People v. Osman

2024 IL App (2d) 230149-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: February 8, 2024
• Docket: 2-23-0149
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2024 IL App (2d) 230149-U No. 2-23-0149 Order filed February 8, 2024

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court OF ILLINOIS, ) of Kane County. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 19-CM-472 ) SAMMY OSMAN, ) Honorable ) Rene Cruz, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE MULLEN delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice McLaren and Justice Birkett concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: (1) The trial court did not err in giving unmodified versions of the Illinois pattern jury instructions on obstructing a peace officer where the case did not involve unusual facts or new law. (2) The evidence was sufficient to prove defendant guilty of (a) obstructing a peace officer where defendant refused to obey various commands when the police responded to a business where a burglary was reported to be in progress and (b) criminal trespass to real property where defendant and his mother, an employee of the business, were discovered on the premises at nearly midnight, after the business owner had given them notice not to enter the business after-hours.

¶2 Defendant, Sammy Osman, appeals his convictions for obstructing a peace officer (720

ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 2018)) and criminal trespass to real property (720 ILCS 5/21-3(a)(2) (West 2024 IL App (2d) 230149-U

2018)). He contends that (1) he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of obstructing a

peace officer, (2) the trial court committed plain error in giving unmodified versions of the pattern

criminal jury instructions on obstructing a peace officer, (3) his trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to object to the pattern instructions, and (4) the State did not prove an essential element of

criminal trespass to real property, i.e., that he had received prior notice that he was not allowed on

the property. Because the evidence was sufficient to prove him guilty of both offenses and there

was no error in the jury instructions on obstructing a peace officer, we affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 The State charged defendant in an amended complaint with (1) one count of obstructing a

peace officer—specifically, by impeding the police investigation of an in-progress burglary by not

following the lawful orders of a peace officer, Office Sproles, “ ‘to show himself and to drop a

blunt object from his hands while approaching officers’ ” (720 ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 2018))1 and

(2) one count of criminal trespass to real property by knowingly entering onto the property after

receiving prior notice that entrance was forbidden (720 ILCS 5/21-3(a)(2) (West 2018)).

¶5 The following facts were developed at defendant’s jury trial. At about 11:49 p.m. on

February 6, 2019, Officer Shawn Sproles and several other Elgin police officers were dispatched

1 We note that, in the original complaint, the State alleged in count I that defendant

obstructed a peace officer when he (1) “did not follow the lawful orders of police officers to show

himself after being warned that failure to do so will result in arrest” and (2) “did not follow orders

to drop [a] blunt object from his hands and approached officers, resulting in a less than lethal

projectile being discharged upon him.” The trial court granted the State’s motion to amend the

complaint to read as stated above.

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to a business complex in Elgin to investigate a telephone report of a possible burglary in progress.

Sproles, the first officer to arrive, checked the exterior of the locked building. In doing so, he

observed what he thought was a female with a flashlight inside The Hairy Hound, one of the

businesses in the building. When Sproles knocked on the window and announced himself, the

individual “ducked into” what appeared to be a closet. Sproles spoke on the telephone to the

original caller, who confirmed that he had seen two people enter the building.

¶6 After the other officers arrived, they and Sproles checked the building’s exterior and found

no signs of forced entry. The owner of the building was called and arrived about 30 to 40 minutes

later. He opened the main door and gave the police keys to the interior businesses, including The

Hairy Hound.

¶7 Sproles testified that the police entered the building. Because they believed that someone

was in The Hairy Hound, the officers decided, for safety, to ensure that no one else was in the

building before they entered The Hairy Hound. While searching the remainder of the building, the

officers announced their presence and told any occupants to come out and show their hands.

¶8 Sproles stated that, after the officers found no one in other parts of the building, they arrived

at the entrance to The Hairy Hound. After they unlocked the door, Chad Schuttrow, the K-9 officer

at the scene, announced his presence and commanded the occupants to come out. Schuttrow gave

at least three such commands before a man stepped out. He was later identified as defendant.

Defendant had a blunt object in his hand and did not follow further police commands to drop the

object. Sproles recalled that he himself commanded defendant more than once to drop the object,

but defendant did not comply. Sproles could not identify the object then but later learned it was a

red Bluetooth speaker. Because defendant was not complying with police commands, Officer

Teodolo Ravadan discharged a nonlethal weapon that fired a 40-millimeter, soft-point projectile.

