,. i \ , ,\
n IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF tmllT~~ i 3 Ii L
2 ) PEOPLE OF GUM1, ) CRIMINAL CASE NO. CM 1011-11 3 ) 4 vs. ) ) DECISION AND ORDER 5 ALVIN DELEON PAYUMO, ) (Motion to Suppress) Defendant. 6
8 Defendant filed a Notice of Motion on March 12, 2012 to have heard his Motion to 9 Suppress before the HONORABLE JUDGE ELIZABETH BARRETT-ANDERSON. 10 Defendant is represented by Assistant Public Defender Suresh Sampath. The People are 11 represented by Assistant Attorney General James C. Collins. The Court having ruled on the 12 legal issues presented by the motion heretofore, now therefore, pursuant to Rule CVR 7.1 (e)(1), 13 the Court decides this matter without further briefing or oral argument. Having considered the 14 briefs herein the motion is DENIED. 15
16 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 17 On September 26, 2011, at approximately 7:45 p.m., Officers of the Guam Police 18 Department (hereinafter "Officers") responded to an auto accident the Defendant (hereinafter 19 "Payumo") was involved in on Route 1, near Foremost. At the scene of the crash, Officers 20 investigated with Mr. Kawata Hiroko, who stated that her vehicle was struck from behind by a 21 second vehicle. Payumo was the operator of that vehicle. Payumo stated to the Officer "I'm 22 sorry ma'am, I was drinking. It's my fault." At approximately 7:55 p.m. Payumo agreed to 23 perform the Standardized Field Sobriety Test ("SFST"), which he failed. A test of his blood 24 alcohol content ("BAC") was administered with a reading of .147% BAC. Payumo was arrested 25 shortly after 7:55 p.m. There is no dispute as to these facts. On September 26, 2011, Payumo 26 was charged with 1) Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol, as a misdemeanor (BAC);
2) Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol, as a misdemeanor; and 3) Reckless Driving, 28 as a petty misdemeanor.
Page 1 of5 2
3 DISCUSSION 4 Payumo moves to suppress "any and all evidence" obtained by the Officers as a result of 5 an unlawful detention of his person in violation of 8 Guam Code Annotated § 30.10-30.60, 6 Guam's "Stop and Frisk" statute. Guam law provides that "[n]o person shall be detained under 7 the provisions of § 30.10 longer than is reasonable necessary to effect the purposes of that 8 section, and in no event longer than fifteen (15) minutes .... " 8 GCA § 30.30. Payumo argues 9 that he was detained more than the permitted fifteen (15) minutes, and therefore, the remedy for 10 violation should be suppression of any and all evidence seized. Payumo cites the Court to an 11 earlier decision of this Court in People v. Santos, CM 805-09 (Super. Ct. Guam July 2, 2010), 12 wherein this Court concluded the police officers had detained the defendant longer than 13 lawfully permitted under the facts of the case. For the following reason, the Court is abandoning 14 its mling in Santos based on the following analysis. 15 The purpose for Guam's "Stop and Frisk Act" is for 'investigatory stops' where the 16 police officer has reasonable suspicion that a person has, is, or is about to commit a criminal 17 offense. 8 G.C.A. §30.20. A police officer then has fifteen (15) minutes to ascertain the identity 18 of individual and determine the circumstances surrounding his presence. See §30.30. If probable 19 cause arises during the 'investigatory stop' the police officer is permitted to arrest the 20 individual. See §30AO The time limitation for the statute's 'brief detention' under section 30.10 21 no longer governs once probable cause has been formed. 22 At 7:55 a.m. on September 26, 2011, Officers responded to an auto accident of the 23 Defendant for an 'investigatory stop' because he was reported to have read ended another 24 vehicle. The Officers requested Payumo to submit to the SFST based on the reasonable 25 suspicion Defendant was Driving under the Influence of Alcohol. Sometime after 7:55 p.m. the 26 Officers asked Payumo if he had consumed alcohol, to which he admitted to having dmnk beer. 27 Payumo failed the SFST and was subsequently arrested. During this investigatory stop, the 28 Officers had probable cause to arrest Payumo shortly after 7:55 p.m. based on his admission to
