People v. Peoples

2025 IL App (5th) 220494-U

Opinion

NOTICE 2025 IL App (5th) 220494-U NOTICE Decision filed 01/29/25. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-22-0494 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the

Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Madison County. ) v. ) No. 18-CF-1570 ) FLAZE PEOPLES, ) Honorable ) Ronald R. Slemer, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE VAUGHAN delivered the judgment of the court. Justice Welch concurred in the judgment. Justice Cates concurred in part and dissented in part.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Because the court conflated the Krankel hearing and motion to withdraw hearing into one proceeding, only defendant’s ineffective assistance of claims was considered and the remaining claims made in his motion to withdraw were overlooked. We therefore remand for counsel to comply with Rule 604(d) and make any necessary amendments to the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, and the court to hold a hearing on the claims presented in the motion to withdraw guilty plea.

¶2 Defendant, Flaze Peoples, appeals the judgment and sentence entered on his guilty plea to

home invasion. For the following reasons, we remand for a new motion to withdraw guilty plea

hearing.

1 ¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On May 30, 2018, defendant was charged, by information, with one count of home invasion

(720 ILCS 5/19-6(a)(2) (West 2018)), two counts of aggravated domestic battery (id. § 12-3.3(a)),

and one count of aggravated battery (id. § 12-3.05(d)(2)). A grand jury subsequently indicted

defendant on the same charges.

¶5 The court appointed the public defender’s office to represent defendant at the beginning of

the case. It is unclear when public defender Tyler Bateman was assigned to defendant’s case.

However, the record shows Bateman represented defendant since—at least—July 25, 2018.

¶6 On September 13, 2018, Bateman filed a motion to withdraw as counsel per defendant’s

request. The court addressed Bateman’s motion to withdraw at a hearing on October 1, 2018. At

that time, Bateman confirmed that defendant wanted him to withdraw. Defendant informed the

court that he planned on hiring an attorney to represent him but wanted to represent himself until

further notice. The court questioned defendant about his highest level of education and informed

defendant of the consequences and pitfalls of not having an attorney. Defendant stated that he

understood. The court admonished defendant of the charges against him and penalties he faced.

Defendant again stated that he understood. The court then allowed Bateman to withdraw.

¶7 On November 13, 2018, the court entered an order, stating that it appointed public defender

Bateman to represent defendant. On December 4, 2018, Bateman filed another motion to withdraw

as counsel per the defendant’s request.

¶8 At a hearing on December 10, 2018, Bateman confirmed that defendant wanted him to

withdraw from the case. The court asked defendant’s intention in the case and whether he was

going to hire private counsel. Defendant stated that he was going to represent himself. The court

questioned defendant regarding his education and legal experience and admonished defendant of

2 the charges against him and penalties he faced. The court asked defendant if he would be prepared

to go to prison for at least six years if he was unsuccessful at trial. Defendant stated, “No, Your

Honor.” The court again clarified the penalties defendant faced and asked defendant if he believed

he could try the case. Defendant stated that he was going to try. The court denied the motion to

withdraw and retained Bateman as defendant’s counsel.

¶9 At a hearing on December 17, 2018, the court again addressed the possible penalties

associated with defendant’s charges. After the State advised the court that defendant’s charges

included mandatory Class X sentencing on count II and count III, the court explained that the

sentencing range for each offense was 6 to 30 years’ imprisonment and therefore, the only mercy

the court could give was 6 years’ imprisonment if the case reached the sentencing phase. It then

stated,

“Again, based on your record here and the evidence most likely we are going to hear at

trial, it’s unlikely you are going to get the minimum from me, just so you know; all right?

Probably any judge you are not going to get the minimum if you go to trial and you are

found guilty by a jury on all these counts. So[,] you are going to be looking closer to the

30 than the 6; all right?”

¶ 10 Defendant stated that he understood. The court asked if defendant had any questions.

Defendant replied, “Honestly[,] I just wanna get this over with. I just wanna plea bargain.” The

court indicated its understanding that negotiations were ongoing.

¶ 11 On January 18, 2019, defendant filed correspondence with the court requesting it “go above

and beyond” and review his background. He stated he was not a bad guy but a product of his

environment. Defendant wrote that he “grew up poor, uneducated, battered, bullied, molested, and

unhealthy.” He averred that he had been in special needs classes his entire life and was diagnosed

3 with “ADD, ADHD, severe anxiety, depression and bi-polar disorders.” He stated that he took

responsibility, but DCFS took his son away from his son’s mother and his doctor “cut off” his

medications for his mental disorders. He said he lost his mind and did not know what was going

on. Defendant asserted that his public defender, Bateman, denied him a screening for his mental

illnesses and was working against him. Defendant alleged that the prosecutor, Kerri Davis, used

to work for his attorney, Bateman, at the public defender’s office. After defendant fired Bateman,

Davis told Bateman that she did not like defendant. When defendant was pro se, he asked her why,

and she said, “It’s not that I don’t like you, I just don’t like your background.” Defendant asked

whether that would be a conflict of interest. Defendant further stated that he did not want to take

the offer of 20 years’ imprisonment, being that it was his first violent offense, and he was not on

his medications. Defendant again acknowledged that the charges were serious but said he did not

know what was going on at the time. He asserted an openness for an alternative sentence including

participation in any program and/or payment of fines.

¶ 12 The court held a hearing on January 22, 2019. At that time, Bateman advised the court of

a negotiated plea. Bateman indicated that the State would dismiss the two aggravated domestic

battery counts and the one count of aggravated battery. The State would also amend the home

invasion count to remove the element of great bodily harm. In exchange, defendant would plead

guilty to the amended home invasion count. The parties also agreed that for defendant’s plea of

guilty, his sentence should be 20 years’ imprisonment that would be served at 50%. Defendant

confirmed Bateman’s representation of the plea agreement was correct.

