People v. Pool

2021 IL App (4th) 200072-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: November 4, 2021
• Docket: 4-20-0072
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2021 IL App (4th) 200072-U FILED This Order was filed under November 4, 2021 Supreme Court Rule 23 and NO. 4-20-0072 Carla Bender is not precedent except in the 4th District Appellate limited circumstances IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) McLean County LYNSEY ROSE MARIE POOL, ) No. 19CF227 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Scott D. Drazewski, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Turner and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.

ORDER ¶1 Held: Where the trial court properly found the State met its burden to disprove defendant’s affirmative defense of necessity beyond a reasonable doubt, we affirm defendant’s escape conviction.

¶2 Following a bench trial, defendant, Lynsey Rose Marie Pool, was convicted of

escape. The trial court sentenced defendant to 38 days’ incarceration in the McLean County jail

and 30 months’ probation. Defendant appeals, arguing her conviction for escape cannot stand

where the State failed to disprove her affirmative defense of necessity. We affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 In March 2019, the State charged defendant with one count of escape in violation

of section 31-6(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/31-6(a) (West 2018)), alleging

defendant knowingly failed to report to the McLean County detention facility for periodic imprisonment. Defendant maintained she acted out of necessity and provided notice of her intent

to assert the affirmative defense of necessity.

¶5 At trial, Sergeant Rodney Frank testified he worked as a corrections sergeant at

the McLean County detention facility. On February 24, 2019, he received a phone call from

defendant at approximately 3:40 p.m. in which defendant indicated she would not be reporting to

the detention facility because she was on her way to the hospital. Defendant had been convicted

of aggravated battery in McLean County case No. 17-CF-2. The trial court took judicial notice of

defendant’s periodic incarceration schedule for her conviction in case No. 17-CF-2. According to

the schedule, defendant was to report to the McLean County detention facility on Sundays at

4 p.m. and would be released at 7 a.m. the following day.

¶6 Ovid Winans, assistant superintendent of the McLean County detention facility,

testified medical staff were available to provide services to inmates at the jail from 6:30 a.m.

until approximately 7 p.m., Sunday through Saturday. If an inmate required medical attention

outside of the specified time frame, the correctional staff had access to an on-call physician who

would be able to provide appropriate guidance.

¶7 Defendant testified that on February 24, 2019, at approximately 3:40 p.m., she

called the McLean County detention facility to inform the corrections staff that she would not be

reporting to the jail at 4 p.m. Defendant testified after she made the telephone call, she began

walking to the emergency room at St. Joseph’s Hospital because she was not able to find

someone to provide her transportation. Defendant testified that eventually her mother picked her

up approximately one block away from the hospital and drove defendant the remaining distance

to the emergency room. Defendant also testified she was at the hospital for approximately three

hours. After leaving the hospital, defendant went to a pharmacy to pick up medication prescribed

-2- by an emergency room physician. Defendant testified she arrived at the jail between 10:35 p.m.

and 10:45 p.m.

¶8 The parties stipulated to the admission of the emergency department records

created at approximately 7:25 p.m. on February 24, 2019. The attending physician, Dr. Omer

Nazeer, observed, “30-year-old female with no significant past medical history presents to the

ER with complaints of hesitancy or urgency and dysuria. Also reports mild abdominal

discomfort and cramping ***. Denies fevers chills nausea or vomiting. Denies any history of

kidney stones. Denies all other complaints. Is well-appearing in no distress at this time. States

she has used a primary care physician for which she is being worked up peripherally for an

abnormal CBC a few months ago. At this moment she denies any hematuria or colicky flank

pain.” Defendant further indicated to emergency room personnel she had been experiencing

symptoms for approximately one month. The emergency department records indicate defendant

was discharged from St. Joseph’s hospital at approximately 8:50 p.m.