Page 2 of5 having drunk alcohol. Once probable cause is formed during the "investigatory stop", the fifteen 2 (15) minute time limit for purposes of section 30.1 0 no longer governed. The "investigatory 3 stop", then becomes a detention and need only pass constitutional muster against unreasonable 4 searches and seizures guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. 5 The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the application of a bright-line 6 time limit for Fourth Amendment detentions. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 7 (1985). Although having a 'bright-line' rule would be helpful in evaluating whether an 8 investigative detention is unreasonable, a police officer's common sense and judgment must 9 ultimately govern their conduct. In United States v. Place, the Court reasoned that "[ s]uch a 10 limit would undermine the equally important need to allow authorities to graduate their 11 responses to the demands of any particular situation." Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709, n.1 0 (1983). 12 The Guam legislature has provided clear framework for 'stops' for the purposes of section 13 30.30 and the facts in this case do not trigger its application. 14 Accordingly, this Court does not agree with Defendant's assertion that "all and any" 15 evidence from a detention should be suppressed under §30.60. Although the Court in Santos did 16 not address the suppression issue, the Court will do so now. Guam law provides that "[n]othing 17 seized by a peace officer in the search authorized by §30.50 [Weapons Search Permitted] shall 18 be admissible against any person in any court of this Territory unless both the detention and the 19 search which disclosed its existence was authorized by and conducted in compliance with the 20 provisions of this Chapter" 8 G.c.A. §30.60. In the present case, there is no evidence to 21 suppress from a search of the Defendant based on the following analysis. 22 A "detention" for purposes of section 30.30 is limited to ascertaining the identity of the 23 person and the circumstances surrounding his presence. See §30.20. A request for identification 24 and investigation does not generally constitute a seizure under Terry, and more importantly, 25 does not implicate the Fourth Amendment. Under Terry, a 'detention' occurs when a "police 26 officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 27 1, 16 (1968); see also People v. Santos, 2003 Guam 1, '152 (Sup. Ct. Guam 2003) The Court of 28 Appeals in Michigan found the determining factor in assessing whether a "detention is too long
Page 3 of5 in duration to be justified as an investigatory stop is whether the police were diligently pursuing 2 a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions" "'-=-~-=--'-'- 3 Chambers, 489 N.W.2d 168, 125, (1992). 4 Defendant urges the Court to rely on its ruling in People v. Santo, CM 0332-11, Superior l 5 Court of Guam, July 2, 2010. This Court abandons its ruling in Santos wherein it concluded 6 police officers have fifteen (15) minutes to make an arrest after the onslaught of probable cause 7 following an initial investigatory stop. This Court has not previously adhered to such analysis. 8 People v. Pascual CF 370-08, Superior Court of Guam, January 11,2010; People v. Tedtaotao, 9 CF 50-09, Superior Court of Guam, April 20, 2009.
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,. i \ , ,\
n IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF tmllT~~ i 3 Ii L
2 ) PEOPLE OF GUM1, ) CRIMINAL CASE NO. CM 1011-11 3 ) 4 vs. ) ) DECISION AND ORDER 5 ALVIN DELEON PAYUMO, ) (Motion to Suppress) Defendant. 6
8 Defendant filed a Notice of Motion on March 12, 2012 to have heard his Motion to 9 Suppress before the HONORABLE JUDGE ELIZABETH BARRETT-ANDERSON. 10 Defendant is represented by Assistant Public Defender Suresh Sampath. The People are 11 represented by Assistant Attorney General James C. Collins. The Court having ruled on the 12 legal issues presented by the motion heretofore, now therefore, pursuant to Rule CVR 7.1 (e)(1), 13 the Court decides this matter without further briefing or oral argument. Having considered the 14 briefs herein the motion is DENIED. 15
16 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 17 On September 26, 2011, at approximately 7:45 p.m., Officers of the Guam Police 18 Department (hereinafter "Officers") responded to an auto accident the Defendant (hereinafter 19 "Payumo") was involved in on Route 1, near Foremost. At the scene of the crash, Officers 20 investigated with Mr. Kawata Hiroko, who stated that her vehicle was struck from behind by a 21 second vehicle. Payumo was the operator of that vehicle. Payumo stated to the Officer "I'm 22 sorry ma'am, I was drinking. It's my fault." At approximately 7:55 p.m. Payumo agreed to 23 perform the Standardized Field Sobriety Test ("SFST"), which he failed. A test of his blood 24 alcohol content ("BAC") was administered with a reading of .147% BAC. Payumo was arrested 25 shortly after 7:55 p.m. There is no dispute as to these facts. On September 26, 2011, Payumo 26 was charged with 1) Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol, as a misdemeanor (BAC);
2) Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol, as a misdemeanor; and 3) Reckless Driving, 28 as a petty misdemeanor.
Page 1 of5 2
3 DISCUSSION 4 Payumo moves to suppress "any and all evidence" obtained by the Officers as a result of 5 an unlawful detention of his person in violation of 8 Guam Code Annotated § 30.10-30.60, 6 Guam's "Stop and Frisk" statute. Guam law provides that "[n]o person shall be detained under 7 the provisions of § 30.10 longer than is reasonable necessary to effect the purposes of that 8 section, and in no event longer than fifteen (15) minutes .... " 8 GCA § 30.30. Payumo argues 9 that he was detained more than the permitted fifteen (15) minutes, and therefore, the remedy for 10 violation should be suppression of any and all evidence seized. Payumo cites the Court to an 11 earlier decision of this Court in People v. Santos, CM 805-09 (Super. Ct. Guam July 2, 2010), 12 wherein this Court concluded the police officers had detained the defendant longer than 13 lawfully permitted under the facts of the case. For the following reason, the Court is abandoning 14 its mling in Santos based on the following analysis. 15 The purpose for Guam's "Stop and Frisk Act" is for 'investigatory stops' where the 16 police officer has reasonable suspicion that a person has, is, or is about to commit a criminal 17 offense. 8 G.C.A. §30.20. A police officer then has fifteen (15) minutes to ascertain the identity 18 of individual and determine the circumstances surrounding his presence. See §30.30. If probable 19 cause arises during the 'investigatory stop' the police officer is permitted to arrest the 20 individual. See §30AO The time limitation for the statute's 'brief detention' under section 30.10 21 no longer governs once probable cause has been formed. 22 At 7:55 a.m. on September 26, 2011, Officers responded to an auto accident of the 23 Defendant for an 'investigatory stop' because he was reported to have read ended another 24 vehicle. The Officers requested Payumo to submit to the SFST based on the reasonable 25 suspicion Defendant was Driving under the Influence of Alcohol. Sometime after 7:55 p.m. the 26 Officers asked Payumo if he had consumed alcohol, to which he admitted to having dmnk beer. 27 Payumo failed the SFST and was subsequently arrested. During this investigatory stop, the 28 Officers had probable cause to arrest Payumo shortly after 7:55 p.m. based on his admission to
Page 2 of5 having drunk alcohol. Once probable cause is formed during the "investigatory stop", the fifteen 2 (15) minute time limit for purposes of section 30.1 0 no longer governed. The "investigatory 3 stop", then becomes a detention and need only pass constitutional muster against unreasonable 4 searches and seizures guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. 5 The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the application of a bright-line 6 time limit for Fourth Amendment detentions. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 7 (1985). Although having a 'bright-line' rule would be helpful in evaluating whether an 8 investigative detention is unreasonable, a police officer's common sense and judgment must 9 ultimately govern their conduct. In United States v. Place, the Court reasoned that "[ s]uch a 10 limit would undermine the equally important need to allow authorities to graduate their 11 responses to the demands of any particular situation." Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709, n.1 0 (1983). 12 The Guam legislature has provided clear framework for 'stops' for the purposes of section 13 30.30 and the facts in this case do not trigger its application. 14 Accordingly, this Court does not agree with Defendant's assertion that "all and any" 15 evidence from a detention should be suppressed under §30.60. Although the Court in Santos did 16 not address the suppression issue, the Court will do so now. Guam law provides that "[n]othing 17 seized by a peace officer in the search authorized by §30.50 [Weapons Search Permitted] shall 18 be admissible against any person in any court of this Territory unless both the detention and the 19 search which disclosed its existence was authorized by and conducted in compliance with the 20 provisions of this Chapter" 8 G.c.A. §30.60. In the present case, there is no evidence to 21 suppress from a search of the Defendant based on the following analysis. 22 A "detention" for purposes of section 30.30 is limited to ascertaining the identity of the 23 person and the circumstances surrounding his presence. See §30.20. A request for identification 24 and investigation does not generally constitute a seizure under Terry, and more importantly, 25 does not implicate the Fourth Amendment. Under Terry, a 'detention' occurs when a "police 26 officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 27 1, 16 (1968); see also People v. Santos, 2003 Guam 1, '152 (Sup. Ct. Guam 2003) The Court of 28 Appeals in Michigan found the determining factor in assessing whether a "detention is too long
Page 3 of5 in duration to be justified as an investigatory stop is whether the police were diligently pursuing 2 a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions" "'-=-~-=--'-'- 3 Chambers, 489 N.W.2d 168, 125, (1992). 4 Defendant urges the Court to rely on its ruling in People v. Santo, CM 0332-11, Superior l 5 Court of Guam, July 2, 2010. This Court abandons its ruling in Santos wherein it concluded 6 police officers have fifteen (15) minutes to make an arrest after the onslaught of probable cause 7 following an initial investigatory stop. This Court has not previously adhered to such analysis. 8 People v. Pascual CF 370-08, Superior Court of Guam, January 11,2010; People v. Tedtaotao, 9 CF 50-09, Superior Court of Guam, April 20, 2009. 10 Even if Section 30.30 was violated, this Court finds that suppressIOn IS not an 11 appropriate remedy. The fifteen (15) minute limitation is a statutory right prescribed by the 12 Guam legislature, not a constitutional right. The Fourth Amendment protects against 13 unreasonable searches and seizures applies pursuant to § 1421 b(c) of the Organic Act of Guam; 14 however, nothing in the Act incorporates the fifteen (15) minute limitation as a constitutionally- 15 afforded right to the people of Guam. In addition, Section 30.50 only applies to weapons search 16 and is inapplicable to the present case, as no weapons search occurred. Section 30.60 provides 17 the admissibility of seized evidence found in searches authorized by § 30.50 to be limited to 18 weapons searches. Since no weapons search occurred, this Court finds the suppression of 19 evidence not an appropriate remedy. Based on the foregoing analysis the Defendant's Motion to 20 Suppress is DENIED. 21 This matter is set for Criminal Trial Setting on JUNE ,+'--'*'~..fI 22 SO ORDERED 23 13 Judge, Superior Court of Guam 24
27 1 More specifically, this Court abandons its faulty logic in Decision & Order (July 2,2010) on existence of probable cause does not alter the time and place limitations of 8 G.C.A. §30.20" 28 the existence of probable cause does alter the time and place limitations of Section 30.20. Ifprobable cause is foun during the "investigatory stop", the exclusionary rule is not triggered even after the expiration of the fifteen (15) minute time limitation.
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