¶ 13 After the court read the amended charge of home invasion, defendant stated he understood

the charge. The court asked defendant how he wished to plead, and defendant replied, “I have no

choice, right? Plead guilty right?” The court explained that defendant had a right to go to trial and

4 again asked if defendant wanted to plead guilty. Defendant said, “I plead guilty.” Before the court

accepted the plea, it admonished defendant of his rights. Defendant stated he understood those

rights.

¶ 14 When the court asked if defendant had any questions about his rights, defendant asked if

the court would give defendant someone other than Bateman to represent him. The court answered,

“No, sir. You can have the Public Defender.” Defendant stated Bateman was not in his best interest

and the court needed to give defendant someone else. The court said, “No, sir.”

¶ 15 Bateman spoke to defendant and reminded him that they previously discussed his desire

for a different attorney and that defendant was told that if he was going to have a public defender,

it would be Bateman. Defendant stated that Bateman was not representing him well enough, and

he wondered if he would be assigned a different lawyer if he fired Bateman. The court replied,

“Not in this county.” Defendant asked how long the court would allow for him to hire private

counsel. The court stated that it would provide defendant 21 days to hire a lawyer. The State said

that it wanted to inform defendant that all offers would be revoked by the end of the day whether

defendant hired another attorney or not; so, defendant could tell whoever he hired that the State

was going to trial and would not make another offer in this case. The court asked if the State would

still amend the indictment to remove great bodily harm and the State said that it would not. The

court stated it was defendant’s decision on whether he wanted to hire a private attorney. Defendant

said, “I just plead guilty.” The court asked if defendant was satisfied with Bateman’s

representation. Defendant replied that he was not and “plead guilty to get it over with.”

¶ 16 The court then admonished defendant of the possible sentencing range and the application

of the three-year mandatory supervised release. It also advised that probation was not available for

the offense and defendant could be fined up to $25,000.

5 ¶ 17 Defendant stated, “I was going to ask you, if I have mental conditions and I went to trial,

would you be lenient towards me having mental illnesses?” The court said that if defendant was

mentally ill, it would have defendant examined and the case would not go to trial if a doctor told

the court that defendant was mentally ill. Defendant averred that he had been asking for a mental

evaluation, and he never got one. Bateman stated that there had never been a doubt in his mind

that defendant was competent. Bateman further explained that defendant informed him of his

mental issues and Bateman told defendant that the mental issues were not a defense in this case

and therefore the only time they would come into play would be in a sentencing decision through

an open plea. Bateman again stated defendant was clearly competent.

¶ 18 Defendant interjected, stating that he was mentally ill, and it took a lot for him to sit there

and behave. He further said that he had been behaving well because he did not want to get into any

more trouble and “[i]t’s only going to get worse.” Bateman again stated he believed defendant was

clearly competent.

¶ 19 The court stated that normally, people who were mentally ill did not tell the court that they

were mentally ill and usually said the opposite. The State averred that it had a duty as an officer

of the court to report if it—at any time—believed defendant had any kind of impairment affecting

his decision-making, and it did not. The court stated there was neither evidence that defendant was

mentally ill nor any evidence that would require an examination. It again asked if defendant wanted

to plead guilty. Defendant stated, “Yes, I do. *** I’m just trying to get everything lined up,

understand, with the best possibility for me.”

¶ 20 The State then provided the following factual basis. On May 25, 2018, Sharnice Hicks

lived at 3204 Belle Street, Lot A, Alton, Illinois, and there was an active order of protection

prohibiting defendant from being at that location or contacting Hicks. Also, on that date, defendant

6 entered into Hicks’s home, an argument ensued, and defendant struck Hicks repeatedly about the

body and face.

¶ 21 The court asked defendant if anyone forced or threatened him to plead guilty to the

amended indictment. The report of proceedings revealed that an off-the-record discussion was held

at that time and no response to the question was provided on the record. When the proceedings

resumed on the record, the court again asked if anyone forced or threatened defendant with

anything in order for him to plead guilty to the amended indictment. Defendant replied, “No, Your

Honor.” Defendant provided the same response when asked if anyone promised him anything other

than what was included in the negotiations. Defendant confirmed he was entering the guilty plea

freely and voluntarily. Defendant also confirmed that he discussed the plea agreement with

Bateman.

¶ 22 The court averred that it would bind itself to the plea agreement and sentence defendant to

20 years’ imprisonment with a 3-year mandatory supervised release, and that his sentence would

be subject to day-for-day credit. It further stated that counts II, III, and IV would be dismissed as

well as the misdemeanor charges in cases 18-CM-5000187 and 18-CM-500272. The court asked

whether defendant still wished to plead guilty. Defendant stated, “Yes, Your Honor.” The court

then accepted the plea.

¶ 23 The State waived the presentence investigation report. The court noted defendant’s prior

criminal history was in the record. It then sentenced defendant to 20 years’ imprisonment with 3

years’ mandatory supervised release for home invasion and ordered all other charges to be

dismissed. The court asked defendant if he understood the sentence imposed. Defendant confirmed

that he understood, had no questions, and that was the sentence he negotiated.

7 ¶ 24 On February 12, 2019, defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In the

motion, he requested to withdraw his plea in exchange for his right to a fair trial. He stated he did

not know how to properly draft a motion to withdraw and could not access the law library despite

multiple requests. He therefore asked the circuit clerk to file a motion to withdraw for him.

¶ 25 On February 14, 2019, Bateman filed a motion to withdraw guilty plea. The motion

asserted that defendant was improperly admonished by the court as to the consequences of his

plea, defendant did not understand the consequences of his plea, and it was in the interest of justice

that defendant be allowed to withdraw his plea.

¶ 26 On February 25, 2019, defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his plea, a letter, and

an affidavit. The letter stated that defendant was withdrawing his plea to exercise his rights to a

fair trial. The pro se motion directed that his argument to withdraw his plea could be found in his

affidavit.

