People v. Pangelinan

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 2

3 THE PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) ) CRIMINAL CASE NO. CM0401-12 4 vs. ) 5 ) DECISION AND ORDER ENRIQUE PEREZ PANGELINAN, ) 6 ) 7 Defendant. )

8 INTRODUCTION 9 This matter came before the Honorable James L. Canto II on the Defendant's motion to 10 suppress, filed September 27,2012. Oral arguments were heard on October 29,2012. Assistant 11 Attorney General Gabrielle L. Rossi, Esq. appeared on behalf of the Government and Assistant 12 Public Defender Suresh Sampath, Esq. represented Defendant. Having considered the parties' 13 briefs, oral arguments, and the applicable law, the Court now issues the following Decision and 14 Order. 15 BACKGROUND 16 Defendant is charged with driving under the influence of alcohol and reckless driving 17 based upon the following events. On April 21, 2012 at approximately 12:40 a.m., Guam Police 18 Officer John A. Bagaforo stopped Defendant's car when it almost hit his vehicle as it attempted 19 to make a left tum across Marine Corps. Drive. (Testimony of John A. Bagaforo, Record Log 20 at 2:34, Oct. 29, 2012.) Officer Bagaforo observed that Defendant had bloodshot, watery eyes 21 and smelled of alcohol. Id. He asked Defendant to participate in a standardized field sobriety 22 test. Id. Defendant failed the test when he could not keep his balance during the instructions of 23 the test. Id. Officer Bagaforo allowed Defendant to make two phone calls to a relative and a 24 friend who could pick up his vehicle and fishing gear. Id. and Testimony of Emique P. 25 Pangelinan, Record Log at 2:49, Oct. 29, 2012. Defendant was subsequently arrested at 1:10 26 a.m. (Testimony of John A. Bagaforo, Record Log at 2:34, Oct. 29, 2012.) 27 On September 27, 2012, Defendant moved to suppress all evidence obtained from the 28 investigative detention because it lasted longer than fifteen (15) minutes in violation of 8 GCA

Page 1 of8 § 30.30. Defendant asserts his initial detention was an unreasonable selzure and that all 2 evidence obtained during or as a result of the seizure must be suppressed. 3 The Government opposes suppression on the bases that: 1) the Defendant consented to 4 an extended detention when he participated in field sobriety tests; 2) probable cause to arrest 5 appeared before 15 minutes of alleged detention; and 3) suppression should be limited to 6 evidence obtained after 15 minutes of detention and before arrest. 7 DISCUSSION 8 1. The Stop and Frisk Statutes 9 The Fourth Amendment permits brief investigative detentions that are based upon a 10 reasonable suspicion of illegal conduct. People v. Johnson, 1997 Guam 9 ~ 4 (citing Terry v. 11 Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968)). This principle is codified in the "Stop and Frisk" 12 statutes at 8 GCA Chapter 30. See People v. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 ~ 40. 13

14 Title 8 GCA § 30.10 states: 15 Whenever a peace officer encounters any person under circumstances which reasonably indicate that such person has committed, is committing or is about to 16 commit a criminal offense, the peace officer may detain such person. 17 Title 8 GCA § 30.20 states: 18 Detention pursuant to § 30.10 shall be for the purpose of ascertaining the 19 identity of the person detained and the circumstances surrounding his presence abroad which lead the officer to believe that he had committed, was committing, 20 or was about to commit a criminal offense, but such person shall not be 21 compelled to answer any inquiry of the peace officer.

22 Title 8 GCA § 30.30 states: 23 No person shall be detained under the provisions of § 30.10 longer than is reasonably necessary to effect the purposes of that section, and in no event 24 longer than fifteen (15) minutes. Such detention shall not extend beyond the 25 place where it was first effected or the immediate vicinity thereof.

