The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY April 30, 2026
2026COA32
No. 24CA1349, People v. Papol — Juvenile Court — Direct Filing in District Court
In this postconviction proceeding, a division of the court of
appeals considers, for the first time, whether certain statutory
processes for criminally prosecuting a juvenile in a district court
under the direct file statute in section 19-2-517(1)(a)(I), C.R.S.
2020 — such as a transfer hearing — are jurisdictional or
procedural. If the defendant is age eligible and the criminal
offenses for which the defendant is charged are enumerated in the
direct file statute — which is the case here — the division concludes
that the statutory requirements are procedural, not jurisdictional.
As a result, because the defendant in this case entered into a valid
plea agreement, he waived any error committed by the district
court. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2026COA32
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1349 El Paso County District Court No. 18CR5723 Honorable Robin Chittum, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
James Edward Papol,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE JOHNSON Pawar and Gomez, JJ., concur
Announced April 30, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Marixa Frias, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
K. Andrew Fitzgerald, Alternate Defense Counsel, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Some juveniles alleged to have violated the law may be
adjudicated only in juvenile court based on (1) their age at the time
of the alleged offense and (2) the offense they are alleged to have
committed. See § 19-2.5-801, C.R.S. 2025. But juveniles over a
certain age, who are alleged to have committed an enumerated
offense in the direct file statute, may be criminally prosecuted in
district court. See Howard v. People, 2020 CO 15, ¶¶ 1, 15, 17
(describing the various ways a juvenile may be criminally charged in
a district court). Because of this dual justice system, this case
presents the following question: Are the prerequisites in the direct
file statute for the prosecution initiating a criminal action against a
juvenile charged with an enumerated offense jurisdictional or
procedural?
¶2 The answer to this question is critical because, if the statutory
prerequisites in this scenario are procedural, then any errors
committed by a district court could be waived if, as is the case here,
the defendant entered into a plea agreement. See, e.g., Neuhaus v.
People, 2012 CO 65, ¶ 8 (“[A] ‘guilty plea represents a break in the
chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process’ and
waives all non-jurisdictional errors in the defendant’s conviction.”
1 (quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973))); see also
People v. Butler, 251 P.3d 519, 520 (Colo. App. 2010) (“A valid,
unconditional guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional objections,
including allegations that constitutional rights have been violated.”).
But if the prerequisites are jurisdictional — meaning the juvenile
court has exclusive jurisdiction over the case and a district court
may acquire jurisdiction only after the juvenile court satisfies the
statutory requirements — then a defendant may raise the district
court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction at any time, even, as here,
in a postconviction proceeding. See, e.g., People v. Sandoval, 2016
COA 57, ¶ 47 (“[A] court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction may
not be waived and can be raised at any time in a proceeding,
including for the first time on appeal.”).
¶3 In this case, defendant, James Edward Papol (Papol), appeals
the postconviction court’s order denying his request under Crim. P.
35(a) and (c) to set aside his plea agreement and vacate his criminal
conviction on grounds that the district lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over his case. In 1988, when he murdered the victim,
M.V., Papol was fifteen years old. But as a cold case, the
prosecution did not file charges against Papol until 2018. The
2 prosecution filed the case in district court, but Papol argued it
should have been filed in juvenile court and that, as a result of this
error, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his
criminal case. The district court, as well as the postconviction
court, disagreed with Papol, finding that the 1988 direct file statute,
in effect at the time of the murder, applied — which permitted the
direct filing of criminal charges against juveniles fourteen years old
and older — and therefore his case had been properly filed in
district court.
¶4 We agree with Papol that his case should have been filed in
juvenile court based on the 2012 direct file statute. But we
disagree with him that the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over his case. Based on Papol’s age and the offense he
committed, his case was eligible for transfer from the juvenile court
to the district court under the 1988 direct file statute, so any error
in failing to file in juvenile court — and the absence of a transfer
hearing — was procedural rather than jurisdictional. This is
because, as we discuss in further detail below, Colorado district
courts have general jurisdiction over criminal cases, and the
General Assembly cannot limit that constitutionally derived
3 jurisdiction after it has granted it. See Colo. Const. art. VI, § 9(1);
Garcia v. Dist. Ct., 403 P.2d 215, 218 (Colo. 1965). As a result,
upon entry of his valid plea agreement, Papol waived the claim that
his criminal case was incorrectly filed in district court. Therefore,
we affirm the postconviction court’s order, albeit on different
grounds. See People v. Thompson, 2020 COA 117, ¶ 55 n.7.
