People v. O'Garro

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. O'Garro

53 A.D.2d 520, 385 N.Y.S.2d 939, 1976 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13106

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJune 3, 1976

StatusPublished

This text of 53 A.D.2d 520 (People v. O'Garro) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. O'Garro, 53 A.D.2d 520, 385 N.Y.S.2d 939, 1976 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13106 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1976).

Pincite

Opinion

judgment, Supreme Court, New York County, rendered on December 10, 1973, convicting defendant, after trial before Ascione, J., and a jury, of two counts of robbery in the second degree and one count each of assault in the second degree and grand larceny in the third degree, unanimously modified, on the law, to the extent of reversing the conviction for grand larceny in the third degree and dismissing that count of the indictment and, as so modified, the judgment is affirmed. (People v Pyles, 44 AD2d 784.) The People concede that, on the facts in this case, grand larceny in the third degree was an inclusory concurrent count and that the judgment should be so modified. We have examined the other contentions raised by defendant-appellant and find them to be without merit. Concur—Stevens, P. J., Markewich, Kupferman, Murphy and Capozzoli, JJ.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

judgment, Supreme Court, New York County, rendered on December 10, 1973, convicting defendant, after trial before Ascione, J., and a jury, of two counts of robbery in the second degree and one count each of assault in the second degree and grand larceny in the third degree, unanimously modified, on the law, to the extent of reversing the conviction for grand larceny in the third degree and dismissing that count of the indictment and, as so modified, the judgment is affirmed. (People v Pyles, 44 AD2d 784.) The People concede that, on the facts in this case, grand larceny in the third degree was an inclusory concurrent count and that the judgment should be so modified. We have examined the other contentions raised by defendant-appellant and find them to be without merit. Concur—Stevens, P. J., Markewich, Kupferman, Murphy and Capozzoli, JJ.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

53 A.D.2d 520, 385 N.Y.S.2d 939, 1976 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13106, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-ogarro-nyappdiv-1976.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack