2026 IL App (1st) 242564-U No. 1-24-2564 Order filed April 30, 2026 Fourth Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 22 CR 1312601 ) MICHAEL PITTS, ) Honorable ) Joanne F. Rosado, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE OCASIO delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Navarro and Justice Lyle concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Defendant’s 30-year sentence for attempted first degree murder is affirmed over his contention that the trial court may have relied upon an improper factor in aggravation. Where the trial court merged three counts, the sentences imposed on those counts are vacated pursuant to the one-act, one-crime doctrine and the mittimus is corrected accordingly.
¶2 Following a bench trial, defendant Michael Pitts was found guilty of two counts of
attempted first degree murder, one count of aggravated battery, and one count of aggravated
discharge of a firearm. The trial court merged the counts into one count of attempted first degree No. 1-24-2564
murder (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 9-1(a)(1) (West 2022)) (count 2) and sentenced Pitts to 30 years in
prison thereon. On appeal, Pitts contends that the case must be remanded for resentencing where
“there is a question” as to whether the merged counts improperly influenced his sentence. In the
alternative, he contends that the mittimus must be amended to reflect a single conviction and
sentence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm Pitts’s conviction and sentence on count 2; vacate
the sentences imposed on the other, merged counts; and order correction of the mittimus.
¶3 Pitts’s conviction arose from an October 23, 2022, shooting in Chicago. Following arrest,
Pitts was charged with five crimes against Corey Edwards: attempted first degree murder (count 1),
attempted first degree murder while personally discharging a firearm (count 2), attempted first
degree murder while personally discharging a firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm
(count 3), aggravated battery (count 4), and aggravated discharge of a firearm (count 5).
¶4 We set forth the trial evidence relevant to the issue on appeal.
¶5 At trial, Corey Edwards testified that, on the night in question, Davonte Brough drove him
and a man he knew only as “Face” to a residential location where they intended to purchase
marijuana. Edwards rode in the front passenger seat and Face sat behind him. Pitts, whom Edwards
had met “four times possibly” and knew as Brough’s brother, approached their vehicle on foot.
Edwards described what happened next:
“[Pitts] came from the front of the car. [Brough said], like, He ain’t going to shoot,
that’s my brother. And he shot me. I looked at my hand. That’s where the bullet first went.
Looked at my hand. Looked at him right in his face. *** He came on the side of the car,
on my side of the car. I was on the passenger side. He was like over—he came around this
way and started shooting.”
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¶6 Face pushed Edwards’s head down and Brough drove off. Edwards realized that, in
addition to being shot in the hand, he had also been shot in the leg, back, and stomach. Edwards
further testified that Face said his hand was grazed, but the court sustained Pitts’s hearsay objection
to that testimony. Edwards added that he lost consciousness in the vehicle. He eventually had
surgery and was hospitalized for almost a month.
¶7 The State published a portion of a video recorded by a doorbell camera, which was admitted
into evidence, and which this court has reviewed. The video depicts a stretch of residential street
with people sitting in and standing between parked vehicles. A dark-colored sedan drives from left
to right across the screen. A man in a green shirt appears on the right side of the screen and walks
across the street in front of the moving sedan. He then turns toward the passenger side of the sedan,
someone yells indecipherable words, and the sedan accelerates while the man raises his right arm
and runs after the sedan. As the sedan and the man leave the camera’s view, seven shots can be
heard.
¶8 In court, Edwards identified Pitts as the man in the green shirt in the video.
¶9 Brough, who stated several times that he did not want to participate in the trial, testified
that, on the night in question, he drove Edwards and “Face,” whom he also knew as “Cortez,” to a
residential location to buy marijuana. Brough’s brother, Pitts, was present, “[m]ingling with some
people.” Brough saw Pitts cross the street but did not see him draw a weapon. He heard gunshots
and drove fast to get away. He did not know that anyone in the vehicle had been hit until “Corey
and Face said that he was shot.” After arriving at the hospital, Brough found a bullet hole in the
hood of his jacket. When asked whether Face had been hit, Brough answered, “from my
understanding he was grazed.” The trial court sustained Pitts’s objection to speculation.