¶ 27 Defendant’s affidavit stated the plea was the result of coercion by the public defender

Bateman. Defendant explained that he felt Bateman forced him to take the 20 years based on

Bateman’s statements to defendant that he would get 30 years’ imprisonment at 85% from the

judge. Bateman also would say threatening things like “I know the judge, he’s going to make you

into a poster child” and “You’ll get 25-30 years at 85%. It’s your life not mine.” Defendant also

stated the court forced him to take the plea because when defendant raised Bateman’s coercion,

the court felt that defendant was wasting its time or being stubborn. Defendant averred that he told

the court he was not pleased with Bateman’s representation when asked. Also, when the court

asked if defendant was forced to take the plea, defendant said, “yes, I was forced by my public

defender because Mr. Bateman said you would give me 30 years at 85%” if he did not take the

plea deal. Defendant asserted that the court was aggravated and replied, “Yes you are going to get

8 30 years!” Defendant alleged that when the bailiff was escorting him back to jail, defendant

apologized to the court. The court then asked if defendant wanted to take the plea and defendant

said yes because of the court’s comment that he would get 30 years’ imprisonment. Defendant

stated the court instructed the woman typing, “That was off the record and now we’re back on the

record.” The court then asked defendant the same questions to which he previously answered no,

and this time, defendant answered yes.

¶ 28 In the affidavit, defendant also alleged that Bateman was ineffective because he was

working for the State and would not listen to defendant. Defendant stated that he asked Bateman

to remove himself from the case so defendant could receive a different public defender, but the

State convinced defendant to obtain Bateman again by saying it would demand a speedy trial if

defendant remained pro se. Defendant stated Bateman was angry when he was reappointed to

defendant’s case and continued not to listen to defendant. Bateman refused to present legal

documents proving defendant’s mental illnesses. Defendant again stated he was in special

education classes throughout his life and asserted he received a Social Security check for his

disabilities. Defendant asserted Bateman also denied defendant’s mental evaluation requests more

than three times and failed to obtain medical records showing the doctor “cut off” his medications.

¶ 29 Defendant’s third listed ground in the affidavit stated that there was no factual basis for the

plea. He said he did not commit home invasion because he used a key to the home in which he

resided.

¶ 30 Defendant’s fourth ground to withdraw asserted that he was not mentally competent to

enter the plea. He stated that he suffered from ADHD, ADD, severe anxiety, and depression. He

also asserted that DCFS took two of his children and he was not taking his medications prior to

9 the plea. Defendant claimed he was not in his right mind before May 25, 2018, or at any point

before the plea was entered and had been off his medications for nine months.

¶ 31 On March 27, 2019, based on the ineffective assistance of counsel allegations, the court

entered an order allowing Bateman to withdraw and appointed public defender Steve Griffin. On

August 24, 2020, defendant filed a document entitled “Motion [for] Permission to File a Late

Notice to Withdraw My 2019 Guilty Plea.” In the document, defendant stated his sixth amendment

right to counsel had been violated. He asserted that Griffin had not contacted him. Defendant also

asserted that Bateman and the State forced him to take the guilty plea. He further contended

Bateman was ineffective for failing to ask the court to impose a 10-year sentence. After Judge

Tognarelli retired in December 2020, Judge Ronald R. Slemer presided over the case.

¶ 32 On September 17, 2021, the court entered an order continuing the matter and ordering

defendant to file any amended pleading within 35 days. No amended pleadings were filed.

¶ 33 The motion to withdraw hearing was held March 21, 2022. Defendant testified first, stating

Hicks was his children’s mother. He said that their relationship was going well until his

medications were cut off. Thereafter, everything went downhill. Defendant testified that prior to

the incident he was taking medication for mental illnesses that included ADHD, ADD, and bipolar

disorder. He was seeing Dr. Vallala at OSF Healthcare, St. Anthony’s Hospital. Dr. Vallala

prescribed him Adderall and Xanax for his mental illnesses, and Vicodin for his back pain.

Defendant explained that he had back and ankle problems from being heavy his entire life, playing

sports, and injuring himself. Defendant testified that he had been receiving Social Security

Disability benefits for his physical and mental conditions since 2016. At some point, Dr. Vallala

told defendant he could not treat both his back and mental illness, and defendant needed to choose

10 which was more of an issue. When defendant told him they were both issues, Dr. Vallala cut

defendant off from his medications.

¶ 34 Defendant stated that on the date of the incident he was upset with Hicks because DCFS

took his son away after she did not take her medication for her bipolar and schizophrenia mental

illnesses and left her son in the house unattended. Defendant stated that an argument started, and

his lack of medication played a big role in that.

¶ 35 Defendant testified that he initially asked Bateman to remove himself from the case

because he was ineffective. Defendant explained that he asked Bateman for a mental health

evaluation because defendant knew something was wrong and he needed help. Defendant asserted

that Bateman was playing devil’s advocate because prosecutor Davis used to be his assistant at the

public defender’s office, and Bateman did not know if he wanted to work for defendant or

prosecutor Davis. Defendant testified that Bateman never brought discovery for defendant to

review. After he went pro se, he obtained the discovery himself. Defendant admitted he did

something wrong but stated that he needed someone to fight for him so he could get the help he

needed.

¶ 36 Counsel Griffin asked if, at the time, he intended to go to trial. Defendant replied that he

was going to go to trial because he was charged with something he did not do. He explained that

he was not supposed to be convicted of home invasion because he did not force entry into the home

and was only supposed to be convicted of a violation of order of protection and aggravated

domestic battery. Defendant stated that he had a key to the residence, had personal belongings

there, and stayed at the residence on a regular basis. He further stated that he provided that

information to Bateman.

11 ¶ 37 Defendant testified that he requested Bateman introduce documents showing his mental

illnesses and that he had been taken off his medications and to argue that this was the only reason

that this crime occurred. Defendant also testified that Bateman told him the court would impose

the maximum sentence if he went to trial, and defendant brought that up on the day of his plea.

