Filed 9/15/25 P. v. Orozco CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E083908
v. (Super.Ct.No. 16CR030622)
ALONZO OROZCO, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Ingrid Adamson
Uhler, Judge. Affirmed and remanded with instructions.
Allen G. Weinberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher Beesley and
Daniel Rogers, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1 Alonzo Orozco appeals the trial court’s order declining to resentence him under
Penal Code section 1172.75, which declares legally invalid most prison prior
enhancements imposed before 2020 and requires courts to strike such enhancements and
resentence defendants whose sentences include them.1 The People argue he is ineligible
for resentencing under section 1172.75 because at his initial sentencing the court stayed
the punishment for the enhancement. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In 2018 Orozco was convicted of several crimes. At Orozco’s sentencing, the
court said “there were two priors alleged pursuant to 667.5(b), one-year priors, that
actually the Court is considering not imposing,” and reiterated this sentiment moments
later by stating “[t]he Court was considering striking the two one-year priors as not really
being meaningful in this case.” It ultimately found true the two prison prior
enhancements but said it was “going to strike the two one-year prior prison terms. The
sentence that Mr. Orozco’s serving is basically a life sentence, and those are not
meaningful, so I will strike those.”
In 2023 the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)
identified Orozco, among others, as an inmate serving a sentence that contained a prior
prison term enhancement, and referred him to the trial court for possible resentencing
under section 1172.75. The trial court cited People v. Rhodius (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 38
(Rhodius), reversed by People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, and concluded it
1 Unlabeled statutory citations refer to the Penal Code.
2 “lack[ed] jurisdiction for resentencing under 1172.75 based on the fact that the 667.5(b)
priors were stricken or stayed at the time of pronouncement of judgment.” It therefore
denied Orozco’s request for resentencing.
DISCUSSION
In 2022, Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 728) added
section 1171.1 to the Penal Code, later re-numbered to section 1172.75. This section says
“[a]ny sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to
subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any enhancement imposed for a prior
conviction for a sexually violent offense . . . is legally invalid.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).)
Section 1172.75 charges the “Secretary of the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation [CDCR] and the county correctional administrator of each county” to
“identify those persons in their custody currently serving a term for a judgment that
includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a),” and provide certain information
about those people “to the sentencing court that imposed the enhancement.” (§ 1172.75,
subd. (b).) Once a trial court is made aware of a sentence which includes such an
enhancement, “the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.”
(§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) Such resentencing “shall result in a lesser sentence than the one
originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would
endanger public safety.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).) The resentencing is also not limited
to merely striking the now-invalid enhancements, as “section 1172.75 requires a full
3 resentencing, not merely that the trial court strike the newly ‘invalid’ enhancements.”
(People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402.)
To date, two published cases define whether section 1172.75 provides relief where
the enhancement or the punishment for the enhancement was stricken: People v. Espino
(2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 188, review granted October 23, 2024, S286987 (Espino) and
People v. Tang (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1003 (Tang). In Espino the sentencing court
“imposed a prison prior, but stated that it was ‘striking that additional punishment.’ ”
(Espino, at p. 194.) The reviewing court relied heavily on those cases disagreeing with
the now reversed Court of Appeal opinion in Rhodius in holding that so long as an
enhancement is imposed—even if the court strikes the punishment for that
enhancement—defendants are entitled to relief under section 1172.75. (Id. at p. 196
[after discussing the split, concluding there is “no good reason to reject the weight of
authority interpreting section 1172.75 and imply an execution requirement into the word
“ ‘impose.’ ”].) Espino is currently pending review before the California Supreme Court.
The circumstances in Tang were different. There, an appellate court struck the
prison prior enhancement before the defendant sought resentencing. (Tang, supra, 109
Cal.App.5th at p. 1006.) The Tang court noted that this scenario was unlike any
previously considered, because the enhancement was not imposed and executed, imposed
and stayed, or imposed with punishment stricken, but stricken entirely. (Tang, at
pp. 1007-1008.) According to Tang in that circumstance “[i]t would be anomalous to
conclude that an enhancement was both imposed by and stricken from the judgment.”
4 (Id. at p. 1008.) Accordingly, the court concluded that resentencing under
section 1172.75 was not available to defendants whose enhancements had been stricken
entirely. (Id. at p. 1009.)
