People v. Polanski

2024 IL App (1st) 240828-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: July 12, 2024
• Docket: 1-24-0828
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2024 IL App (1st) 240828-U No. 1-24-0828B Order filed July 12, 2024 Fifth Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 22 CR 11185 ) RAFAL POLANSKI, ) Honorable ) Neera Walsh, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge presiding.

JUSTICE NAVARRO delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Mitchell and Justice Mikva concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State’s petition to detain defendant before trial. Affirmed.

¶2 Defendant Rafal Polanski appeals from the March 26, 2024, order of the circuit court of

Cook County denying him pretrial release pursuant to article 110 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/110 et seq. (West 2022)), which was amended by Public

Act 11-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act. Defendant argues No. 1-24-0828B

that the State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that: (1)

defendant posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community;

and (2) no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the real and present threat to the

safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific, articulable facts of the

case, or defendant’s willful flight. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 Defendant was arrested on September 5, 2022, and charged with attempted first-degree

murder and aggravated domestic battery. Bond hearings were held on September 6, 2022, January

24, 2023, and May 4, 2023. Defendant was denied pretrial release on each of these occasions.

Following enactment of the Pretrial Fairness Act, defendant filed a petition to grant release. He

argued that he did not pose a real and present threat to the safety of the community or any person,

he did not have a criminal record prior to this case, and he had sought opportunities to learn and

better himself in jail. The State filed a petition for pretrial detention, arguing that defendant posed

a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community based on specific

articulable facts, and that there was a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid prosecution.

¶5 On March 26, 2024, a hearing was held on the petitions. Defense counsel asked the court

to grant defendant pretrial release because the alleged offense was a “stand-alone event.” Defense

counsel stated that since then, a divorce judgment and an order of protection had been entered.

Defense counsel claimed that defendant did not know the whereabouts of the victim.

¶6 The State argued that the proof was evident and the presumption great that defendant

committed an eligible offense for pretrial detention, defendant poses a real and present threat to

the safety of any person or persons or the community, and that no condition or combination of

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conditions could mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the

community. The State proffered the following evidence.

¶7 The victim and defendant were married and shared a six-year-old daughter. At the time of

the offense, the victim’s mother was visiting, and the daughter was at home. The couple had been

in ongoing counseling to address marital issues. The State indicated that defendant “was trying to

be intimate with the victim, and she established at counseling that she did not want to have that

relationship with him.”

¶8 On the date in question, while the victim was taking a shower, defendant walked into the

bathroom. The victim told defendant she wanted privacy, but defendant “indicated to her that he

should be able to see her naked because he’s her husband.” The victim then pushed him out of the

bathroom and locked the door.

¶9 Defendant went downstairs and “grabbed the largest knife in the kitchen.” The minor child

observed defendant walking back to the bathroom. She also observed him prying open the door

and gaining entry to the bathroom. After reentering the bathroom with the knife, the victim pleaded

with him to calm down. Defendant “stabbed her about the head, the abdomen,” her arms and her

legs. She called for help and her mother woke up. Her mother saw defendant with a knife, standing

in front of the victim “as she’s crouched in a defensive position in the corner of the bathroom.”

The mother ran to get help from the neighbors.

¶ 10 The minor child “ran to the bathroom and she pulled her father’s shirt *** in an attempt to

pull him away from the victim.” The victim was able to grab the knife and throw it away from the

defendant, directing her child to hide the knife. Defendant then “began to choke the victim with

both of his hands.” He “pressed his thumb into the middle of her throat, applying pressure and

impeding her breathing.”

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¶ 11 When officers arrived on the scene, the victim’s mother directed the police officers to the

upstairs bathroom and observed defendant in the bathroom. Defendant was “fully covered in

blood” with no injuries to himself.

¶ 12 The victim was transported to the hospital where she underwent emergency surgery. She

suffered four abdominal stab wounds, including one laceration to her liver. She had two lacerations

on her head, “massive swelling in her throat, and a significant number of lacerations to both her

arms and her hands and her legs.”

¶ 13 The State indicated that when this matter initially came to court, medical personnel could

not determine the extent of damage to the victim’s throat due to swelling. She was intubated and

fully dependent on machine airflow. Since then, the victim “has lost mobility in her left arm; she

suffers from current trauma and has been undergoing therapy for that trauma.” She lost her job due

to having to undergo therapy and not being able to work. She cannot use her hand, and she suffers

from posttraumatic stress disorder.

¶ 14 The State noted that defendant is a “native of Poland,” and argued that he would have the

opportunity to flee if released, knowing that if convicted, he would not be eligible for probation as

a sentence in this case. The State further argued that defendant should be detained because the

incident was unprovoked, and defendant did not stop even when the child tried to intervene.

¶ 15 The court noted that it had an opportunity to consider what was presented in the petition

for pretrial release and the petition for detention. The court then stated:

“The State has shown by clear and convincing evidence the proof is evident or the

presumption is great that the defendant committed an eligible offense as listed in

the statute, attempt first-degree murder of his wife at the time in front of their minor

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child who was approximately six years of age in their home; that he stabbed the

victim numerous times causing wounds and also choking her.

The defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or

persons or the community based on specific articulable facts of the case, to wit, the

defendant choked and stabbed the victim in front of the minor child causing serious

injury to the complaining witness. And, again, this was in their home, a place that

they should have felt safe.

There are also indications based on – although the defendant is not charged

with any sexual charges in this, that this did not just begin as a disagreement; this

was the defendant engaging in believing that he should be able to view the victim

in a state of undress in the bathroom, and that he had this right to do so; and then

proceeded to go and get a knife and come back and proceeded to stab this victim

numerous times.

The Court finds that there are no conditions or combination of conditions as

set forth in the statute that can mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of

any person or persons in the community based on specific articulable facts of this

case.

Less restrictive conditions would not avoid a real and present threat to the

safety of any person or persons or the community based on the specific articulable

facts of this case, being that this alleged incident the defendant committed is inside

of their home in front of a minor child and his then wife at the time; and to say that

this defendant could be on electronic monitoring for an order of protection or a GPS

would prevent him from returning when, in this particular case, this defendant left

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the bathroom, went to the kitchen area, got a knife and then returned. So there is

nothing to indicate that this defendant would not do this again.

As far as flight risk, the defendant is facing extensive punishment if he were

to be found guilty of these charges. And so for those reasons, this defendant is going

to be detained.”

¶ 16 Defendant now appeals.

¶ 17 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 18 On appeal, defendant argues: (1) the State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and

convincing evidence that defendant posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or

persons or the community, based on the specific, articulable facts of the case; and (2) the State

failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or

combination of conditions could mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person or

persons or the community based on the specific, articulable facts of the case, or defendant’s willful

flight.

¶ 19 “Section 110-6.1(e) of the Code presumes that all defendants are eligible for pretrial release

and places the burden of justifying pretrial detention by clear and convincing evidence on the

State.” People v. Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753, ¶ 11; 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West 2022). If

the State files a petition requesting denial of pretrial release, “the State has the burden to prove by

clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that a defendant

has committed a qualifying offense, that the defendant’s pretrial release poses a real and present

threat to the safety of another person or the community or a flight risk, and that less restrictive

conditions would not avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community

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and/or prevent the defendant’s willful flight from prosecution.” People v. Vingara, 2023 IL App

(5th) 230968, ¶ 7; 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West 2023).

¶ 20 We review the circuit court’s factual findings on whether the State proved these three

elements under the manifest-weigh-of-the-evidence standard. People v. Pitts, 2024 IL App (1st)

232336, ¶ 29. “A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only where the opposite

conclusion is clearly apparent or if the finding is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the

evidence presented.” People v. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13. We review a circuit

court’s ultimate detention ruling under the abuse of discretion standard. Id. “An abuse of discretion

occurs when the court’s ruling is fanciful, arbitrary, or unreasonable or where no reasonable person

would agree with the court’s position.” People v. Wells, 2024 IL App (1st) 232453, ¶ 16. “[I]n

assessing the sufficiency of a trial court’s findings, its written findings must be read in conjunction

with its oral pronouncements.” People v. Andino-Acosta, 2024 IL App (2d) 230463, ¶ 19. See also

People v. Costillo, 2024 IL App (1st) 232315, ¶¶ 30-31 and People v. Montano, 2024 IL App (1st)

232481-U, ¶ 25 (agreeing that the trial court’s written findings must be read in conjunction with

its oral statements).

¶ 21 Defendant’s first argument is that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing

evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that defendant poses a real and present

threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community. In support of this argument,

defendant stated in his notice of appeal that the court based its decision that defendant posed a real

and present threat on the 2022 incident that occurred inside the shared home of the defendant and

the victim. Defendant argued that as of 2024, the home was no longer shared, and defendant “has

no knowledge of the complaining witness’s whereabouts since September 2022. Since this case

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has been pending a divorce judgment has been entered, and defendant has not made any contact

with the complaining witness or their child.”

¶ 22 We conclude that the court reasonably found the State met its burden to show by clear and

convincing evidence that defendant “poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or

persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case.” 725 ILCS 5/110-

6.1(e)(2) (West 2023). The Code permits the court to consider certain factors in assessing whether

a defendant poses such a threat, including the nature and circumstances of the offense charged,

whether it was a crime of violence involving a weapon, and characteristics of the defendant. 725

ILCS 5/110-6.1(g) (West 2023); 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a) (West 2023); see People v. Snowden, 2024

IL App (1st) 232272-U, ¶ 27. Here, the State’s proffered evidence was sufficient for the trial court

to find that the proof was evident that defendant stabbed the victim multiple times with a deadly

weapon, and that when the victim was able to take away his knife, he proceeded to strangle the

victim.

¶ 23 Additionally, section 110-6.1(g)(9) of the Code states that the court can consider any other

factors, including those listed in section 110-5 of the Code. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g)(9) (West 2023).

Section 110-5(a)(6) of the Code states that when a person is charged with attempted first-degree

murder of a spouse, the court may consider whether the person has access to deadly weapons, the

duration of the incident, physical injury, strangulation, and forcible entry to gain access to the

alleged victim.