I. Background
¶5 M.V. was sexually assaulted and murdered in 1988. Although
law enforcement recovered DNA evidence from M.V.’s body, the
initial investigation did not lead to any arrests. Almost thirty years
later in 2018, using updated technology, an analyst with the
Colorado Springs Police Department developed a DNA profile from
the evidence previously recovered that matched Papol’s DNA. As
mentioned, he was fifteen in 1988.
¶6 Papol was charged with first degree murder, among other
offenses. The prosecution originally filed Papol’s case in juvenile
court but dismissed it shortly thereafter. The prosecution then filed
this action in district court under section 19-2-805(1)(a), C.R.S.
1988. The 1988 statute stated that a “juvenile may be charged by
the direct filing of an information in the district court or by
4 indictment only when . . . [t]he juvenile is fourteen years of age or
older and is alleged to have committed a class 1 felony.” Id.
(emphasis added).
¶7 As relevant here, the direct file statute was significantly
amended in 2010 and 2012 in three ways. First, the General
Assembly increased the minimum age required for direct filing in
district court from fourteen to sixteen years of age for juveniles
alleged to have committed a class 1 or class 2 felony. Ch. 264, sec.
1, § 19-2-517(1)(a)(I), 2010 Colo. Sess. Laws 1199. Contrast § 19-2-
517(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2009, with § 19-2-517(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2010.1
Second, it eliminated direct filing for juveniles fourteen or fifteen
years of age. Ch. 128, sec. 1, § 19-2-517(b)-(c), 2012 Colo. Sess.
Laws 440-41. And finally, it allowed a juvenile whose case was
direct filed in district court to request a reverse-transfer hearing to
1 The General Assembly repealed and relocated the juvenile statute
in 2021. Ch. 136, secs. 1-2, 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws 557-773. The previous section 19-2-517(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2020, is now codified at section 19-2.5-801(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2025. See Sec. 2, § 19-2.5- 801(1)(a)(I), 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws 613.
5 determine whether the case should be transferred to juvenile court.
Id. at 441; see § 19-2-517(3)(a), C.R.S. 2012.2
¶8 Papol argued below that the 2012 amendments governed in
his case and requested a reverse-transfer hearing, which the district
court denied. He then filed a motion to dismiss his case for lack of
statutory authority, arguing that the 1988 statute did not apply and
that, because he was fifteen at the time of the alleged offense, his
case had to be filed in juvenile court. The prosecutor opposed the
motion, arguing that the 1988 statute applied and, therefore, that
Papol’s case was eligible for direct filing in district court. The court
denied that motion as well.
¶9 The parties reached a disposition in which Papol pled guilty to
second degree murder, aggravated robbery, and four crime of
violence sentence enhancer counts, with a stipulated sentencing
range of forty to sixty years in prison. The district court sentenced
him to a total of sixty years in the custody of the Department of
Corrections with five years of parole.
2 Based on the statute’s 2021 repeal and relocation, section 19-2-
517(3)(a), C.R.S. 2020, is now codified at section 19-2.5-801(4)(a), C.R.S. 2025.
6 ¶ 10 In 2023, Papol filed postconviction motions for relief under
Crim. P. 35(a) and (c), arguing, among other issues, that the district
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear his case because of
the 2012 amendments to the direct file statute. The postconviction
court denied the motions, holding that the district court had
jurisdiction over Papol’s case.3 It reasoned that the 1988 direct file
statute applied because the date of the offense, not the date of the
filing of the charges, dictated which version of the statute applied.
Papol appeals only the postconviction court’s jurisdictional ruling.
II. Standard of Review
¶ 11 We review de novo a district court’s subject matter jurisdiction
determination when there is no factual dispute. People in Interest of
J.W. v. C.O., 2017 CO 105, ¶¶ 17-18. And we review de novo
questions of law, including a court’s statutory interpretation. Id.
