People v. Nguerebanda

2025 IL App (1st) 232013-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: May 19, 2025
• Docket: 1-23-2013
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2025 IL App (1st) 232013-U No. 1-23-2013 Order filed May 19, 2025 First Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 21 CR 2229 ) STEVEN NGUEREBANDA, ) Honorable ) Aleksandra Gillespie, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE FITZGERALD SMITH delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Lavin and Cobbs concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The trial court did not err in rejecting defendant’s defense of necessity where the evidence showed that defendant escalated the situation and reasonable alternatives to pushing the victim were available. Remanded with instructions where defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated battery in violation of the one-act, one- crime rule.

¶2 Following a bench trial, defendant Steven Nguerebanda was found guilty of two counts of

aggravated battery and sentenced to 13 months of probation and anger management classes.

Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred when it rejected his affirmative defense of No. 1-23-2013

necessity. He further argues, and the State concedes, that his convictions violate the one-act, one-

crime rule. We affirm and remand with directions.

¶3 Defendant was charged with two counts of aggravated battery for pushing Hailey Murrieta,

causing great bodily harm (count I) and permanent disfigurement (count II) (720 ILCS 5/12-

3.05(a)(1) (West 2020)).

¶4 Prior to trial, defendant disclosed that he intended to present the affirmative defense of

necessity.

¶5 At trial, Murrieta testified that on June 13, 2020, she visited her friend Rachel Miller, who

lived in an apartment on the 900 block of West Carmen Avenue in Chicago. Around midnight,

Murrieta heard arguing in the lobby. Murrieta went to the lobby, where she observed a man, later

determined to be defendant, and a woman, later determined to be Amanda, sitting on a bench in

the corner. 1 Defendant became “more aggressive” with his conduct and body language. Murrieta

told defendant to step away from Amanda, who appeared “scared.” Defendant moved to another

bench, about a foot away, but then stood and pointed “very close” in Murrieta’s face. They

exchanged words, but Murrieta could not recall what they said.

¶6 Amanda got behind Murrieta, and Miller, who had entered the lobby, intervened to help

Murrieta and Amanda keep their distance from defendant. Defendant shoved Miller, Murrieta, and

Amanda, and grabbed Amanda as Murrieta tried to help her exit the building. He blocked the exit

as Miller held the door open, shoved Miller several times, and screamed at all three women.

Defendant was “very aggressive” with his tone and body language.

1 Amanda’s last name does not appear in the record. During cross-examination of Murrieta, defense counsel stipulated to the identity of defendant as the man in the lobby.

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¶7 At some point, defendant lunged towards Murrieta, placed his hands on her collarbone, and

pushed her using “real hard force,” causing her to fall backwards and land on her hands. Murrieta

felt instant pain in her left wrist, which swelled and felt hot to the touch. She returned to Amanda,

who was sitting on the bench and trying to contact her sister. Murrieta spoke to the sister, informing

her that Amanda was safe and they were trying to get her out of the building.

¶8 Shortly after Murrieta’s fall, two male tenants arrived in the lobby. After one of the men

talked to defendant, the man, defendant, and Miller escorted Amanda into her sister’s vehicle.

Defendant returned about a minute later, and he was “still very aggressive” with his tone and

yelling before entering the elevator.

¶9 On June 30, 2020, Murrieta had surgery in which nine screws and a plate were placed on

her left wrist. Murrieta showed the court the three-inch surgical scar.

¶ 10 The State published a video from the building lobby, which was entered into evidence. The

video is included in the record, and we have viewed it. There is no audio component. Murrieta

identified the parties in the video during her testimony.

¶ 11 In the video, Murrieta enters the lobby and speaks to someone outside the frame. After

about 30 seconds, defendant approaches Murrieta, pointing in her face. The two seem to be

arguing, and defendant becomes more agitated. Miller enters the lobby, and defendant grabs her

arm and pushes her into Murrieta. Amanda appears and stands behind defendant. Miller then holds

the lobby door open, gesturing to Amanda to go outside. Defendant blocks Amanda with his arm

and grabs her wrist, moving her behind him. He releases Amanada, and she moves toward

Murrieta. As Amanda passes defendant, he grabs her arm and Murrieta tries to pry his hand off

Amanda. While this happens, defendant and Murrieta continue to argue, and defendant points in

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Murrieta’s face. Miller places herself between Murrieta and defendant. She also tries to pry

defendant’s hand off Amanda’s arm. Murrieta says something to defendant, and he shoves all three

women but continues to hold Amanda’s arm.

¶ 12 After about a minute, defendant lunges at Murrieta, who stumbles but remains standing.

Murrieta walks toward defendant, who gestures at her and points in her face. Miller opens the

lobby door and gestures to Amanda to exit, but defendant stops Amanda from leaving. He turns to

Murrieta, points at her face, and appears to speak angrily at her. Murrieta raises her hands, palms

facing forward. Defendant lunges at her, pushing on her shoulders. Murrieta falls backwards, and

her left hand hits the floor.