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Although the projectile struck defendant in the leg, he did not immediately comply; rather, Sproles

gave three or four more commands before defendant dropped the object and got on the floor. After

defendant was on the floor, Paula Osman (Paula), defendant’s mother, stepped out in front of

defendant. According to Sproles, once defendant was on the floor, it “only took about a minute”

for the officers to handcuff him.

¶9 On cross-examination, Sproles estimated that Ravadan fired his weapon a minute after he

entered The Hairy Hound. Sproles testified that, after the police commands, defendant

“eventually” dropped the object, got down on his knees and showed his hands, and then got on his

stomach. Sproles could not recall defendant raising his arm to either throw the object at the officers

or stab them with it.

¶ 10 The State played the video from Sprole’s body camera, which depicted, among other

things, the encounter with defendant. The counter on the video showed that defendant got on his

stomach nearly three minutes after Schuttrow entered The Hairy Hound. During that time, several

officers commanded defendant to show himself, drop the object in his hands, and get on his

stomach.

¶ 11 Schuttrow testified that, when he arrived at the scene, he and his K-9 dog assisted the other

officers in clearing the rest of the building before proceeding to The Hairy Hound. During the

search, Schuttrow gave two sets of three announcements, each stating that the police were present

and that the occupants must make themselves known or the dog would be sent. The announcements

were “very loud” so that they could be heard over the dog’s barking. After each announcement,

Schuttrow silenced the dog so that he could hear any responses. When the officers reached the

door of The Hairy Hound, they unlocked the door and Schuttrow stood in the doorway, giving

another set of announcements. After hearing something fall inside the premises, the officers

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ordered anyone inside to show themselves. Defendant stepped into view about 20 feet from the

front entrance. According to Schuttrow, defendant was wearing a backpack and held an

unidentified object in his hand. Schuttrow told defendant to drop the object, but he refused.

Because the dog was barking loudly at this point, Schuttrow removed himself and the dog from

the interior of The Hairy Hound, and Ravadan took the lead. After he and his dog exited, Schuttrow

could no longer see defendant.

¶ 12 On cross-examination, Schuttrow estimated that Ravadan fired his weapon about 10 to 15

seconds after Schuttrow entered The Hairy Hound. He admitted the dog was barking loudly but

explained that this was to gain defendant’s compliance. On redirect examination, he testified that,

during the 10 to 15 seconds before Ravadan shot defendant, both he and Ravadan gave several

commands to defendant to drop the object, but he refused. On recross-examination, Schuttrow

admitted that he never saw defendant attempt to throw the object at the officers or threaten to stab

them with it.

¶ 13 Ravadan testified that, after Schuttrow entered The Hairy Hound, Ravadan entered and

positioned himself to see defendant. Eventually, Ravadan took over and was in front of Schuttrow.

¶ 14 According to Ravadan, defendant was at the back of a hallway, about 15 feet from Ravadan.

He was wearing a backpack and holding an object in his hand. Ravadan could not tell the nature

or color of the object at that time. Ravadan ordered defendant several times to show his hands, but

he refused. Defendant eventually dropped the backpack but not the object in his hand. Ravadan

then pointed his nonlethal weapon at defendant and told him several times to show his hands and

drop the object. Instead of dropping the object, defendant turned sideways, with the hand that held

the object now behind him and out of view. He then raised the hand that held the object. At that

point, Ravadan shot defendant in his left thigh with a soft, sponge-point bullet. After being hit,

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defendant did not immediately drop the object and “continued to be belligerent towards [the]

officers.” Ravadan reloaded and told defendant several times to get on the floor, or he would be

shot again. Defendant then dropped the object and got on the floor. However, after getting on the

floor, defendant remained on his knees and refused to lie on his stomach despite being ordered to

do so. “Eventually,” defendant went down on his stomach, but then he started doing pushups while

continuing to yell at the officers. After defendant got on the floor, a female, later identified as

Paula, stepped out. She complied with police commands and was removed from the area.

Defendant “eventually” stopped doing pushups. For safety, he was handcuffed only after Paula

had been arrested.

¶ 15 The State played the video from Ravadan’s body camera. On cross-examination, Ravadan

admitted that the video showed that defendant dropped the object approximately 13 seconds after

Ravadan entered The Hairy Hound. Ravadan further admitted that he fired his weapon about eight

or nine seconds after he entered. He acknowledged, too, that defendant dropped the object “a few

seconds” after Ravadan fired the weapon. Ravadan’s body camera video showed that several

minutes passed from when Ravadan entered The Hairy Hound to when defendant finally complied

with the command to lie on his stomach.

