2020 IL App (1st) 172106-U No. 1-17-2106
SECOND DIVISION June 9, 2020
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ____________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Cook County. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 12 CR 18153 ) ALAN PADILLA, ) ) The Honorable Defendant-Appellant. ) Thomas J. Byrne, ) Judge Presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE PUCINSKI delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Fitzgerald Smith and Justice Coghlan concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The judgment of the trial court is reversed, where the defendant was a juvenile offender, and the trial court imposed a discretionary de facto life sentence without making a finding that the defendant was beyond rehabilitation so that he was among the rarest of juveniles whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.
¶2 Alan Padilla was convicted in a jury trial for first degree murder, and was sentenced to 65
years’ imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that his discretionary de facto life sentence violates the
eighth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and the
proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11), where he 1-17-2106
was 17 years old at the time of the offense and the trial court failed to make a determination as to
whether he was “among the rarest of youth whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.” We
reverse and remand with instructions.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 Padilla was charged by indictment with six counts of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-
1(a)(1), (2) (West 2012)), following an incident in Chicago, Illinois, on August 31, 2012. Prior to
trial, the State nolle prossed four of the six counts.
¶5 Also prior to trial, Padilla brought a motion to declare the sentencing scheme for his charges
unconstitutional as applied to Padilla, where Padilla was a minor at the time of the offense and his
charges carried a statutory minimum of 45 years and a maximum sentence of natural life in prison.
Padilla requested that the trial court (1) hold that the sentencing scheme for Padilla’s charges is
unconstitutional and (2) “consider a sentence that comports, at a minimum, with the sentencing
scheme under the Juvenile Court Act *** to a maximum of thirty-nine years.” Padilla’s
constitutional challenge to the sentencing scheme was not addressed until after Padilla’s jury trial.
¶6 Because the issue on appeal concerns the constitutionality of Padilla’s sentence, we set
forth a brief summary of the facts adduced at trial, which commenced on December 13, 2016. The
record shows that the victim of the murder, Jalen Stogner, was a 17-year-old African American
teenager, and the State presented evidence regarding Padilla’s motive in order to show that Jalen
was targeted in the murder specifically because of his race, as we will describe.
¶7 Jalen’s mother, Marla Stogner, testified that on August 31, 2012, around 4 p.m., she drove
to a laundromat on 47th Street and Ashland Avenue with Jalen and two of her other four children.
She parked her vehicle in front of the laundromat, and Jalen took a laundry bag from the vehicle
and stood in the laundromat doorway. Padilla, whom Marla had never seen before, walked 12 to
-2- 1-17-2106
15 feet from Jalen and “said something” to Jalen. Jalen asked Padilla what he said. Marla testified
that Jalen did not “reach for anything,” have a firearm, or “go after” Padilla. Rather, Marla told
Jalen not to argue, and told Padilla that Jalen “wasn’t here for any trouble.”
¶8 Padilla then lifted his shirt, pulled out a firearm, and aimed it at Jalen. Jalen turned and ran
inside the laundromat, and Padilla shot the firearm three times. Marla “scream[ed],” “begg[ed],”
and told Padilla, “That’s my son.” Padilla stared and pointed his firearm at Marla, but turned
around and ran down an alley near the laundromat. Marla entered the laundromat and saw Jalen
unresponsive and “falling on the floor.” She turned Jalen to his side, and “blood *** spilled out of
his mouth.” Police officers took Jalen to the hospital in an ambulance, and Marla learned that Jalen
had died. At the police station, Marla identified Padilla from a lineup. Marla also testified regarding
video footage recovered from the laundromat that depicted the incident.
¶9 DeShawn Sims, one of Marla’s children, testified in corroboration with Marla. The State
also presented the testimony of two customers, who both testified that they saw Padilla walking
around the laundromat “nervous.” The two customers both heard gunshots, and saw Jalen enter
the laundromat bleeding and fall to the ground. A laundromat employee corroborated this
testimony, but added that she also saw Padilla argue with another man outside the laundromat prior
to the incident. She also added that when Padilla was walking around the laundromat and looking
nervous, he did not wash or carry any laundry during his visit. The two customers and the
laundromat employee all identified Padilla from a lineup. The witnesses who were at the scene all
consistently testified that Padilla was wearing a white shirt and blue, or jean, shorts.
