NOTICE: This order was filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2026 IL App (3d) 230371-U
Order filed March 6, 2026 ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 18th Judicial Circuit, ) Du Page County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-23-0371 v. ) Circuit No. 02-CF-2346 ) ADAM P. PALINSKI, ) Honorable ) Ann Celine O’Hallaren Walsh, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE DAVENPORT delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Peterson and Bertani concurred in the judgment. ____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: The court did not err in denying defendant’s postconviction petition.
¶2 Defendant, Adam P. Palinski, appeals from the denial of his postconviction petition
following a third-stage evidentiary hearing on his actual innocence claim. Defendant contends the
denial of his petition was manifestly erroneous where newly discovered evidence overwhelmingly
established an involuntary intoxication defense that was previously unavailable under Illinois law.
We affirm. ¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Defendant was charged on August 15, 2002, with solicitation of murder for hire (720 ILCS
5/8-1.2(a) (West 2002)) after a fellow inmate at the Du Page County jail reported that defendant
intended to have a witness against him killed. He was arrested the following day. Defendant had
previously been arrested in March 2002 for an unrelated offense. The State produced numerous
recorded jail conversations at defendant’s jury trial. These conversations included discussions
about the method of killing, payment, soliciting funds for the payment, and reservations about
going forward with the plan. Defendant pursued an entrapment defense at trial. The jury rejected
his defense, and the trial court sentenced him to 24 years’ imprisonment. Defendant’s direct appeal
was unsuccessful. People v. Palinski, No. 2-04-0082 (2005) (unpublished order under Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 23). So was his 2006 petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2006)).
¶5 In May 2017, the circuit court granted defendant leave to file a successive postconviction
petition. Defendant’s petition raised an actual-innocence claim based on the affirmative defense
of involuntary intoxication, which was not legally available in his circumstances until 2006. See
People v. Hari, 218 Ill. 2d 275, 278 (2006) (recognizing, for the first time, that an involuntary
intoxication defense may be based on an unexpected and unwarned side effect of prescribed
medication). The court later dismissed the petition after second-stage postconviction proceedings.
¶6 The Second District reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. People v. Palinski,
2020 IL App (2d) 180341-U, ¶ 68. In doing so, the court held defendant had presented newly
discovered evidence for purposes of his claim. The court rejected the State’s argument that the
evidence was “not new in the sense that all of the actual facts existed at the time defendant engaged
in the acts that formed the basis of his convictions.” Id. ¶ 49. The court pointed out that the change
2 in relevant law did not occur until after defendant’s trial. Id. ¶ 48. Thus, at trial, the evidence
concerning defendant’s involuntary intoxication from prescription drugs was not relevant and,
therefore, could not have been discovered at that time. Id. ¶ 49.
¶7 At the evidentiary hearing, defendant’s mother, Susan Palinski, testified that in 1999 and
2000, defendant struggled with mental health issues including depression. Defendant began seeing
a psychiatrist. Susan attended an appointment with him where he was prescribed Paxil. She
testified neither she nor defendant were informed Paxil could cause manic episodes or lead to
delusions. Susan visited defendant in jail after his March 2022 arrest. At one visit, Susan recalled
defendant could not “follow a complete thought” or engage in a normal conversation with her. She
said defendant kept “going back and forth with different thoughts and *** interrupting us and
going on onto another tangent.” Susan received letters from defendant during his incarceration
which were “rambling,” “wordy,” and not cohesive. Defendant appeared to be losing weight, not
sleeping well, and unable to focus.
¶8 Defendant’s father, Paul Palinski, visited defendant in jail weekly after his March 2002
arrest. Paul testified defendant was unable to sleep well due to frightening dreams. Defendant
appeared thinner and pale. Defendant was frequently tired and “out of sorts” during visits. It was
difficult to converse with defendant because he would frequently change subjects, even within the
same sentence, and move from one unrelated topic to another in succession. His speech was very
rapid and difficult to understand, and he was fidgety and unable to stay still. Defendant appeared
to be very impulsive and delusional. He did not seem to appreciate the severity of his situation,
often discussing his post-release plans without explaining how he expected to be released.
¶9 James O’Donnell, a registered pharmacist, testified that selective serotonin reuptake
inhibitors (SSRIs), like Paxil, are designed to alleviate depression by increasing serotonin
3 availability in the brain. Paxil use could cause side effects, however, including insomnia, agitation,
increased anxiety, increased depression, violent behavior, and manic switching. Individuals
experiencing a manic episode are “on all the time,” potentially suffering delusions of grandeur and
unrealistic thoughts, and preoccupying themselves with unnecessary activities, depending on the
severity of the episode. Manic switching is more likely to occur in adolescents and young adults,
during the first few months of therapy, and when dosages are increased. Using Trazodone with
Paxil increases the risk of manic switching.
¶ 10 On reviewing defendant’s hospital and jail records, O’Donnell opined that defendant was
suffering from severe Paxil-induced mania. O’Donnell cited the jail physician’s documented signs
of and treatment for bipolar disorder, defendant’s reported behavior changes, and the known risk
factors. He noted defendant’s symptoms dissipated when his Paxil usage was discontinued. The
State cross-examined O’Donnell at length about his qualifications in pharmacology, his knowledge
about Paxil and other antidepressants, the degrees he held, prior lawsuits filed against him for
falsely advertising that he possessed a doctorate in pharmacology, and occasions where his expert
or opinion testimony was disallowed by various courts.
¶ 11 Dr. Wyma, a board-certified psychiatrist, testified he had previously evaluated defendant
in August 2012. In connection with his evaluation, Wyma reviewed defendant’s medical and
psychiatric records from the jail and an investigative report that summarized statements made by
defendant at the jail.
¶ 12 Wyma noted defendant’s mental health struggles before his incarceration for which he had
been prescribed Paxil. Wyma testified that numerous potential side effects existed for Paxil,
including mania. He described mania as a “mood state” of accelerated, expansive thinking that
may include more grandiose thinking, not appreciating the seriousness or limitations of one’s
4 actions, and “poor sleep, poor judgment, maybe more impulsivity.” After defendant’s arrival at the
jail, reports indicated Paxil helped his sleep but, as time progressed, defendant’s thinking became
more accelerated, his sleep decreased, and he experienced mild euphoria. The jail psychiatrist
increased defendant’s Paxil dosage and prescribed Trazodone to help him sleep. Wyma indicated
the risk of cycling into a manic state based on Trazodone was very minimal but the combination
of Trazodone with Paxil “would increase it some.”
¶ 13 Defendant’s medical reports from March to October 2002 documented various complaints
and behavioral notes, including difficulty sleeping, increased anxiety, increased energy, racing
thoughts, and pressured speech. On several occasions, the records indicated defendant reported
feeling “more stable” but occasionally felt “manicky.” Defendant was prescribed medication for
bipolar disorder. In July 2002, the records noted defendant was able to converse better and was
calmer. The next month, however, defendant complained of an inability to focus and feeling highly
excitable. In January 2003, defendant’s mood appeared to be stabilizing and in March 2003, he
reported feeling better after discontinuing the use of Paxil.
¶ 14 Wyma opined defendant was suffering from a “full-blown manic episode” by September
15, 2002, and it was possible the episode started as early as May 2002 based on reported symptoms.
Wyma testified mania could affect an individual’s ability to think, speak, and make decisions. He
explained that, commonly, a person experiencing mania has racing thoughts and, as a result,
becomes more impulsive because “you don’t have to think long[;] you have a thought and an action
just follows directly.” When asked whether defendant could conform his conduct to the law at the
time he made the incriminating statements, Wyma stated:
“[Mania] will affect somebody’s ability to do what they would normally do, adhere
to rules, adhere to people’s expectations of them. It will affect it. Does it stop it
5 completely or does it make it a lot tougher? Depends how far along the road you
go, but it is clearly known to decrease *** your ability to restrain yourself ***.”
He noted that a person suffering from mania is more susceptible to the power of suggestion.
¶ 15 Wyma testified he had not met defendant in person. He conducted his 2012 interview over
the telephone. Wyma stated he did not recall listening to the audio recordings of defendant’s jail
conversations. He reviewed written transcripts of the dialogue. Wyma clarified he believed
defendant experienced a manic episode which lasted several months while in jail “with some
variability up and down.” He indicated the August 2002 jail records containing defendant’s
complaints of feeling “manicky over the past three weeks” included a doctor’s note that defendant
did not believe he was experiencing any “real side effects to [the] meds.” When confronted with
the numerous conversations defendant had with multiple people at the jail from May to August
2002 regarding killing the witness, Wyma agreed the statements did not sound like impulsive
statements, but “sound[ed] like it had thought that went into it.” Wyma testified that once a person
starts down an impulsive path, “it may be a lot more difficult for that individual to know how to
contain that, even if, at that point, their mania may have quieted down.” The incriminating
statements, however, indicated an awareness of cause and effect.
¶ 16 The State played one recorded conversation from July 28, 2002, in which defendant stated
he could feign mental illness such as bipolar disorder or schizophrenia if necessary. Wyma had
not previously heard the audio recording of this conversation. Having only read the transcripts, he
was unaware of defendant’s speech patterns during his jail conversations. Wyma indicated
defendant was speaking at a normal rate of speed which, coupled with the content of his
conversation, could indicate malingering. He noted, however, the jail psychiatrist indicated no
6 concerns about malingering and defendant may have been making statements about feigning
mental illness because of grandiosity as opposed to malingering.
¶ 17 Wyma testified he did not believe defendant was in a constant manic state during the three
months he discussed killing the witness. Wyma nevertheless believed defendant could not conform
his conduct to the law because it may have been difficult for him to stop the plan when he was no
longer in his manic state. Wyma admitted he was speculating, however, because he had not spoken
enough with defendant.
¶ 18 Defendant testified he was first prescribed Paxil in April 2000. He was informed of possible
side effects but was not told Paxil could lead to a manic episode by any medical provider who
prescribed him Paxil. In May 2002, he began to feel “very agitated, very restless, and ***
manicky.” Defendant testified he developed a preoccupation with having the witness killed to
prevent his testimony. Defendant indicated that during these conversations, he experienced racing
thoughts and developed a preoccupation with organized crime, which was not something he had
experienced before his arrest. He denied having an elaborate plan to effectuate the killing.
Defendant testified his conversations had a surreal quality to them and did not feel like they had
any real consequences.
¶ 19 The court issued a written order denying defendant’s successive postconviction petition. In
so ruling, it found O’Donnell’s and Wyma’s opinion testimony not credible. The court concluded
O’Donnell was not qualified to render an opinion as to whether defendant was suffering from a
manic episode while incarcerated. It further concluded Wyma’s contention that defendant could
not conform his conduct to the law lacked sufficient support. It explained that Wyma did not speak
with defendant enough to be able to answer specific questions about defendant’s manic state, did
not meet with defendant in person, did not listen to the audio recordings of defendant’s
7 conversations which formed the basis of his solicitation-of-murder-for-hire conviction, and did not
offer support for his opinion that defendant was suffering from Paxil-induced mania such that he
could not conform his conduct to the law. The court found defendant had not met his burden to
show the evidence was sufficiently conclusive to change the result on retrial.
¶ 20 This appeal followed.
¶ 21 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 22 On appeal, defendant argues the court’s denial of his successive postconviction petition
was manifestly erroneous where the newly discovered evidence overwhelmingly established his
actual innocence through the previously unavailable involuntary intoxication defense.
¶ 23 Initially, we note that we ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs discussing whether
we were bound by the Second District’s determination that defendant had presented newly
discovered evidence to support his actual innocence claim. See Palinski, 2020 IL App (2d)
180341-U, ¶ 68. The law-of-the-case doctrine generally prohibits relitigation of an issue decided
in a prior appeal. People v. Oaks, 2012 IL App (3d) 110381, ¶ 18. This doctrine does not control,
however, when a higher reviewing court makes a contrary ruling on the same issue after the lower
court’s decision. People v. Anderson, 2015 IL App (2d) 140444, ¶ 27. Our order instructed the
parties to address the effect of People v. Taliani, 2021 IL 125891, a case involving a strikingly
similar actual-innocence claim, on the judgment in Palinski, 2020 IL App (2d) 180341-U.
¶ 24 At issue in Taliani was the denial of leave to file a second successive postconviction
petition. Taliani, 2021 IL 125891, ¶ 2. The defendant was convicted of first degree murder and
aggravated battery after he shot his girlfriend and her mother with a sawed-off shotgun, killing the
girlfriend and seriously injuring the mother. Id. ¶¶ 1, 6. In his second successive postconviction
petition, the defendant raised an actual-innocence claim based on the defense of involuntary
8 intoxication. Id. ¶ 45. He contended that while it was known at the time of trial he was taking
prescribed medication, it was not known that those medications, when taken together, could cause
heightened irritability, altered consciousness, and confusion. Id. ¶ 60. According to the defendant,
the fact he was taking the medication had taken on new significance after the supreme court, in
2006, recognized the defense of involuntary intoxication based on unwarned side effects of
prescription medication. Id.
¶ 25 In affirming the denial of leave to file a second successive postconviction petition, the
supreme court remarked, “A new defense is a new theory; it is not new evidence.” Id. ¶ 70. Out of
context, this remark might be understood to categorically bar actual-innocence claims that are
based on defenses that were not legally available at the time of trial. In context, however, we find
no reason to read so much into the court’s remark. Indeed, immediately following this remark, the
supreme court explained the defendant’s motion for leave failed because he had not attached any
affidavits or contemporary documentation to establish he was, in fact, involuntarily intoxicated. 1
Id. The mere availability of the new defense was not sufficient to meet the defendant’s burden of
presenting that evidence. Id. ¶ 72.
