People v. Norton CA2/7

Opinion

Filed 9/9/26 P. v. Norton CA2/7 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B337186

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No.

v. 23CJCF00091)

MARCEL D. NORTON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Serena R. Murillo, Judge. Reversed.

Monique Hemli-Munoz, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Ryan M. Smith, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________________

INTRODUCTION

Marcel D. Norton burglarized Michelle Alexander’s home.

At the time, Alexander lived with her daughter-in-law, Donnaysia Brinkley. Alexander’s daughter, Lanetta Stuckey, used to live in the apartment, but she had moved out. When Norton entered Alexander’s home, he asked Alexander where her daughter was. Alexander, thinking Norton was referring to Stuckey, told Norton that Stuckey was not there.

Norton was convicted of residential burglary under Penal Code section 459.1 The trial court issued a 10-year protective order under section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1), protecting Alexander and Brinkley from Norton. The court stated that the order was appropriate because the motive for the crime was a prior dating relationship between Norton and Stuckey and that Alexander and Brinkley were “collateral” victims of prior domestic violence.

Section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1), provides in relevant part that, when a defendant is convicted of a domestic violence crime, the trial court may issue “an order restraining the defendant from any contact with a victim of the crime.” Norton argues, the People concede, and we agree the trial court erred in issuing the protective order because Norton’s burglary conviction is not a domestic violence offense. Therefore, we reverse.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Norton Enters Alexander’s Home and Destroys Property

Alexander lived with Brinkley and Alexander’s two granddaughters. Stuckey used to live in the home, but she no longer lived there. On November 1, 2023, at approximately 11:00 p.m., Alexander was in her bedroom, and Brinkley and the granddaughters were in the living room. They heard a thumping noise at the front door, and it broke open.

Norton entered, holding a metal rod. Norton struck two windows and a television with the rod and asked Alexander, who had come out of the bedroom, where her daughter was. Alexander believed he was asking about Stuckey. She told Norton that Stuckey was not there. Alexander returned to the bedroom and called the police. Norton left the apartment.

B. Norton Is Convicted of Burglary and Sentenced The People charged Norton with committing first degree burglary with a person present. The case proceeded to trial, but the jury was unable to reach a verdict, and the court declared a mistrial. After the People asked the court to strike the allegations that a person other than an accomplice was present and that the offense was a violent felony within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (c)(21), Norton pleaded no contest to first degree burglary, and the trial court sentenced him to the middle term of four years.

The trial court also issued a 10-year protective order under section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1), naming Alexander and Brinkley as protected parties. The court found that, because of the

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relationship between Norton and Stuckey, Norton’s conviction involved domestic violence. The court based this finding on the testimony of two witnesses at the trial: Brinkley’s statement she “had a speculation” Stuckey and Norton were “together” and the apartment manager’s statements that he had seen them together on multiple occasions and that he thought they were “boyfriendgirlfriend .” The court ruled this evidence supported a finding Alexander and Brinkley were victims of domestic violence within the meaning of section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1). Norton timely appealed, and the trial court granted his request for a certificate of probable cause.

DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review Section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1), provides, in relevant part:

“When a criminal defendant has been convicted of a crime involving domestic violence [as defined in enumerated statutes] the court, at the time of sentencing, shall consider issuing an order restraining the defendant from any contact with a victim of the crime.” Section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1), “provides authority for the imposition of postconviction protective orders where a defendant is convicted of a qualifying domestic violence offense.” (People v. Garcia (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 887, 901.)

Domestic violence is abuse committed against, among other categories of victims, a person with whom the defendant had a dating relationship (§ 13700, subd. (b); see also Fam. Code, § 6211 [“‘Domestic violence’ is abuse perpetrated against . . . [¶] (a) [a] spouse or former spouse[;] [¶] (b) [a] cohabitant or former cohabitant[;] [¶] (c) [a] person with whom the respondent is

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having or has had a dating or engagement relationship[;] [¶] (d) [a] person with whom the respondent has had a child . . .[;] [¶] (e) [a] child of a party . . .[; or] [¶] (f) [a]ny other person related by consanguinity or affinity within the second degree.”].)