¶ 10 The State also presented testimony that police officers investigated the scene just after 4
p.m., and found Padilla about four blocks away from the laundromat, on the railroad tracks on top
of a viaduct. Padilla was holding black socks in his hand, and he wore a different “blueish black”
-3- 1-17-2106
shirt, and denim jeans. Padilla also held a cell phone with the battery removed. An officer asked
Padilla what he was doing on the tracks, and Padilla stated, “Just chilling.” The police recovered
Padilla’s cell phone, arrested Padilla, and took him to the police station.
¶ 11 The State also submitted testimony that Jalen had a bullet wound entering the right side of
the back of his chest, and the bullet lodged in his lower right lung cavity.
¶ 12 An inmate at the Cook County jail testified that he heard Padilla rapping “[a]bout killing a
n***.” The inmate remarked on the song, and asked Padilla why he was in prison. Padilla stated
he had been in an altercation with a black man on 48th and Ashland and left to retrieve his firearm.
Padilla returned to the area “[t]o kill a n***,” but did not see that black man, so he “look[ed] for a
n*** to kill” and “found him.” Padilla then told the inmate he killed a “n***” who was “walking
his laundry into the [l]aundromat” by shooting him twice. Afterwards, Padilla left the scene and
urinated on his hands. Padilla additionally told the inmate he was going to “[b]eat the murder rap”
and plea insanity. The court admonished the jury, and stated that the inmate’s testimony regarding
any of Padilla’s conduct not included in Padilla’s charges was received on the issue of motive
only. The court told the jury it was their role to determine whether that conduct occurred.
¶ 13 The State rested, and Padilla testified.
¶ 14 Padilla stated that at the time of the incident, he was 17 years old and homeless, his father’s
location was unknown, and his mother had been deported to Mexico. Thirty minutes before the
incident, a man punched Padilla and tried to rob him, and Padilla ran into the laundromat. Padilla
left the laundromat and passed Jalen, who said to Padilla, “ ‘What are you looking at?’ ” Padilla
did not say anything, and Jalen told Padilla, “ ‘I’m going to kill you.’ ” Padilla stated he believed
Jalen’s threat due to the prior altercation he had experienced. Padilla walked away from Jalen, but
-4- 1-17-2106
Jalen called, “Yo, yo.” Padilla turned around and saw Jalen reach into his waistband. Padilla
thought Jalen had a firearm, shot Jalen twice, and ran into an alley.
¶ 15 On cross-examination, Padilla confirmed that he never saw Jalen with a firearm, and that
Jalen was holding a laundry bag when they interacted. Padilla also confirmed that he initially gave
the police an alibi, saying he was at a McDonald’s when the shooting occurred.
¶ 16 The jury found Padilla guilty of first degree murder, and found that during the commission
of the offense of first degree murder, Padilla personally discharged a firearm that proximately
caused death to another person.
¶ 17 Before Padilla’s sentencing hearing, the trial court heard arguments regarding Padilla’s
motion to declare the sentencing scheme of Padilla’s charges unconstitutional. The trial court
observed that a change in the law had altered the “crux” of Padilla’s motion, since the applicable
firearm enhancement was no longer mandatory.
¶ 18 Defense counsel argued that any sentence over 39 years is a de facto natural life sentence,
and that “regardless of whether the 25 to life imposition is discretionary, *** any enhancement for
a juvenile beyond the 25 years would be unconstitutional.” The State responded that the United
States Supreme Court only held that a life sentence for a juvenile offender should not be
mandatory. A court may still impose a discretionary natural life sentence, as long as the judge had
considered the juvenile offender’s youth and its attendant circumstances.
¶ 19 The trial court denied Padilla’s motion to declare the sentencing scheme unconstitutional,
and proceeded to Padilla’s sentencing hearing.
¶ 20 At the sentencing hearing, the trial court initially noted that Padilla was previously
diagnosed with a mental disorder, and that it had ordered an evaluation of Padilla’s fitness. A
forensic psychologist concluded that Padilla was fit to stand trial, but “was unable to render an
-5- 1-17-2106
opinion with any degree of psychiatric certainty” due to Padilla’s lack of cooperation, which “was
not the result of any mental illness.”