III. Analysis
¶ 12 Papol contends that the postconviction court erred by
concluding that the 1988 version of the direct file statute applied
3 The postconviction court determined that Papol’s jurisdictional
challenge was not a challenge to his sentence under Crim. P. 35(a) and resolved the issue under Rule 35(c).
7 and, consequently, argues that the district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over his case. We agree with the postconviction
court’s conclusion that the district court had subject matter
jurisdiction over Papol’s case, but we disagree with how it arrived at
that determination.
¶ 13 The analytical rubric matters in this case for two reasons.
First, the postconviction court incorrectly relied on People v.
Godinez, 2018 COA 170M, ¶ 20 — in which a division of this court
concluded that the 2012 amendments to the direct file statute do
not apply retroactively — for purposes of holding that the 1988
statute applied. Instead, we conclude that the 2012 direct file
statute applies. And second, district courts have general
jurisdiction over criminal matters, and the mechanism by which a
juvenile’s case is transferred to the district court or reverse-
transferred from a district court to the juvenile court is procedural,
not jurisdictional, if the juvenile’s age and the enumerated offense
charged are within the scope of the direct file statute.
A. The 2012 Direct File Statute Applies to Papol’s Case
¶ 14 In analyzing Papol’s jurisdictional claim, the postconviction
court first determined that the 1988 version of the direct file statute
8 applied. It did so by applying the reasoning in Godinez. In that
case, the division held that the 2012 amendments to the statute
were not ameliorative or amendatory legislation and thus should
not be applied retroactively under People v. Stellabotte, 2018 CO 66,
¶ 3. Godinez, ¶ 28. Because the postconviction court held that the
1988 version of the direct file statute applied to Papol’s case, it
concluded that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction.
¶ 15 The Attorney General asserts that the postconviction court’s
analysis is correct and that the prosecution had authority to direct
file charges against Papol in the district court (because he was
fourteen years old or older and charged with a class 1 felony).
Papol, however, contends that the 2012 version of the direct file
statute should have applied because his case was filed in 2018, well
after the 2012 revisions (which allowed direct filing of charges only
if the juvenile was sixteen or older). He further contends that the
postconviction court erred in relying on Godinez because its
analysis on retroactivity does not apply to his situation. We agree
with Papol on both points.
¶ 16 Papol relies on Bostelman v. People, 162 P.3d 686, 690 (Colo.
2007), for both contentions. We acknowledge that, in criminal law,
9 the “general rule is that the date of the offense governs the
applicable statute to be applied in charging the offense.” Id.; see
also People v. Woodward, 11 P.3d 1090, 1093 (Colo. 2000)
(concluding that the statute in effect at the time of the offense
controls); People v. Marlott, 552 P.2d 491, 494 (Colo. 1976)
(requiring a criminal defendant to be sentenced under the statute in
effect at the time the offense was committed).
¶ 17 But Bostelman does not resolve the precise question here.
That case did not address the application of two different versions
of the direct file statute in a particular case. Rather, Bostelman
focused on interpreting section 19-2-517(1)(a)(V), C.R.S. 2005 —
which provided that “[a] juvenile may be charged by the direct filing
of an information in the district court or by indictment only
when . . . [t]he juvenile is fourteen years of age or older [and] has
allegedly committed a delinquent act that constitutes a felony”
(emphases added) — to determine whether the age of the juvenile at
the time the offense occurred or at the time the charges were filed
governed. Although the case is not helpful to directly resolve the
question presented here, it directs one critical aspect of our
analysis: The supreme court held that “[a] juvenile’s age at the time
10 the delinquent act occurs . . . determines whether the prosecution
can file directly charges in district court.” Bostelman, 162 P.3d at
692. In other words, it is not the juvenile’s age when the
prosecution files charges that governs but the juvenile’s age when
the delinquent act occurred.
¶ 18 Because the postconviction court agreed that Bostelman did
not resolve the issue, it turned to Godinez to resolve whether the
2012 amendments to the direct file statute applied. Godinez held
that the 2012 amendments to the direct file statute were not
ameliorative, amendatory legislation subject to retroactive
application. Godinez, ¶ 28. As a result, the postconviction court in
this case concluded that the 1988 statute controlled.