¶ 24 Here, the proffered evidence showed that defendant forcibly entered the bathroom to gain

access to the victim by picking a lock. He then used a deadly weapon to stab her multiple times.

When he could no longer stab the victim with a knife because the victim took it away, he strangled

her. He was not thwarted by the presence of either his six-year-old daughter, or his mother-in-law.

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The victim suffered significant injuries, including the loss of mobility in her left arm. Accordingly,

we find that the trial court could reasonably find that defendant posed a “real and present threat”

to the victim and the community, and its finding was not against the manifest weight of the

evidence.

¶ 25 From this evidence, the trial court could also reasonably conclude that the State met its

separate statutory burden to prove that “no condition or combination of conditions” could mitigate

the real and present threat posed by defendant. Section 110-5 of the Code outlines the factors trial

courts should consider in determining conditions of pretrial release. 725 ILCS 5/110-5 (West

2023). These factors include the nature and the circumstances of the offense; the weight of the

evidence against defendant; the history and characteristics of defendant; and if the defendant is

charged with attempted murder of his spouse, whether defendant has access to deadly weapons,

the severity and duration of the alleged offense, physical injury, strangulation, and forcible entry.

Id.

¶ 26 Here, the trial court found that less restrictive conditions would not avoid a real and present

threat to the victim or the community, since the alleged incident occurred inside their home. The

trial court also stated that electronic monitoring or GPS would not prevent defendant from

returning to find the victim when “in this particular case, this defendant left the bathroom, went to

the kitchen area, got a knife and then returned. So there is nothing to indicate that this defendant

would not do this again.” The trial court specifically referenced how when defendant discovered

he was locked out of the bathroom he went to the kitchen and got a knife, picked the locked

bathroom door, and proceeded to stab the victim multiple times. When the knife was eventually

taken from him, he then began strangling the victim until authorities arrived on the scene. A locked

door, his child as a witness, the presence of his mother-in-law, and the removal of the knife, were

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all measures that did not thwart defendant form his goal of attempting to murder the victim, and

therefore there is no reason to think that GPS or electronic monitoring would prevent him from

finding the victim again. Accordingly, the trial court’s finding that the State met this requirement

was also not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 27 Defendant’s reliance on People v. Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753 does not convince us

otherwise. In Stock, the defendant was charged with one count of aggravated battery/discharge of

a firearm. Id. ¶ 1. The evidence proffered by the State was that defendant picked up a handgun

during an argument with his wife and discharged one round into the bedroom wall. Id. ¶ 5. The

bullet penetrated the bedroom wall, and entered the adjoining bathroom, and grazed his wife, who

was in the bathroom. Id. His wife suffered a grazing wound to her stomach and an injury to her

hand. Id.

¶ 28 On appeal, this court agreed that the trial court’s findings at the pretrial detention hearing

were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. ¶ 13. As to whether no condition or

combination of conditions could mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person or

the community, the court found that the State did not present any evidence supporting that

conclusion. Id. ¶ 17. The court found that “the bare allegations that defendant has committed a

violent offense are not sufficient to establish this element.” Id. ¶ 18. The court stated that if the

base allegations that make up the sine qua non of a violent offense were sufficient on their own to

establish this element, “then the legislature would have simply deemed those accused of violent

offense ineligible for release.” Id. However, the court stated that “[t]his is not to say that alleged

facts stating the basic elements of an offense are not relevant or are not part of the proof that no

conditions could mitigate the threat posed by a defendant.” Id.

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¶ 29 In the case at bar, the State presented evidence beyond the bare allegations of the offense

of attempted first-degree murder to meet its burden of proof. The proffered evidence of defendant

repeatedly stabbing the victim certainly made up the basic elements of the offense. 720 ILCS 5/8-

4(a) (West 2022) (a person commits the offense of attempt when, with the intent to commit a

specific offense, he does any act that constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that

offense); 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2022) (a person who kills an individual without lawful

justification commits first degree murder if in performing the acts which cause the death, he intends

to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual or another, or knows that such acts will cause

death to that individual or another). However, as the court noted, defendant forced entry into the

bathroom to get to the victim, used a deadly weapon to stab her multiple times, and then proceeded

to strangle the victim when he lost possession of his knife. The presence of their six-year-old

daughter and the victim’s mother did not stop defendant’s attack. The victim had to undergo

emergency surgery for the lacerations she sustained, and lost mobility in her left arm. These

specific articulable facts go well beyond “bare allegations that defendant has committed a violent

offense.” Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753, ¶ 18. Accordingly, we find Stock to be inapposite to

the case at bar.

¶ 30 Considering our finding that the trial court properly found that the State met its burden of

proof by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions could

mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, we

need not address defendant’s argument regarding whether he was a flight risk. See People v.

Simmons, 2024 IL App (1st) 240592-U, ¶ 17 (dangerousness and flight are separate bases for

pretrial detention).

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¶ 31 For the foregoing reasons, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting

the State’s pretrial petition for detention of defendant.

¶ 32 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 33 We affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 34 Affirmed.

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