¶ 21 In aggravation, the State presented Chicago police officer Dwayne Gross, who testified
that on August 31, 2012, at about 10:50 p.m., he searched and processed Padilla following Padilla’s
arrest. As Gross “took [Padilla] over” to be fingerprinted, Padilla “got into a verbal altercation”
with Gross’s partner, Officer Lawrence Foote. Padilla told Foote that Padilla “wanted to fight him,
and *** was going to f*** him up.” On September 1, 2012, at about 11:15 p.m., Padilla “became
agitated” when he saw Foote and yelled that he “wanted to f*** [Foote] up.” Gross attempted to
guide Padilla towards a cell, and Padilla punched Gross in the chest. Gross then claimed that he
and Padilla “used direct mechanics.” Officers moved Padilla to his cell, and Padilla tried to “squirm
away.” Gross suffered a fractured left hand due to the incident.
¶ 22 On cross-examination, Gross confirmed that “direct mechanics” meant punching, and that
he broke his hand punching Padilla.
¶ 23 Chicago police officer Deborah Jovanovich corroborated Gross’s account of this
altercation, and added that she suffered a cut on her wrist and a jammed finger assisting Gross.
¶ 24 Chicago correctional officer Richard O’Connor testified that on September 21, 2012, at
about 9 p.m., he worked in the Cook County Department of Corrections, when Padilla sprayed a
substance onto O’Connor’s right side and face. O’Connor believed the substance was a mixture of
urine and feces based on its smell and color. Chicago correctional officer Arcenio Pizana testified
that on February 8, 2016, at about 9 a.m., Padilla refused to reenter his cell, and staff members
physically “escorted” him to his cell. Two hours later, Padilla threw a liquid substance onto
Pizana’s back. The next day, Padilla called Pizana a “b***” and told Pizana, “I should beat your
ass.” Padilla advanced towards Pizana, and Pizana deployed pepper spray at him. Chicago
-6- 1-17-2106
correctional officer Thomas Maciunas testified that on March 15, 2016, at about 10 a.m., he saw
Padilla fight with another inmate and ordered Padilla to stop. Padilla did not stop, so Maciunas
“[u]tilized [pepper] spray.”
¶ 25 Lieutenant Michael Hallihan, a “Watch Commander” with the Cook County Sheriff’s
Department, testified that Padilla’s inmate discipline reports, which reflected about 20 instances
in which Padilla was disciplined for misconduct, which included fighting with inmates, refusing
to comply with orders, attempting to escape, assaulting staff, damaging property in his cell, or
possessing contraband, specifically shanks and batches of “hooch,” which was described as
“inmate made alcohol, using lunch products.”
¶ 26 Mark Washington, Jalen’s father, read a victim impact statement describing the hardship
he faced after his son died, and stating that he had lost his only son “to the historical ongoing
racism and gun violence in America.” Washington stated, “This cowardice murderer sitting here,
should know what it’s like to get life without parole for his racist senseless first degree murder.”
¶ 27 The defense presented in mitigation Dolci Vasquez, Padilla’s mother, who stated that she
was 14 years old when she met Padilla’s father and became pregnant with Padilla. Two years later,
Padilla’s father left for Mexico. Vasquez’s own father then assumed a father figure role for Padilla.
Vasquez met another man, with whom she had a daughter, but the second man “was very abusive”
and “would beat [Vasquez] up” and “humiliate” her. Vasquez then returned to her parents with her
daughter and Padilla. After “[s]ome time,” Vasquez met her boyfriend, Luis, and lived with him.
¶ 28 Padilla attended school and was diagnosed with attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder
(ADHD). Vasquez stated that they changed Padilla’s medication dosage “all the time,” and Padilla
“had no stability in his emotions.” Vasquez then sent Padilla to a “Masonic School for his
behavior,” and “[e]verything changed,” as Padilla put more effort into his studies. Vasquez’s father
-7- 1-17-2106
then died, and Padilla “was devastated,” “did not accept the loss,” and “became more rebellious.”
Padilla received “stronger medicine so that he could be at peace.”
¶ 29 Vasquez stated that she later moved to Mexico with Luis, Padilla, and her daughter. Luis
became abusive, beat Vasquez, and “use[d] drugs.” Vasquez testified that Padilla once tried to
defend Vasquez from Luis, became upset, and left for a party. When Padilla returned from the
party, Padilla told Vasquez he had fallen asleep and was “almost raped by a man.”
¶ 30 Vasquez then returned to Chicago and sent Padilla to be with her family. She grew
dependent on alcohol, enrolled in a self-help group, and took her children to Alcoholics
Anonymous meetings so they could see she “wanted to give them the best possible life for them.”