¶ 19 We again agree with Papol that the postconviction court
misapplied Godinez to conclude that the 2012 statute should not be
applied to his case.
¶ 20 Godinez dealt with a juvenile defendant’s case that was direct
filed under section 19-2-517(1)(b), C.R.S. 2011, allowing the
prosecution to file charges in district court against a fourteen- or
fifteen-year-old for certain enumerated offenses. The 2012
amendments to the direct file statute eliminated that provision, so
11 the prosecution, under the new law, could direct file an action in
district court only if the juvenile was sixteen years of age or older
and charged with certain enumerated offenses. See § 19-2-
517(1)(a), C.R.S. 2012. The 2012 amendments went into effect a
few months after the juvenile’s case was filed. The juvenile argued
that the amendments applied retroactively, entitling him to a
reverse-transfer hearing under section 19-2-517(3), C.R.S. 2012.
Godinez, ¶ 4.
¶ 21 Godinez, ¶ 20, first relied on the axiomatic principle that
legislation is “presumed to have prospective application unless the
General Assembly expresses a contrary intent.” People v. Talley,
934 P.2d 859, 860 (Colo. App. 1996). This means that “[l]egislation
is applied prospectively when it operates on transactions that occur
after its effective date, and retroactively when it operates on
transactions that have already occurred or [on] rights and
obligations that existed before its effective date.” Godinez, ¶ 21
(quoting Ficarra v. Dep’t of Regul. Agencies, 849 P.2d 6, 11 (Colo.
1993)).
¶ 22 But Godinez, ¶ 15, also acknowledged that the supreme court
had recently decided Stellabotte. That case held that “ameliorative,
12 amendatory legislation applies retroactively to non-final convictions
under section 18-1-410(1)(f), [C.R.S. 2025,] unless the amendment
contains language indicating it applies only prospectively.”
Stellabotte, ¶¶ 28-30, 38. The Godinez division, however, concluded
that the 2012 amendments were not “ameliorative, amendatory
legislation” as contemplated by Stellabotte. Godinez, ¶ 28 (quoting
Stellabotte, ¶ 3). As a result, the division concluded that the
juvenile was not entitled to the benefit of the 2012 amendments to
the direct file statute, meaning his case had been properly filed in
the district court under the law at the time the case was filed.
¶ 23 Whether we agree with Godinez’s outcome is irrelevant
because a Stellabotte analysis is applicable in situations where the
amendatory legislation “became effective at any time before the
conviction became final on direct appeal” under section 18-1-
410(1)(f). Stellabotte, ¶ 26. In other words, we agree with Papol
that the question of whether the 2012 amendments apply
retroactively as amendatory, ameliorative legislation to his case is
inapplicable because, although the offense for which he was
charged was committed in 1988, the prosecution had not yet filed
charges against him when the 2012 amendments were enacted.
13 Therefore, the default rule — that legislation applies prospectively to
transactions occurring after the effective date — entitles Papol to
the benefit of the 2012 amendments. See § 2-4-202, C.R.S. 2025;
Ficarra, 849 P.2d at 11.
¶ 24 The Attorney General disagrees, arguing that because the
murder occurred in 1988, the relevant “transaction” occurred before
2012. But the prosecution’s action to file charges against Papol did
not occur until 2018. We agree that the substantive law that
applies is the law in effect at the time the offense occurred. See
Edwards v. People, 129 P.3d 977, 984 n.7 (Colo. 2006) (“[A]
substantive rule is one that ‘alters the range of conduct or the class
of persons that the law punishes.’” (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin,
542 U.S. 348, 353 (2004))). But a law or rule is procedural when “it
regulates ‘only the manner of determining the defendant’s
culpability.’” Id. at 984 (quoting Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 353). In
the context of this case, when (as discussed below) the changes to
the statute affected only the manner in which Papol could be
charged with a criminal offense and not whether he could be
charged at all, the 2012 amendments were procedural. Therefore,
the 2012 direct file statute applies to Papol’s case.