Defendant further told the court that he needed a mental evaluation, but the court denied his

request. He stated that Bateman also denied defendant’s request for a mental evaluation three times

and told the court that he felt defendant was competent. Defendant testified that he also requested

Bateman file for a change of judge. Counsel Griffin asked whether Bateman explained to defendant

that he got “one free change of judge,” and defendant stated, “No, sir.” Defendant testified that

Bateman was appointed as his counsel on a 2013 burglary charge, and he ended up receiving time

served for that offense. At that time, prosecutor Davis was Bateman’s assistant at the public

defender’s office, and he met with her in that case.

¶ 38 Defendant testified that he finished high school three years later and had an Individualized

Education Plan. He stated he told Bateman, and the court after defendant fired Bateman, that he

wanted to go to trial for this case. He said that he was a sitting duck in jail for eight months with

nothing being achieved. Defendant testified that he still communicated with Hicks, and no one at

the public defender’s office tried to take Hicks’s statement.

¶ 39 Defendant testified that as soon as he took this deal, he did not like it. He agreed that it was

fair to say his chief complaint was that neither Bateman, nor the system, took into account his

mental health history and his mental state on the day of the offense. Defendant further stated that

he did not commit the crime to which he pled guilty, and he was forced and threatened to plead

guilty.

12 ¶ 40 On cross-examination, defendant agreed he had a criminal history that included felony theft

and felony burglary convictions in 2010. Defendant further agreed that Bateman represented him

in those cases and worked hard for him at that time. Defendant stated he also had another felony

theft conviction in 2011. Defendant then stated Bateman did not represent him until 2013 when he

was convicted of a felony burglary. Defendant agreed at that time he was just released from his

two-year prison sentence for theft and the court sentenced him to time served in that case.

Defendant agreed that Bateman also represented him in 2015 for retail theft, to which defendant

was sentenced to 300 days’ periodic imprisonment. After counsel Griffin told defendant not to

speculate, defendant stated that Bateman did not represent him in 2015.

¶ 41 The State asked defendant if he struck Hicks at her residence. Defendant stated he struck

Hicks, but he was not in his right state of mind and was remorseful. Defendant agreed he struck

Hicks multiple times about the body and face, causing cuts, but again apologized and stated he did

not have the right state of mind. He testified he did not commit home invasion. Defendant

understood home invasion required forced entry. The State asked if defendant would agree he

would be guilty of home invasion if it had nothing to do with forced entry. Defendant said, “No,

sir. I’m not sayin’ that.” Defendant agreed that he entered Hicks’s apartment and struck her

multiple times. Defendant said he understood the range of punishment for home invasion was 10

to 30 years’ imprisonment to be served at 85% and that the State reduced that to be served at 50%.

Defendant did not recall the State saying it would never offer defendant a better deal than 20 years’

imprisonment to be served at 50%. Defendant agreed that Bateman discussed his mental health

concerns at the plea hearing and stated the concerns did not rise to a level of being incompetent.

Defendant also agreed he did not have a doctor to testify as to his mental state at the time of the

plea.

13 ¶ 42 Defendant stated that Bateman worked hard for defendant in 2013, wanted defendant to do

well, and wanted him to be a productive member of society. Defendant said that he believed

counsel Bateman and prosecutor Davis were working together because she was Bateman’s

previous assistant, and she told defendant that she did not like him and his background. Prosecutor

Davis also told defendant that she would not do anything for defendant unless Bateman represented

him again. The State asked if defendant wanted to get out of prison, and he replied that he wanted

justice to be served. He then said that he wanted to get out of prison. When the State asked if he

would do anything to get out of prison, defendant said, “Yes, sir, I would. And I would do anything

to stay out of prison as well, too. I learned my lesson, sir.”

¶ 43 On redirect, defendant testified that he discussed his mental state on the date of the offense

to Bateman and asked him to make a proffer for the defense of temporary insanity. Defendant said

that he did not believe his mental state had improved from the date of the offense until he went to

jail.

¶ 44 Prosecutor Davis testified next, stating that she recalled defendant wishing to discharge

Bateman because he wanted another public defender to represent him. She believed she spoke to

defendant only once when he was pro se. Davis testified that prior to defendant discharging

Bateman, she offered defendant 20 years’ imprisonment and amendment to the home invasion

charge to remove the great bodily harm so that day-for-day credit would apply in exchange for

defendant’s guilty plea. She did not remember if that was her first offer or if there were any further

negotiations. To her memory, the offer had been conveyed to defendant and when he was pro se,

he tried to negotiate a lesser offer. Then, as she did with any pro se defendant, she explained the

offer would not go down and if they proceeded to trial and an offer was requested, the offer would

14 go up. She also told defendant that was the final offer in that case. Davis did not remember if her

first offer was 15 years to be served at 85%.

¶ 45 Davis denied telling defendant that she did not like him and his background. When asked

if Davis told defendant that he did not belong with his children, Davis stated that she told defendant

that—based on his criminal history—she was concerned about him in society and his danger to

the community. She recalled receiving a letter from defendant while he was in jail. The letter was

nice and not threatening or upsetting. Davis could not recall whether there was any discussion of

the defense of temporary insanity or defendant’s mental state on the day of the offense. She had

no knowledge of defendant’s mental health history or whether defendant had been taken off of his

medications shortly before the offense. She also had no knowledge on whether he had received

Social Security Disability benefits in the time leading up to the offense.

¶ 46 Counsel Griffin asked if Bateman supervised Davis when she worked at the public

defender’s office. Davis testified that Bateman was head of the trial team, which was a title in

figure only, and he was not her supervisor. She had no recollection of whether she worked with

Bateman on cases while at the public defender’s office. She did not recall defendant’s 2013

burglary conviction or meeting with defendant on that case. Davis stated that it would be

exceptionally abnormal for her to discuss or help Bateman with a burglary case.

¶ 47 On cross-examination, Davis explained that it would be abnormal to help Bateman on a

burglary case because he had been working in the public defender’s office for 30 years when she

started, and she did not believe he ever asked her to help on any of his cases. If he had, that would

be an extraordinary event that she would remember. She stated he certainly never asked her to visit

a client in jail for him. The State asked if Davis’s comments about defendant’s danger to society

were a reflection of defendant’s criminal history and behavior in this case. Davis answered

15 affirmatively, stating her recollection of his criminal history was that he had violent prior offenses.