One night, while Vasquez was driving her children back from a “spiritual retreat,” the police
detained Vasquez, and Padilla yelled at the police not to “beat [her] up.”
¶ 31 Vasquez was deported to Mexico. She testified that she knew this event was traumatic for
Padilla, and decided her children would stay with her sister, Wendy Fernandez, because Padilla
“was extremely upset and started to get involved with problems.” However, the Department of
Children and Family Services took custody of Vasquez’s children away from Fernandez, and
Padilla “lived at a school.” Vasquez stated, “I know that my Son felt the abandonment on my part,
because he always felt it relative to his Father.” According to Vasquez, Padilla was “looking for
love,” but found it “with the wrong kinds of people, such [as] gangs.” Vasquez stated that Padilla
was a child who did not have his mother or father, and that “the only thing he could do was to
survive on the streets.” Vasquez asked that the trial court “have compassion and comprehension.”
¶ 32 The defense also presented a letter from Fernandez, Vasquez’s sister, who stated that
Padilla is a “good person,” and that “life has *** treated him very badly.” Fernandez stated, “I am
certain that there has been much suffering in spite of his young age.” Fernandez further stated that
-8- 1-17-2106
Padilla’s lack of a father figure affected him. Padilla suffered from “an impediment” from a young
age, and while he liked to play, “feel free,” and “do everything that [a] young child likes to do,”
his medication “paralyze[d]” and “sedated” him. He was a “highly intelligent child” who “always
had perfect grades,” but would behave differently when he did not take his medication. Fernandez
stated that Padilla “was a very good boy,” who would tell her “he was going to study very hard to
become someone in life” and to “return to his [m]other everything that she had done for him and
for his [s]ister.” Unfortunately, Padilla made “questionable friends,” and “started to *** behave
badly.” When his mother was deported, Padilla frequently cried and “was always sad.” Fernandez
acknowledged that what Padilla did could not be “justified,” but stated that he was simply “in a
moment and place that were wrong for him.” Fernandez concluded that Padilla was “only an
adolescent” and was “extremely remorseful” for what he did.
¶ 33 The defense also presented a letter from Padilla’s grandmother, Maria Vasquez, who stated
that Padilla was “very respectful,” “applied himself,” and “had a wonderful attitude.” Maria
Vasquez stated that Padilla had “bad friends who turned him like this,” and that he lacked “the
love of his [f]ather.” She stated that Padilla “is in the flower of his youth, full of life,” and asked
that the circuit court “show him clemency, because we would assume charge, and take care of him,
to guide him on a right and correct path, so that he can become an honest man.”
¶ 34 Additionally, the defense submitted Padilla’s school records, which showed that Padilla
got “A’s and B’s.” The defense presented a report from Sullivan High School, in which Padilla’s
English teacher stated that Padilla had an A in English and had completed 90% of his assignments
and had attended class. The teacher further reported that Padilla “likes to participate in class,”
works well in groups, “learn[s] well through discussion,” and “tend[s] to curse a lot in in class”
-9- 1-17-2106
but “always apologizes and stops.” The teacher further voiced concern that Padilla’s “outside
friendships may be affecting his focus.”
¶ 35 The trial court also considered the presentencing investigative report (PSI), which stated
that Padilla’s birth date was October 4, 1994, confirming that Padilla was 17 years old at the time
of the offense. The PSI also stated that Padilla’s father’s location was unknown, that his mother
was in Aurora, Illinois, and that he had one maternal sibling. Padilla was raised by his mother and
maternal grandparents, and he had a “ ‘good’ ” relationship with his mother, a close relationship
with his sister, and no relationship with his father. He described his childhood as “ ‘bad’ ” after his
grandfather passed away, and denied ever being abused or neglected. At age 15, Padilla was placed
in a “group home” after his mother’s deportation. Padilla denied that his family had a history of
drug or alcohol abuse, or that he had family members in prison or on probation.
¶ 36 According to the PSI, Padilla’s highest level of education was ninth grade, and he reported
he received A’s and B’s and participated in the basketball team. Padilla was “expelled and
suspended for fighting.” Padilla denied having any monthly income or expenses prior to
incarceration, but stated he sold drugs to support himself. The PSI also stated that Padilla was a
member of the gang La Raza from 2010 to the present date and went by the street name
“ ‘Dangerous,’ ” and he ranked as a “foot soldier.” Additionally, the PSI reflected that Padilla had
received probation for possessing a stolen automobile, but violated the probation, and was
previously convicted of battery. An additional case was opened against Padilla for aggravated
battery to a peace officer, arising from the incident in which Padilla purportedly punched Gross,
and Gross broke his own hand punching Padilla.