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¶ 10 Brough testified that Pitts was wearing green on the night of the shooting. When the State
re-published footage from the doorbell camera, Brough identified Pitts as the man in the green
shirt in the video. The State introduced into evidence and published text messages Brough and
Pitts exchanged after the shooting. In the messages, Brough told Pitts that he was in the car and
both he and Face had been grazed. When Pitts replied that he would “never shoot [his] brother,”
Brough wrote back, “But you did ***. And face [sic].”
¶ 11 Pitts testified that, on the night in question, he was not at the location of the shooting but,
rather, was at home. He denied that he was the man in the green shirt in the video and denied
shooting at the sedan. He also denied knowing Edwards or ever having seen him before he testified
at trial and denied having sent Brough the text messages that were introduced into evidence.
¶ 12 The trial court found Pitts guilty on all counts save count 3, explaining that great bodily
harm had not been proved where Edwards did not testify as to why he was hospitalized or what
surgery he underwent. The court found that Edwards testified credibly, that Brough was distraught
over his testimony and “did not want to be here,” and that Pitts’s testimony was a “complete lie.”
Pitts filed a posttrial motion, which the trial court denied.
¶ 13 A presentence investigation (PSI) report was prepared. Among other things, the PSI report
reflected that Pitts’s criminal history included three felonies (criminal damage to government
property, manufacture/delivery of fentanyl, and possession of a stolen motor vehicle) and two
misdemeanors (resisting/obstructing a peace officer and attempted possession of a controlled
substance), and that he was on probation at the time of the shooting.
¶ 14 At sentencing, the State argued in aggravation that Pitts had an “extensive history of prior
criminal activity,” that his conduct caused or threatened serious harm to the three people in the
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vehicle and the bystanders on the street, and that a significant sentence would be necessary to deter
others. The State added that Pitts was on probation at the time of the shooting, and that he showed
no remorse.
¶ 15 In mitigation, the defense argued that Pitts was 26 years old, had completed high school
and some college, provided care for his son, and worked two jobs. The defense also argued that
Pitts’s three prior felony convictions were for nonviolent offenses. The defense asked the court not
to apply any firearm enhancements and to order that its sentence be served at 50%. Pitts declined
to speak in allocution.
¶ 16 The court reviewed the facts of the case. In the course of summarizing Edwards’s
testimony, it noted, inter alia, that Edwards said Face “received a graze wound to his hand.” When
synopsizing Brough’s testimony, the court noted Brough “didn’t realize he had a bullet hole
through his shirt” until arriving at the hospital. The court later commented that Pitts’s actions
“could have ended [Brough’s] life just as quickly as those bullets were flying through his vehicle.”
¶ 17 The court noted it had found both Edwards and Brough to be “extremely credible” and Pitts
not credible, as “[e]verything he said was a lie.” It specified that when Pitts testified, “[h]e was
very cold, disassociated with the facts *** [and] tried to pretend as if none of this really was him,
nothing actually happened.” In contrast, Edwards and Brough had described the incident as “what
it actually was, and that was Mr. Pitts being angry about something, taking out a gun, and trying
to kill Mr. Edwards.”
¶ 18 Further, the court acknowledged it was in possession of the PSI report.
¶ 19 The court stated that it was applying the “gun enhancements” and announced its sentencing
decision as follows:
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“So looking at the [PSI] report, the history, character, and attitude of the defendant,
the evidence and the arguments presented, having considered all the statutory matters and
the aggravation and mitigation, and due to the circumstances, I find the following:
That as to Count Number 1, the defendant will be sentenced to 25 years in the
Illinois Department of Corrections, mandatory supervised release in the amount of 18
months.
As to Count 2, the defendant will be sentenced to 30 years in the Illinois Department
of Corrections, mandatory supervised release 18 months.
As to Count 4, the defendant will be sentenced to 30 years in the Illinois Department
And as to Count 5, he will be sentenced to 10 years in the Illinois Department of
Corrections, mandatory supervised release 18 months.
Count 1, 4, and 5 will merge into Count 2, for a total of 30 years in the Illinois
Department of Corrections, mandatory supervised release 18 months.”
¶ 20 The mittimus reflects that Pitts was “adjudged guilty” of four offenses and sentenced as
follows: count 1, attempted murder, 25 years; count 2, attempted murder, 30 years; count 4,
aggravated battery, 30 years; and count 5, aggravated discharge of a firearm, 10 years. The
mittimus further provides that “COUNTS 1, 4, AND 5 MERGED INTO COUNT 2.” The half
sheet from the day of sentencing also includes a hand-written notation bracketing the respective
sentences for counts 1, 2, 4, and 5 and stating, “All merge into Ct 2.”
¶ 21 Pitts filed a written motion to reconsider sentence, arguing that his 30-year sentence was
excessive “[i]n light of the evidence presented at trial and to the Court.” He further asserted that
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the court failed to consider the sentencing objective of restoring him to useful citizenship, as well
as his “character and attitudes,” which indicated he was unlikely to commit another crime. The
trial court denied the motion.
¶ 22 On appeal, Pitts contends that “there is a question” as to whether the merged guilty findings
on counts 1, 4, and 5 improperly influenced the court’s 30-year sentence on count 2. He argues
that, where the mittimus listed four separate convictions and sentences, the record “reflects the
possibility that the sentences imposed for the merged offenses affected the 30-year sentence
imposed on count 2.” He asserts that the fact that the 30-year sentence listed for count 4 is the
same length as the 30-year sentence imposed on count 2 “indicat[es] the merged aggravated battery
conviction was significantly relied upon in determining the sentence for the most serious offense.”
¶ 23 Pitts also argues that the court’s references at sentencing to Face having been grazed, and
to Brough’s hoodie having a bullet hole in it, show that “the court seemed to focus on the fact that
there were victims other than Edwards.” He maintains that, where he was not charged with any
offense against Face or Brough, the court’s references “raise the possibility, despite the merger,
that [his] 30-year sentence on Count 2 was influenced by the similar sentences *** imposed for
offenses the trial court may have believed (incorrectly) were committed against persons other than
Edwards.” Pitts concludes that “it cannot be determined from the record what effect the convictions
and sentences of four separate felonies for the same act influenced the ultimate sentence [he]
received.” As a result, he requests that this court remand for resentencing.
¶ 24 The State responds that Pitts has forfeited this contention where he did not object at
sentencing or raise the issue in his motion to reconsider sentence. In his reply brief, Pitts argues
that we may reach the issue as a matter of plain error. See People v. Hardy, 2020 IL App (1st)
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172485, ¶ 77 (plain error may be raised for the first time in a reply brief). Pitts asserts that plain
error exists because the evidence at sentencing was close and because the integrity of the judicial
process is affected by “a sentence based on consideration of the same act more than once in
aggravation to increase a sentence.”
¶ 25 The plain error doctrine is a narrow and limited exception to forfeiture. People v. Hillier,
237 Ill. 2d 539, 545 (2010). In the sentencing context, a defendant must show either that (1) the
evidence at the sentencing hearing was closely balanced, or (2) the error was so egregious as to
deny the defendant a fair sentencing hearing. Id. Whether forfeiture may be avoided under either
of these theories requires us first to determine whether a clear error occurred. People v. Garcia,
2023 IL App (1st) 220524, ¶ 18. Here, we find no clear error.
¶ 26 Whether a court relied on an improper factor in imposing a sentence presents a question of
law that we review de novo. People v. Lopez, 2025 IL App (1st) 232120, ¶ 48. In considering
whether reversible error has occurred based on the trial court having allegedly considered an
improper sentencing factor, a reviewing court should make its decision based on the record as a
whole and not focus on a few words or statements of the trial court. Id. ¶ 51. If a trial court
considered improper factors, the sentence may nevertheless be affirmed if the reviewing court “can
determine from the record that the weight placed on the improperly considered aggravating factor
was so insignificant that it did not lead to a greater sentence.” People v. Heider, 231 Ill. 2d 1, 21
(2008).
¶ 27 After reviewing the record as a whole, we find no indication that the trial court increased
Pitts’s sentence on count 2 due to its guilty findings on counts 1, 4, and 5. Rather, it is clear from
the record that the court fashioned sentences for each of the counts separately. At the sentencing
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hearing, the court orally announced the sentences one by one and then immediately stated that
counts 1, 4, and 5 merged into count 2. In keeping with its pronouncement of sentence, the court
also specified on the mittimus and the half sheet that the four separate sentences would merge.
¶ 28 The transcript shows that at sentencing, the court specifically considered the facts of the
case, the PSI report, and Pitts’s history, character, and attitude. The court also stated it had
considered all the statutory factors in mitigation and aggravation. See 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.1, 5-5-3.2
(West 2024). Further, the court properly noted Pitts’s lack of credibility when he testified at trial.
