People v. Phillips

2020 IL App (1st) 173094-U

Opinion

2020 IL App (1st) 173094-U

FOURTH DIVISION June 30, 2020

No. 1-17-3094

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

) Appeal from the THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Circuit Court of ) Cook County Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) ) No. 15 CR 12746 GLEN PHILLIPS, ) ) Defendant-Appellant, ) ) Honorable ) Alfredo Maldonado, ) Judge Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE REYES delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Gordon and Justice Lampkin concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Affirming the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County where: (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to declare a mistrial; (2) certain remarks made by the prosecutor did not constitute error and, even if they did, did not rise to the level of plain error requiring reversal; (3) the evidence was sufficient to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of two counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm; and (4) the one-act, one-crime doctrine was not violated.

¶2 Following a jury trial, defendant Glen Phillips was found guilty of two counts of the first 1-17-3094

degree murder of Eddie Jones and two counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm. The jury

also specially found that defendant personally discharged a firearm that resulted in Eddie’s death.

The trial court merged the two counts of first degree murder and sentenced defendant to 30

years’ imprisonment in the Illinois Department of Corrections plus a 25-year firearm

enhancement. The trial court further sentenced defendant to 10 years’ imprisonment on each

count of aggravated discharge of a firearm to run concurrent to each other and consecutive to the

sentence for murder. On appeal, defendant raises four contentions: (1) the trial court abused its

discretion when it failed to declare a mistrial after the State violated a motion in limine during

the trial; (2) the prosecutor’s statements during closing argument and rebuttal argument denied

him a fair trial; (3) the evidence was insufficient to find him guilty of aggravated discharge of a

firearm; and (4) one of the two convictions for aggravated discharge of a firearm should be

vacated because they are based on the same gunshot. For the reasons which follow, we affirm

the judgment of the trial court.

¶3 BACKGROUND

¶4 Defendant was charged by indictment with multiple counts of first degree murder and

aggravated discharge of a firearm based on the allegation that on June 25, 2014, defendant

knowingly shot Eddie with a firearm, killing him. The allegations further indicated that

defendant knowingly shot into a vehicle that was occupied by two individuals: Quinton Neely

and Annette Walton. The State then proceeded to trial on two counts of first degree murder (720

ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2014)) and two counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm (720

ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(2) (West 2014)).

¶5 Pretrial

¶6 Prior to trial, the parties discussed motions in limine. Particularly relevant to this case,

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was defendant’s request to bar any reference to a “drug debt” the victim owed to defendant. The

prosecutor asserted Merle Jones 1 would testify that he heard defendant say, “Where’s my

money?” but that she would not be inquiring as to why the money was owed. The trial court

then granted the motion in limine to exclude any reference to a drug debt, but explicitly allowed

the State to present testimony that Eddie owed a financial obligation to defendant.

¶7 Trial

¶8 Donald Jones, the victim’s brother, testified that on June 25, 2014, he was with Eddie an

hour before he was murdered, and that Eddie was in good health at that time. Donald further

testified that later evening he learned his brother had been shot and killed. Thereafter, Donald

spoke with Neely and Red Singletary about the shooting and contacted the detectives who were

investigating the murder.

¶9 Annette Walton testified that on June 25, 2014, she was in a romantic relationship with

Eddie. That day, Eddie had come to Walton’s home to celebrate her birthday. That evening,

around 9 p.m. they left her house with Neely and drove to a liquor store where they purchased a

small bottle of brandy. At this time, Eddie was driving Walton’s vehicle and she was in the front

passenger seat and Neely was seated directly behind her. As they drove the three passed the

brandy around in the vehicle. She did not become intoxicated and, to her knowledge, no one was

using drugs while in the automobile.

¶ 10 At 10:45 p.m., Eddie drove to the 6500 block of South Sangamon in Chicago. Walton

testified she expressed her displeasure for being on this block as it was “loud” and “wild.” An

individual then indicated to Eddie he wanted to speak with him, so Eddie curbed the vehicle on

the left side of the one-way street. Eddie exited the vehicle and spoke with this person on the

1 The record discloses Merle Jones is of no relation to the victim, Eddie Jones.

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sidewalk and near the passenger side of the vehicle. Walton described the individual as an

African American male, five foot, six inches tall with a slim build. He was wearing a black

hoodie with the hood pulled up and she could not view his face. Meanwhile, Walton was

reading Facebook on her cell phone and listening to the radio. She could not hear the

conversation.

¶ 11 As the noise from outside the vehicle on the block became louder, Walton testified she

turned around and expressed to Neely that she wanted Eddie to hurry up so they could leave.

Then she heard “a big pop.” The man Eddie had been speaking with had a handgun and Eddie

was pushing the man away. Walton then observed fire coming out of the handgun and heard

“constant shooting.” Eddie grabbed his stomach and fell to the ground. Walton then slid into the

drivers’ seat, closed the drivers’ side door, and drove to the corner. Neely told her to let him out

at the corner, which she did. Thereafter she drove to 69th and South Sangamon where she called

her brother and Eddie’s sister. When her family arrived, they took her back to the 6500 block of

South Sangamon where she spoke with police officers.

¶ 12 Quinton Neely, the victim’s best friend, testified that on June 25, 2014, at 9 p.m. he

(along with Walton and Eddie) drove to the liquor store. Eddie was driving with Walton seated

in the front passenger seat and he was behind Walton. On the way to the liquor store, Neely was

smoking marijuana. After purchasing a half-pint of liquor, Eddie continued driving while they

passed the bottle around.

¶ 13 At 10:45 p.m. Eddie drove onto the 6500 block of South Sangamon where he was flagged

down by a man Neely knew as “Sluggo.” Eddie curbed the vehicle on the left-hand side of the

street and exited. Eddie began talking to Sluggo and Neely noticed that Merle, an individual he

knew from the neighborhood, was also present. As Eddie spoke with these individuals, Neely

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was playing on his cell phone. Then, in his peripheral vision, Neely noticed Merle and Sluggo

separate, so he looked up from his phone. Neely testified he observed a person come towards

Eddie with a handgun pointed at him. He was African American with a slight build and was

about five-foot-six or five-foot-seven. He was dressed in jeans with white shoes and a dark

hoodie with the hood up. At that point, Neely could not see the man’s face. The man then fired

at Eddie. Neely got down inside the vehicle but peeked over the top of the front seat (which was

in a reclined position). As he continued watching, Neely observed that Eddie had his hands

raised and was walking backward towards the automobile. The man with the firearm also

stepped closer to the vehicle. As he did, Neely could view his face and recognized him as a man

he knew from the neighborhood as “Skee.” Skee continued to shoot Eddie for a total of five to

six times. Eddie then grabbed his stomach and fell to the ground. At this point, Skee was within

two feet of Neely.

¶ 14 According to Neely’s testimony, Walton then started “hollering” and drove off toward

the corner at that moment Neely was able to observe defendant raise his firearm and shoot into

the vehicle. At the corner, Neely exited the vehicle to go check on Eddie. He was unconscious

and bleeding. That evening, Neely provided the police officers with a general description of the

shooter but did not reveal his name. The following day, he did not inform the detectives who

were investigating the case that he knew the shooter’s name because, “I was scared, and I wanted

the streets to handle him because he shot my friend.” Two weeks later, on July 13, 2014, Neely

contacted the police and, during an interview, he provided them with Skee’s name. Neely then

also identified Skee in a photo array. Neely testified in court that defendant was the individual

he knew as Skee and the person he observed shoot Eddie.

¶ 15 On cross-examination, Neely admitted that he was “buzzed, not drunk” and was “high” at

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10:45 p.m. on June 25, 2014. Neely further clarified his positioning in the vehicle as he

observed the shooting. Neely stated he was “balled up with my head peaking up from over the

[drivers’] seat.”

¶ 16 Merle Jones testified that he had been convicted of three felonies. He further testified

that he had known defendant for approximately 30 years, that defendant’s full name was Glen

Phillips, and that his nickname was “Skee.” Merle then identified defendant in court as the

person he knew as “Skee.”

¶ 17 Merle testified that on June 25, 2014, at 10 p.m. he was sitting in his vehicle which was

parked on the 6500 block of South Sangamon. His uncle, Vincent Singletary and his cousin,

Parrish Miles (who went by the nickname “Sluggo”), were outside talking when Eddie came

driving up the block. Eddie pulled alongside Merle’s vehicle and said, “What’s up, nephew?

I’ve been praying for you.” Then Eddie parked and exited his vehicle. As Eddie was talking to

Parrish, Merle exited his vehicle to join them. At this point, Vincent had returned to his own

home. Eddie, Parrish, and Merle spoke for 10-15 minutes. Merle then testified that defendant

was not present when the shooting occurred. According to Merle, while he had previously

implicated defendant in the murder, he was not telling the truth at that time because he was

hoping to obtain a deal from the Cook County assistant state’s attorney (ASA) on his own

separate felony case.

¶ 18 The prosecutor then impeached Merle with statements he made before the grand jury and

on a videotape recorded at the DuPage County jail regarding the present case.

¶ 19 Before the grand jury, Merle testified that while Parrish and Eddie were talking,

defendant walked down the street and came up to them. Defendant was wearing a hoodie.

Defendant asked Eddie about some money that Eddie owed him. Eddie told defendant, “I got

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you” and then defendant, who had a firearm in his hand, took a swing at Eddie. Eddie moved to

block it and then defendant shot him in the leg. Defendant continued to shoot Eddie five more

times. At trial, Merle testified he recalled giving this testimony.

¶ 20 Regarding the videotape recorded in DuPage County, Merle testified he recalled making

all the statements therein which identified defendant as the shooter. In the videotape, which was

admitted into evidence and published to the jury, Merle tells the detectives that as he was talking

with Eddie and Parrish, defendant walked out and asked Eddie about the money Eddie owed

him. Eddie informed defendant that he did not have the money at the moment but he would get

it to him. Defendant then tried to hit Eddie with a pistol and Eddie moved to block it. Defendant

then shot the victim in the leg and continued shooting.

¶ 21 The prosecutor played portions of the videotape. During one portion, Merle stated

defendant asked the victim about money Eddie owed defendant. The Cook County ASA

interviewing Merle at the DuPage County jail asked if he knew what defendant was talking about

when he asked Eddie about the money. In the video clip Merle stated: “No, I didn’t know, but I

can just assume, you know, from the streets, you know, I ain’t know something but it was for

some dope or some shit.” Defense counsel immediately objected to the video clip without

stating a basis for the objection. The trial court sustained the objection and initiated a sidebar

with counsel. Defense counsel argued that playing this unedited video clip to the jury violated

the motion in limine which prohibited the prosecution from referencing that Eddie owed

defendant a drug debt. The trial court agreed that the motion in limine had been violated.

Defense counsel then moved for a mistrial arguing that the violation of the motion in limine was

highly prejudicial. The trial court denied the motion for a mistrial and instead concluded the

proper remedy was to admonish the jury to disregard the portion of the video that was just played

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and allow the prosecution to present an edited version of the video. The trial court instructed the

jury to “disregard in its entirety the video clip that was last played. You are to disregard it in its

entirety.”

¶ 22 On cross-examination, Merle testified he was under the influence of marijuana, ecstasy,

and cocaine at the time of the shooting. He further testified that he initially informed detectives

that he was not present when the shooting occurred. Merle also offered the conflicting testimony

that he told the truth to the detectives, but that he was also exaggerating. According to Merle, he

did not receive a deal from the State for his testimony, but that the detectives and Cook County

ASA led him to believe he would get a deal.

¶ 23 Lisa Longo, a former Cook County ASA, testified that she took the statement from Merle

at the DuPage County jail on January 10, 2015. Neither she nor the detectives made any

promises to Merle to obtain his statement.

¶ 24 Jennifer Cooper, a Cook County ASA, testified that she presented Merle to the grand jury

on July 14, 2015. Cooper testified that Merle informed the grand jury that while he was at his

girlfriend’s house, he and Sluggo discussed the shooting. Merle further informed the grand jury

that defendant called him after the shooting and Merle asked defendant why he shot Eddie.

Defendant told Merle to stick to the “G-code,” which meant not to say anything. According to

Cooper, she did not make any promises to Merle about his pending cases or lead him to believe

that he would receive assistance on those cases.

¶ 25 Detective William Sullivan of the Chicago Police Department testified that on June 25,

2014, at 10:45 p.m. he and his partner Detective Michelle Moore-Grose were assigned to this

case. They went to the scene where Eddie was lying on the ground. Neely, who was present

when they arrived, was interviewed by the detectives. Later, Walton returned to the scene and

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she was also interviewed. Walton then accompanied the detectives to her vehicle. A few days

later, during their investigation, Detective Sullivan spoke with Donald and learned the suspect’s

name was Glen Phillips. Separately, a sergeant from the 7th District spoke with Detective

Sullivan and, following that conversation, Detective Sullivan commenced looking for defendant.

¶ 26 On July 13, 2014, Detective Sullivan presented Neely with a photo array and Neely

identified defendant within that photo array. Neely also informed Detective Sullivan that

defendant was known by the nickname “Skee.” Detective Sullivan further testified that on

January 8, 2015, the DuPage County Sheriff’s Office contacted him on Merle’s behalf.

Detective Sullivan’s testimony about Merle’s videotaped statement was consistent with the

videotape played to the jury. According to Detective Sullivan, he made no promises to Merle.

Detective Sullivan then contacted the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office and ASA Longo

arrived to interview Merle in his presence. Detective Sullivan testified that ASA Longo made no

promises to Merle in exchange for his statement. Merle then made the same statements to ASA

Longo as he made to Detective Sullivan. She asked if Merle could repeat his statement on

videotape and Merle agreed.

¶ 27 Detective Abdalla Abuzanat of the Chicago Police Department testified that on June 25,

2014, he was an evidence technician who processed the crime scene. He recovered five fired

shell casings, a cell phone, a baseball cap, and a fired bullet.

¶ 28 The parties then presented three stipulations. The first was from Dr. Benjamin Soriano,

an assistant medical examiner from the Cook County Office of the Medical Examiner and an

expert in the field of forensic pathology. Dr. Soriano, if called, would testify that he performed a

postmortem examination on the remains of Eddie and that the manner of death was homicide.

He would testify that bullets and bullet fragments were recovered from the victim’s body and

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that Eddie died as a result of multiple gunshot wounds to the head, neck, and thighs.

¶ 29 The second stipulation was regarding Elizabeth Dawson, an officer of the Chicago Police

Department, who, if called, would testify that she is a forensic scientist and an expert in firearms

identification. She received two fired bullet fragments recovered from Eddie’s body and the

bullet recovered from the scene of the offense. According to Dawson, the three fired bullets

were fired from the same 9mm firearm.

¶ 30 The final stipulation was from Chicago police officer Timothy Karn, an expert in

firearms and tool mark identification, who, if called, would testify that he analyzed the five shell

casings from the scene and determined that all of these casing were fired from the same firearm.

¶ 31 Chicago Police Officer Elizabeth Healy testified before the jury as an expert in firearms

identification. According to Healy, the three recovered bullets were fired from the same 9mm

firearm.

¶ 32 At the close of its case, the State admitted its exhibits and formally rested. Defense

counsel moved for a directed verdict, which was denied. The defense then rested without

presenting any evidence.

¶ 33 Prior to and during closing argument, the trial judge instructed the jury that the

statements made by counsel were not evidence. 2 The State then argued the evidence was

sufficient to convict defendant of murder and aggravated discharge of a firearm beyond a

reasonable doubt. In response, defense counsel set forth a theory that Donald was the

mastermind behind naming defendant as the shooter and that the evidence was insufficient to

convict defendant where the witnesses were not believable and there was no corroborating

2 We observe that on appeal defendant maintains that several comments made by the prosecutor during closing argument and rebuttal were improper and denied him a fair trial. Due to the length and numerosity of those comments, we will set them forth in full in the analysis section.

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physical evidence. In rebuttal, the State stressed the credibility of the witnesses and the

consistencies in their testimonies.

¶ 34 After the jury was instructed, it deliberated and ultimately found defendant guilty of two

counts of first degree murder and two counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm based on

defendant firing into a vehicle occupied by Walton and Neely. The jury further specially found

that defendant personally discharged a firearm causing Eddie’s death. Defendant moved for a

new trial, which was denied. Thereafter, the matter proceeded to a sentencing hearing. After

hearing evidence in aggravation and mitigation, the trial court merged the two first degree

murder counts and sentenced defendant to 30 years’ imprisonment plus a 25-year mandatory

firearm enhancement. The trial court further sentenced defendant to 10 years’ imprisonment on

each count of aggravated discharge of a firearm to run concurrent to each other and consecutive

to the sentence for murder. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence, which the trial

court denied. This appeal follows.

¶ 35 ANALYSIS

¶ 36 On appeal, defendant raises four contentions: (1) the trial court abused its discretion

when it failed to declare a mistrial after the State violated a motion in limine during the trial; (2)

the prosecutor’s statements during closing argument and rebuttal argument denied him a fair

trial; (3) the evidence was insufficient to find him guilty of aggravated discharge of a firearm;

and (4) one of the two convictions for aggravated discharge of a firearm should be vacated

because they are based on the same gunshot. We address each issue in turn.

¶ 37 Motion for a Mistrial

¶ 38 Defendant’s first argument on appeal is that a new trial is warranted due to the violation

of the motion in limine wherein the State was prohibited from referencing that the victim owed a

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“drug debt” to defendant. Defendant maintains that the trial court’s curative instructions were

not enough where this highly prejudicial, inadmissible evidence provided the only explanation as

to why defendant would have shot and killed the victim over a debt. Defendant further contends

that this error is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 39 In response, the State maintains that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it

denied defendant’s motion for a mistrial because the violation of the motion in limine was not so

serious that it defeated the ends of justice by denying defendant a fair trial. The State argues that

(1) Merle’s statement was based on speculation, (2) the trial court immediately cured the error,

and (3) the reference to “dope” was brief and isolated. The State asserts the error was harmless

as the evidence in this case was overwhelming.

¶ 40 A violation of a ruling on a motion in limine will constitute grounds for a mistrial “only

when the violation effectively deprived the defendant of his right to a fair trial.” People v.

Phillips, 383 Ill. App. 3d 521, 547 (2008). “To prevail on appeal, [the] defendant must establish

that there was a manifest necessity for the mistrial or that the ends of justice would be defeated

by continuance of the trial; that is, that the jury was so influenced and prejudiced that it would

not, or could not, be fair and impartial, and the damaging effect of the evidence could not be

remedied by admonitions or instructions.” People v. Wills, 153 Ill. App. 3d 328, 339-40 (1987).

“An improper remark will not result in reversal unless it appears that the guilty finding was the

result of the error.” People v. Brooks, 172 Ill. App. 3d 417, 422 (1988). “A prompt objection,

sustaining of the objection, and instruction to disregard the testimony generally cures any

potential prejudice.” Id. This court must consider the trial as a whole in determining whether a

new trial is necessary. Id. “The decision to declare a mistrial rests within the discretion of the

trial court and will not be disturbed on review unless there has been an abuse of discretion.”

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Wills, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 339. An abuse of discretion exists only when the trial court’s ruling is

“arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable or where no reasonable man would take the view adopted by

the trial court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Santos, 211 Ill. 2d 395, 401

(2004).

¶ 41 A mistrial should be declared only where an error of such magnitude has occurred that

the defendant was denied his right to a fair trial and continuing the proceedings would defeat the

ends of justice. People v. Nelson, 235 Ill. 2d 386, 435 (2009); People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305,

341 (2000). An error of such magnitude did not occur in this case. It is undisputed that the State

violated the motion in limine when it did not remove the reference to “dope” in Merle’s

videotaped statement. The remark, however, when viewed in the context of the trial was brief

and isolated. See Brooks, 172 Ill. App. 3d at 422 (this court must consider the trial as a whole in

determining whether a new trial is necessary). Defense counsel also immediately objected to the

video clip and the trial court sustained the objection. See Hall, 194 Ill. 2d at 342 (a timely,

sustained objection and instructing the jury to disregard the testimony can correct this type of

error). After admonishing the State for violating the motion in limine, the trial court considered

the prejudice defendant suffered from the error and weighed it in comparison with the evidence

that had already been presented.

¶ 42 As relayed by our supreme court:

“The vital question to be determined is whether the jurors had been influenced

and prejudiced to such an extent that they would not, or could not, be fair and impartial.

[Citation.] This determination involves the court’s consideration of all the facts and

circumstances and conjecture regarding the effect that the incompetent information had

upon the minds of the jurors, a determination incapable of absolute accuracy or a very

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high degree of reliability. Jurors themselves are incapable even of knowing the effect

which prejudicial matters have upon their minds. The determination, therefore, must rest

in sound judicial discretion to reach an inference, from the facts and circumstances, that a

fair trial had or had not been interfered with. The most controlling fact or circumstance

to create the inference is the character and nature of the allegedly prejudicial information.

Each case must be determined upon its own facts and circumstances. [Citation.]” People

v. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d 355, 402 (1996), overruled in part on other grounds, People v.

Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366 (1998).

¶ 43 The trial court determined that it did not have a prejudicial effect to warrant a new trial

based on its brevity and the fact the trial court would be giving a curative instruction. We agree

with the trial court that this error was not so prejudicial as to be incurable and deny defendant a

fair trial. Merle’s statement was not dispositive that Eddie owed a drug debt to defendant.

Indeed, the language used by Merle indicated it was speculative at best. See Whitehead, 169 Ill.

2d at 402 (1996). Thereafter, the trial court promptly gave the jury a strongly worded curative

instruction that it should disregard the testimony and the jury is presumed to have followed that

instruction. See Brooks, 172 Ill. App. 3d at 422 (“A prompt objection, sustaining of the

objection, and instruction to disregard the testimony generally cures any potential prejudice.”).

We decline to find that the trial court’s decision was arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable

considering the circumstances surrounding the playing of the video clip and the evidence

presented at trial. See Brooks, 172 Ill. App. 3d at 422 (“An improper remark will not result in

reversal unless it appears that the guilty finding was the result of the error.”). Thus, it does not

appear that the guilty finding was the result of the remark such that the court abused its

discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial. See Hall, 194 Ill. 2d at 342.

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¶ 44 Prosecutorial Misconduct

¶ 45 Defendant next contends that a new trial is warranted due to multiple improper arguments

and remarks made by the State during closing and rebuttal argument. According to defendant,

the prosecutor’s improper statements had the effect of bolstering the State’s contention that

defendant was responsible for the shooting and as the evidence was closely balanced, these

remarks were sufficient to improperly tip the scales in favor of the State.

¶ 46 In response, the State asserts that the prosecutor’s comments did not deny defendant a

fair trial because the statements were not improper and, even if they were, any error was

harmless because the comments were not a material factor in defendant’s conviction.

¶ 47 Prior to addressing this issue, we observe that defendant concedes he did not properly

preserve this claim for our review. Specifically, defendant made only one objection during

closing argument and did not raise any issues with the propriety of closing argument in a

posttrial motion. See People v. Reese, 2017 IL 120011, ¶ 60 (to properly preserve an issue for

review, a timely objection must be made, and the issue must be included with specificity in a

posttrial motion). The plain-error doctrine permits this court to consider an unpreserved error

when either (1) a clear or obvious error occurs and the evidence is so closely balanced that the

error alone threatens to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the

seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear and obvious error occurs and that error is so serious that it

affects the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenges the integrity of the judicial process,

regardless of the closeness of the evidence. People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 564-65 (2007).

The burden of persuasion remains with the defendant under both prongs of the plain-error test.

People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32, 43 (2009). The first step of plain-error review is to determine

whether any error occurred. Id.

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¶ 48 A prosecutor has wide latitude in making a closing argument and is permitted to

comment on the evidence and any fair, reasonable inferences it yields. People v. Glasper, 234

Ill. 2d 173, 204 (2009). “Closing arguments must be reviewed in their entirety, and the

challenged remarks must be viewed in context.” People v. Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d 52, 131 (2001).

Comments made during rebuttal argument are not improper if they were invited by the defense.

See People v. Giraud, 2011 IL App (1st) 091261, ¶ 43, aff’d, 2012 IL 113116. The State “may

fairly comment on defense counsel’s characterizations of the evidence and may respond in

rebuttal to statements of defense counsel that noticeably invite a response.” People v. Willis,

2013 IL App (1st) 110233, ¶ 110. Improper closing arguments constitute reversible error only

when they result in substantial prejudice against a defendant “to the extent that it is impossible to

determine whether the jury’s verdict was caused by the comments or the evidence.” Caffey, 205

Ill. 2d at 131. “[C]omments made in closing argument must be considered in the proper context

by examining the entire closing arguments of both the State and the defendant.” People v.

Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 154 (1998).

¶ 49 The parties recognize that there is confusion as to whether the standard of review for the

propriety of closing argument is de novo or abuse of discretion. People v. Burman, 2013 IL App

(2d) 110807, ¶ 26 (comparing People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill.2d 92 (2007) (de novo standard), with

People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99 (2000) (abuse-of-discretion standard). Nonetheless, because the

result here would be the same under either standard, we need not decide which standard applies.

See Burman, 2013 IL App (2d) 110807, ¶ 26.

¶ 50 Vouching for the Credibility of the Witnesses

¶ 51 Defendant first maintains, is that the State “repeatedly vouched” for its own witnesses.

According to defendant, the prosecutor argued in closing that the jury should believe Merle’s

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out-of-court statements (those made at the DuPage County jail and before the grand jury)

because the detectives he spoke to were able to verify what he told them. Defendant claims that

the State essentially argued that the detectives verified that what Merle told them about the

shooting was true.

¶ 52 The State maintains that the prosecutor was not vouching for the credibility of the

witnesses or the investigation but was instead merely arguing that the prior statements were

credible, which is within the bounds of proper argument.

¶ 53 “A prosecutor may express an opinion based on the record, and may draw reasonable

inferences from the evidence presented; however, a prosecutor may not vouch for the credibility

of a government witness or use the credibility of the State’s Attorney’s office to bolster a

witness’s testimony.” People v. Effinger, 2016 IL App (3d) 140203, ¶ 24. A prosecutor

vouching for the credibility of a witness poses the following dangers: (1) such vouching can

convey to the jury that there is other evidence known to the prosecutor but not presented to the

jury that supports the charges against the defendant, and (2) the opinion of the prosecutor as to

the credibility of a witness may cause a juror to trust the State’s judgment rather than his or her

own assessment of the evidence. People v. Williams, 2015 IL App (1st) 122745, ¶ 13.

¶ 54 Here, defendant refers to the following statement in closing argument:

“Another truth detector, Ladies and Gentlemen, is the fact that when you’re trying

to get a deal, and if he thought he really was going to be getting a deal, what good is it to

lie?

If you really want a deal, you’re going to be telling the truth.

You know what, if you want the deal, you better come with the goods, because

the Detectives can determine whether or not you have or have not told the truth.

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So, why -- even if he thought he could get a deal. We all know he couldn’t,

because he was in DuPage custody when he gave that video.

Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office has no jurisdiction there. Chicago Police

Department has no jurisdiction there. He couldn’t get that deal; but even if he thought he

was being slick and he could, why would he lie about who actually did it?

And why, if he was just looking for a deal, would he add on further information,

not just that he saw the shooting, and that he saw Glen Phillips actually commit the

shooting; but that Glen Phillips then later called him, and gave him information about the

fact that he did do the shooting, and stick to the G code, that statement that Glen makes to

him.” (Emphasis added.)

¶ 55 Defendant specifically has an issue with the italicized text (“Detectives can determine

whether or not you have or have not told the truth”) and maintains that with this statement the

prosecutor is stating the detectives verified the accuracy of Merle’s out-of-court statements.

However, when read in context, this argument was made to demonstrate--not that the detectives

corroborated Merle’s out-of-court statements--but that when Merle made these statements he was

telling the truth because he knew that the detectives had the ability to determine whether his

statements could get him “a deal.” This is a reasonable inference based on the evidence at trial.

See Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 204 (a prosecutor is permitted to comment on the evidence and any

inferences it yields). The prosecutor here was merely arguing Merle’s testimony was credible,

not that it was verified by detectives as true.

¶ 56 In addition, defendant asserts that in rebuttal argument the prosecutor repeatedly offered

the jury her own personal opinion on the credibility of Neely’s testimony and Merle’s videotaped

statement. The State denies that the prosecutor explicitly stated her personal views during

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rebuttal closing argument and therefore asserts that the remarks were not improper.

¶ 57 The prosecutor, as the representative of the State of Illinois, stands in a special relation to

the jury. Prosecutors must therefore choose their words carefully so that they do not place the

authority of their office behind the credibility of his witnesses. People v. Roach, 213 Ill. App. 3d

119, 124 (1991). The prosecutor may express an opinion if it is based on the record. Id. The

prosecutor may not, however, state his or her personal opinion regarding the veracity of a

witness or vouch for a witness’s credibility. Id.

¶ 58 Defendant takes issue with the following comments made by the prosecutor in rebuttal.

To put these comments in context, the prosecutor was responding to defendant’s theory that

Donald was the mastermind behind accusing defendant of murdering his brother and convinced

Neely to lie to detectives regarding the identity of the shooter:

“He [Neely] was probably [t]he most sincere person in this case. He came in

here, and he told you the truth. He told you what happened that evening. He was scared.

He was crouched down in the back seat of his car when those shots were fired, several

shots were fired that night out of nowhere.

And who did he see out there shooting?

He saw this Defendant, a person that he knows. He came in here. He was very

emotional when he pointed out the Defendant as the shooter, extremely sincere. You saw

his credibility, and that brings us to Merle Jones’ testimony.” (Emphasis added.)

While the second remark was a reference to Neely’s demeanor on the stand, the initial comment

can be considered more akin to a personal opinion than a comment based on the testimony. This

remark, however, did not involve the prosecutor personally vouching for Neely’s credibility nor

did it take up a large portion of the argument. See id. at 125 (finding error occurred where the

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prosecutor commented repeatedly on the credibility of the State’s own witnesses to bolster their

credibility). It was made in passing and in direct reference to defendant’s theory that Donald

manipulated Neely to lie to detectives and, in turn, on the witness stand. Moreover, the jury was

admonished, albeit during defense counsel’s closing argument, that personal opinions of counsel

are not to be considered. Accordingly, based on the context and limited use of the remark, we

conclude that defendant was not substantially prejudiced. See People v. Nitz, 143 Ill. 2d 82, 120

(1991) (finding that it is a fair comment for the prosecutor to argue that a witness is believable

because of her demeanor while testifying and because her testimony was corroborated).

¶ 59 Defendant next contends that the prosecutor offered similar opinions about Merle’s out-

of-court identification:

“And when you guys go back to the Jury room, you’ll be able to look at that

videotape. You saw the statement when it was played out here in open court, but you

saw his statement. You saw how sincere he was. He wasn’t making anything up. He

wasn’t sitting here. He wasn’t -- he wasn’t slouched down in his chair, speaking in a low

voice when he gave his statement to the police and to the ASA.

He was very honest. He was being very honest, and you’ll have that evidence.

You’ll be able to look at it if you want, and you can see how sincere he was, and you can

tell that he was telling the truth at the time -- the opportunity that he did have to tell

the truth.” (Emphasis added.)

Specifically, defendant asserts that the prosecutor did not restrict herself to asking the jury to

infer that the recanted statement was true based on the demeanor evidence; she also offered her

opinion about Merle’s sincerity and honesty. Defendant further observes that the prosecutor

opined that Merle “was telling the truth” and that “[h]e wasn’t making anything up.”

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¶ 60 An assertion by the prosecutor that the State’s witnesses testified truthfully is construed

as an argument rather than as an expression of the prosecutor’s personal opinion or a guarantee

by the State’s Attorney’s office. See People v. Rivera, 262 Ill. App. 3d 16, 27 (1994) (“In the

remarks of which [the] defendant complains, the prosecutor merely asserted that certain

witnesses testified truthfully,” and the prosecutor “is entitled to assume the truth of the State’s

evidence.”); People v. Pryor, 170 Ill. App. 3d 262, 273 (1988) (by telling the jury, “ ‘Downs is

right. Downs has told you what he saw. Downs is believable. *** Downs is correct,’ ” the

prosecutor merely assumed the truth of the State’s evidence, as the prosecutor had a right to do,

instead of placing the integrity of the State’s Attorney’s office behind the credibility of Downs);

People v. Agosto, 70 Ill. App. 3d 851, 857 (1979) (“It is legitimate argument for the prosecutor to

tell the jury the State’s witnesses told the truth ***.”). Here, the prosecutor encouraged the jury

to use their own senses to determine whether Merle’s out-of-court statements were sincere. By

asserting to the jury that Merle had told the truth in his statements to the police as opposed to in

open court, the prosecutor did nothing improper. She merely assumed the truth of the State’s

evidence, as she was allowed to do. See Rivera, 262 Ill. App. 3d at 27.

¶ 61 Misstating the Evidence

¶ 62 Defendant next argues that the prosecutor misstated the evidence three different times

during closing argument. The first is when she stated that “we all know” that Merle could not

get a plea deal because he was in DuPage County custody and therefore the Cook County State’s

Attorney’s Office “had no jurisdiction.” Defendant asserts there was no evidence presented

during the trial on this point and therefore she was imparting her own personal knowledge on the

jury. In response, the State maintains there was nothing improper about this statement where it

was based on the evidence and common sense.

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¶ 63 We agree with the State. “[P]rosecutors may discuss subjects of common experience or

common sense in closing argument.” People v. Runge, 234 Ill. 2d 68, 146 (2009). Our supreme

court has also acknowledged that “jurors do not leave their common sense behind when they

enter court” and therefore “it would seem proper for prosecutors to couch arguments in those

terms and make appeals thereto.” Id. Aside from it being common sense that a Cook County

State’s Attorney would not have jurisdiction over a DuPage County case, it was apparent from

the testimony, particularly that of Detective Sullivan and ASA Longo, that Merle’s cases in

DuPage County and Cook County were separate. Thus, the prosecutor’s comments in this

instance did not constitute error.

¶ 64 Second, defendant asserts that during rebuttal argument the State improperly argued that

defendant frightened Merle into recanting his out-of-court statements during the trial:

“And he couldn’t do it [(tell the truth)] when he came before you, 2 days ago. He

couldn’t do it then, because his friend is right there. He was crouched down in his chair.

Judge Maldonado had to tell him to speak up, because he’s afraid of this guy. He didn’t

want to confront him.”

Immediately after this argument was made, the trial court sua sponte admonished the jury that

“[a]ny statement by a lawyer that is not based on evidence should be disregarded by you. Use

your own recollection of the evidence.”

¶ 65 Here, while there was no evidence that defendant threatened Merle into recanting his

prior statements, the prosecutor was making a comment on Merle’s demeanor while on the

witness stand. See People v. Jackson, 391 Ill. App. 3d 11, 44 (2009) (citing People v. Byron,

164 Ill.2d 279, 296-97 (1995)) (“[c]ommenting on a defendant’s appearance during closing

argument is implicitly recognized as falling within the bounds of legitimate argument.”). A

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witness’ demeanor while testifying is something the jury may consider when determining a

witness’ credibility. See People v. Hood, 229 Ill. App. 3d 202, 210 (1992) (the credibility of the

witnesses and the weight given their testimony are determinations exclusively within the

province of the jury, and where the resolution of guilt turns on the credibility of the witnesses,

the jury is to determine that credibility since it has a superior opportunity to observe their manner

and demeanor). In any event, any prejudice this comment may have caused defendant was cured

by the trial court’s sua sponte instruction to disregard statements made by counsel that were not

based on the evidence. See People v. Short, 2020 IL App (1st) 162168, ¶ 77.

¶ 66 Lastly, defendant asserts that the prosecutor misrepresented the nature and quantity of the

evidence against him in relation to the aggravated discharge of a firearm counts. During closing

argument the prosecutor stated:

“Everybody out there describes that this man walked up within feet of that

automobile; and after he pumped bullet after bullet into the body of Eddie Jones, as

Annette was moving over and attempting to peal away; and she screams, he pumps a

bullet into that car as it’s fleeing. He knew or certainly should have known, that there

were people inside that car. The very reason he shot into it, is because there were people

inside that car.”

¶ 67 The State agrees that only Neely testified that he observed defendant shoot in the front

windshield of the vehicle while occupied by him and Walton and that the above statement would

be inaccurate if it implies that all of the witnesses so testified. The State, however, maintains

that this comment does not warrant reversal of defendant’s conviction because it was harmless

given the fact that the jury was properly instructed that closing arguments were not evidence.

We agree. The record reveals that the jury was admonished on multiple occasions by the trial

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court that the statements by the attorneys is not evidence and should be disregarded if they

misstate the evidence. See id. The jury was also told to rely only on their own recollection of

the evidence. As previously discussed, it is presumed that the jury follows the trial court’s

instructions. See Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 201. It is highly unlikely that the jurors took the

prosecutor’s statement as evidence where the record clearly demonstrates that only Neely

testified he observed defendant shoot into the vehicle. Consequently, we find that defendant was

not sufficiently prejudiced by this statement so as to warrant a new trial. See People v. Kelley,

2015 IL App (1st) 132782, ¶ 84.

¶ 68 Questioning During Direct Examination

¶ 69 In his final argument regarding prosecutorial misconduct, defendant asserts that the

prosecutor erred when she elicited the fact defendant was apprehended by the “Fugitive

Apprehension Unit” during her direct examination of Detective Sullivan. Defendant asserts that

this information suggested to the jury that defendant was a fugitive and such evidence of flight,

in turn, demonstrates consciousness of guilt. Defendant maintains this question was improper

because it served to prejudice defendant in the eyes of the jury.

¶ 70 The record discloses that the prosecutor asked Detective Sullivan the following question,

“Detective, did you have the opportunity to learn that the defendant had been arrested by

Fugitive Apprehension Unit in early June of 2015?” To which he replied, “Yes.”

¶ 71 In light of the evidence presented during the trial, we find the prosecutor’s statement did

not prejudice defendant. While the prosecutor did use the phrase “Fugitive Apprehension Unit,”

the phrase was not defined by Detective Sullivan and was not used again during the trial. While

it is arguable that a prosecutor stating the formal name of the unit that apprehended the defendant

is even evidence where no witness so testified, no other evidence was introduced at trial that

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would suggest defendant’s flight. Indeed, there was no motion in limine regarding flight and no

jury instructions were provided to the jury regarding flight. In any event, we are of the opinion

that this alleged error, when viewed in the context of the entire trial, did not prejudice defendant.

¶ 72 In sum, because we have concluded that no error occurred in many of the statements

made by the prosecutor during closing argument and during direct examination, there can be no

plain error. People v. Calhoun, 404 Ill. App. 3d 362, 382-83 (2010). Moreover, even if we were

to consider those comments that could be considered error, such error would not rise to the level

of plain error to constitute reversible error. Generally, improper comments by a prosecutor “do

not constitute reversible error unless they result in substantial prejudice to the accused and were

material to [the] conviction.” People v. Barker, 298 Ill. App. 3d 751, 757 (1998). As we discuss

herein in considering defendant’s challenges on appeal, the evidence at trial was not closely

balanced; multiple eyewitnesses identified defendant as the shooter and Neely testified he

observed defendant shoot into the vehicle’s windshield. See People v. Carrilalez, 2012 IL App

(1st) 102687, ¶ 30 (the testimony of one eyewitness is sufficient to convict). In addition, “[a]n

instruction that closing arguments are not evidence and any statement not based on the evidence

should be disregarded,” as the trial court gave here, “tends to cure possible prejudice from

improper remarks.” People v. Thomas, 200 Ill. App. 3d 268, 275 (1990). Accordingly, we find

that the challenged comments, even if erroneously permitted by the trial court, did not rise to the

level of plain error to constitute reversible error.

¶ 73 Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 74 Defendant next contends that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for

two counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(2) (West 2014)) where

the evidence at trial demonstrated that five shots were fired at the victim and the victim suffered

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five gunshot wounds. Defendant maintains that while a bullet did strike the windshield of the

automobile in which Walton and Neely were riding, the bullet was not fired at the vehicle but at

the victim. Accordingly, because no shot was fired at the automobile, the evidence is insufficient

to sustain defendant’s conviction for aggravated discharge of a weapon.

¶ 75 In response, the State asserts that the evidence demonstrated that defendant knowingly

and intentionally pointed a firearm at the automobile’s windshield and fired a shot. The State

points to the testimony of multiple witnesses who observed defendant shooting at the victim as

he stood next to the vehicle occupied by Walton and Neely. The State further points to evidence

that the witnesses heard five to six shots fired.

¶ 76 In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence we determine whether, after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Ross, 229

Ill. 2d 255, 272 (2008). In our review, we are mindful that the trier of fact assesses the

credibility of the witnesses, determines the appropriate weight of the testimony, and resolves

conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence. People v. Naylor, 229 Ill. 2d 584, 614 (2008). It is

not the function of the reviewing court to retry the defendant or substitute its judgment for that of

the trier of fact. People v. Collins, 214 Ill. 2d 206, 217 (2005). We will reverse a conviction

only where the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or so unsatisfactory as to justify a

reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. People v. Campbell, 147 Ill. 2d 363, 374-75 (1992).

¶ 77 “A person commits aggravated discharge of a firearm when he or she knowingly or

intentionally *** [d]ischarges a firearm *** in the direction of a vehicle he or she knows or

reasonably should know to be occupied by a person.” 720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(2) (West 2014).

Defendant does not challenge that he lacked knowledge that the vehicle was occupied, instead he

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maintains the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate he knowingly discharged the firearm in

the direction of the vehicle.

¶ 78 Here, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence demonstrated that

defendant intentionally fired his weapon at the vehicle occupied by Neely and Walton. Neely

testified as follows:

“Q. What -- did you see whether or not Skee [defendant] had shot anywhere else

other than at Eddie?

A. Yes, he did.

Q. And where was that?

A. In the front windshield.

Q. The automobile that you were in?

A. Yes.

Q. The automobile that Annette was in?

Q. And was that after or before Annette had hollered?

A. Pardon me, ma’am?

Q. Was that before or after Annette had hollered?

A. That was after she hollered. He shot the windshield.”

As the State correctly notes, one witness’ testimony is sufficient to convict a defendant of an

offense. See Carrilalez, 2012 IL App (1st) 102687, ¶ 30. Thus, Neely’s clear testimony alone is

sufficient evidence that defendant intentionally fired into the vehicle occupied by Neely and

Walton.

¶ 79 In reply, defendant does not dispute that one witness’ testimony is sufficient to convict.

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He does, however, maintain that Neely’s testimony “merely makes explicit the uncontested fact

that, during the shooting, one of the bullets struck the windshield. And that fact does not permit

one to rationally conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a sixth shot was fired.” Defendant

contends that the physical evidence (five gunshot wounds, five fired shell casings recovered from

the scene) demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that only five shots were fired and therefore

it is impossible for defendant to have fired an additional shot at the vehicle. We disagree. At

trial, Neely testified that he heard five or six shots. While she did not testify to an exact number,

Walton testified that there was “constant shooting.” Merle’s testimony revealed that he heard

five shots. The physical evidence recovered from the scene consisted of five fired shell casings

and three bullets or bullet fragments. In making this argument that the evidence was insufficient

to establish six shots were fired, defendant is essentially asking this court to reweigh the

evidence. It is within the jury’s purview to weigh the evidence and resolve any conflicts. See

People v. Petermon, 2014 IL App (1st) 113536, ¶ 28. It is not the role of this court to reweigh

the evidence on appeal. People v. Reed, 2018 IL App (1st) 160609, ¶ 37. The jury was

presented with the physical evidence as well as the testimonies of the witnesses. As the State

notes, the witnesses did not state that a specific number of shots were fired, but that there were

“several” shots or “five or six” shots fired. The jury also had before it Neely’s testimony that

defendant specifically fired at the vehicle as he left the scene. We cannot say that the evidence

presented here is so unreasonable, improbable, or so unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable

doubt of the defendant’s guilt. See Campbell, 147 Ill. 2d at 374-75.

