People v. Oravec

2025 IL App (3d) 240220-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: August 28, 2025
• Docket: 3-24-0220
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: This order was filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2025 IL App (3d) 240220-U

Order filed August 28, 2025 ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 18th Judicial Circuit, ) Du Page County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-24-0220 v. ) Circuit No. 22-CF-1313 ) KERRY L. ORAVEC, ) Honorable ) Margaret O’Connell, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the judgment of the court. Justice Davenport concurred in the judgment. Justice Hettel specially concurred. ____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶1 Held: (1) The evidence presented was sufficient to establish the defendant was traveling at least 21 miles per hour over the legal speed limit. (2) The court did not abuse its discretion in allowing speedometer calibration testimony.

¶2 The defendant, Kerry L. Oravec, appeals her conviction for aggravated fleeing or

attempting to elude a peace officer, arguing that the State failed to prove her guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt. The defendant further contends that the Du Page County circuit court abused its

discretion by allowing the State to elicit testimony without establishing a proper foundation. ¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of aggravated fleeing or attempting

to elude a peace officer (625 ILCS 5/11-204.1(a)(1) (West 2022)). At trial, Sergeant Sean Ryan

testified that he had been employed with the Westmont Police Department for 22 years and was

on patrol in a marked squad car at approximately 2:07 a.m. on June 8, 2022. At that time, Ryan

observed the defendant’s vehicle turn into the oncoming traffic lane on a two-lane roadway. As

the defendant continued to travel westbound in the eastbound traffic lane, Ryan began following

her vehicle and activated his emergency lights once he was 150 to 200 feet behind her. After the

emergency lights were activated, the defendant’s vehicle briefly merged into the correct traffic

lane behind a red SUV before entering the parking lane to accelerate past the SUV. Ryan followed

the defendant for approximately six blocks on Burlington Avenue, a residential street with a posted

speed limit of 25 miles per hour. Ryan testified that his squad car’s speedometer displayed a speed

of 55 miles per hour and was consistent with the speed he believed he was traveling. Although his

rate of speed was 30 miles per hour over the posted speed limit, Ryan was unable to close any

distance between his vehicle and the defendant’s. The pursuit was captured on dash camera video

from Ryan’s squad car, which was admitted into evidence.

¶5 During his testimony, Ryan was questioned by the State regarding his squad car’s

speedometer and the following colloquy occurred:

“Q. And with regards to the speedometer of that squad vehicle, was that

calibrated?

A. It’s calibrated in the factory before we get them.

Q. Okay. And what year was that squad car?

A. It’s a 2021.

2 Q. And in your training and experience with the Westmont Police

Department, is there any margin of error with those speedometers?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection.

THE COURT: Overruled.

***

A. About two miles an hour one way or the other.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, Judge, foundation. I don’t believe that

this officer can testify as to the calibration. He hasn’t provided any evidence as to

his knowledge of the foundation—

THE COURT: He’s testifying as to his personal experience and knowledge,

so your objection is overruled.”

¶6 The proceedings continued and the defendant moved for a directed finding at the close of

the State’s case, arguing that Ryan’s testimony was insufficient to establish that she exceeded the

speed limit by at least 21 miles per hour. In denying the motion, the court found that Ryan’s

testimony had sufficiently established the speed-related element of the offense.

¶7 Subsequent to the jury’s guilty verdict, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial. The

defendant argued, inter alia, that the court erred (1) in denying the defendant’s motion for a

directed finding because the State’s evidence was insufficient to establish that the defendant’s

vehicle was traveling 21 miles per hour over the legal speed limit and (2) by allowing Ryan to

testify about the speedometer calibration on his squad car without laying a proper foundation. The

court denied the defendant’s motion, finding in part that Ryan’s testimony was sufficient to

establish the speed the defendant was traveling and was supported by the dash camera video.

¶8 II. ANALYSIS

3 ¶9 On appeal, the defendant first argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to

prove that she was driving at a speed at least 21 miles per hour over the legal speed limit. When a

defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence and all reasonable

inferences from the record in the light most favorable to the State to determine whether any rational

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

People v. Harvey, 2024 IL 129357, ¶ 19. It is not our function to retry the defendant, and we will

not substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact regarding the weight of the evidence or the

credibility of witnesses. People v. Jones, 2023 IL 127810, ¶ 28. A criminal conviction will not be

reversed unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that it leaves a

reasonable doubt regarding the defendant’s guilt. Id.

¶ 10 To sustain the defendant’s conviction for aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a peace

officer, the State was required to prove that the defendant had been given a visual or audible signal

by a peace officer and then fled or attempted to elude a peace officer while traveling at a rate of

speed at least 21 miles per hour over the legal speed limit. 625 ILCS 5/11-204.1(a)(1) (West 2022).

Here, the only element of the offense in dispute is the aggravating factor of speed, as the defendant

claims the State’s evidence failed to prove that she was traveling at least 21 miles per hour over

the legal speed limit.

¶ 11 Here, Ryan testified that the posted speed limit on Burlington Avenue was 25 miles per

hour. To establish that the defendant’s speed exceeded the maximum speed limit by 21 miles per

hour, the State had the burden of proving that the defendant was traveling at least 46 miles per

hour. Proof of a defendant’s speed may be established by various methods, including: radar gun,

stopwatch, pacing the defendant’s vehicle, or direct testimony of an officer. People v. Lipscomb,

2013 IL App (1st) 120530, ¶ 7. Ryan’s testimony established that, as he travelled at 55 miles per

4 hour, the defendant’s vehicle continued to speed away from him. This established that the

defendant was travelling more than 30 miles per hour over the speed limit.