¶ 26 We conclude Taliani does not allow us to revisit whether defendant should have ever been
granted leave to file a successive petition. See Anderson, 2015 IL App (2d) 140444, ¶ 27. Here,
defendant submitted the evidence that was absent in Taliani. He submitted affidavits from himself,
his mother, and two physicians to support his claim that he was, in fact, involuntarily intoxicated.
1 As an aside, we note the Taliani court assumed for the sake of analysis that an actual-innocence claim can challenge the mens rea of the offense, as typical actual-innocence claims challenge the actus reus of the offense. Taliani, 2021 IL 125891, ¶ 66. This is a fairly important assumption that neither party comments on in this appeal. We nevertheless make the same assumption. 9 Those affidavits contained observations and opinions regarding defendant’s behavior around the
time of the offense. Accordingly, the Second District’s determination stands as the law of the case.
¶ 27 Having resolved this preliminary issue, we turn to the parties’ arguments. This appeal arises
from third-stage proceedings under the Act. At the third stage, a defendant’s allegations are no
longer presumed to be true. See People v. House, 2023 IL App (4th) 220891, ¶ 78. Instead, “the
trial court acts as a factfinder, making credibility determinations and weighing the
evidence.” People v. Reed, 2020 IL 124940, ¶ 51. The court’s findings regarding issues of
credibility and fact will not be reversed unless those findings are manifestly erroneous. Id.
Manifest error is error that is “clearly evident, plain, and indisputable.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) People v. Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 98.
¶ 28 “[T]o succeed on a claim of actual innocence, the defendant must present new, material,
noncumulative evidence that is so conclusive it would probably change the result on retrial.” Id.
¶ 96. Once the court concludes the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing was new,
material, and noncumulative, it must then “consider whether that evidence places the evidence
presented at trial in a different light and undercuts the court’s confidence in the factual correctness
of the guilty verdict.” Id. ¶ 97.
¶ 29 The parties focus their arguments on whether the evidence presented was so conclusive as
to probably change the result on retrial. Section 6-3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/6-
3 (West 2002)) provided: “A person who is in an intoxicated or drugged condition is criminally
responsible for conduct unless such condition is involuntarily produced and deprives him of
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct
to the requirements of law.” Unexpected side effects of prescription medications which a defendant
was not warned about falls within the scope of “an intoxicated or drugged condition” as defined
10 in section 6-3. Hari, 218 Ill. 2d at 291. The Second District previously found the record positively
rebutted any claim that defendant was unable to appreciate the criminality of his conduct. Palinski,
2020 IL App (2d) 180341-U, ¶ 59. Nevertheless, a defendant is excused from criminal liability if
“a mental disease or defect” substantially impaired his or her ability to consciously refrain from
the wrongful conduct, despite appreciating the criminality of the conduct. People v. Eckhardt, 156
Ill. App. 3d 1077, 1090 (1987). Thus, the issue at the evidentiary hearing was whether defendant
was involuntarily intoxicated such that he was unable to conform his conduct to the law.
¶ 30 The evidence at the hearing established that the use of Paxil can cause manic episodes.
Defendant’s medical records from the jail contained reports that he was experiencing symptoms
commonly associated with mania. Other records indicated defendant did not believe he was
experiencing any side effects from his prescribed medication and contained reports that defendant
felt calmer and more stable. Wyma believed defendant was not in a constant manic state between
May and August 2002 but may have had difficulty stopping his plan outside the manic state. Wyma
had not listened to audio recordings of defendant’s conversations and had not heard defendant’s
speech patterns in coming to his conclusion. Upon hearing one such conversation at the evidentiary
hearing, Wyma indicated defendant’s speech pattern was normal. Further, Wyma indicated the
statements made by defendant over the course of several months appeared to have been thoughtful
and not impulsive. He again opined defendant may have been unable to stop the planning once he
had started it but later admitted to the court this was speculation because he had not spoken to
defendant enough to know if that was true in this instance.
