2020 IL App (2d) 180464-U No. 2-18-0464 Order filed October 26, 2020
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court OF ILLINOIS, ) of De Kalb County. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 17-CF-64 ) PATRICK OWENS, ) Honorable ) William P. Brady, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Birkett and Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Defendant’s conviction for violating registration requirement in the Sex Offender Registration Act was invalid; defendant was charged with failing to sign his registration form, but no signature requirement appears in section 3, under which defendant was charged; the signature requirement in section 8, under which defendant was not charged, could not be read into section 3 without violating defendant’s due process right to notice of the charges against him.
¶2 Following a bench trial, defendant, Patrick Owens, was convicted of failing to register as
a sex offender (730 ILCS 150/3(a) (West 2016)) by failing to sign the registration form. He
appeals, contending that he was not proved guilty given that the statute did not require his
signature. We reverse. 2020 IL App (2d) 180464-U
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Defendant was charged with two counts of failing to register as a sex offender. The first
count alleged that he failed to disclose that he had a Facebook account. The second count alleged
that he refused to sign his personal signature to the registration form in violation of section 3(a) of
the Sex Offender Registration Act (Act) (720 ILCS 1503(a) (West 2016)).
¶5 At trial, Sergeant Tony Kwasniewski testified that he supervises the De Kalb Police
Department’s sex-offender registration program. As such, he reviews all registration forms
completed by the department and forwards them to the state police to be included in the Law
Enforcement Agencies Data System (LEADS).
¶6 Kwasniewski reviewed a registration that defendant completed in January 2017. He knew
defendant from previous encounters. He noted that on two signature lines, defendant had written,
“F *** the police,” and in other places, where his initials were required, he wrote “F.U.”
Kwasniewski compared the form to one that defendant completed in December 2016 and found
that the earlier form contained defendant’s “normal signature.”
¶7 Kwasniewski encountered defendant a few days later and asked him about the profane
comment on the registration form. Defendant responded that that was his new signature.
¶8 Defendant executed another registration form in February 2017. His signature did not read
“F*** the police.” Defense counsel objected to the introduction of the February 2017 form,
questioning its relevance. The court speculated that it could be evidence that defendant had not
changed his name to “F*** the police” or that it was his new signature, as he told Kwasniewski.
Defense counsel stated that such was not the defense’s contention.
¶9 The court found that defendant did not have to re-register his Facebook account, because
that information was already on file. However, the court found that defendant was required to sign
-2- 2020 IL App (2d) 180464-U
the form with his real name. Accordingly, it convicted him on count II. Defendant was
subsequently acquitted in a failure-to-register case that arose in 2016.
¶ 10 At sentencing, defendant explained that he was required to register as a sex offender
because he had been convicted of criminal sexual abuse. The victim in that case was now his wife
and they had a child together. Defense counsel argued that when defendant registered in January
2017, he was frustrated because he had lost his home and his job as a result of his arrest in
connection with the 2016 case. Defendant did not realize that signing something other than his real
name was wrong and he had since re-registered. The court sentenced defendant to 13 months’
conditional discharge. Defendant timely appeals.
¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 12 Defendant contends that he was not proved guilty of failing to register as a sex offender,
because the section of the statute under which he was charged does not require a signature. He
contends that while that section requires a registrant to provide numerous items of personal
identification, it nowhere requires the registrant to sign the form.
¶ 13 Generally, where a defendant challenges on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence, the
relevant question is whether, after viewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found all the elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. People v. Collins, 214 Ill. 2d 206, 217 (2005). However, as both parties
acknowledge, the issue here is essentially one of statutory construction: whether the statute
required defendant’s signature. The construction of a statute is a legal question that we review
de novo. People v. Campa, 217 Ill. 2d 243, 252 (2005).
¶ 14 Defendant was charged with violating section 3(a) of the Act (730 ILCS 150/3(a) (West
2016)), which states in relevant part:
-3- 2020 IL App (2d) 180464-U
“A sex offender *** shall *** register in person and provide accurate information as
required by the Department of State Police. Such information shall include a current
photograph, current address, current place of employment, the sex offender’s or sexual
predator’s telephone number, including cellular telephone number, the employer’s
telephone number, [and] school attended[.]”
¶ 15 Our primary goal in construing a statute is to determine and give effect to the legislature’s
intent. People v. Lewis, 223 Ill. 2d 393, 402 (2006). The best indication of that intent is the statutory
language, given its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. We may not depart from the plain statutory
language by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not
express. Id. A court may not add provisions to a statute. Id. Further, any ambiguity in a statute
must be strictly construed in favor of the accused. People v. Davis, 199 Ill. 2d 130, 135 (2002).
¶ 16 Section 3(a)’s plain language simply does not require a signature and we may not add such
a requirement. Even if we could do so, requiring a signature would not further the purpose of the
statute, which is to allow law enforcement agencies “to ‘monitor the movements of the perpetrators
by allowing ready access to crucial information.’ ” People v. Molnar, 222 Ill. 2d 495, 499 (2006)
(quoting People v. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381, 388 (1991)). Here, the January 2017 form that defendant
signed contained preprinted information, presumably stored in the De Kalb Police Department’s
computer from prior registrations. The form included defendant’s name and address. The State
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2020 IL App (2d) 180464-U No. 2-18-0464 Order filed October 26, 2020
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court OF ILLINOIS, ) of De Kalb County. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 17-CF-64 ) PATRICK OWENS, ) Honorable ) William P. Brady, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Birkett and Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Defendant’s conviction for violating registration requirement in the Sex Offender Registration Act was invalid; defendant was charged with failing to sign his registration form, but no signature requirement appears in section 3, under which defendant was charged; the signature requirement in section 8, under which defendant was not charged, could not be read into section 3 without violating defendant’s due process right to notice of the charges against him.