¶ 12 The defendant asserts that Ryan’s testimony failed to prove her vehicle’s speed because it

was “similarly ambiguous” to the officer testimony provided in Lipscomb. In Lipscomb, the officer

testified about his own rate of speed but did not indicate the period of time he drove at that speed

or the relationship between his vehicle and the defendant’s during the pursuit. Id. ¶¶ 8-9. The court

held the officer’s testimony was insufficient for the trier of fact to reasonably infer or determine

the speed of the defendant’s vehicle. Id. ¶ 9. Unlike the officer in Lipscomb, Ryan testified that he

was traveling 30 miles per hour over the legal speed limit and was unable to close any distance

between his vehicle and the defendant’s during the six-block pursuit. See People v. Bates, 2024 IL

App (4th) 230011, ¶¶ 5, 29 (officer testimony about his own rate of speed and inability to catch up

to the defendant’s vehicle during pursuit sufficient to establish the aggravated speed factor).

Lipscomb is further distinguishable because the only testimony presented was the officer’s

testimony, whereas Ryan’s testimony was corroborated by his dash camera video. Therefore, the

evidence was sufficient for the jury to have reasonably inferred that the defendant exceeded the

speed limit by at least 21 miles per hour.

¶ 13 The defendant next contends that testimony about the speedometer calibration of Ryan’s

squad car lacked a proper foundation because Ryan did not provide testimony regarding the

speedometer’s accuracy. We disagree. Ryan testified about the accuracy of the speedometer when

he indicated that there was a two mile per hour margin of error and that the speed displayed during

the pursuit was consistent with the rate of speed he believed he was traveling. Once the question

of the speedometer’s accuracy was raised through Ryan’s testimony, it was an issue of fact for the

jury to resolve. See Village of Schaumburg v. Pedersen, 60 Ill. App. 3d 630, 633 (1978). Moreover,

5 the State had no burden to prove the speedometer’s accuracy beyond a reasonable doubt. See

People v. Fair, 61 Ill. App. 2d 360, 365-66 (1965). No foundation was necessary for Ryan to testify

that his department’s squad cars were generally factory-calibrated prior to receipt and that his

vehicle was manufactured the year prior to the incident as his statements were based on his own

experience and knowledge. See Ill. R. Evid. 701 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). Therefore, the admission of

such testimony was not an abuse of discretion. See People v. Richardson, 2013 IL App (2d)

120119, ¶ 10.

¶ 14 In coming to this conclusion, we note that the defendant spends a portion of his brief

discussing the Westmont Police Department policies regarding pacing and speedometer accuracy

and asks us to take judicial notice of such policies. This information could have been introduced

at trial during Ryan’s cross-examination to contest his credibility and the weight to be given to the

evidence. However, the defendant did not do so. We will not now consider Ryan’s compliance or

noncompliance with these policies. See People v. Aquisto, 2022 IL App (4th) 200081, ¶ 91

(appellate court will decline to take judicial notice of information that should have been presented

during circuit court proceedings).

¶ 15 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 16 The judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.

¶ 17 Affirmed.

¶ 18 JUSTICE HETTEL, specially concurring:

¶ 19 I concur with the majority’s decision to affirm the circuit court’s judgment. However, I do

not join in the majority’s holding regarding Ryan’s speedometer-calibration testimony. Supra ¶ 13.

¶ 20 Illinois Rule of Evidence 602 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) provides that “[a] witness may not testify

to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has

6 personal knowledge of the matter.” In other words, the party offering the testimony must lay a

foundation for the testimony to be admissible. In this case, regarding speedometer calibration,

Ryan testified at trial that (1) squad cars are “calibrated in the factory before we get them” and (2)

the margin for error with the speedometers was two miles per hour. Without more, it is impossible

to determine whether Ryan’s speedometer-calibration testimony came from personal knowledge.

The court’s ruling that this testimony was admissible, because it came from personal knowledge,

constituted an abuse of discretion.

¶ 21 In partial support of it upholding the circuit court’s evidentiary ruling on this issue, the

majority states that “[n]o foundation was necessary for Ryan to testify that his department’s squad

cars were generally factory-calibrated prior to receipt and that his vehicle was manufactured the

year prior to the incident as his statements were based on his own experience and knowledge.”

Supra ¶ 13. The majority’s citations in support of this statement—Illinois Rule of Evidence 701

(eff. Jan. 1, 2011) and People v. Richardson, 2013 IL App (2d) 120119, ¶ 10—address lay-opinion

testimony, which was not the basis for the circuit court’s admission of Ryan’s speedometer

calibration testimony. Additionally, even if Ryan’s testimony could be considered lay-opinion

testimony, both Rule 701 and Richardson acknowledge that opinion testimony still requires

foundation evidence. Ill. R. Evid. 701 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) (requiring, in part, that lay-opinion

testimony is “rationally based on the perception of the witness”); Richardson, 2013 IL App (2d)

120119, ¶ 10 (holding that lay-opinion testimony must be based, in part, “on the witness’s personal

observation”). There was nothing in Ryan’s speedometer-calibration testimony to indicate that it

was based on personal knowledge.

¶ 22 Despite the circuit court’s erroneous ruling and the majority’s decision to uphold that error,

the erroneous admission of Ryan’s speedometer-calibration testimony constituted harmless error.

7 Proof of a defendant’s speed can be established in several ways, including through an officer’s

direct testimony. People v. Lipscomb, 2013 IL App (1st) 120530, ¶ 7. Even without the erroneously

admitted speedometer-calibration testimony, the evidence presented in this case was sufficient to

sustain Oravec’s conviction for the charged offense.