¶ 16 Beatrice Papanicolaou, the owner of The Hairy Hound, testified that Paula was employed

at The Hairy Hound at the time of the incident and had worked there for about nine months. She

began as a full-time employee but, “towards the end,” she was down to part-time work. Defendant

was Paula’s son. Paula had a key to the business because she would occasionally open before

Papanicolaou arrived. The business generally closed around 5 or 6 p.m.

¶ 17 Because Papanicolaou had received multiple complaints about people being inside The

Hairy Hound after-hours, she had “conversations with both [Paula and defendant].” She told them

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“several times that [they] [could] not be [there] after hours.” She specifically remembered that

defendant was present when she said that he and Paula were not to enter The Hairy Hound after-

hours. Defendant was present because he would pick up Paula from work. When asked if she

remembered the last time she had told them they could not enter The Hairy Hound after-hours, she

answered that she could not recall the exact date because “it was so long ago.” She added that she

might have last reminded Paula on February 5, 2019, the day before the incident, or “somewhere

around that time.” Papanicolaou acknowledged that she occasionally boarded dogs at The Hairy

Hound and asked Paula to remain after-hours to care for the dogs. However, no dogs were being

boarded on the day of the incident. Papanicolaou did not recall exactly the last day Paula had

worked before the incident, but it might have been that same day.

¶ 18 On cross-examination, Papanicolaou testified that the complaints about people being in

The Hairy Hound after-hours came from business owners in the same building and business

owners from across the street. The complaining owners were concerned about their property.

Papanicolaou had no written documentation of the complaints because the area was small and the

group of owners was “tight knit.” Papanicolaou reiterated that she had told Paula and defendant

several times that they were not to enter The Hairy Hound after-hours. Papanicolaou added, “The

last time I told them was the last time I seen [Paula], which I don’t know if she worked, and I told

her that she cannot be there after hours because there’s people complaining.” When she most

recently admonished Paula on that point, Paula promised that she would do as Papanicolaou said.

Because “it’s been so long,” Papanicolaou could not recall the exact date she told defendant not to

enter The Hairy Hound after-hours. She did not give Paula or defendant a written notice or keep a

written record of orally admonishing them. When asked if she had told the police that she had

warned defendant not to enter The Hairy Hound after-hours, she implied that she did not tell them

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because defendant did not work for her. Papanicolaou did not recall telling the police she did not

like Paula and wanted her gone.

¶ 19 On redirect, Papanicolaou testified that, because The Hairy Hound closed at 5 or 6 p.m.

and no dogs were boarded on February 6, 2019, there was no reason for anyone to be there at 11

p.m. that night. When asked how long before the incident she last told defendant that he was not

allowed there after-hours, she responded that she did not recall because “[i]t was so long ago.” She

speculated that it might have been the same day that she last told Paula, as she and defendant were

always together.

¶ 20 The trial court instructed the jury on, inter alia, the definition of obstructing a peace officer

(see Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 22.13 (approved May 4, 2018) (hereinafter

IPI Criminal No. 22.13)) and the elements to be proven for that offense (see Illinois Pattern Jury

Instructions, Criminal, No. 22.14 (approved May 4, 2018) (hereinafter IPI Criminal No. 22.14)).

Defendant neither objected to these instructions nor offered any alternative instructions. The

definitional instruction read:

“A person commits the offense of resisting or obstructing a peace officer when he

knowingly resists or obstructs the performance of any authorized act within the official

capacity of one known to him to be a peace officer.” See IPI Criminal No. 22.13.

The elements instruction read:

“To sustain the charge of resisting or obstructing a peace officer[,] the State must prove the

following propositions:

First Proposition: That Officer Shawn Sproles was a peace officer; and

Second Proposition: That the defendant knew Officer Shawn Sproles was a peace

officer; and

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Third Proposition: That the defendant knowingly resisted or obstructed the

performance by Officer Shawn Sproles of an authorized act within his official capacity.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each one of these

propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant

guilty.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of these

propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant

not guilty.” See IPI Criminal No. 22.14.

¶ 21 The jury found defendant guilty of both counts. Following the denial of defendant’s motion

for a new trial, in which he did not challenge the jury instructions, the trial court sentenced

defendant to 12 months’ conditional discharge on the obstruction conviction, 12 months’ court

supervision on the criminal trespass conviction, and 100 hours of community service on each

conviction, to run concurrently. Defendant, in turn, filed this timely appeal.