Davis stated that she had no personal animosity or prejudice against defendant.

¶ 48 On redirect examination, Davis stated she had no recollection of the circumstances of how

Bateman was reappointed in this case. She remembered having a conversation with defendant

about Bateman being reappointed but did not remember exactly how he became reappointed. She

did not recall writing an order reappointing Bateman.

¶ 49 On recross-examination, Davis testified that she would never ask for a specific attorney to

be appointed on a case. She stated that it did not matter who was on the other side and she would

have acted in a professional manner regardless. She further stated that she would have made the

same offer to any defense attorney, and she specifically communicated that to defendant. The State

questioned if she asked for Bateman to be appointed to a case, and Davis answered, “No. If I would

have asked it would have been because he was the public defender and it would have been in the

context of the Public Defender’s Office.” On redirect examination, Davis testified that she did not

recall telling defendant that she was not going to speak with him unless Bateman was reappointed

in the case.

¶ 50 The State called Bateman to testify. Bateman stated that he represented defendant on

several occasions but could not remember exactly how many times. Bateman did not remember

the 2018-19 case charging defendant with home invasion, aggravated domestic battery, and

aggravated battery, but said he represented defendant on those types of cases. Bateman knew he

represented defendant on a variety of cases prior to that.

¶ 51 Bateman testified that he always advised his clients of the potential penalties they face and

usually on more than one occasion. When asked whether he ever forced anyone to plead guilty to

a charge, Bateman stated that he had strongly advised clients on more than one occasion to plead

16 guilty and sometimes clients view that as being forced, although it was their independent decision.

Bateman explained that he gave this strong advice when someone was looking at 10 years’

imprisonment and he knew they would be convicted. Under such circumstances, he would explain

what the evidence was, what the jury would do with that evidence, and what the result would be.

Bateman testified that he never threatened any of his clients. He also never gave his clients an

ultimatum. Bateman said he tried to represent his clients to the best of his ability. Bateman could

not recall a specific conversation in which he advised defendant of the possible outcomes.

However, he knew he had more than one conversation with defendant about what would happen

at trial, the potential penalties if he went to trial, and what the judge would probably do.

¶ 52 Bateman remembered defendant discussing his mental health, several times. Bateman

stated probably about 25% or more of his clients had some type of mental issue and he had some

clients who were deemed incompetent. When asked if Bateman ever doubted defendant’s

competence, Bateman stated, “In my representation on the particular case that we’re talking about,

never in my mind did I think that he was incompetent as our courts determine incompetence to be,

which is a very low standard.” Bateman further said he never had a good faith belief to request

defendant be examined on the issue of competency.

¶ 53 Bateman testified that he dealt with Davis both when she was with the public defender’s

office and as a prosecutor. Bateman had no memory of asking Davis to meet with defendant.

Bateman testified that while he engaged in plea discussions with Davis, he did not collude against

defendant. He stated that he never did anything unethical and always tried to represent defendant

as any other individual and to the best of his ability, which included being clear and direct as to

what Bateman believed would happen.

17 ¶ 54 On cross-examination, Bateman stated that he fully believed he visited defendant face-to-

face and went over discovery with him. He further stated, “What if any, DVDs I showed him I

have no recollection. My guess is, that if he gave a statement that I would have at least had him

watch that DVD.” Bateman could not remember if his investigator interviewed Hicks but thought

he had the investigator interview someone.

¶ 55 Bateman again testified that defendant informed Bateman of his mental issues, but

Bateman could not remember the specifics of those conversations. Bateman also could not

remember if defendant informed him that he had been taken off of his medication a short time

before the offense. Bateman stated that because defendant informed him of his mental health

history, Bateman would have followed up on that history for the purposes of sentencing. Counsel

Griffin asked if Bateman could have developed a temporary insanity defense, Bateman stated that

he could not have.

¶ 56 Bateman agreed Davis worked in the public defender’s offices for a number of years and

that he socialized with Davis outside of the office. He also agreed that after she left, he never tried

a case before a jury when she was on the other side. Bateman could not remember if defendant

indicated that he was uncomfortable with Bateman and Davis’s relationship while Bateman

represented defendant. Bateman did not agree that the optics looked bad. When asked if defendant

could feel intimidated by being before a judge with an attorney who used to work and socialize

with the prosecutor, Bateman stated that a defendant could feel intimidated any time he was

brought into a courtroom. He also stated that clients facing 10 years in prison were in an

intimidating situation. However, Bateman did not see how Davis working in Bateman’s office

prior to her being a prosecutor would increase defendant’s fear.

18 ¶ 57 Bateman stated defendant may have informed him that he had a key to Hicks’s apartment.

Bateman clarified that he could not remember exactly what defendant said, but it was defendant’s

position that the apartment was his residence. Bateman testified that the information did not

necessarily raise an issue regarding the home invasion charge because there was an order of

protection in place. Bateman agreed that in 2018, it was apparent to most of the defense that Judge

Tognarelli could be particularly onerous on domestic violence offenders. Bateman further agreed

that he was probably the instigator in his office to consider changing judges from Judge Tognarelli

because of his approach to domestic violence cases. He stated that it was his understanding that a

defendant received “one free” judge change if requested in the appropriate period of time. When

asked whether he requested a change of judge in this case, Bateman said, “The record speaks for

itself.” Bateman also said a mental health evaluation would not have necessarily occurred even if

he had proffered a defense of temporary insanity.

¶ 58 The parties were granted 30 days to submit written arguments. The State filed its argument

on April 7, 2022. It contended that the record refuted the allegations that defendant did not get the

deal that he negotiated and that he was mentally incompetent to plead guilty. It relied on Bateman’s

testimony that he addressed at length that defendant had mental issues but none of them rose to

the level of incompetence to stand trial or plead guilty. It also relied on Bateman’s testimony that

he informed defendant of all his options, what he believed was the best option for defendant, and

that he never coerced a client to take a deal but strongly hinted to some clients what the best course

of action would be. The State also asserted that Davis and Bateman testified that they did not

collude on this, or any other, matter. The State argued that as such, the record refuted defendant’s

allegations.