¶ 31 Wyma testified as to the notes of Dr. Corcoran, a psychiatrist who evaluated defendant in
relatively close proximity to August 15, 2002, the date defendant is alleged to have perfected his
solicitation to commit murder. Corcoran’s July 11, 2002, notes indicated defendant was less manic
11 and able to “converse better in routine conversation.” Wyma testified it appeared the mood
stabilizers were having some desirable effect while not impairing defendant as before. Three days
after defendant’s arrest on the solicitation charge, Corcoran reported defendant was not sleeping
well, had pressured speech, and was at the “high end of excitable.” On September 15, 2002,
Corcoran reported defendant appeared “manicky” and that he exhibited disorganized thoughts.
Defendant had adorned his cell with drawings of engines and calculus equations and was talking
about “the Big Bang Theory.” According to Wyma, defendant’s conduct was consistent with
Corcoran’s notes that defendant was bipolar and perhaps hypermanic.
¶ 32 Wyma read a number of transcripts of phone and other recordings of defendant obtained
during the investigation, but he was unaware of the July 28, 2002, telephone conversation in which
defendant boasted he could feign being bipolar or schizophrenic. Wyma testified defendant was
speaking at a normal rate and that his statements “could be” a textbook example of malingering,
but that bipolar disorder and malingering are not mutually exclusive.
¶ 33 The court found that the newly presented evidence of involuntary intoxication was not
sufficient to undermine its confidence in the correctness of the verdict. The court explained it found
the testimony of Wyma not credible, highlighting the lack of a definitive opinion about defendant’s
manic state and Wyma’s repeated admissions of insufficient contact with defendant. The court
acknowledged Wyma’s testimony regarding impulsivity but found no credible evidence to support
the claim that defendant was in a manic state and thus unable to conform his conduct to the law.
The record contained months of conversations and planning in which defendant participated, and
which Wyma admitted seemed to lack impulsivity.
¶ 34 The court found O’Donnell was not qualified to opine on defendant’s ability to conform to
the requirements of the law. We have no basis to disturb the court’s finding. O’Donnell holds a
12 degree in pharmacy, not pharmacology. And although O’Donnell is a board-certified
pharmacologist, his certification is in research-oriented “applied pharmacology,” rather than
“clinical pharmacology,” which focuses on clinical settings and requires a medical license.
Notably, while O’Donnell’s curriculum vitae indicates he has been published 335 times,
O’Donnell has never authored an article concerning Paxil or other SSRIs. The trial court properly
found O’Donnell unqualified to render an opinion.
¶ 35 Our conclusion accords with the evaluations of two courts on O’Donnell’s qualifications.
In 2002, a federal court concluded O’Donnell lacked the required credentials to testify regarding
Paxil and its associated warnings, noting his claim to the title “doctor” was based solely on the
completion of a one-year Doctor of Pharmacy program in 1971, in which he took just one
pharmacology-related course. Newton v. Roche Laboratories, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 672, 678 n.3
(W.D. Tex. 2002). The court observed O’Donnell admitted he had previously falsely advertised
himself as possessing a doctorate in pharmacology to attract more interest from lawyers. Id. In
2004, another federal court determined O’Donnell’s qualifications to testify regarding SSRIs, and
Paxil in particular, were “non-existent.” Devito v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., CIV.A. 02-CV-
0745NPM, 2004 WL 3691343, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2004).
¶ 36 Based on the record before us, we cannot say the trial court’s credibility and qualification
determinations were arbitrary, unreasonable, or not based on the evidence. Accordingly, we affirm
the court’s denial of defendant’s successive postconviction petition.
¶ 37 In reaching this conclusion, we reject defendant’s contention that the circuit court
improperly conflated the disjunctive prongs of the involuntary intoxication defense. See Taliani,
2021 IL 125891, ¶ 70 (an involuntarily intoxicated defendant lacks the substantial capacity to
“either appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the law” (emphases
13 added)). The court mentioned that defendant’s understanding of the consequences he faced showed
he could conform his conduct to the law. To be sure, one may understand the potential
consequences of an action but still be unable to conform his actions to the law. See Eckhardt, 156
Ill. App. 3d at 1090. It does not follow, however, that a defendant’s understanding of the
consequences cannot be a factor in determining whether he is able to conform his actions to the
law. The court’s statements make clear it considered defendant’s understanding of the
consequences in conjunction with his months of planning, coordination, and deliberation. See
Taliani, 2021 IL 125891, ¶ 69 (requiring a persuasive showing of involuntary intoxication based
on new evidence “considered along with all the evidence presented at trial”). Ultimately, the court
found no credible evidence that a prolonged manic state caused impulsivity and thus concluded
defendant could conform his conduct to the law. Its limited references to defendant’s appreciation
of his conduct’s seriousness do not overcome that conclusion.
¶ 38 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 39 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County.
¶ 40 Affirmed.