“Abuse” is “intentionally or recklessly causing or attempting to cause bodily injury, or placing another person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to himself or herself, or another.” (§ 13700, subd. (a).) Section 136, subdivision (3), defines “victim” as “any natural person with respect to whom there is reason to believe that any crime as defined under the laws of this state or any other statute or of the United States is being or has been perpetrated or attempted to be perpetrated.” Thus, “a postconviction protective order under section 136.2[, subdivision] (i)(1) is authorized if: (1) the defendant has been convicted of one (or more) of the statutorily enumerated crimes; and (2) ‘the protected person qualifies as a “‘“victim”’” of said crime(s).’” (People v. Walts (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 127, 139.)

Protective orders under section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1), “are limited to defendants convicted of crimes that qualify as ‘“‘domestic violence and where the protected person qualifies as a “‘“victim”’” of said crime(s).” (People v. Lopez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 227, 237.) Courts do not have inherent authority to issue a criminal protective order absent a statute authorizing such an order. (People v. Corrales (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 283, 286-287.)

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B. The Trial Court Erred in Issuing a Criminal Protective Order for an Offense That Did Not Involve Domestic Violence

Norton was not convicted of a domestic violence or other offense that authorized the court to issue a protective order under section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1). As the People concede, his conviction did not justify a protective order. (See People v. Garcia, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 901 [where the defendant’s convictions “are not domestic violence offenses,” the court does “not have statutory authority to impose [a] postconviction protective order, and it must be stricken”].)

The trial court issued a protective order based on testimony Norton and Stuckey had been in a dating relationship. The court admitted the order was “a stretch,” but concluded the evidence was “probably sufficient.” The court stated: “I do think the motive for this crime was based on prior domestic violence and a relationship with the victim’s daughter, Ms. Stuckey. And that Ms. Brinkley and Ms. Alexander were victims of that and collateral damage of that incident at their home, which was motivated by domestic violence within the meaning of” People v. Beckemeyer (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 461 and People v. Delarosarauda (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 205.

Both cases are distinguishable. In Beckemeyer the defendant was convicted of attempted murder of a woman he had been dating and assault with a deadly weapon of her son. (People v. Beckemeyer, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 464.) The court held the victim’s son was a victim for purposes of a protective order under section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1), because the defendant assaulted the son during a domestic violence incident. (Beckemeyer, at 467.) In Delarosarauda the defendant was

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convicted of willfully inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition upon a spouse or cohabitant, assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury, assault with a deadly weapon, and misdemeanor vandalism. (People v. Delarosarauda, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at pp. 207-208.) The court in Delarosarauda held the trial court erred in issuing a protective order under section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1), that enjoined the defendant from contacting his son and stepdaughter, absent evidence the defendant harmed or attempted to harm them. (Delarosarauda, at p. 212.)

Beckemeyer and Delarosarauda involved convictions for crimes that involved domestic violence; Norton’s conviction for burglary did not. As the People concede, “[w]hile the trial court’s reliance on Beckemeyer and Delarosarauda did apply with regard to the definition of a victim, neither case involved non-domestic violence convictions.” And even if Norton’s actions were “motivated” by some kind of dating history between Norton and Stuckey, Stuckey was not a victim of the burglary. (See People v. Pena (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 640, 648 [the Legislature amended section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1), in 2018 “to specify that ‘a victim’ is only a victim ‘of the crime’ the defendant was convicted of committing”]; People v. Walts, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 143 [“[i]f there is no reason to believe that an enumerated section 136.2[, subdivision] (i)(1) offense for which the defendant was convicted ‘is being or has been perpetrated or attempted to be perpetrated’ against a particular person, that person is not a ‘victim’ and may not seek, or be named as protected party by, a protective order under section 136.2[, subdivision] (i)(1)”].)

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DISPOSITION

The order is reversed.

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

FEUER, J.

STONE, J.