M. J. Kelly, J.
Defendant-appellant, Robert Ned Peterson, appeals by right from his November 6, [541]*5411973 conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, MCLA 335.341(l)(c); MSA 18.1070(41)(l)(c). A sentence of 30 days in jail and two years’ probation was imposed on November 13, 1973 and stayed by the trial judge pending the outcome of this appeal.
Three issues are raised for our consideration: the legality of the search and seizure, the application of the "two-ounce presumption” and the sufficiency of the evidence. All will be discussed.
I
The house in which Peterson then resided was searched by Escanaba and Michigan State Police officers during the early morning of April 25, 1973. A quantity of what appeared to be marijuana was seized and Peterson, among others, was arrested.
The search was conducted pursuant to a warrant issued on the basis of the following affidavit:
"On April 24, 1973 I have been informed by two apparently reliable anonymous citizens that in the above residence of one Kevin Johnson there is secreted a quantity of what was described as marijuana, and was given a sample of the substance described to me as being a part of that substance and I performed a chemical field test of the substance and the result of said chemical test showed the presence of marijuana a controlled substance.
"Based upon their actual observation, and description of the substance in the residence and the sample delivered to me and the results of the aforesaid test, I am of the opinion probable cause exists to believe a violation of the Controlled Substance Act of 1972 has and is now occurring and that the aforesaid residence is used as a 'stash’ for the aforesaid controlled substance.
"The informants described the material as bagged in plastic baggies and was of a green leafy nature and [542]*542described as nickle bags and had actually seen said materials within forty-eight hours from above date.”
All of the real evidence introduced against Peterson at trial was obtained as a result of the search of his residence. He moved to suppress this evidence prior to trial, arguing that the search warrant was constitutionally defective. The validity of the search warrant depends on the sufficiency of the affidavit in support of its issuance.
Defendant suggests that prior dealings between the affiant and informant are necessary. If this were true, then every informant whose anonymity is protected would have his first case thrown out. In fact, the law is otherwise:
"While a history of prior dealings between an informant and the police can be an important element in establishing the reliability of the informant, the absence of such a history does not of itself prove the informant unreliable. The magistrate is entitled to look to the underlying circumstances, including those portions of the information independently verified by police, and to other factors supporting the probable truthfulness of the information.” United States v Wong, 470 F2d 129, 131 (CA 9, 1972).
The crucial test is stated in Aguilar v Texas, 378 US 108, 114; 84 S Ct 1509; 12 L Ed 2d 723 (1964). That case requires, in the disjunctive, that the magistrate be furnished facts from which the officer "concluded that the informant * * * was 'credible’ or his information 'reliable’ ”. (Citation omitted.) In Jones v United States, 362 US 257; 80 S Ct 725; 4 L Ed 2d 697 (1960), the US Supreme Court noted that:
"In testing the sufficiency of probable cause for an officer’s action even without a warrant, we have held [543]*543that he may rely upon information received through an informant, rather than upon his direct observations, so long as the informant’s statement is reasonably corroborated by other matters within the officer’s knowledge. ” 362 US at 269. (Emphasis supplied.)
Defendant makes much of the fact that the affidavit refers to "apparently reliable anonymous citizens”. As Judge Bronson points out, this phrase taken alone does not meet the Aguilar requirement of adequate facts for the magistrate to pass on the informant’s credibility. However, that is not the sole question, for constitutional muster is passed if the affidavit recites sufficient facts for a magistrate to conclude that the information was reliable. Aguilar v Texas, supra. And, pursuant to Jones v United States, supra, it is appropriate to look at the contents of the affidavit beyond the words "apparently reliable anonymous citizens” to see whether there is evidence "reasonably corroborat[ing]” the informant. In so doing, it should be kept in mind that "[t]he rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has been found for accommodating * * * often opposing interests”. Beck v Ohio, 379 US 89, 91; 85 S Ct 223; 13 L Ed 2d 142 (1964), quoting Brinegar v United States, 338 US 160; 69 S Ct 1302; 93 L Ed 1879 (1949). It should also be apparent that the reliability that Judge Bronson finds wanting is a requirement designed to protect against knowingly false or inadvertently erroneous information given by the informant to the officer.