19 ¶ 59 Counsel Griffin filed defendant’s argument in support of his motion to withdraw his guilty

plea on April 25, 2022. It stated that defendant testified that he had a plausible defense to some or

all of the charges, some of which may have involved lesser included offenses. It further stated that

defendant also credibly testified that Davis formerly played a role in his 2013 case, while she was

employed at the public defender’s office, and he was not given ample opportunity to review

discovery. The motion further stated, “Defendant’s mental health issues, while not necessarily

affording Defendant a defense nor rising to the level of ‘fitness to stand trial’, would have been

more adequately presented through a Rule 402(d) conference, prior to trial and/or negotiated plea.”

The same day, Griffin filed a Rule 604(d) certificate, stating that he (1) consulted with defendant

to ascertain defendant’s contention of error in the entry of the guilty plea and sentence,

(2) examined the court file and report of proceedings of guilty plea and sentencing hearing, and

(3) made any amendments to the motion necessary for adequate presentation of any defects in

those proceedings.

¶ 60 The court filed an order on July 8, 2022, denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty

plea. It explained that the court reviewed the record and defendant tried to manipulate the case to

get a better deal. It also found the record showed defendant contradicted himself in his claims to

withdraw his plea. The court determined defendant’s testimony was not believable, defendant was

clearly competent to enter a guilty plea, and the record showed that the plea was knowingly and

voluntarily entered.

¶ 61 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 62 On appeal, defendant asserts four arguments. He contends that his plea was involuntary

because (1) the court refused to allow him to proceed pro se and (2) the court told defendant he

would get the maximum sentence if he did not plead guilty. He also argues that (3) a remand is

20 required for a new Krankel hearing where the court failed to inquire into defendant’s claims of

ineffective counsel and (4) remand is required for Rule 604(d) compliance where Griffin failed to

indicate which motion to withdraw guilty plea he proceeded on and failed to make the necessary

amendments to adequately present defendant’s claims. We address the last two issues on appeal;

however, because we resolve this appeal on the last asserted issue, we will not address defendant’s

first two contentions of error.

¶ 63 The Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984),

developed a common-law procedure to address pro se posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel. In re Johnathan T., 2022 IL 127222, ¶ 23. Normally, if the trial court considered the

merits of defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims, we reverse only if there was

manifest error. People v. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 98. However, when the question is one of

procedure, our review is de novo. People v. Jolly, 2014 IL 117142, ¶ 28. Here, although the court

considered defendant’s ineffectiveness claims on the merits, defendant only complains of the

court’s failure to properly conduct a preliminary Krankel inquiry. Thus, our review is de novo.

¶ 64 Pursuant to Krankel, once a defendant raises a pro se posttrial ineffective assistance of

counsel claim, the trial court must determine whether defendant’s pro se allegations show possible

neglect of his case. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 97. If the court finds the claims pertain to matters

of trial strategy or lack merit, it need not appoint Krankel counsel. Id. However, if the allegations

show possible neglect, new counsel should be appointed to independently evaluate defendant’s

pro se claims and represent defendant at the hearing on the pro se claims of ineffective assistance

of counsel. Id. “ ‘This procedure allows the trial court to decide whether independent counsel is

necessary to argue a defendant’s pro se posttrial ineffective assistance claims at a full Krankel

21 [evidentiary] hearing.’ ” People v. Teen, 2023 IL App (5th) 190456, ¶ 43 (quoting In re Johnathan

T., 2022 IL 127222, ¶ 23).

¶ 65 Here, there is no indication that the court inquired into defendant’s claims whatsoever

before appointing counsel. Rather, about a month after defendant’s pro se motion raised ineffective

assistance of counsel claims, the court—through a brief written order—allowed Bateman to

withdraw and appointed Griffin based on defendant’s ineffective claims regarding Bateman.

Moreover, the court here did not specify whether Griffin was to provide limited representation as

Krankel counsel or was to represent defendant going forward. As stated in People v. Reed, 2018

IL App (1st) 160609, ¶ 51, “Allowing trial counsel to withdraw and appointing new posttrial

defense counsel does not satisfy Krankel procedure.” See also People v. Roberson, 2021 IL App

(3d) 190212, ¶ 20 (“the purpose of the Krankel procedure is not to provide a defendant with

effective counsel going forward but to ensure that he received effective assistance previously”).

¶ 66 However, unlike Reed, the record here shows that Griffin proceeded as Krankel counsel

and, ultimately, an inquiry into defendant’s claims occurred. See Reed, 2018 IL App (1st) 160609,

¶ 52. At the March 21, 2022, hearing, Griffin’s questioning was directly related to each of

defendant’s ineffectiveness claims. Griffin’s written argument also related to defendant’s

ineffectiveness claims. The purpose of Krankel was therefore fulfilled where Griffin presented

each of defendant’s pro se ineffectiveness claims.

¶ 67 Accordingly, because the purpose of Krankel is met where the court fully considered each

of defendant’s pro se claims of ineffectiveness, we find any error in failing to conduct a

preliminary inquiry harmless with respect to defendant’s Krankel claims. See Jackson, 2020 IL

124112, ¶ 127 (an error is harmless where, beyond a reasonable doubt, the result would have been

the same absent the error). The same, however, cannot be said for defendant’s motion to withdraw.

22 ¶ 68 In order to appeal a guilty plea, a defendant must comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule

604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017) and file a motion to withdraw the plea “within 30 days of the date on

which sentence is imposed.” Id. The rule requires “[t]he motion to be heard promptly.” Id.

