People v. Pillar
This text of 590 N.W.2d 622 (People v. Pillar) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Defendant’s probation was revoked pursuant to MCL 771.4; MSA 28.1134, and the court imposed a sentence of two to five years’ imprisonment for defendant’s underlying conviction of attempted second-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520c(1)(a); MSA 28.788(3)(1)(a), involving his nine-year-old daughter. Defendant appeals as of right. We reverse and remand.
Defendant argues that he was denied due process when the trial court found a probation violation solely on the basis of evidence of an arrest and again when the trial court considered conduct that was neither in violation of the order of probation nor *269 charged in the violation petition when deciding to revoke his probation. We agree with both of defendant’s contentions.
Probation violation hearings are summary and informal and are not subject to the rules of evidence or of pleading applicable in a criminal trial. The scope of these proceedings is limited and the full panoply of constitutional rights applicable in a criminal trial do not attach. People v Johnson, 191 Mich App 222, 225; 477 NW2d 426 (1991); People v Ritter, 186 Mich App 701, 705-706; 464 NW2d 919 (1991). However, probationers are afforded certain due process at violation hearings because of the potential for loss of liberty. See Gagnon v Scarpelli, 411 US 778; 93 S Ct 1756; 36 L Ed 2d 656 (1973); Morrissey v Brewer, 408 US 471; 92 S Ct 2593; 33 L Ed 2d 484 (1972). Specifically, a probationer has the right to a procedure consisting of (1) a factual determination that the probationer is in fact guilty of violating probation, and (2) a discretionary determination of whether the violation warrants revocation. People v Laurent, 171 Mich App 503, 505; 431 NW2d 202 (1988).
Here, defendant allegedly violated his probation by engaging in illegal sexual conduct with his daughter. At the probation violation hearing, the sole evidence presented was a police report indicating that defendant had been arrested and charged with the crime. 1 Solely on the basis of that evidence, the trial court found that defendant had violated his probation. However, it is well settled that probation may not be revoked solely on the basis that the probationer was *270 arrested. There must be verified facts in the record from which the court can find by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation was committed. People v Buckner, 103 Mich App 301, 303; 302 NW2d 848 (1980). The hearing was devoid of any verified facts that would enable a rational trier of fact to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant violated the terms of his probation.
Moreover, only evidence relating to the charged probation violation activity may be considered at a violation hearing and only such evidence may provide the basis for a decision to revoke one’s probation. People v Graber, 128 Mich App 185, 193; 339 NW2d 866 (1983); Laurent, supra at 505. During the probation violation hearing, the trial judge repeatedly made reference to a term of probation involving visitation with defendant’s daughter that was neither stated on the record at sentencing nor imposed as a term of probation in the original or amended order of probation. The trial judge’s recurrent reference to defendant’s allegedly improper visitation strongly suggests that defendant’s unsupervised visitation with his daughter, which did not violate a term of probation and which was not charged as conduct in violation of a term of probation, was erroneously considered by the judge in her ultimate decision to revoke defendant’s probation.
Consequently, we reverse the order of probation revocation and remand for a new probation violation hearing. Defendant urges this Court to remand the matter for consideration by a different trial judge. A case should be assigned to a different judge if it would be unreasonable to expect the trial judge, given her handling of the matter, to be able to put *271 previously expressed findings out of mind without substantial difficulty. People v Evans, 156 Mich App 68, 72; 401 NW2d 312 (1986). Here, with respect to the trial judge’s belief that she had prohibited unsupervised visitation with defendant’s daughter as a condition of probation, the judge stated:
You know what really upsets me. Everybody in this case screwed up. And you know who took the fall? Me. I don’t appreciate that. The prosecutor’s office screwed up, the probation department screws up, and I take the fall for it. Because nobody listed to what I said when I was sentencing you.
The trial judge further indicated that her review of the sentencing transcript revealed that she had imposed visitation conditions. However, our review of the sentencing transcript, which is attached as Appendix A to this opinion, contains no reference to restrictions placed on defendant’s visitation with his daughter. Indeed, the record demonstrates that those terms of probation that were imposed by the trial court were indeed set forth in the original and amended orders of probation. Given the certainty and vigor with which the trial judge expressed her findings, which we have already determined to be devoid of any record support, as well as the unbending blame that she erroneously placed on everyone involved in this case with the exception of herself, we are convinced that the judge would have difficulty setting aside her previously expressed views and justly resolve the issue at a subsequent hearing. Cf. People v Hill, 221 Mich App 391, 398; 561 NW2d 862 (1997). Hence, proceedings on remand shall be conducted by a different judge.
*272 Reversed and remanded. Jurisdiction is not retained.
APPENDIX A
The Clerk: People versus Pillar.
Mr. Alan [the Prosecutor]: Ready, your Honor.
Your Honor, for the record, Dean Alan on behalf of the People. The defendant appears before Court with counsel for sentencing today on file number 94-2623- FH. He pled guilty on a prior occasion to attempt [sic] CSC second, a five year felony. We would ask that the Court accept the plea and impose sentence.
The Court: Is that what you want me to do?
Mr. Garton [Defense Counsel]: That’s correct, your Honor. Good morning. For the record, Arthur Garton.
The Court: Hold on.
Do you want me to accept the plea?
Mr. Garton: Yes, your Honor.
The Court: Would you raise your right hand please?
(Defendant sworn)
The Court: This sentence was adjourned from 12-27, Mr. Alan.
Mr. Alan: That’s correct, your Honor.
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590 N.W.2d 622, 233 Mich. App. 267, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-pillar-michctapp-1999.