26 Title 8 GCA § 30.40 states: 27 If at any time after the onset of the detention authorized by § 30.10, probable cause for arrest of the person shall appear, the person shall be arrested. If after 28

2 8 an inquiry into the circumstances which prompted the detention, no probable cause for the arrest of the person shall appear, he shall be released. 2

3 Thus under Guam law, a police officer having a reasonable suspicion regarding criminal 4 activity by a particular individual may detain that person to investigate said suspected criminal 5 activity. 8 GCA §§ 30.10 & 30.20. When this investigative detention reveals probable cause 6 for arrest, "the person shall be arrested." 8 GCA § 30.40. However, "in no event [shall a 7 person be detained] longer than fifteen (15) minutes," and the person "shall be released," if no 8 probable cause for arrest appears. 8 GCA §§ 30.30 and 30.40. 9 In this case, the parties dispute the application and effect of the 15 minute time limit for IO investigative detentions. The Government argues that any appearance of probable cause to II arrest within 15 minutes removes the need to apply the time limitation. Alternatively, the 12 Government contends that any suppression applies only to evidence obtained after 15 minutes 13 and before arrest. Defendant asserts that if he is not arrested or released within 15 minutes 14 pursuant to the Stop and Frisk statutes, then all evidence from the investigative detention must 15 be suppressed unless it comes from an independent source. 16

17 2. Violation of the IS-Minute Time Limit 18 a. Meaning of the "Stop and Frisk" Act. 19 Title 8 GCA Chapter 30 and the IS-minute time limit are derived from former Penal 20 Code Sections 735 through 736.4. See 8 GCA § 30.10, COMMENT; Guam Pub. L. 10-99 (June 21 19, 1969). Former Sections 735 through 736.4 were enacted as original statutes and without 22 any statement of legislative findings or intent. P.L. 10-99. There is an absence of controlling 23 authority to interpret the 15 minute time limit. 1 Without clear legislative intent or authority to 24

25 I For example, Guam law does not explicitly discredit any detention beyond the time limit nor does it converse I 26 hold that the time limit is merely a guide for law enforcement. Compare Florida v. Royer, 460, U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325 (1983) ("[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary t 27 effectuate the purpose of the stop."), and Us. v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575 (1985) ("I assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider i 28 appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm 0

Page 3 of8 the contrary, the Court shall interpret the Stop and Frisk statutes according to their plain 2 meaning. See Guam Resorts, Inc. v. G. C Corporation, 2012 Guam 13 ~ 7 ("When the plain 3 reading of a statute is 'clear on its face' and yields to an unambiguous definition, we will not 4 look past that plain reading."); Castino v. G.C Corp., 2010 Guam 3 ~ 29 ("A plain reading 5 construction is appropriate where the statute lays out specific requirements and indicates exactly 6 what is necessary for compliance without ambiguous terms."); People v. Lau, 2007 Guam 4 ~~

7 11-14. 8 An examination of the plain language of the IS-minute time limit within the context of 8 9 GCA Chapter 30 does not reveal ambiguity or absurd and unworkable consequences. See 10 Sumitomo Const., Co., Ltd. v. Government of Guam, 2001 Guam 23 ~ 17; People v. Flores, 11 2004 Guam 18 ~ 18. The Stop and Frisk statutes state that a person shall be detained, "in no 12 event longer than fifteen (15) minutes." 8 GCA § 30.30. If probable cause to arrest appears, "at 13 any time after the onset of the detention ... the person shall be arrested." 8 GCA § 30.40. If 14 probable cause does not appear, "he shall be released." ld. This language clearly contemplates 15 that any investigative detention must end by arrest or release within 15 minutes. Even where 16 probable cause to arrest appears within 15 minutes of detention, the plain language of 8 GCA § 17 30.30 does not allow the detention to continue beyond 15 minutes. When a person is detained 18 without arrest for more than 15 minutes, although probable cause to arrest may appear, the Stop

19 and Frisk statutes are violated. 20 To posit that probable cause arising before the expiration of 15 minutes somehow 21 negates the statute's time limit is to say that an officer may detain an individual indefinitely 22 without an arrest just because probable cause arose within the first 15 minutes. This would be 23 an illogical reading of the statute that subverts its entire purpose, and one which this Court 24 cannot reasonably adopt. The Guam Legislature has apparently narrowed the ability of any 25

27 dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant."), with Us. v. Place,46? U.S. 696, 709 n.IO, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2646 (1983) ("We understand the desirability of providing law enforcemen 28 authorities with a clear rule to guide their conduct. Nevertheless, we question the wisdom of a rigid time limitation.