¶ 22 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 23 On appeal, defendant contends that (1) the State did not prove him guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt of obstructing a peace officer, (2) the trial court committed plain error when it

tendered pattern jury instructions on obstructing a peace officer that were not modified to specify

Officer Sproles’s authorized act(s) or defendant’s illegal conduct, (3) his trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to object to the instructions on obstructing a peace officer, and (4) the State

failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt an essential element of criminal trespass to real property,

i.e., that defendant had received prior notice that he was not allowed on the property.

¶ 24 We address defendant’s challenges in a different order than he presents them.

¶ 25 A. Jury Instructions on Obstructing a Peace Officer and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

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¶ 26 We begin with defendant’s contention that the trial court erred in giving the pattern jury

instructions on obstructing a peace officer without modifying them to limit the material conduct

to that charged in the amended complaint (i.e., defendant’s failure to show himself and drop the

object from his hand). We begin by noting that defendant forfeited this claim as he did not object

to the instructions, or tender an alternative, in the trial court. Generally, no party may challenge on

appeal the failure to give an instruction unless the party had tendered it. Ill. S. Ct. R. 366(b)(2)(ii)

(eff. Feb. 1, 1994). However, under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 451(c) (eff. Apr. 8, 2013),

“substantial defects [in jury instructions] are not waived by failure to make timely objections

thereto if the interests of justice require.” “The purpose of Rule 451(c) is to permit correction of

grave errors and errors in cases so factually close that fundamental fairness requires that the jury

be properly instructed.” People v. Sargent, 239 Ill. 2d 166, 189 (2010). The rule is coextensive

with the plain-error rule in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967). Sargent, 239 Ill.

2d at 189. Before conducting a plain-error analysis, we must first determine whether there was any

error. People v. Wilson, 404 Ill. App. 3d 244, 247 (2010).

¶ 27 The purpose of jury instructions is to provide the jury with the correct legal principles

applicable to the evidence, so that the jury may reach a correct conclusion according to the law

and the evidence. People v. Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d 52, 81 (2008). The correctness of a jury

instruction depends not on whether defense counsel can imagine a problematic meaning, but on

whether ordinary persons acting as jurors would fail to understand it. Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d at 81.

When an IPI criminal instruction applies in a criminal case, it shall be used unless the court

determines it does not accurately state the law. Ill. S. Ct. R. 451(a) (eff. Apr. 8, 2013). The IPI

instructions should be used because they have been painstakingly drafted and trial judges should

not second guess the drafting committee where the instruction clearly applies. People v. Durr, 215

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Ill. 2d 283, 301 (2005). Accordingly, a trial court may deviate from the pattern instruction and

format “ ‘only where necessary to conform to unusual facts or new law.’ ” People v. Anderson,

2012 IL App (1st) 103288, ¶ 40 (quoting People v. Banks, 287 Ill. App. 3d 273, 280 (1997)).

Although deciding whether to give a certain instruction is generally a matter of discretion, when

the issue is whether the instruction accurately conveys the applicable law, the proper standard of

review is de novo. People v. Pierce, 226 Ill. 2d 470, 475 (2007).

¶ 28 Here, the trial court did not err in giving the pattern instructions defining obstruction of a

peace officer and setting forth the elements to be proven. There is no question that the pattern

instructions accurately conveyed the applicable law. Further, the instructions were consistent with

the charged offenses. There were neither unusual facts nor new law. The State produced evidence

that defendant refused to comply with clear police commands to show himself and drop the object.

The evidence matched the amended complaint’s allegations. Indeed, the jury had been apprised of

the allegations of the amended complaint during voir dire, opening statements and closing

arguments and was fully aware of what conduct was alleged to support an obstruction charge.

Additionally, any variance between the evidence and the allegations of the amended complaint

was neither material nor such that defendant was either misled in his defense or subject to double

jeopardy. See People v. Lattimore, 2011 IL App (1st) 093238, ¶ 67. Although the evidence

included instances of obstructive conduct beyond that alleged in the amended complaint (such as

defendant’s refusal to lie on the floor), those variances merely elaborated upon how defendant

committed the underlying offense and did not deprive him of notice of the charge. See Lattimore,

2011 IL App (1st) 093238, ¶¶ 67, 70. Accordingly, the jury could properly rely on that uncharged

conduct to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Lattimore, 2011 IL App (1st)

093238, ¶ 67. Nor was the indictment lacking any material detail such that defendant could not

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defend against a future prosecution based on the same facts. See Lattimore, 2011 IL App (1st)

093238, ¶ 71. Finally, this case did not involve any new law. We conclude that the use of the

unmodified IPI Criminal Nos. 22.13 and 22.14 was proper.