¶ 69 Moreover, Rule 604(d) requires counsel to consult with the defendant to ascertain the

defendant’s contentions of error in the entry of the plea and sentence, examine the trial court file

and the report of proceedings of the plea of guilty and sentencing hearing, and make any

amendments to the motion necessary for adequate presentation of any defects in the guilty plea or

sentencing proceedings. Id. Counsel must file a certificate stating that he or she has completed the

Rule 604(d) duties. Id.

¶ 70 Rule 604(d) “was designed to eliminate needless trips to the appellate court and to give the

trial court an opportunity to consider the alleged errors and to make a record for the appellate court

to consider on review in cases where defendant’s claim is disallowed.” People v. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d

93, 106 (1988). “That purpose is to ensure that before a criminal appeal can be taken from a guilty

plea, the trial judge who accepted the plea and imposed sentence be given the opportunity to hear

the allegations of improprieties that took place outside the official proceedings and dehors the

record, but nevertheless were unwittingly given sanction in the courtroom.” Id. at 104. Counsel’s

certification requirements under the rule furthers this purpose by allowing the trial court to ensure

counsel reviewed all of defendant’s claims and the relevant bases for a postplea motion. People v.

Gorss, 2022 IL 126464, ¶ 15. “ ‘The attorney certificate thereby encourages the preservation of a

clear record, both in the trial court and on appeal, of the reasons why a defendant is moving to

withdraw his plea or to reduce sentence.’ ” Id. (quoting In re H.L., 2015 IL 118529, ¶ 10).

¶ 71 Counsel must strictly comply with Rule 604(d)’s certification requirement. In re H.L., 2015

IL 118529, ¶ 8. “[E]ven when the certificate is valid on its face, a remand will be necessary if the

23 record refutes the certificate.” People v. Winston, 2020 IL App (2d) 180289, ¶ 14. Whether counsel

strictly complied with Rule 604(d) is reviewed de novo. People v. Lindsay, 239 Ill. 2d 522, 525

(2011).

¶ 72 While counsel here filed a facially valid Rule 604(d) certificate, we find the record rebuts

the presumption that counsel undertook Rule 604(d) duties, and the court held a hearing on all of

defendant’s claims in his motion to withdraw his plea. Postplea counsel did not amend any petition,

nor clarify which petition he would proceed on. Despite all parties—including the court—stating

the March 21, 2022, hearing was to address the motion to withdraw, only defendant’s

ineffectiveness claims were presented. Importantly, Bateman’s motion, as well as defendant’s

pro se motion, asserted issues other than ineffectiveness claims. Namely, the additional issues of

improper admonishments and failure to understand the consequences of the plea 1 were presented

in Bateman’s motion. Certainly, there was overlap regarding defendant’s ineffective assistance of

counsel claims and other claims in his pro se motion (i.e., counsel failed to obtain a mental

evaluation and defendant was mentally incompetent to plead guilty). Yet, defendant’s pro se

motion also included additional issues of whether the court coerced defendant to plead guilty by

telling defendant he would get the maximum sentence if he went to trial or by denying defendant

to proceed pro se for a second time. 2 No argument was provided on these additional issues, and

the court did not consider them. We further note that Griffin directly contradicted the allegation in

defendant’s pro se motion that he was mentally incompetent to enter a guilty plea where Griffin’s

1 The failure to understand the consequences of the plea claim may relate to defendant’s contention that he was mentally incompetent; however, we cannot make such conclusion where neither the motion nor Griffin provided further explanation regarding this basis. 2 We note that defendant’s pro se motion also asserted—separately from his ineffective assistance of counsel claims—that his plea should be withdrawn because he was mentally incompetent and there was insufficient factual basis for the plea. Defendant’s testimony at the hearing related to these issues, but Griffin never argued such issue as an independent basis to withdraw the plea. 24 written argument after the hearing conceded that defendant’s mental health issues did not

necessarily afford defendant a defense or raise an issue regarding his fitness to stand trial. As such,

where the record shows that Griffin failed to clarify which motion to withdraw he intended to

present, failed to argue issues raised in either Bateman or defendant’s motion, or file an amended

motion to withdraw the guilty plea, we find the record rebuts his compliance with Rule 604(d).

See People v. Bridges, 2017 IL App (2d) 150718, ¶ 11 (record rebuts Rule 604(d) compliance

where counsel failed to offer any argument or evidence in support of the motion).

¶ 73 The failure to properly consider all of defendant’s contentions of error, beyond his

ineffectiveness claims, undoubtedly stems from the confusion created by the court’s failure to

adhere to proper Krankel procedure and delineate Griffin’s duties. The proper procedure would

have been to inquire into defendant’s pro se ineffectiveness claims and appoint Krankel counsel if

the claims showed possible neglect. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 97. Krankel counsel would have

then represented defendant at an evidentiary hearing on defendant’s ineffectiveness claims. People

v. Downs, 2017 IL App (2d) 121156-C, ¶ 43. If defendant’s claims succeeded at the evidentiary

hearing, defendant would have been entitled to return to the status quo prior to his guilty plea with

new counsel. People v. Kyles, 2024 IL App (4th) 230128-U, ¶ 27; see Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d at 189

(In the context of a Krankel evidentiary hearing regarding a conviction after trial, if “the judge

finds that the defendant did not in fact receive effective assistance of counsel based upon counsel’s

alleged failure to present a valid alibi defense, then he shall order a new trial.”). If defendant’s

claims were denied after an evidentiary hearing, then Bateman should have remained as

defendant’s counsel and argued the motion to withdraw that he filed, or the court could have

appointed Griffin (or other new counsel) to represent defendant generally in the case and argue

any remaining issues. See People v. Buchanan, 2013 IL App (2d) 120447, ¶ 24. The court,

25 however, did not follow this procedure. As such, errors occurred where no hearing was held on all

the claims in the motion to withdraw defendant’s guilty plea as required by Rule 604(d). See

People v. Maxwell, 2013 IL App (4th) 111042, ¶ 13 (under Rule 604(d), defendant is entitled to a

hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea).