¶2 Following a bench trial, defendant, Patrick Owens, was convicted of failing to register as
a sex offender (730 ILCS 150/3(a) (West 2016)) by failing to sign the registration form. He
appeals, contending that he was not proved guilty given that the statute did not require his
signature. We reverse. 2020 IL App (2d) 180464-U
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Defendant was charged with two counts of failing to register as a sex offender. The first
count alleged that he failed to disclose that he had a Facebook account. The second count alleged
that he refused to sign his personal signature to the registration form in violation of section 3(a) of
the Sex Offender Registration Act (Act) (720 ILCS 1503(a) (West 2016)).
¶5 At trial, Sergeant Tony Kwasniewski testified that he supervises the De Kalb Police
Department’s sex-offender registration program. As such, he reviews all registration forms
completed by the department and forwards them to the state police to be included in the Law
Enforcement Agencies Data System (LEADS).
¶6 Kwasniewski reviewed a registration that defendant completed in January 2017. He knew
defendant from previous encounters. He noted that on two signature lines, defendant had written,
“F *** the police,” and in other places, where his initials were required, he wrote “F.U.”
Kwasniewski compared the form to one that defendant completed in December 2016 and found
that the earlier form contained defendant’s “normal signature.”
¶7 Kwasniewski encountered defendant a few days later and asked him about the profane
comment on the registration form. Defendant responded that that was his new signature.
¶8 Defendant executed another registration form in February 2017. His signature did not read
“F*** the police.” Defense counsel objected to the introduction of the February 2017 form,
questioning its relevance. The court speculated that it could be evidence that defendant had not
changed his name to “F*** the police” or that it was his new signature, as he told Kwasniewski.
Defense counsel stated that such was not the defense’s contention.
¶9 The court found that defendant did not have to re-register his Facebook account, because
that information was already on file. However, the court found that defendant was required to sign
-2- 2020 IL App (2d) 180464-U
the form with his real name. Accordingly, it convicted him on count II. Defendant was
subsequently acquitted in a failure-to-register case that arose in 2016.
¶ 10 At sentencing, defendant explained that he was required to register as a sex offender
because he had been convicted of criminal sexual abuse. The victim in that case was now his wife
and they had a child together. Defense counsel argued that when defendant registered in January
2017, he was frustrated because he had lost his home and his job as a result of his arrest in
connection with the 2016 case. Defendant did not realize that signing something other than his real
name was wrong and he had since re-registered. The court sentenced defendant to 13 months’
conditional discharge. Defendant timely appeals.
¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 12 Defendant contends that he was not proved guilty of failing to register as a sex offender,
because the section of the statute under which he was charged does not require a signature. He
contends that while that section requires a registrant to provide numerous items of personal
identification, it nowhere requires the registrant to sign the form.
¶ 13 Generally, where a defendant challenges on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence, the
relevant question is whether, after viewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found all the elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. People v. Collins, 214 Ill. 2d 206, 217 (2005). However, as both parties
acknowledge, the issue here is essentially one of statutory construction: whether the statute
required defendant’s signature. The construction of a statute is a legal question that we review
de novo. People v. Campa, 217 Ill. 2d 243, 252 (2005).
¶ 14 Defendant was charged with violating section 3(a) of the Act (730 ILCS 150/3(a) (West
2016)), which states in relevant part:
-3- 2020 IL App (2d) 180464-U
“A sex offender *** shall *** register in person and provide accurate information as
required by the Department of State Police. Such information shall include a current
photograph, current address, current place of employment, the sex offender’s or sexual
predator’s telephone number, including cellular telephone number, the employer’s
telephone number, [and] school attended[.]”
¶ 15 Our primary goal in construing a statute is to determine and give effect to the legislature’s
intent. People v. Lewis, 223 Ill. 2d 393, 402 (2006). The best indication of that intent is the statutory
language, given its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. We may not depart from the plain statutory
language by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not
express. Id. A court may not add provisions to a statute. Id. Further, any ambiguity in a statute
must be strictly construed in favor of the accused. People v. Davis, 199 Ill. 2d 130, 135 (2002).
¶ 16 Section 3(a)’s plain language simply does not require a signature and we may not add such
a requirement. Even if we could do so, requiring a signature would not further the purpose of the
statute, which is to allow law enforcement agencies “to ‘monitor the movements of the perpetrators
by allowing ready access to crucial information.’ ” People v. Molnar, 222 Ill. 2d 495, 499 (2006)
(quoting People v. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381, 388 (1991)). Here, the January 2017 form that defendant
signed contained preprinted information, presumably stored in the De Kalb Police Department’s
computer from prior registrations. The form included defendant’s name and address. The State
presented no evidence at trial that the offender’s signature on the form serves any important law-
enforcement purpose.
¶ 17 Reference to a signature in the Act is only in section 8(a), which provides that
“[r]egistration as required by this Article shall consist of a statement in writing signed by the person
giving the information that is required by the Department of State Police.” 730 ILCS 150/8(a)
-4- 2020 IL App (2d) 180464-U
(West 2016). However, defendant was charged under section 3, not section 8. “A defendant in a
criminal prosecution has a fundamental due process right to notice of the charges against him;
thus, a defendant may not be convicted of an offense he has not been charged with committing.”
People v. Clark, 2016 IL 118845, ¶ 30. The indictment charged defendant under section 3, and we
may not simply transport the signature requirement from section 8(a) to section 3(a).
¶ 18 Because section 3(a) does not require an offender’s signature on the form, and because no
other violation of the statute was proved, defendant was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of failure to register. Thus, we reverse his conviction.
¶ 19 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 20 For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of De Kalb County.
¶ 21 Reversed.
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