¶9 Following closing arguments, the trial court found defendant guilty of one count

of escape based on her failure to report to the McLean County detention facility for periodic

imprisonment. Specifically, the court found the evidence failed to establish an affirmative

defense of necessity. In its ruling, the court noted defendant contacted the correctional facility at

approximately 3:40 p.m., from a location two blocks from the facility and more than two miles

from the hospital. The emergency department records showed defendant was not treated until

approximately 7:50 p.m. According to Dr. Nazeer, defendant was comfortable and in no distress.

The court noted further defendant reported suffering for approximately one month but did not

seek treatment on a day she was not required to be in custody. The court observed “a decision

-3- was made by the defendant here in order to seek medical treatment of a nonemergency nature at

the hospital emergency room as opposed to the jail.”

¶ 10 Defense counsel filed a posttrial motion arguing defendant was not proven guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt. Following a hearing, the trial court denied defendant’s motion and

sentenced defendant to 38 days’ imprisonment and 30 months’ probation.

¶ 11 This appeal followed.

¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13 On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred when it found her guilty of

escape. Specifically, defendant contends the State failed to disprove her affirmative defense of

necessity.

¶ 14 “When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case,

the relevant inquiry is whether, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Hinthorn, 2019 IL

App (4th) 160818, ¶ 89, 146 N.E.3d 122. “The trier of fact has the responsibility to determine the

credibility of witnesses and the weight given to their testimony, to resolve conflicts in the

evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from that evidence.” Hinthorn, 2019 IL App (4th)

160818, ¶ 89. The reviewing court, when considering the sufficiency of the evidence, does not

retry the defendant. People v. Beauchamp, 241 Ill. 2d 1, 8, 944 N.E.2d 319, 322 (2011). “A

conviction will be reversed only where the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or

unsatisfactory that it justifies a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.” People v. Belknap,

2014 IL 117094, ¶ 67, 23 N.E.3d 325.

-4- ¶ 15 As relevant to this appeal, a person commits escape where she “knowingly fails to

report to a penal institution or to report for periodic imprisonment at any time or knowingly fails

to return from furlough or from work and day release or who knowingly fails to abide by the

terms of home confinement.” 720 ILCS 5/31-6 (West 2018). Here, defendant admits she “failed

to report on time for periodic imprisonment, thereby committing the offense of escape.”

Defendant claims, however, she sufficiently raised the defense of necessity and the State failed to

disprove that defense beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 16 Section 7-13 of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/7-13 (West 2018))

describes the necessity defense as follows:

“Necessity. Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is justifiable by reason

of necessity if the accused was without blame in occasioning or developing the

situation and reasonably believed such conduct was necessary to avoid a public or

private injury greater than the injury which might reasonably result from his own

conduct.”

The defense of necessity is available to a defendant, as a matter of law, if (1) the defendant was

without blame in occasioning or developing the situation and (2) the defendant reasonably

believed that her conduct was necessary to avoid a public or private injury greater than the injury

that might have resulted from literal compliance with the law. People v. Janik, 127 Ill. 2d 390,

399, 537 N.E.2d 756, 760 (1989). “The defense of necessity applies when the threat of harm was

immediate, and defendant’s conduct was the sole option to avoid injury.” People v. Guja, 2016

IL App (1st) 140046, ¶ 47, 51 N.E.3d 970. In this case, it is undisputed defendant was without

blame in the occasion of her urinary tract infection. However, we do not believe defendant

-5- satisfies the second prong of the test, concerning necessity to avoid a greater private or public

injury than would result from her compliance with the law.