¶ 80 One Act, One Crime

¶ 81 Lastly, defendant contends that one of the two convictions for aggravated discharge of a

firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(2) (West 2014)) should be vacated under the one-act, one-crime

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doctrine where the convictions were based on the same, singular shot. According to defendant,

the State failed to allege that defendant shot at another person where the indictment charged

defendant with shooting “in the direction of a vehicle he knew or should have known to be

occupied by a person.” Defendant further maintains that the State’s theory at trial was that

defendant shot one time at the vehicle, not at the individuals inside the vehicle.

¶ 82 The State asserts in response that defendant’s two convictions for aggravated discharge of

a firearm were proper because there were two victims. According to the State, both Neely and

Walton were in the vehicle when defendant pointed the firearm in their direction and fired a shot

through the vehicle’s windshield. The State maintains that the plain language of the aggravated

discharge statute provides that a defendant may be charged with either shooting at a person or at

a vehicle a defendant knows is occupied by a person and thus there is no violation of the one-act,

one-crime doctrine in this case.

¶ 83 As a threshold matter, defendant acknowledges that he forfeited this issue for appeal

because he failed to object to the multiple convictions at trial and did not raise the issue in his

posttrial motion. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). The parties agree, however, that

our supreme court has repeatedly held that a one-act, one-crime violation is reviewable under the

second prong of the plain error doctrine because it affects the integrity of the judicial process.

People v. Coats, 2018 IL 121926, ¶ 10. Accordingly, we will consider the issue.

¶ 84 Whether a conviction should be vacated under the one-act, one-crime doctrine is a

question of law which we review de novo. Id. ¶ 12. Under this rule, a defendant cannot be

convicted of multiple offenses that are based on precisely the same single physical act. Id. ¶ 11

(citing People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d 551, 566 (1977)). Where a defendant is convicted of two such

offenses, the conviction for the less serious offense must be vacated. People v. Johnson, 237 Ill.

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2d 81, 97 (2010).

¶ 85 A defendant, however, can be convicted of separate offenses where a common act is part

of multiple crimes. People v. Rodriguez, 169 Ill. 2d 183, 188 (1996). Our supreme court has

consistently defined an “act” as “any overt or outward manifestation which will support a

different offense.” Coats, 2018 IL 121926, ¶ 15 (quoting People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d 551, 566

(1977)). Multiple convictions with concurrent sentences are permitted where defendant has

committed multiple acts, “despite the interrelationship of those acts.” King, 66 Ill. 2d at 566.

Moreover, “when more than one offense arises from a series of incidental or closely related acts

and the offenses are not, by definition, lesser included offenses, convictions with concurrent

sentences can be entered.” Id.

¶ 86 In clarifying the one-act, one-crime rule from King, the supreme court explained that a

court must first determine whether the defendant’s conduct consists of a single physical act or

separate acts. Coats, 2018 IL 121926, ¶ 12 (citing Rodriguez, 169 Ill. 2d at 186). If the court

determines that defendant committed multiple acts, it must then determine whether any of the

offenses are lesser-included offenses. Id. If none of the offenses are lesser-included offenses,

then multiple convictions may be entered. Id.

¶ 87 Under certain circumstances, multiple convictions for the same offense may be proper.

Coats, 2018 IL 121926, ¶ 24. In such cases, the court should look to the legislative intent behind

the statute and determine whether the evidence supports multiple violations. Id. To sustain

multiple convictions, the charging instrument must indicate that the State intended to treat

defendant’s conduct as separate, multiple acts. People v. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d 335, 345 (2001).

¶ 88 Here, the State charged defendant with two separate counts of aggravated discharge of a

firearm under section 24-1.2(a)(2) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(2) (West

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2014)). That section provides that a defendant is guilty of the offense when he knowingly or

intentionally “[d]ischarges a firearm in the direction of another person or in the direction of a

vehicle he or she knows or reasonably should know to be occupied by a person.” Id. The statute

thus demonstrates that the legislature allowed for a defendant to be charged with either shooting

at a person, or at a vehicle he knows is occupied by a person. Because the statute defines the

criminal act as being directed against a person, or at a vehicle occupied by a person, the statute

reflects an intent to allow for multiple convictions where the defendant discharges a firearm at

multiple people inside a vehicle.

¶ 89 The record reveals that in the indictment, each count identically alleged that defendant

“KNOWINGLY DISCHARGED A FIREARM IN THE DIRECTION OF A VEHICLE HE

KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN TO BE OCCUPIED BY A PERSON, TO WIT:” and

named a separate victim – Quinton Neely and Annette Walton. The charging instrument thereby

indicated that the State intended to treat defendant’s conduct as four separate acts against two

individual victims. See Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d at 345.

¶ 90 The record further reveals that the evidence supported the two separate convictions.

Neely and Walton both testified that they were the two occupants in the vehicle. They also

testified that they heard multiple gunshots fired, with Neely specifying that he observed

defendant shoot at the vehicle one time after he heard Walton cry out. Based on this record, we

conclude that defendant’s convictions for two separate counts of the offense against two victims

are proper. See Coats, 2018 IL 121926, ¶ 24.

¶ 91 In reaching this determination, we find that defendant’s reliance on People v. Hardin,

2012 IL App (1st) 100682, is misplaced. In Hardin, the defendant was convicted of two counts

of aggravated discharge of a firearm in the direction of a vehicle known to be occupied by a

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peace officer. Id. ¶ 1. The evidence established that the defendant fired one gunshot at a police

vehicle occupied by two officers. Id. ¶ 4. On appeal, the defendant argued that one of his

convictions should be vacated under the one-act, one-crime doctrine because his convictions

were for shooting at the vehicle itself, not at the officers inside, and he fired only one gunshot at

one vehicle. Id. ¶ 25. This court agreed and vacated one of defendant’s convictions. Id. ¶¶ 26-

39.

¶ 92 In Hardin, however, the defendant was convicted under section 24-1.2(a)(4), which

prohibits the discharge of a firearm in the direction of a vehicle occupied by a peace officer. 720

ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(4) (West 2008). A separate subsection, (a)(3), prohibits discharge in the

direction of a person known to be a peace officer. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(3) (West 2008). Id.

¶ 27.

¶ 93 Unlike Hardin, here, defendant was convicted under subsection (a)(2), which provides

that a defendant is guilty when he discharges a firearm in the direction of another person or in

the direction of a vehicle he knows to be occupied by a person. Accordingly, defendant’s two

convictions for aggravated discharge of a firearm are proper.

¶ 94 CONCLUSION

¶ 95 For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is

affirmed.

¶ 96 Affirmed.

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