¶ 29 Further, although defendant cites several cases in support of his assertion that the

unmodified pattern instructions did not accurately state the law, all of these cases are

distinguishable because they address the sufficiency of a charging instrument. See People v.

Stoudt, 198 Ill. App. 3d 124 (1990); People v. Gerdes, 173 Ill. App. 3d 1024 (1988); People v.

Leach, 3 Ill. App. 3d 389 (1972).

¶ 30 Because no error occurred in using the pattern instructions, there was no “grave error” that

would support review under Rule 451(c). See Sargent, 239 Ill. 2d at 189. Thus, we uphold

defendant’s forfeiture of his argument. It follows that because it was not error to give IPI Criminal

Nos. 22.13 and 22.14, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to either object or tender

alternative instructions.

¶ 31 B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 32 We turn to defendant’s arguments on the adequacy of the State’s evidence to support his

convictions.

¶ 33 In any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the relevant inquiry is whether, after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Taylor, 2012

IL App (2d) 110222, ¶ 8. This standard applies whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial

and whether the judgment resulted from a jury or a bench trial. Taylor, 2012 IL App (2d) 110222,

¶ 8. Determining the weight to be given to the witnesses’ testimony, their credibility, and the

reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence are the responsibilities of the trier of fact.

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Taylor, 2012 IL App (2d) 110222, ¶ 8. Thus, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the

trial court on such matters. People v. Sutherland, 155 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (1992).

¶ 34 The amended complaint charged defendant with obstructing Sproles. The elements of

obstructing a peace officer are that the defendant (1) knowingly obstructed someone he knew was

a peace officer and (2) the obstruction actually impeded or hindered the officer from performing

any authorized act within his or her official capacity. 720 ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 2018); see People

v. Sadder-Bey, 2023 IL App (1st) 190027, ¶ 26.

¶ 35 Based on its plain language, section 31-1 of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code) (720 ILCS

5/31-1 (West 2018)) does not particularize all the types of obstructive conduct that might fall

within its purview. People v. Baskerville, 2012 IL 111056, ¶ 23. Rather, the legislature chose to

frame that provision in broad terms, confined only by the rights of free speech, assembly, and other

constitutional concerns. Baskerville, 2012 IL 111056, ¶ 23. Although a person might commit

obstruction of a peace officer via a physical act, such conduct is neither an essential element of,

nor the exclusive means of committing, an obstruction. Baskerville, 2012 IL 111056, ¶ 23. The

legislative focus of section 31-1(a) is on the tendency of the conduct to interpose an obstacle that

impedes or hinders an officer’s performance of his authorized duties. Baskerville, 2012 IL 111056,

¶ 23. Put another way, the offense of obstructing a peace officer does not require proof of a physical

act. Baskerville, 2012 IL 111056, ¶ 29.

¶ 36 Further, any obstruction must materially impede the officer’s performance of an authorized

act. People v. Gotschall, 2022 IL App (4th) 210256, ¶ 27; People v. Mehta, 2020 IL App (3d)

180020, ¶ 26; see also People v. Casler, 2020 IL 125117, ¶ 41 (reaffirming that the defendant’s

acts must be a material impediment) (citing Baskerville, 2012 IL 111056, ¶ 23; People v. Comage,

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241 Ill. 2d 139, 150 (2011)). Whether a defendant obstructed a peace officer is for the trier of fact

to decide based on the facts and circumstances of each case. Baskerville, 2012 IL 111056, ¶ 23.

¶ 37 Here, the evidence established that Sproles was attempting to investigate the report of a

possible burglary in progress. That was undoubtedly an authorized act within his official capacity.

Nor is there any issue that defendant knew that Sproles was a peace officer. Rather, the only issue

raised by defendant is whether the evidence proved that he materially impeded Sproles in that

regard. It did.

¶ 38 The evidence showed that once the officers entered The Hairy Hound, they loudly

announced their presence and ordered anyone inside to show themselves. Defendant did not

immediately comply, as it took several commands from Schuttrow before defendant finally

stepped into view. Once he did, several officers, including Sproles, ordered him to drop an

unidentified object from his hand and lie on his stomach on the floor. Defendant did not

immediately comply; rather, he dropped the object only after repeated commands, a shot in the leg

with a soft-tipped bullet, and a threat to shoot him a second time in the same manner. However,

even after dropping the object, defendant still refused to get on the floor and lie on his stomach.