Page 4 of8 officer to graduate an investigative detention according to the demands of a particular situation, 2 as the U.S. Supreme Court might otherwise afford in the absence of an explicit time limit. 3 Based upon the plain meaning of the Stop and Frisk statutes, the Court holds that an 4 investigative detention must cease by arrest or release within 15 minutes of its initiation? 5 The Government argues that Defendant's voluntary consent to undergo a Standardized 3 6 Field Sobriety Test vitiates the effect of8 GCA § 30.30, tolling the IS-minute clock. However, 7 the plain language of the statute is inescapable. It states in pertinent part: "No person shall be 8 detained ... longer than is reasonably necessary to effect the purposes of [Section 30.10], and in 9 no event longer than fifteen (15) minutes. 8 GCA § 30.30 (emphasis added). This 10 unconditional language unequivocally imparts that no circumstance may serve as an exception 11 to the time limit, be it exigency or even an express waiver by the detainee. 12 b. Application to the Facts of this Case. 13 In order to apply this rule to the present case, the Court must further examine the 14 difference between an investigative detention and an arrest. Under Guam law, "a person has 15 been seized under the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding 16 the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." Cundiff, 17 2006 Guam 12 at ~ 21 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 18 1877 (1980)). An investigative detention under 8 GCA Chapter 30 is consistent with a Fourth 19 Amendment seizure. See e.g. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 at ~ 40; Terry, 392 U.S. at 16 ("It must be 20 recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to 21 walk away, he has 'seized' that person."). For this reason, an investigative detention occurs 22 when a reasonable person would believe he is not free to leave under the circumstances. 23

24 Such a limit would undennine the equally important need to allow authorities to graduate their responses to th demands of any particular situation."). 25 2 The Court recognizes this law's possibly impairing effect upon meaningful law enforcement investigatio technique; however, this Court is duty-bound to administer the law as the Legislature intended and may do no more 26 The only alternative is for the Legislature to re-examine whether the statute indeed withstands an effectiv application to real-world circumstances within the reasonable balance between individual liberty interests and th 27 Government's law enforcement interests. 3 See generally, People v. Santos, 1999 Guam 1 ~~ 33-37; People v. Chargualaf, 2001 Guam 1 ~~ 14-15 28

Page 5 of8 Guam law defines an arrest as, "an actual restraint of the person, or. .. submission to the 2 custody of the person making the arrest." 8 GCA § 20.10. An officer must announce the arrest 3 pursuant to 8 GCA § 20.25, but the declaration is not an absolute requirement for a lawful arrest 4 based upon probable cause. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 at ,,35-36 and 25-26 (quoting People v. 5 Maddox, 294 P.2d 6, 9 (Cal. 1956); and Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225 6 (1964)). Any physical restraint that curtails movement constitutes an arrest. Id. at" 19-20 7 (quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 67, 88 S.Ct. 1889 (1968)).4 Even without physical 8 restraint, a severely intrusive detention may constitute an arrest. Id. at " 21-22 (quoting 9 Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216, 99 S.Ct. 2248 (1979) (custodial interrogation is an 10 arrest and requires probable cause)). 11 In this case, Officer Bagaforo stopped Defendant's car at approximately 12:40 a.m. 12 because Defendant turned in front of and almost collided with the Officer's vehicle. A traffic 13 stop is, "unquestionably a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." People v. 14 Rasauo, 2011 Guam 1 ,26 (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436-439 (1984)). See 15 also People v. Chargualaf, 2001 Guam 1 , 17. Under the circumstances of a traffic stop, 16 Defendant was detained pursuant to 8 GCA Chapter 30 because he could not reasonably believe 17 that he was free to disregard Officer Bagaforo and drive away. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 18 554 (no detention if person can disregard and walk away). Defendant was not physically 19 restrained or interrogated under custody until 1:10 a.m. when he was formally arrested. The 20 detention lasted approximately thirty minutes before it ended with an arrest. For this reason, the 21 investigative detention violated the 15-minute time limit of the Stop and Frisk statutes. 22