-10- 1-17-2106
¶ 37 The PSI further stated that Padilla was seen by a psychiatrist, was diagnosed with bipolar
disorder, and received treatment in the Cook County Department of Corrections, and that he had
been previously diagnosed with behavioral and learning disorders.
¶ 38 Padilla drank alcohol every weekend and “limited his drinking to half a gallon of alcohol.”
He also used cannabis from the age of 13 to present, cocaine from ages 13 to 14, and codeine
cough syrup from ages 15 to 17.
¶ 39 The parties presented arguments on Padilla’s sentencing.
¶ 40 In aggravation, the State argued that Padilla was “unsafe,” should receive a sentence
enhancement for committing first degree murder with a firearm, and should remain in prison for
natural life. The State observed that throughout the entire case, Padilla boasted about his
membership with the La Raza gang and said they called him “Dangerous.” The State also argued
that there was no evidence showing Padilla had remorse or rehabilitative potential.
¶ 41 Then, the State outlined the factors regarding Padilla’s youth. The State asserted, “[I]t’s
not like the Defendant just turned 17. He was actually less than two months from his 18th birthday
when he killed Jalen in cold blood.” As to “outside peer pressure or negative influences,” the State
stated that Padilla boasted about being a member of the gang La Raza, and that Padilla “even has
a new tattoo” on his face “from when he first came in here.” However, the State reminded the court
that Padilla’s current offense had nothing to do with “gang war” or “peer pressure,” but rather,
Padilla willfully killed a 17-year-old boy out of racist motives, bragged about it, and rapped about
it in prison.
¶ 42 The State next addressed Padilla’s family home environment and noted Padilla’s close
relationships with his mother and sister. Additionally, the State observed the lack of substance
abuse or criminal history in Padilla’s family, and Padilla’s denial that he was ever abused or
-11- 1-17-2106
neglected. The State emphasized that Padilla was expelled from high school for fighting, and he
sold drugs to support himself. The State also argued that Padilla was able to meaningfully
participate in his defense, as the trial evidence showed Padilla attempted to cover up the murder
when he changed his clothes, discarded his firearm, and urinated on his hands. Padilla also changed
his story multiple times, initially telling the detectives that he was at a McDonald’s, then pleading
insanity, then asserting self-defense. In discussing Padilla’s prior juvenile or criminal history, the
State observed that Padilla received probation for possession of a stolen motor vehicle, and
violated his probation multiple times, before he killed Jalen 22 days later. Then, less than 24 hours
after the murder, Padilla “pick[ed] up a new case” for aggravated battery for “what he did to
Detective Aid Gross and ** Debora.” The State referenced the various behavioral issues Padilla
exhibited while in prison, stated that Padilla had spent at least “398 days in segregation” as a result,
and asked, “How in the world can that be rehabilitative?” The State concluded that a natural life
sentence was “the only just sentence.”
¶ 43 In mitigation, the defense also addressed the factors regarding Padilla’s youth, first arguing
that Padilla suffered “cognitive disabilities, ADHD.” The defense argued that Padilla was
“psychotic” in prison, that he had a history of being medicated, and that he “was impulsive and
had difficulty controlling impulsivity.” Defense counsel also asserted that Padilla experienced
outside peer pressure and negative influences, having had a father who abandoned him, a mother
who struggled with alcoholism and was deported, and a grandfather who had provided stability
but died. Padilla became involved with gangs “because that’s who replaced his family that was no
longer there.” Additionally, defense counsel argued that Padilla had suffered trauma at a young
age, having had to defend his mother from domestic abuse at a young age, and having been
“nearly” or “possibly” raped as a child.
-12- 1-17-2106
¶ 44 As to rehabilitative potential, defense counsel asserted that Padilla showed potential when
he was in a stable environment. When guards told Padilla to stop fighting, “more often than not,
he listened to them.” Defense counsel explained that Padilla simply “wanted to be in segregation”
because “jail is not a nice place,” and Padilla lacked the “wherewithal to rise above the
circumstances” in prison. Counsel concluded that Padilla had a “very minimal juvenile or criminal
history,” and “given his age of 17, given his background, given his psychological profile,” Padilla
should receive less than 35 years’ imprisonment. Defense counsel claimed that “35 years would
not deprecate the seriousness of the offense,” but would still “give Alan a chance to rehabilitate
and do something useful in his life.”