14 ¶ 25 For these reasons, the postconviction court erred by relying on
Godinez to determine that the 1988 direct file statute applied.
Because the 2012 amendments govern — and Bostelman, 162 P.3d
at 692, tells us that the age when the delinquent committed the
alleged crime, not when the prosecution filed charges, controls —
the prosecution should have filed Papol’s case in juvenile court
under section 19-2-517(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2012, since Papol was fifteen
in 1988. But this determination does not end our inquiry. We next
turn to Papol’s claim that the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction.
B. The District Court Had Subject Matter Jurisdiction
¶ 26 We start by revisiting Godinez’s analysis dealing with
jurisdiction. In addition to contending that the 2012 amendments
retroactively applied to him, the juvenile in Godinez also argued
that the district court had been divested of jurisdiction over his case
when the General Assembly increased the direct filing age for
juveniles from fourteen to sixteen years or older. Godinez, ¶ 19.
¶ 27 But the division rejected this argument, holding that
“[a]mending procedures by which jurisdiction is obtained is not the
same as removing jurisdiction entirely,” id. at ¶ 24, because the
15 “district court’s subject matter jurisdiction over [certain-aged]
defendants does not derive from the direct-file statute,” but rather
from the state’s constitution, id. at ¶ 23. See Colo. Const. art. VI,
§ 9(1) (“The district courts shall be trial courts of record with
general jurisdiction, and shall have original jurisdiction in all civil,
probate, and criminal cases, except as otherwise provided” in the
constitution. (emphasis added)).
¶ 28 Papol is not entirely wrong that, in some instances, the district
court may not have subject matter jurisdiction over a juvenile. But
this principle is more nuanced than it may appear at first blush. As
we discuss below, if the prosecution files a juvenile’s case in district
court and the juvenile is not age eligible or the offense is not an
enumerated offense in the direct file statute for which the juvenile is
charged, the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the
action because the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction over
certain aged juveniles for nonenumerated offenses. To put this in
context, we first turn to Sandoval, ¶¶ 16-17, which provided a
historical overview of Colorado’s direct file statute in the Children’s
Code.
16 ¶ 29 Sandoval noted that Colorado was a pioneer in creating a
juvenile justice system, with the county courts in the 1960’s having
jurisdiction of “delinquent children” aged sixteen years or younger
who violated state or municipal laws, except for Denver, which had
a separate juvenile court under the state constitution. Id. at ¶ 25
(quoting Ch. 85, secs. 1-2, 1903 Colo. Sess. Laws 178-79). In 1963,
voters passed a constitutional amendment that went into effect in
1965, “vest[ing] the district courts with original jurisdiction in ‘all
civil, probate, and criminal cases.’” Id. at ¶ 26 (quoting Ch. 313,
sec. 1, 1963 Colo. Sess. Laws 1050). The General Assembly
enacted implementing legislation in 1964, ostensibly giving the City
and County of Denver Juvenile Court “exclusive jurisdiction” over
cases in which a child was under sixteen years of age and charged
with a “crime of violence punishable by death or life imprisonment.”
Id. at ¶ 27 (quoting Ch. 46, sec. 3(3), 1964 Colo. Sess. Laws 438).
¶ 30 The supreme court recognized that “it has long been the rule
that the Denver Juvenile Court . . . has exclusive jurisdiction, for
example, in delinquency and dependency matters.” Garcia, 403
P.2d at 219. But it nonetheless invalidated the 1964 statute
because “the General Assembly’s attempted grant of exclusive
17 jurisdiction to the juvenile court over crimes charged against
children under sixteen was unconstitutional.” Sandoval, ¶ 28
(emphasis added) (citing Garcia, 403 P.2d at 218). Garcia reasoned
that the 1964 statute conflicted with the constitution’s general
grant of jurisdiction to district courts in all criminal cases. 403
P.2d at 218; see Sandoval, ¶ 28.
