such language did not adequately reflect the definition in the statute, and the State did not use the

correct standard related to willful flight in the initial detention hearing.

¶ 36 In addition to the State failing to provide the correct grounds for relief in the verified

petition and offering an amendment with the wrong standard for willful flight, the trial court also

erred in its findings related to the defendant’s flight risk. The trial court found that the defendant

was a flight risk because “he does not have any family in the Mt. Vernon area,” other than his two

children. Additionally, the trial court indicated the defendant had only been a resident of the county

for about five years. In its written order, the trial court specifically said that the defendant was a

flight risk based on the following: “lack of long term ties to the community, nature of the offense,

risk of flight given potential sentencing range.”

¶ 37 The trial court’s written order found a risk of flight due to the potential sentencing range

of the offenses. The State never provided the sentencing ranges for the offenses during either

hearing, and did not argue that the sentencing range contributed to the defendant’s flight risk. The

trial court not only considered factors that were not presented at either of the defendant’s hearings,

but also committed error by using the sentencing range in support of its findings.

¶ 38 The Code presumes that pretrial release is available for all criminal defendants. Pretrial

release must not, however, be predicated exclusively upon a finding that the defendant committed

a detainable offense. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West 2024); People v. Stock, 2023 IL App (1st)

231753, ¶ 18. “More is required” than stating the basic elements of a detainable offense, such as

its sentencing range. Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753, ¶ 18. If the sentencing range for an offense

is allowed as the means for detention under the flight risk standard, then every offense with a

potentially high sentencing range would be detainable. The trial court’s reasoning is clearly at odds

with the Code’s presumption of eligibility for all defendants, and the plain language of the Code

16 indicates more is required. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West 2024); People v. Ramirez, 2023 IL

128123, ¶ 13 (“The best evidence of legislative intent is the statutory language itself, which must

be given its plain and ordinary meaning.”).

¶ 39 The trial court’s oral and written findings were thus not based on the meaning of willful

flight as defined within the Code of “intentional conduct with a purpose to thwart the judicial

process to avoid prosecution.” 725 ILCS 5/110-1(f) (West 2024). The State did not present any

evidence of willful avoidance of prosecution by failing to appear at court hearings or similar

behaviors intended to thwart the judicial process to avoid prosecution. Therefore, the trial court

had no basis for its findings that it had considered the definition of willful flight as set forth in the

Code. As such, the trial court erred when it relied on the sentencing ranges for the felonies charged

as a basis for finding the defendant posed a risk of willful flight if not detained. We thus vacate

the trial court’s finding that willful flight was a basis for detaining the defendant.

¶ 40 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 41 We affirm the trial court of Jefferson County’s orders detaining the defendant based on the

dangerousness standard and that no conditions would mitigate the risk posed by the defendant. We

vacate the orders detaining the defendant based on the willful flight standard.

¶ 42 Affirmed in part and vacated in part.