Therefore, the primary question before us is whether the sentencing court struck
the enhancement or just the punishment for the enhancement, as under section 1385,
subdivision (b)(1) it may do either. Considering the court’s order in the context of the
entire record, we conclude it intended to strike the enhancement itself, not merely the
punishment for the enhancement.
In the sentencing hearing, shortly before asking Orozco to give up his right to a
trial on the prison priors, the court stated “there were two priors alleged pursuant to
667.5(b), one-year priors, that actually the Court is considering not imposing.” Orozco
then waived his trial right. Moments later, in explaining its tentative sentence, the court
repeated this same sentiment by saying “[t]he Court was considering striking the two
one-year priors as not really being meaningful in this case.” These are unambiguous
statements that the court was considering striking the enhancements, not just the
punishment. If the court was considering striking just the punishments, it would need to
impose the enhancements.
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Filed 9/15/25 P. v. Orozco CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E083908
v. (Super.Ct.No. 16CR030622)
ALONZO OROZCO, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Ingrid Adamson
Uhler, Judge. Affirmed and remanded with instructions.
Allen G. Weinberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher Beesley and
Daniel Rogers, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1 Alonzo Orozco appeals the trial court’s order declining to resentence him under
Penal Code section 1172.75, which declares legally invalid most prison prior
enhancements imposed before 2020 and requires courts to strike such enhancements and
resentence defendants whose sentences include them.1 The People argue he is ineligible
for resentencing under section 1172.75 because at his initial sentencing the court stayed
the punishment for the enhancement. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In 2018 Orozco was convicted of several crimes. At Orozco’s sentencing, the
court said “there were two priors alleged pursuant to 667.5(b), one-year priors, that
actually the Court is considering not imposing,” and reiterated this sentiment moments
later by stating “[t]he Court was considering striking the two one-year priors as not really
being meaningful in this case.” It ultimately found true the two prison prior
enhancements but said it was “going to strike the two one-year prior prison terms. The
sentence that Mr. Orozco’s serving is basically a life sentence, and those are not
meaningful, so I will strike those.”
In 2023 the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)
identified Orozco, among others, as an inmate serving a sentence that contained a prior
prison term enhancement, and referred him to the trial court for possible resentencing
under section 1172.75. The trial court cited People v. Rhodius (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 38
(Rhodius), reversed by People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, and concluded it
1 Unlabeled statutory citations refer to the Penal Code.
2 “lack[ed] jurisdiction for resentencing under 1172.75 based on the fact that the 667.5(b)
priors were stricken or stayed at the time of pronouncement of judgment.” It therefore
denied Orozco’s request for resentencing.
DISCUSSION
In 2022, Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 728) added
section 1171.1 to the Penal Code, later re-numbered to section 1172.75. This section says
“[a]ny sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to
subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any enhancement imposed for a prior
conviction for a sexually violent offense . . . is legally invalid.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).)
Section 1172.75 charges the “Secretary of the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation [CDCR] and the county correctional administrator of each county” to
“identify those persons in their custody currently serving a term for a judgment that
includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a),” and provide certain information
about those people “to the sentencing court that imposed the enhancement.” (§ 1172.75,
subd. (b).) Once a trial court is made aware of a sentence which includes such an
enhancement, “the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.”
(§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) Such resentencing “shall result in a lesser sentence than the one
originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would
endanger public safety.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).) The resentencing is also not limited
to merely striking the now-invalid enhancements, as “section 1172.75 requires a full
3 resentencing, not merely that the trial court strike the newly ‘invalid’ enhancements.”
(People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402.)
To date, two published cases define whether section 1172.75 provides relief where
the enhancement or the punishment for the enhancement was stricken: People v. Espino
(2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 188, review granted October 23, 2024, S286987 (Espino) and
People v. Tang (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1003 (Tang). In Espino the sentencing court
“imposed a prison prior, but stated that it was ‘striking that additional punishment.’ ”
(Espino, at p. 194.) The reviewing court relied heavily on those cases disagreeing with
the now reversed Court of Appeal opinion in Rhodius in holding that so long as an
enhancement is imposed—even if the court strikes the punishment for that
enhancement—defendants are entitled to relief under section 1172.75. (Id. at p. 196
[after discussing the split, concluding there is “no good reason to reject the weight of
authority interpreting section 1172.75 and imply an execution requirement into the word
“ ‘impose.’ ”].) Espino is currently pending review before the California Supreme Court.
The circumstances in Tang were different. There, an appellate court struck the
prison prior enhancement before the defendant sought resentencing. (Tang, supra, 109
Cal.App.5th at p. 1006.) The Tang court noted that this scenario was unlike any
previously considered, because the enhancement was not imposed and executed, imposed
and stayed, or imposed with punishment stricken, but stricken entirely. (Tang, at
pp. 1007-1008.) According to Tang in that circumstance “[i]t would be anomalous to
conclude that an enhancement was both imposed by and stricken from the judgment.”
4 (Id. at p. 1008.) Accordingly, the court concluded that resentencing under
section 1172.75 was not available to defendants whose enhancements had been stricken
entirely. (Id. at p. 1009.)
Therefore, the primary question before us is whether the sentencing court struck
the enhancement or just the punishment for the enhancement, as under section 1385,
subdivision (b)(1) it may do either. Considering the court’s order in the context of the
entire record, we conclude it intended to strike the enhancement itself, not merely the
punishment for the enhancement.
In the sentencing hearing, shortly before asking Orozco to give up his right to a
trial on the prison priors, the court stated “there were two priors alleged pursuant to
667.5(b), one-year priors, that actually the Court is considering not imposing.” Orozco
then waived his trial right. Moments later, in explaining its tentative sentence, the court
repeated this same sentiment by saying “[t]he Court was considering striking the two
one-year priors as not really being meaningful in this case.” These are unambiguous
statements that the court was considering striking the enhancements, not just the
punishment. If the court was considering striking just the punishments, it would need to
impose the enhancements. Saying it was considering not imposing them at all is
therefore the same as saying it was considering striking the enhancements. In his
argument, accordingly, the prosecutor stated that he was “assuming the Court strikes the
two one-year priors.” Moreover, as the court explained the sentence it would impose, it
5 gave no indication that it would impose the prison prior enhancements but strike their
punishment.
Given this context, we read the court’s ultimate statement that it was “going to
strike the two one-year prior prison terms” to mean that it intended to strike the
enhancements themselves and not just the punishment for the enhancements. Unlike
most other enhancements, these enhancements are sometimes referred to using the word
“term” when speaking of the enhancement itself, and not just the punishment on the
enhancement. (See, e.g., People v. Acosta (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 19, 25 [trial court
“must strike the three prior prison terms”] [bolding, italics, and capitalization omitted];
People v. Garcia (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1563 [trial court has decision “to impose
or strike the three prior prison terms”].) Indeed, immediately after saying it was going to
strike the prior prison terms, the court reiterated that “[t]he sentence that Mr. Orozco’s
serving is basically a life sentence, and those [enhancements] are not meaningful, so I
will strike those.” Like the earlier statements, this final statement provides no indication
that the court intended to impose the enhancements and strike the punishment only.
Therefore, on the oral record alone we believe the sentencing court struck Orozco’s
enhancements, and not merely the punishment for the enhancements.
The abstract of judgment is not helpful in the determination of what the oral
pronouncement meant. The abstract of judgment incorrectly records the enhancements as
stayed by using an “S” in the appropriate box. That did not happen. If the trial court had
intended to only strike the punishment, the form abstract of judgment provides that the
6 clerk should enter the abbreviation “PS”—for punishment stricken. The oral transcript
shows that the abstract of judgment is in error and should be corrected. Our reading of
the record is that it should be corrected by removing any reference to the enhancements.
Because the sentencing court struck the enhancements themselves, we apply Tang
and conclude that Orozco is not entitled to relief under section 1172.75. We therefore
affirm the trial court’s order denying his petition.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s order denying Orozco’s petition under section 1172.75,
but remand with instructions to correct the abstract of judgment by removing any
reference to the stricken enhancements, and to correct the sentencing minute order to
reflect that the enhancements were stricken rather than stayed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS RAPHAEL J. We concur:
CODRINGTON Acting P. J.
MENETREZ J.