¶ 17 Necessity involves a choice between two admitted evils where other optional

courses of action are unavailable. Janik, 127 Ill. 2d at 399. “The evils to be faced which would

authorize the use of the defense must be grave and serious.” People v. Govan, 169 Ill. App. 3d

329, 338, 523 N.E.2d 581, 586 (1988). The conduct chosen must promote some higher value

than the value of literal compliance with the law. Janik, 127 Ill. 2d at 399. Conduct that would

otherwise be illegal is justified by necessity only if the conduct was the sole reasonable

alternative available to the defendant under the circumstances. See Guja, 2016 IL App (1st)

140046, ¶¶ 47-49. When other alternatives exist, which if carried out would cause less harm,

then the accused is not justified in breaking the law. People v. Haynes, 223 Ill. App. 3d 126, 128,

584 N.E.2d 1040, 1042 (1991).

¶ 18 Winans testified inmates had access to medical staff from 6:30 a.m. to

approximately 7 p.m., seven days a week. Frank testified he received a call from defendant at

3:40 p.m. on February 24, 2019, during which defendant indicated she would not be reporting to

jail at 4 p.m. The emergency room reports indicate defendant did not see a physician in the

emergency room until approximately 7:38 p.m. The trial court found defendant’s timeline

unpersuasive, stating: “[A]nd so that was three hours and 46 minutes later from when she had

contacted *** Correctional Officer Frank, and then was there approximately an hour and a half.

Yes, there was testimony that she thought she was there about three hours or so. I don’t think

that’s that relevant as much as it does—what it does is refute her testimony, meaning the

defendant’s testimony, and causes the Court to consider that credibility to assign to same.” The

-6- court further observed defendant called the detention facility from a location approximately two

blocks away. The hospital was more than two miles from defendant’s location.

¶ 19 As the trial court noted, had defendant reported to the jail at 4 p.m. as required by

the terms of her periodic incarceration order, the jail would have provided defendant with

medical care. The court observed the medical reports indicated defendant only complained of

“mild discomfort and cramping; and she is well appearing and in no distress at this time.” The

lack of immediacy with regard to defendant’s medical condition was further highlighted by the

fact defendant reported experiencing the pain for approximately one month. The court found

defendant could have addressed her medical concerns by either reporting her symptoms to

medical staff at the jail or by simply seeking medical attention when she was not required to be

in custody subject to her periodic incarceration order.

¶ 20 Defendant relies on People v. Kucavik, 367 Ill. App. 3d 176, 180, 854 N.E.2d

255, 259 (2006) to support her claim. In Kucavik, the court concluded “to require the defendant’s

conduct to be the ‘sole’ alternative to illegal conduct would render the language in the statute

referring to the accused’s reasonable belief meaningless.” Kucavik, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 176. We

find Kucavik unpersuasive. As the supreme court told us in Janik, necessity involves a choice

between two admitted evils where other optional courses of action are unavailable. Janik, 127 Ill.

2d at 399. Therefore, the defense of necessity presumes only two possibilities available to a

defendant: (1) violating the criminal statute or (2) not violating the criminal statute—and that the

former was the only reasonable option because the evil of the second option was greater. See

People v. White, 78 Ill. App. 3d 979, 981, 397 N.E.2d 1246, 1247 (1979). As we noted above,

the court in Haynes, citing both Janik and White, found the defense of necessity permitted only

two choices. Likewise did the Fifth District in People v. Branham, 217 Ill. App. 3d 650, 651, 577

-7- N.E.2d 803, 805 (5th Dist. 1991), the Second District in People v. Kratovil, 351 Ill. App. 3d

1023, 1034, 815 N.E.2d 78, 89 (2d Dist. 2004), and the First District in People v. Boston, 2016

IL App (1st) 133497, ¶ 39, 54 N.E.3d 217, to name only a few. Kucavik, on the other hand, does

not appear, from our review, to have been cited favorably for the proposition espoused by

defendant in any reported case. Here, defendant did not present evidence sufficient to raise a

reasonable doubt that breaking the law by failing to report to jail was the sole reasonable

alternative under the circumstances. We continue to follow the weight of authority in Janik,

holding that the defense of necessity is not available where other reasonable alternatives are

presented to defendant.

¶ 21 Therefore, in reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution,

we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found defendant’s necessity defense fails

because of the lack of immediacy. We find the evidence was sufficient to find the essential

elements of the crime were present to find defendant guilty of escape beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 22 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 23 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 24 Affirmed.

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