¶ 74 We find support for our determination in People v. Kyles, 2020 IL App (2d) 180087, and

People v. Buchanan, 2013 IL App (2d) 120447. In Kyles, the appellate court remanded for further

Krankel proceedings where the court’s appointment of counsel to “the dual role of Krankel counsel

and of trial counsel for the remaining matters” created confusion as to whether new counsel

completed Krankel duties. 2020 IL App (2d) 180087, ¶¶ 46-47.

¶ 75 In Buchanan, plea counsel filed a motion to withdraw the defendant’s guilty plea because

defendant did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to a jury trial, did not fully

comprehend the court’s admonishments, and was coerced into pleading guilty. 2013 IL App (2d)

120447, ¶ 6. At the next hearing, the court was informed that defendant alleged that plea counsel

was ineffective, and defendant wanted Krankel counsel. Id. ¶ 8. The court explained that it would

conduct a Krankel inquiry before it appointed new counsel. Id. Thereafter, upon defendant’s

request, the court allowed the defendant to proceed pro se. Id. The court then allowed the defendant

to file an amended motion to raise additional ineffectiveness allegations and set the hearing for a

future date. Id. At the hearing, the defendant appeared pro se. Defense counsel and the State were

also present. Id. ¶ 10. Ultimately, the court denied the defendant’s Krankel claims and declined to

appoint Krankel counsel. Id. The defendant then argued that his plea agreement included that the

State would not try to revoke his probation in Ogle County, but his probation was revoked. Id.

¶ 14. The State explained that it agreed to not communicate the defendant’s plea with Ogle County

but neither the State nor defense counsel had control over whether Ogle County revoked the

26 defendant’s probation. Id. The court denied the defendant’s motion and appointed new counsel to

represent defendant on a pending petition to revoke his probation in this case. Id. ¶ 15.

¶ 76 The appellate court found that while the trial court was aware of its Krankel requirements

and conducted the requisite hearing, it was “not clear where the Krankel hearing ended and the

rest of the hearing began” and the court also effectively denied the motion to withdraw without

allowing counsel to argue the merits of that motion. Id. ¶¶ 24-25. It determined the trial court did

not treat defendant’s request to proceed pro se as a complete waiver of counsel and allowed

defendant to proceed pro se only with respect to his ineffectiveness claims. Id. ¶ 23. “Upon

concluding that defendant’s pro se claims of ineffectiveness were without merit, the court should

have clearly informed defendant that he was not entitled to conflict counsel and, at that point,

allowed counsel to argue any remaining issues (or taken a proper waiver of counsel).” Id. ¶ 24. As

such, the appellate court remanded so that counsel could argue the merits of the motion. Id. ¶ 25.

¶ 77 We acknowledge the differences between this case and Buchanan and Kyles, but find the

cases still support our decision. While, unlike Kyles, it is clear that Griffin acted as Krankel

counsel, Kyles supports the notion that remand is required when it is not clear that counsel—who

the court appointed for dual roles—undertook the duties of both Krankel counsel and postplea

counsel. Also, in Buchanan, no Krankel counsel was appointed after the court held a proper

Krankel inquiry, which differs from the instant case. However, Buchanan is similar to here in that

both trial courts held a muddled, consolidated Krankel and postplea motion hearing that resulted

in the court denying a defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea without counsel arguing the

merits of all of defendant’s contentions. Thus, because the record fails to show Griffin knew he

needed to present defendant’s contentions of error beyond the ineffectiveness claims and the court

failed to consider those alleged errors on the merits, we remand for further proceedings.

27 ¶ 78 On remand, defendant should have an opportunity to file a new motion to withdraw his

plea with the assistance of counsel. However, because the court has already ruled on his Krankel

claims, he is not entitled to relitigate those claims. While the court found that plea counsel Bateman

was not ineffective, it has already allowed Bateman to withdraw and appointed Griffin to represent

defendant. Accordingly, Griffin should complete the duties set forth in Rule 604(d), file a new

Rule 604(d) certificate, and amend the motion to withdraw if necessary.

¶ 79 Defendant also argues on appeal that his plea was involuntary because the court refused to

allow him to proceed pro se and the court told defendant he would get the maximum sentence if

he did not plead guilty. “The trial court is the place for fact finding to occur and for a record to be

made concerning the factual basis upon which a defendant relies for the grounds to withdraw a

guilty plea.” Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 104. As such, we decline to address such issues and find Griffin

may assert them in the motion to withdraw on remand if he deems them meritorious.

¶ 80 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 81 Counsel failed to comply with Rule 604(d) and the court did not consider all of the

contentions in the motion to withdraw defendant’s guilty plea. We therefore remand for further

proceedings in accordance with our disposition.

¶ 82 Remanded with directions.

¶ 83 JUSTICE CATES, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

¶ 84 After reviewing the record, I agree that postplea counsel Griffin did not comply with the

requirements under Rule 604(d) and that the trial court did not consider all of the contentions raised

in the defendant’s pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Therefore, I concur with the

majority’s decision to remand this case to the trial court to permit the defendant to pursue his

motion to withdraw his guilty plea with the assistance of postplea counsel. On remand, counsel

28 should perform his duties in compliance with Rule 604(d), file a new 604(d) certificate, and amend

the defendant’s pro se motion to withdraw guilty plea, if necessary.

¶ 85 That said, I do not agree with the majority’s decision to consider the defendant’s claim of

error as to the Krankel proceedings and so I do not join in their analysis of that matter. Given our

findings: (1) that there was overlap regarding the defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel and his claims in his motion to withdraw his guilty plea (particularly his contentions

around his mental health issues and mental incompetence); (2) that the trial court held a muddled,

consolidated hearing on two separate proceedings—a Krankel hearing and a hearing on the motion

to withdraw guilty plea; and (3) that the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to withdraw his

guilty plea without hearing postplea counsel’s arguments on the merits of all of the defendant’s

claims, I would withhold consideration of the Krankel argument until the Rule 604(d) proceedings

are concluded and a final order is issued on the motion to withdraw the defendant’s guilty plea.

Accordingly, I concur in part and dissent in part.