In this case the incriminating information came from two citizens. Such information is perhaps more likely to be reliable than information which depends solely on the veracity of one person. The description of the substance appears to coincide [544]*544with the experienced officer’s knowledge of the appearance of marijuana. It is fair to infer that the informants knew marijuana when they saw it. Therefore, the affiant and magistrate could discount the possibility that the informants had mistakenly identified a licit substance as marijuana. The officer’s field test verified that the substance was marijuana — the informants were proven truthful in that particular. Also, the act of turning, over marijuana to the police could itself be considered a reliability credential. If the search of defendant’s premises had proved fruitless, undesired attention might have focused on the informants themselves. It is one thing for an informant to tell an officer that there is an illegal substance at such and such a place and it is another for the informant to produce a sample. The sample makes the story more convincing.
In the context of this case, the dangers Aguilar seeks to protect against are satisfied. Otherwise we are straining to protect against the vague possibility that two citizens delivered an illicit substance from an unknown source to a police officer to falsely incriminate the defendant. That would be a serious crime committed openly. Considering the facts related to the magistrate, I am inclined to find this probability less than the probability that the information given was accurate in material part. To be sure, the claims of the informants had not been substantiated in all respects. However, those claims had been substantiated in a number of important respects. The affidavit was sufficient to support the search warrant and no error was committed by introducing the marijuana into evidence. Still the conviction must be reversed.
II
At trial, the prosecutor relied on and the trial [545]*545court instructed on the two-ounce presumption embodied in MCLA 335.341(2); MSA 18.1070(41)(2).
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M. J. Kelly, J.
Defendant-appellant, Robert Ned Peterson, appeals by right from his November 6, [541]*5411973 conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, MCLA 335.341(l)(c); MSA 18.1070(41)(l)(c). A sentence of 30 days in jail and two years’ probation was imposed on November 13, 1973 and stayed by the trial judge pending the outcome of this appeal.
Three issues are raised for our consideration: the legality of the search and seizure, the application of the "two-ounce presumption” and the sufficiency of the evidence. All will be discussed.
I
The house in which Peterson then resided was searched by Escanaba and Michigan State Police officers during the early morning of April 25, 1973. A quantity of what appeared to be marijuana was seized and Peterson, among others, was arrested.
The search was conducted pursuant to a warrant issued on the basis of the following affidavit:
"On April 24, 1973 I have been informed by two apparently reliable anonymous citizens that in the above residence of one Kevin Johnson there is secreted a quantity of what was described as marijuana, and was given a sample of the substance described to me as being a part of that substance and I performed a chemical field test of the substance and the result of said chemical test showed the presence of marijuana a controlled substance.
"Based upon their actual observation, and description of the substance in the residence and the sample delivered to me and the results of the aforesaid test, I am of the opinion probable cause exists to believe a violation of the Controlled Substance Act of 1972 has and is now occurring and that the aforesaid residence is used as a 'stash’ for the aforesaid controlled substance.
"The informants described the material as bagged in plastic baggies and was of a green leafy nature and [542]*542described as nickle bags and had actually seen said materials within forty-eight hours from above date.”
All of the real evidence introduced against Peterson at trial was obtained as a result of the search of his residence. He moved to suppress this evidence prior to trial, arguing that the search warrant was constitutionally defective. The validity of the search warrant depends on the sufficiency of the affidavit in support of its issuance.
Defendant suggests that prior dealings between the affiant and informant are necessary. If this were true, then every informant whose anonymity is protected would have his first case thrown out. In fact, the law is otherwise:
"While a history of prior dealings between an informant and the police can be an important element in establishing the reliability of the informant, the absence of such a history does not of itself prove the informant unreliable. The magistrate is entitled to look to the underlying circumstances, including those portions of the information independently verified by police, and to other factors supporting the probable truthfulness of the information.” United States v Wong, 470 F2d 129, 131 (CA 9, 1972).
The crucial test is stated in Aguilar v Texas, 378 US 108, 114; 84 S Ct 1509; 12 L Ed 2d 723 (1964). That case requires, in the disjunctive, that the magistrate be furnished facts from which the officer "concluded that the informant * * * was 'credible’ or his information 'reliable’ ”. (Citation omitted.) In Jones v United States, 362 US 257; 80 S Ct 725; 4 L Ed 2d 697 (1960), the US Supreme Court noted that:
"In testing the sufficiency of probable cause for an officer’s action even without a warrant, we have held [543]*543that he may rely upon information received through an informant, rather than upon his direct observations, so long as the informant’s statement is reasonably corroborated by other matters within the officer’s knowledge. ” 362 US at 269. (Emphasis supplied.)
Defendant makes much of the fact that the affidavit refers to "apparently reliable anonymous citizens”. As Judge Bronson points out, this phrase taken alone does not meet the Aguilar requirement of adequate facts for the magistrate to pass on the informant’s credibility. However, that is not the sole question, for constitutional muster is passed if the affidavit recites sufficient facts for a magistrate to conclude that the information was reliable. Aguilar v Texas, supra. And, pursuant to Jones v United States, supra, it is appropriate to look at the contents of the affidavit beyond the words "apparently reliable anonymous citizens” to see whether there is evidence "reasonably corroborat[ing]” the informant. In so doing, it should be kept in mind that "[t]he rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has been found for accommodating * * * often opposing interests”. Beck v Ohio, 379 US 89, 91; 85 S Ct 223; 13 L Ed 2d 142 (1964), quoting Brinegar v United States, 338 US 160; 69 S Ct 1302; 93 L Ed 1879 (1949). It should also be apparent that the reliability that Judge Bronson finds wanting is a requirement designed to protect against knowingly false or inadvertently erroneous information given by the informant to the officer.
In this case the incriminating information came from two citizens. Such information is perhaps more likely to be reliable than information which depends solely on the veracity of one person. The description of the substance appears to coincide [544]*544with the experienced officer’s knowledge of the appearance of marijuana. It is fair to infer that the informants knew marijuana when they saw it. Therefore, the affiant and magistrate could discount the possibility that the informants had mistakenly identified a licit substance as marijuana. The officer’s field test verified that the substance was marijuana — the informants were proven truthful in that particular. Also, the act of turning, over marijuana to the police could itself be considered a reliability credential. If the search of defendant’s premises had proved fruitless, undesired attention might have focused on the informants themselves. It is one thing for an informant to tell an officer that there is an illegal substance at such and such a place and it is another for the informant to produce a sample. The sample makes the story more convincing.
In the context of this case, the dangers Aguilar seeks to protect against are satisfied. Otherwise we are straining to protect against the vague possibility that two citizens delivered an illicit substance from an unknown source to a police officer to falsely incriminate the defendant. That would be a serious crime committed openly. Considering the facts related to the magistrate, I am inclined to find this probability less than the probability that the information given was accurate in material part. To be sure, the claims of the informants had not been substantiated in all respects. However, those claims had been substantiated in a number of important respects. The affidavit was sufficient to support the search warrant and no error was committed by introducing the marijuana into evidence. Still the conviction must be reversed.
II
At trial, the prosecutor relied on and the trial [545]*545court instructed on the two-ounce presumption embodied in MCLA 335.341(2); MSA 18.1070(41)(2). That presumption is unconstitutional. People v Serra, 55 Mich App 514; 223 NW2d 28 (1974). Reliance on the unconstitutional statute was reversible error.
Equally fundamental is the fact that the presumption was inapplicable to the present case. A search of the residence uncovered about 7-1/2 ounces of marijuana. Of that amount, 5.6 ounces were found under a pile of dirty clothes in the room of Kevin Johnson. No testimony connected defendant with this particular marijuana. The rest of the marijuana amounted to slightly less than two ounces. Thus, there was no evidence that defendant possessed more than two ounces. Instruction on the statutory presumption suffered a double infirmity. It was inapplicable to the facts and unconstitutional.
Ill
Defendant also complains that the trial court erred in denying his request for a directed verdict of acquittal. The prosecution’s proofs revealed that the search warrant was executed one morning at about 1:30 a.m. Defendant was bathing and Kevin Johnson was sleeping. The residence consisted of three bedrooms and a music room, each of which contained at least one mattress. Defendant was the lessee of the flat, but the landlord understood that others would also live there. The undisputed testimony was that a number of rent-paying residents and guests had lived in the home.
No marijuana was found on defendant’s person or in the clothes he donned when arrested. None was found in the bathroom or in the bedroom from [546]*546which defendant got his clothes, presumably his bedroom. In short, the police found no marijuana in the areas over which defendant had exclusive control.
As noted above, the largest package of marijuana was found in Kevin Johnson’s room. Other small packets of marijuana were found in the third bedroom which, all evidence suggests, was used by an unnamed third party. There is nothing at all to connect defendant to this marijuana. Proof of defendant’s identity as the possessor of the marijuana found in the bedrooms of others was entirely lacking. Those packets form no basis for defendant’s conviction.
Other packets were found in "common areas” such as the music room and living room. To these areas, all residents had access. As noted by Judge (now Justice) Levin in his opinion for this Court in People v Davenport, 39 Mich App 252, 256; 197 NW2d 521 (1972): "[Defendant] cannot be convicted on the theorem that someone must have been in possession of the heroin”. Here, as in Davenport, there is nothing to show that defendant knew of the presence of the marijuana. Compare People v Valot, 33 Mich App 49; 189 NW2d 873 (1971). As in Davenport, the prosecutor in the instant case failed to prove that it was defendant, not one of the other residents, that placed the marijuana in the common areas.
The only contraband which was connected to defendant was found in a box in the hall closet. A manila envelope containing marijuana seeds was found in the box. Also in the box was the title to defendant’s motorcycle. The Court in People v Davenport, supra, noted:
"The evidence in this case regarding possession of the [547]*547heroin is entirely circumstantial. The established rule is that where the people’s case is based on circumstantial evidence the prosecution has the burden of proving 'that there is no innocent theory possible which will, without violation of reason, accord with the facts’.” 39 Mich App at 256. (Citations omitted.)
While the case is extremely close, reasonable jurors might find from the presence of the motorcycle title that defendant knew of the presence of the marijuana. The inference is not compelling; we find only that it is permissible. People v Valot, supra. The prosecution established a prima facie case of possession; and whether it is possession beyond a reasonable doubt should be left for the jury. The trial judge properly left to the jury the determination of the lesser offense of simple possession.
As to the charged offense of possession with intent to deliver, we find insufficient evidence. It should again be emphasized that the only marijuana that the jury could properly find defendant possessed consisted of the seeds found in the manila envelope. This Court recently said in People v Serra, supra:
"Prosecutions involving large amounts of marijuana will not require a presumption to convince a jury that the possessor intended something other than personal use; the inference may follow of its own force. When smaller amounts are at issue, the prosecutor can introduce evidence of the kind he suggests the defendant should be forced to use; expert witnesses and acquaintances of the defendant. The jury will then be left, unfettered by presumptions of any kind, to weigh the evidence on both sides and resolve the question before it.” 55 Mich App at 525.
Where the quantity is large, the intent to de[548]*548liver may be a permissible inference. Here, however, the quantity of seeds possessed was so slight that we are constrained to find that reasonable jurors could not infer the intent to deliver from that quantity. There was no other evidence on the question of defendant’s intent. It was therefore error for the trial judge to deny defendant’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on the charged offense.
Reversed and remanded for retrial on the charge of possession only.