23 3. The Exclusionary Remedy 24 The Stop and Frisk statutes do not provide an explicit remedy for a person who 25 detained by law enforcement for more than 15 minutes. See 8 GCA Chapter 30. However, an 26

27 " Cf People v. 2007 Guam 8 ~, People v. 2003 Guam 1 ~ 51 (police custody ultimatel 28 detennined by use restraint comparable to fonnal arrest).

Page 6 ofS unreasonable investigative detention implicates the Fourth Amendment under Guam law. See 2 e.g. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 at ~ 40; Chargualaf, 2001 Guam 1 at ~ 20 ("[T]he Fourth 3 Amendment is only at issue where the police detain or seize an individual while posing 4 investigative questions.") (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324 5 (1983)). When the Fourth Amendment is violated by an unlawful seizure or investigative 6 detention, evidence obtained during the detention must be suppressed pursuant to the 7 exclusionary rule. See e.g. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 at ~ 51; Terry, 392 U.S. at 13-15. Evidence 8 that is obtained during or derived from an unlawful detention must be suppressed pursuant to 9 the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 at ~ 41 (citing Wong Sun v. JO United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); People v. Santos, 2003 Guam 1 ~ 64).5 On this basis, the II Court shall apply the ordinary exclusionary rule and fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to the 12 Stop and Frisk statutes and suppress all evidence obtained or derived from an unlawful 13 detention that exceeds the time limit; specifically meaning any and all evidence obtained during 14 the entire detention, and not just that evidence obtained after the 15-minute time limit has 15 elapsed. 16 In this case, the unlawful Stop and Frisk detention ended when Defendant was arrested 17 at 1: 10 a.m. All evidence obtained during the unlawful detention shall be suppressed pursuant 18 to the exclusionary rule. After the arrest at 1: 10 a.m., it appears that the police did not collect 19 further evidence and Defendant does not move to suppress any particular evidence obtained 20 after the arrest. 6 For this reason, the Court shall decline to conduct an analysis of the evidence 21 obtained after the arrest until such evidence is presented and the matter is ripe for adjudication. 22

23 5 See also Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442-443, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2508 (1984) ("The core rationale consistentl 24 advanced by this Court for extending the exclusionary rule to evidence that is the fruit of unlawful police conduc has been that this admittedly drastic and socially costly course is needed to deter police from violations 0 25 constitutional and statutory protections. This Court has accepted the argument that the way to ensure suc protections is to exclude evidence seized as a result of such violations notwithstanding the high social cost of lettin 26 persons obviously guilty go unpunished for their crimes. On this rationale, the prosecution is not to be put in a bette position than it would have been in if no illegality had transpired."). 27 6 The Government presented no evidence beyond the arrest at 1: 10 a.m., possibly because Defendant allegedl declined to participate in a blood, breath or urine test and declined to waive his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 38 28 U.S. 436 (1966). (People's Opposition, 2, Oct. 8,2012.)

Page 7 of8 See generally People v. Gay, 2007 Guam 11 ~ 8 (quoting u.s. v. Dibiase, 687 F.Supp. 38, 42 2 (D. Conn. 1988) ("an issue is not fit for judicial review when it involves contingent future 3 events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at alL") (internal quotations

4 omitted). 5 III 6 III 7 III 8 CONCLUSION 9 Based upon the foregoing, Defendant's motion to suppress is hereby GRANTED and all 10 evidence obtained from the onset of the detention and throughout the entire detention shall not

II be admissible against Defendant. 12

13 SO ORDERED this ~1S-rH day of December, 2012. 14

17 Judge, Superior Court of Guam 18

Page 8 of8