After several more commands to do so, he got on his knees but still refused to lie down. Finally,

after still more commands, defendant got on his stomach but then began doing pushups. Only after

several more commands did defendant finally lie still so that the officers could safely handcuff

him. This course of conduct—which included defendant’s refusal (as charged) to promptly show

himself and drop the object, despite numerous commands—occurred over several minutes and

prevented Sproles from proceeding with his burglary investigation. Thus, this conduct materially

impeded and hindered Sproles’s performance of an authorized police function.

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¶ 39 Defendant argues that the approximately 13-second interval between the police commands

that he drop the object and his compliance was too brief to constitute a material impediment or

hindrance. We are unpersuaded.

¶ 40 First, the amount of time alone is not dispositive of whether conduct materially impedes or

hinders a peace officer, as that issue depends on the totality of the facts of any given case.

Baskerville, 2012 IL 111056, ¶ 23; see also People v. Shenault, 2014 IL App (2d) 130211, ¶ 22

(neither Baskerville nor Taylor categorically held that the degree of obstruction is measured by

only the amount of time necessary for a peace officer to overcome the defendant’s conduct).

Further, during an ongoing burglary investigation, an unidentified object in a suspect’s hand for

even a short time is particularly dangerous and, here, clearly thwarted the progress of the

investigation until the potential danger was resolved. See People v. McGhee, 2020 IL App (3d)

180349, ¶ 61 (burglary is dangerous because it creates the possibility of a violent confrontation

between the offender and an occupant or a person who comes to investigate) (citing Quarles v.

United States, 587 U.S. ___, ___,139 S. Ct. 1872, 1879 (2019)). As the court stated in People v.

Synnott, 349 Ill. App. 3d 223, 228 (2004), “[i]t seems clear that any behavior that actually threatens

an officer’s safety or even places an officer in fear for his or her safety is a significant impediment

to the officer’s performance of his or her duties.” Accordingly, defendant’s refusal, if only for 13

seconds, to drop the object after several commands to do so heightened the danger of the situation

and effectively prevented Sproles from proceeding with the investigation until that danger was

resolved.

¶ 41 Second, the relevant time here spanned well beyond 13 seconds. As discussed, defendant

took several minutes to fully comply with officers’ commands that he show his hands, drop the

object, and lie on the floor so that he could be handcuffed. We cannot parse out the time that it

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took to comply with one set of police commands from the total time it took for defendant to comply

with all of the commands. Thus, the time it took for defendant to drop the object does not alone

show that defendant was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of obstructing a peace

officer.

¶ 42 We next address whether defendant was proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of

criminal trespass to real property. Specifically, we must determine whether the evidence

established that defendant was given prior notice that he was prohibited from after-hours entry into

The Hairy Hound.

¶ 43 To obtain a conviction for criminal trespass to real property under section 21-3(a)(2) of the

Code (720 ILCS 5/21-3(a)(2) (West 2018)), the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that,

before defendant entered The Hairy Hound, he had received notice from the owner or occupant

that such entry was forbidden. A defendant has received such notice if he has been personally

notified, either in writing or orally. 720 ILCS 5/21-3(b) (West 2018). The defendant must know

that he was told not to enter. People v. Chai, 2014 IL App (2d) 121234, ¶ 34.

¶ 44 Here, Papanicolaou testified that, because she had received complaints about people being

inside The Hairy Hound after-hours, she personally told both defendant and Paula “several times”

that they were not to enter The Hairy Hound after-hours. Further, we note that, even if she had not

told defendant more than once that he was not to enter the establishment after-hours, it was

reasonable to conclude that, if Paula, an employee, was not allowed there after-hours, then neither

was defendant, a non-employee. Additionally, although Papanicolaou could not specifically recall

how long before the incident she had last admonished them, it could not have been longer than the

nine months that Paula had been working at The Hairy Hound at the time of the incident. More

importantly, section 21-3(a)(2) does not expressly require that the notice be given within a certain

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time of the entry. Additionally, Papanicolaou’s inability to recall the exact date when she last

notified defendant that he was not to enter The Hairy Hound after-hours did not materially detract

from her credibility, as she explained that it had been too long ago to recall the exact date.

¶ 45 Thus, because the owner, Papanicolaou, testified that she personally notified defendant

before the incident that he was not to enter The Hairy Hound after-hours, the jury could reasonably

rely on that testimony to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had received the personal

notice required to prove criminal trespass to real property.

¶ 46 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 47 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County.

¶ 48 Affirmed.

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