¶ 45 Padilla stated in allocution that he “didn’t mean for things to happen that day,” and
apologized to Jalen’s family. He explained that all he needed “was a support system to direct me
in the right direction; but things happen.” Padilla then stated, “I live with this nightmare; and it
haunts me daily; and again, I’m sorry to my victim family [sic], as well as I’m sorry for my own
family, as well. And that’s it.”
¶ 46 The circuit court stated that it recalled the facts and circumstances of the case and that,
“like the jury,” it found Padilla’s account of the event “completely incredible.” The court described
the severity of Padilla’s offense, stating, “[T]his was the Defendant’s conscious choice to find a
victim, because he had been in an altercation with somebody else,” and Jalen “just happened to be
in the Defendant’s sights.” The court observed that the murder was not “brought on by sudden and
tense passion or an uncontrollable impulse,” but “was by design.” Further, the court noted that
Padilla saw Jalen with his mother, and decided to shoot Jalen, a 17-year-old boy who “wasn’t
carrying a gun, or a weapon, or gang insignia,” but rather only carried “a bag of laundry for his
family, to help out his [m]other.”
-13- 1-17-2106
¶ 47 The court also described the cruel effect of Padilla’s offense on the victim’s family, stating:
“The unimaginable shock and pain that Jalen’s [m]other suffered at the laundromat
is unspeakable. The effect that his actions, his decisions had beyond the laundromat, is
nothing that can be comprehended.
What he’s done to his own family, and what he’s done to Jalen’s family, and what
he took away from Jalen, 17 years old, is beyond comprehension for us to truly understand
it.”
¶ 48 The court noted that Padilla was 17, so there were “some considerations that the Court
must go through” in determining an appropriate sentence.” As to the factors regarding Padilla’s
youth, the circuit court observed that Padilla chose to commit the murder, and was not “put up to
[it] by older, more mature individuals who [held] sway over the Defendant.” The court also stated
that Padilla should have understood “the bond between a Mother and a Son” when he shot Jalen
in front of his mother, since Padilla had lost his mother and grandfather. Additionally, court
considered Padilla’s “young age at the time of the offense,” Padilla’s “personal history, prior to
the offense,” all the factors in aggravation and mitigation, the PSI, and Padilla’s conduct in prison.
¶ 49 The court raised Padilla’s rehabilitative potential once when it stated the following:
“So, what I’m left with, is to fashion an appropriate sentence that considers the
vicious, horrendous murder of Jalen by the Defendant, another 17-year-old; and I’m
required to consider the Defendant’s youthfulness, his rehabilitative potential in doing that;
and I certainly have.
I’ve considered the fact that the Defendant is loved by his family, and the suffering
that his own family is going to consider.
-14- 1-17-2106
In fashioning a sentence appropriate in this case, I’ve considered the State’s request
for natural life; and that’s an appropriate request, under the circumstances, that you serve
the rest of your life without the possibility of parole.” (Emphasis added.)
However, we note that the court made no express finding as to whether Padilla had rehabilitative
potential.
¶ 50 The trial court found that the discretionary sentencing enhancement for discharging a
firearm was “appropriate under the circumstances of this case.” Thus, the court sentenced Padilla
to 40 years imprisonment, with an enhancement of 25 years, for a total of 65 years’ imprisonment.
¶ 51 Padilla filed a motion to reconsider his sentence. At the hearing on the motion, Padilla’s
counsel adopted the “previous argument at the sentencing hearing” and rested on it. The trial court
found that Padilla’s sentence was “appropriate,” and denied Padilla’s motion to reconsider
“[b]ased on all the statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation as well as the material considered
in the [PSI].” This appeal followed.
¶ 52 ANALYSIS
¶ 53 On appeal, Padilla argues that because he was a juvenile offender, the trial court was
constitutionally prohibited from imposing a de facto life sentence unless it had determined that
Padilla was “among the rarest of youth whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.” According
to Padilla, the trial court made no such finding, and so the imposition of a de facto life sentence on
Padilla violated the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend.
VIII). The State responds that Padilla’s discretionary de facto life sentence was constitutional
because the trial court considered Padilla’s youth and its attendant circumstances before
determining that he was beyond rehabilitation.