¶ 31 The General Assembly responded to Garcia by passing a new
law in 1967 that provided exclusive jurisdiction to the juvenile court
over proceedings involving juveniles — children between ten and
seventeen years old — who could be adjudicated delinquent by
violating a state or federal law, instead of being prosecuted for
crimes. Sandoval, ¶ 29 (“[T]he 1967 statute referred to violations of
law by children, rather than crimes.”). The 1967 legislation was a
precursor to the 2012 direct file statute, allowing a child to be
charged with a felony only if “(1) the juvenile court certified the
child to be held for criminal proceedings in the district court or (2) a
child sixteen years of age or older was charged in district court with
a crime of violence punishable by death or life imprisonment.” Id.
at ¶ 30 (citing Ch. 443, sec. 1, § 22-1-4(4)(a)-(b), 1967 Colo. Sess.
Laws 997).
18 ¶ 32 The supreme court upheld the 1967 legislation in People ex rel.
Terrell v. District Court, 435 P.2d 763, 766 (Colo. 1967). We pause
for a moment to discuss Terrell because it is important to
understand that, in that case, when the supreme court used the
word “jurisdiction,” it meant that the district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over that juvenile’s case. We provide a more
detailed explanation of Terrell below to demonstrate that it is not
contrary to our holding today.
¶ 33 In Terrell, the juvenile, who was fifteen at the time of the
alleged offense, was charged in the district court with assault with a
deadly weapon. Id. The juvenile filed a motion to dismiss,
requesting that his case be transferred or dismissed on the basis
that “because of his age, the only proceeding which could be
brought against him was [a] delinquency proceeding in the [juvenile
court].” Id. at 764. The court in Terrell determined that the 1967
statute barring juveniles sixteen or younger from being prosecuted
with felonies was constitutional because the General Assembly “has
the power to create and define crimes, subject of course to any
applicable constitutional limitations.” Id. at 765. And “[a]s a
corollary, the [General Assembly] may within reasonable limits fix
19 the age below which there can be no criminal responsibility.” Id.
Thus, the court held that the statute was inapplicable because the
juvenile in Terrell was fifteen at the time the offense occurred, and
“the legislative intent was that a child under sixteen years of age
under no circumstance was to be charged with the commission of
a felony.” Id. at 765-66. In other words, the juvenile in Terrell
could only be adjudicated delinquent for what the 1967 law and
Sandoval referred to as his “violations of law.” Sandoval, ¶ 29
(emphasis omitted). This meant the district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over his case.
¶ 34 Sandoval elaborated on the distinction between the juvenile
court having subject matter jurisdiction over delinquent acts and
the district court having subject matter jurisdiction over criminal
prosecutions. There, the issue was whether a juvenile’s case was
improperly direct filed in district court because the offense for
which the juvenile was charged was not enumerated, and he was
fifteen at the time the offense occurred. Id. at ¶ 19 (stating that the
parties conceded, and the division agreed, that neither of the
offenses for which the juvenile was charged were crimes of violence
20 as enumerated in the direct file statute in effect when the offenses
occurred).
¶ 35 The Sandoval division reasoned that the district court’s
“jurisdiction over direct file cases against juveniles constitutes
subject matter jurisdiction,” while the district court “lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over cases involving juveniles who have
committed delinquent acts.” Id. at ¶ 53. A district attorney “may
invoke a district court’s subject matter jurisdiction over enumerated
types of cases under the direct file statute,” and “[b]ecause direct
file cases charge crimes, as opposed to delinquent acts, the
enumerated crimes constitute a class or type of criminal cases and
thus fall within the district courts’ subject matter jurisdiction.” Id.
¶ 36 Papol’s argument that the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction in his case depends, in part, on his view that
jurisdiction was not “invoked” because the statutory prerequisites of
the direct file statute were not satisfied. This position appears to be
supported by language in Sandoval that says, “When the [district
court]’s jurisdiction over a case under the direct file statute has not
been properly invoked, the subject matter of the case remains
21 within the exclusive jurisdiction of the [juvenile court] to adjudicate
delinquency proceedings.” Id. But the issue in Sandoval was
similar to the situation in Terrell: Because of the age of the juveniles
and because the offenses they were charged with were not
enumerated offenses in the direct file statutes in effect during the
relevant time periods, the juveniles could not be held criminally
liable for their conduct.