See People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 213 (2010) (listing the defendant’s credibility among the
factors to be weighed by the sentencing court). Nothing in the court’s comments indicates it relied
on any improper factor when fashioning Pitts’s sentence. Based on the record as a whole, we find
the trial court did not consider an improper sentencing factor. As such, there is no error.
¶ 29 In coming to our conclusion, we reject Pitts’s argument that the court’s choice of 30 years
as the sentence for both aggravated battery and attempted first degree murder “indicat[es] the
merged aggravated battery conviction was significantly relied upon in determining the sentence
for the most serious offense.” Pitts’s argument is unsupported and conclusory, and we fail to see
how the circumstance of sentences being of equal length demonstrates that one influenced the
other.
¶ 30 We also reject Pitts’s argument that the court’s references at sentencing to bullets having
grazed Face and having pierced a hole in Brough’s clothing signal that its 30-year sentence on
count 2 “was influenced by the similar sentences *** imposed for offenses the trial court may have
believed (incorrectly) were committed against persons other than Edwards.” First, the harm caused
or threatened to individuals other than the victim was a proper statutory factor for the court to
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consider in aggravation. See 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(a)(1) (West 2024); People v. Brown, 2019 IL
App (5th) 160329, ¶ 22 (section 5-5-3.2(a)(1) is not restricted to harm or potential harm to the
victim). Here, it is undisputed that Pitts fired at a vehicle with multiple occupants, all of whom
were endangered.
¶ 31 Second, as the State notes, the fact that the court merged the counts demonstrates that it
understood the charges all pertained to one victim, i.e., Edwards. See People v. Leach, 2011 IL
App (1st) 090339, ¶ 30 (the one-act, one-crime rule only applies to multiple convictions for acts
against a single victim); People v. Battle, 2023 IL App (1st) 231838, ¶ 30 (the trial court is
presumed to know the law and apply it properly). Finally, the court stated at sentencing that
Edwards and Brough had testified as to what the crime “actually was, and that was Mr. Pitts being
angry about something, taking out a gun, and trying to kill Mr. Edwards.” The court did not
describe anyone other than Edwards as the victim. For all these reasons, Pitts’s argument that the
court misunderstood who was identified as the victim in the charges and improperly considered in
aggravation the harm or threat of harm to other people in the vehicle he shot at is unpersuasive.
¶ 32 Having considered the record of the sentencing hearing as a whole, we cannot find that the
trial court considered an improper factor in imposing sentence. Without error, the plain error
doctrine does not apply and the issue remains forfeited. See People v. Hood, 2016 IL 118581, ¶ 18
(absent error, there can be no plain error).
¶ 33 Pitts contends, in the alternative, that where the trial court merged the guilty findings on
counts 1, 4, and 5 into count 2, the mittimus must be amended to reflect a single conviction and
sentence on count 2. He acknowledges that he did not raise this claim in the trial court but asserts,
accurately, that violations of the one-act, one-crime doctrine are reviewable under the plain error
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doctrine. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 2019 IL 123901, ¶ 14. The State concedes the issue and we
agree.
¶ 34 As noted, the trial court stated at sentencing that counts 1, 4, and 5 merged into count 2.
However, despite the merger, the court sentenced Pitts to 25 years’ imprisonment on count 1; 30
years’ imprisonment on count 4; and 10 years’ imprisonment on count 5. Because the court merged
those counts, sentence should not have been imposed on them. Regardless, the record supports the
parties’ position that counts 1, 2, 4, and 5 all arose out of the single physical act of Pitts shooting
Edwards. Therefore, Pitts’s simultaneous convictions violate the one-act, one-crime rule. See
People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d 551, 566 (1977). Accordingly, we vacate Pitts’s sentences on counts 1,
4, and 5 and order the mittimus corrected to reflect the vacatur and a single conviction and sentence
on count 2. Remand is unnecessary, as we may directly order the clerk of the court to correct the
mittimus pursuant to our authority under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(1) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967).
See People v. Scott, 401 Ill. App. 3d 585, 602 (2010) (vacating sentence imposed on merged count
and ordering correction of mittimus).
¶ 35 For the reasons explained above, we affirm Pitts’s conviction and sentence on count 2,
vacate the sentences imposed on counts 1, 4, and 5, and order correction of the mittimus.
¶ 36 Affirmed in part; vacated in part; mittimus corrected.
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