-15- 1-17-2106
¶ 54 The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits “cruel and unusual
punishments” (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and applies to the states through the fourteenth
amendment (U.S. Const., amend. XIV). Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005). In Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012), the United States Supreme Court held that “a sentencing
scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders” violates
the eighth amendment. The Supreme Court reasoned that a mandatory life sentence precludes a
trial court from considering the offender’s youth and its “attendant circumstances,” which include
the offender’s “immaturity” and “impetuosity,” the offender’s “failure to appreciate risks and
consequences,” the offender’s family and home environment, the extent to which familial and peer
pressures affected the offender’s conduct, the offender’s “inability to deal with police officers or
prosecutors,” and the offender’s “incapacity to assist his own attorneys.” Id. at 465, 477-78. The
Miller Court stated that “a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating
circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles,” and a mandatory
sentencing scheme unconstitutionally precludes this consideration. Id. at 489. Nonetheless, the
Miller court also noted that “appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest
possible penalty will be uncommon,” due to the “great difficulty” of distinguishing at an early age
“between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the
rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” (Emphasis added and internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 479-80.
¶ 55 Since Miller, the Illinois supreme court has clarified that a mandatory, de facto life-
without-parole sentence was unconstitutional pursuant to Miller (People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271,
¶ 10), and that a prison sentence of over 40 years is a de facto life sentence implicating Miller.
-16- 1-17-2106
(People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶¶ 41-42). In People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 40, our
supreme court found that Miller applies both to mandatory and discretionary life sentences.
¶ 56 The Montgomery court further stated that “a juvenile defendant may be sentenced to life
imprisonment without parole, but only if the trial court determines that the defendant’s conduct
showed irretrievable depravity, permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond the
possibility of rehabilitation.” Id. ¶ 46. This is a finding that can only be made after considering the
defendant’s youth and its attendant circumstances. Id.
¶ 57 Our legislature has also since codified the considerations required by Miller through
section 5-4.5-105 of the Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2018)), which sets
forth each factor a sentencing court must consider, including “the person’s potential for
rehabilitation or evidence of rehabilitation, or both.”
¶ 58 Padilla was convicted of first degree murder pursuant to section 9-1(a)(1) of the Criminal
Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2012)). Section 5-4.5-20 of the Code of Corrections
(730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20(a) (West 2012) provides that a person convicted under section 9-1 and
sentenced to imprisonment shall receive a term “not less than 20 years and not more than 60 years.”
Further, section 5-8-1(d)(iii) (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2012)) provides that where the
person personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused death to another person, “25 years
or up to a natural life shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court.” Section
5-4.5-105(c) of the Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(c) (West 2018)) states that, in
addition to considering the factors regarding a juvenile defendant’s youth, the trial court “may, in
its discretion, decline to impose the sentencing enhancements based upon the possession or use of
a firearm during the commission of an offense included in subsection (d) of Section 5-8-1.”
Pursuant to these provisions, the trial court in its discretion imposed a de facto life sentence, when
-17- 1-17-2106
it sentenced Padilla to 40 years’ imprisonment for first degree murder, with a 25-year enhancement
for discharging the firearm that proximately caused Jalen’s death.
¶ 59 It is undisputed that Padilla also received a de facto life sentence without parole. Section
3-6-3(a)(2)(i) of the Illinois Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(i) (West 2012)) provides
that “a prisoner who is serving a term of imprisonment for first degree murder *** shall receive
no sentence credit and shall serve the entire sentence imposed by the court.” While the Illinois
legislature has since set forth a graduated parole review system for any “person under 21 years of
age at the time of the commission of first degree murder who is sentenced on or after June 1, 2019,”
this provision does not apply to Padilla, who was sentenced on July 10, 2017. P.A. 100-1182, § 5,
eff. June 1, 2019 (730 5/5-4.5-115(b)).
¶ 60 We review de novo whether a sentence is constitutional. People v. Taylor, 2015 IL
117267, ¶ 11.
¶ 61 At the sentencing hearing, the parties spoke at lengths regarding Padilla’s youth and its
attendant circumstances, revealing the circumstances under which Padilla came of age. Padilla did
not have a relationship with his father but was very close to his mother. He watched his mother
suffer physical abuse from the men she dated. Padilla grew up on medication to address his ADHD,
and the PSI showed that Padilla was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and had been previously
diagnosed with behavioral and learning disorders.