¶ 37 Sandoval was correct when it concluded that “the
jurisdictional defect ar[ose] from the type of case in which
jurisdiction was asserted,” id. at ¶ 54, meaning the juvenile in
Sandoval could only be adjudicated delinquent for his violation of
law in the juvenile court. In short, Terrell and Sandoval stand for
the legal proposition that a district court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over a case involving a juvenile’s violation of the law
that the General Assembly intended only to be subject to a
delinquency proceeding rather than a criminal case.
¶ 38 Papol’s situation is not the same as the juveniles’
circumstances in those cases. He acknowledges that, even under
the 2012 direct file statute, his case was eligible for transfer to the
district court. See § 19-2-518(1)(a)(I)(B), C.R.S. 2012 (stating that
22 upon filing a petition, a juvenile’s case could be transferred to
district court if the juvenile was “[f]ourteen years of age or older” at
the time of the commission of the alleged offense and was alleged to
have “committed a delinquent act that constitutes a felony”).4
Nonetheless, he contends that because he did not receive a transfer
hearing in juvenile court under section 19-2-518(1)(a)(I)(B)(II), the
juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction over his case, and the
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
¶ 39 We disagree. A juvenile’s request for, and a juvenile court’s
grant of, a transfer hearing — though important safeguards to
protect juveniles — are procedural mechanisms, not jurisdictional
prerequisites, for a juvenile’s case to be transferred to a district
court when the juvenile is age eligible and alleged to have
committed an offense enumerated in the direct file statute. In other
words, Papol’s situation did not require “invoking” the subject
matter jurisdiction of the district court because the 2012
amendments made his age and the offense for which he was
4 Based on the statute’s 2021 repeal and relocation, section 19-2-
518(1)(a)(I)(B), C.R.S. 2020, is now codified at section 19-2.5- 802(1)(a)(I)(B), C.R.S. 2025.
23 charged eligible for transfer to district court for criminal
prosecution. The General Assembly’s passage of the 2012
amendments contemplated that juveniles similarly situated to Papol
could be adjudicated delinquent for a violation of the law in juvenile
court or could be prosecuted for, and convicted of, a crime in
district court based on his age and the charged offense. In this
particular situation, the court’s compliance with the statutory
requirements to transfer his juvenile case to district court is a
procedural safeguard, not a jurisdictional prerequisite, under
section 19-2-517(1)(a), C.R.S. 2012.
¶ 40 Our holding is not intended to minimize the importance of the
procedural mechanisms the General Assembly has enacted to
protect juveniles being charged with criminal prosecutions. Indeed,
the prosecution should be aware that, if a juvenile’s case is direct
filed in district court and the juvenile is not both age eligible and
charged with an enumerated offense in the direct file statute, Terrell
and Sandoval compel a conclusion that the district court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over that action. But if the district court
already has subject matter jurisdiction by virtue of section 19-2-
517(1), C.R.S. 2020 (current version at § 19-2.5-801(1)), any error
24 relating to the district court’s or the juvenile court’s compliance
with section 19-2-518, C.R.S. 2020 (current version at § 19-2.5-
802, C.R.S. 2025), is procedural and does not affect the district
court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
C. Application to Papol’s Case
¶ 41 Because the 2012 amendments to the direct file statute apply,
Papol’s case should have been filed in juvenile court. But because
he was fifteen at the time of the alleged offense and he was charged
with a class 1 felony, the prosecutor could have sought to have his
case transferred to the district court under section 19-2-
518(1)(a)(I)(B), C.R.S. 2012. Therefore, the district court had
subject matter jurisdiction over his case by virtue of section 19-2-
517(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2012, which made Papol an eligible age to be
held criminally liable for first degree murder. And because this
error is procedural, not jurisdictional, we conclude that Papol
waived his claim when he voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently
entered into his plea agreement. See Neuhaus, ¶ 8; Butler, 251 P.3d
at 520.
25 ¶ 42 As a result, the postconviction court’s order denying Papol’s
request for postconviction relief is affirmed, albeit on different
grounds. See Thompson, ¶ 55 n.7.
IV. Conclusion
¶ 43 We affirm the postconviction court’s order.
JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.