¶ 62 The evidence also showed that, at a young age, Padilla may have been the victim of either
attempted or actual rape. Also at a young age, he lost his two sources of stability, his mother and
maternal grandfather, as his mother was deported and his grandfather died. The evidence further
showed that upon losing his sources of support and stability, Padilla turned to gang activity. In
imposing its sentence, the trial court considered these factors, as well as the factors regarding
-18- 1-17-2106
Padilla’s youth and how they affected the court’s ultimate decision. The court additionally stated
that it had considered Padilla’s rehabilitative potential. However, the court made no express
finding whether Padilla had rehabilitative potential, or whether his crime reflected permanent
incorrigibility.
¶ 63 Our recent ruling in People v. Paige, 2020 IL App (1st) 161563, is instructive. In Paige,
the defendant was convicted of first degree murder, home invasion, and residential burglary when,
at the age of 16, he entered a man’s apartment and stabbed the man with a kitchen knife over 10
times. Id. ¶¶ 5-10. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court considered the defendant’s “age at the
time of the offense and now,” noting that the defendant “has not had an easy life having been raised
a lot with a single parent,” but that the defendant “did have a strong male role model.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 22. The court considered the defendant’s “drug abuse, his mental
condition, and his intellectual abilities,” and considered the defendant was taking “alternative
classes” and “doing well” in them. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 21. The court also
described the brutality of the defendant’s conduct, and stated there was “ample evidence of
premeditation in this crime.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
¶ 64 However, while the trial court in Paige stated that it had “weighed [the defendant’s]
rehabilitative potential,” the court did not expressly make any finding as to whether the defendant
could be rehabilitated. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Nonetheless, the court imposed a
sentence of 50 years’ imprisonment, which consisted of 50 years for first degree murder, along
with a concurrent sentence of 25 years for home invasion, and 15 years for residential burglary,
which was to run concurrently with the first degree murder sentence and consecutively with the
home invasion sentence. Id. ¶ 23.
-19- 1-17-2106
¶ 65 On appeal, this court in Paige noted that while the trial court stated it had considered the
defendant’s rehabilitative potential, the trial court “did not consider whether defendant was beyond
rehabilitation so that he is one of ‘the rarest of juvenile offenders *** whose crimes reflect
permanent incorrigibility.’ ” Id. ¶ 39 (quoting Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. ___, ___, 136
S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016)). We held that “[w]here the trial court focused on the brutality of the crime
and the need to protect the public, with no corresponding consideration given to defendant’s
opportunity for rehabilitation, the imposition of a life sentence on a juvenile defendant was
unconstitutional.” Id.
¶ 66 As in Paige, the trial court here considered Padilla’s youth, and described the brutality of
Padilla’s crime in detail. Also as in Paige, the trial court stated that it had considered Padilla’s
rehabilitative potential, but made no finding as to whether Padilla “was beyond rehabilitation so
that he is one of the rarest of juvenile offenders *** whose crimes reflect permanent
incorrigibility.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
¶ 67 As Illinois courts have recognized, rehabilitative potential is at the heart of the
requirements of Miller, as juveniles specifically exhibit “lesser moral culpability and greater
rehabilitative potential.” People v. Aikens, 2016 IL App (1st) 133578, ¶ 24. A life sentence without
parole, however, implies that “under any circumstances” a juvenile offender “is incorrigible and
incapable of rehabilitation for the rest of his life.” People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 342-43 (2002).
¶ 68 We recognize the brutal nature of Padilla’s offense, as described in the evidence presented
at trial. We also acknowledge the trial court’s thoughtful consideration of the seriousness of the
offense, the evidence presented regarding Padilla’s racist motives, and the impact Padilla had on
the victim’s family. However, Illinois law mandates that the trial court could not impose a de facto
life sentence without parole on Padilla without first making a finding that Padilla was among “the
-20- 1-17-2106
rarest of juvenile offenders *** whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.” Montgomery, 577
U.S. at ___, 136 Sup. Ct. at 734. Because this finding was not made, we must reverse the sentence
imposed by the trial court, and remand the case for a hearing on whether Padilla lacks any
rehabilitative potential. Because we are reversing the trial court’s judgment on this ground, we
make no finding as to whether Padilla does or does not have rehabilitative potential, whether his
sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution, or whether the
provisions under which he was sentenced are unconstitutional.
¶ 69 CONCLUSION
¶ 70 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand the judgment of the trial court.
¶ 71 Reversed and remanded, with instructions.
-21-