¶ 13 On cross-examination, Murrieta affirmed that she initiated contact with defendant and

Amanda. Murrieta wanted to get Amanda out of the building “to be safe” based on the language

Murrieta heard. She believed Amanda was in distress. Defendant allowed Amanda to leave when

her sister’s vehicle was outside.

¶ 14 Miller testified that defendant was arguing with Amanda about leaving the building.

Amanda said that defendant would not let her leave, and she called her sister to pick her up.

Defendant said that Amanda was “drunk and crazy” and “couldn’t leave.” When Murrieta

approached, defendant said it was none of their business and repeated that Amanda was “drunk

and crazy.” From Miller’s observation, Amanda did not appear intoxicated.

¶ 15 Miller recounted that defendant shoved her twice, grabbed Amanda’s arm with a “very

strong grip,” and shoved Murrieta. As Miller attempted to help Amanda exit the building,

defendant placed his hands on Murrieta’s shoulders and pushed, causing Murrieta to fall

backwards onto the floor, where she caught herself with her hands. Defendant then turned to the

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door and tried to prevent Amanda from leaving. Eventually, a male neighbor entered the lobby and

helped Amanda exit the building, along with defendant and Miller. When defendant, Miller, and

the male neighbor returned to the building, defendant began yelling “aggressively.”

¶ 16 On cross-examination, Miller confirmed that defendant repeated that Amanda was drunk,

Amanda should not leave, and it was none of their business. She agreed that defendant became

aggressive when they wanted Amanda to leave the premises.

¶ 17 Defendant testified that on the day of the incident, his friend’s girlfriend, Amanda, drove

him home from a soccer game. Her driving was “no good” because she was “very drunk.” When

they arrived at his apartment, he asked for her vehicle’s keys because he did not want her to drive.

After Amanda gave him the keys, he briefly went to his apartment while Amanda waited for him

in the lobby. When defendant retuned to the lobby, he asked Amanda to call someone to pick her

up. They contacted Amanda’s sister, and defendant asked her if she could pick up Amanda

“because she is very drunk.” The sister said she would be there in 40 to 50 minutes.

¶ 18 In the lobby, Amanda was talking and “yelling too much” that she needed her key back.

Defendant returned the key, but told her she could not leave and needed to wait for her sister. After

about 40 minutes, a woman entered the lobby and talked to them. When the woman grabbed

defendant’s hand to push him away, he pushed her. The woman made physical contact with him

first. Defendant told her that he could not let Amanda leave because Amanda was drunk and it was

not the woman’s business.

¶ 19 On cross-examination, defendant testified that he asked Amanda for her keys as soon as

they arrived in his lobby, and she complied. Defendant then told her to call someone to pick her

up. Amanda was “yelling a lot,” but he was not yelling.

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¶ 20 Defendant pointed at the two women, but one of the women “started first” with how she

talked to him. The woman did not ask him what happened and just told him that he wanted to rob

and kidnap Amanda, which made him “mad.” Defendant tried to explain that Amanda was drunk,

but the woman refused to listen. He spent nearly 15 minutes trying to explain the situation before

he pushed the woman. Defendant only pushed the woman because he did not want Amanda to go

with her, but to remain in the lobby until Amanda’s sister picked her up.

¶ 21 The court found defendant guilty on both counts of aggravated battery. The court found

the facts uncontroverted that defendant pushed Murietta, causing her to fall and break her wrist.

The court noted that, in his necessity defense, defendant alleged that he had to push Murrieta to

prevent Amanda from driving drunk. The court concluded, however, that “there was another

alternative that existed other than pushing Ms. Murrieta.” The court remarked that “[c]learer minds

should have prevailed in this situation and calmer minds would have provided a much more

alternative [sic] than the actual pushing of the victim in his case.”

¶ 22 Defendant filed a motion for new trial, which the court denied. At the hearing, the court

explained that the video “clearly depicts [defendant] pushing [Murietta]” and the “necessity

defense *** clearly didn’t shift the burden back to the State in any way, shape, or form.” The court

found that the “fact remains that [defendant] actually escalated the situation.”

¶ 23 Defendant was sentenced to 13 months of probation and anger management classes.

¶ 24 On appeal, defendant first argues that the trial court erred in rejecting his defense of

¶ 25 “When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine

whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

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reasonable doubt.” People v. Harvey, 2024 IL 129357, ¶ 19. “The trier of fact determines the

credibility of the witnesses, decides what weight to give their testimony, resolves conflicts in the

evidence, and draws reasonable inferences from that evidence.” People v. Swenson, 2020 IL

124688, ¶ 36. We review the evidence “in the light most favorable to the prosecution,” and “[a]ll

reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of a finding of guilt.” Id. ¶ 35. This standard applies to

the factfinder’s “acceptance of the State’s evidence of guilt” and the “rejection of an affirmative

defense.” People v. Jones, 2021 IL App (1st) 181266, ¶ 65. Where sufficient evidence supports

the factfinder’s rejection of an affirmative defense, we are “ ‘constrained to affirm the

conviction.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Gannon, 213 Ill. App. 3d 560, 566 (1991)).

¶ 26 A person commits aggravated battery when, in committing a battery, other than by the

discharge of a firearm, he knowingly causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or

disfigurement. 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(a)(1) (West 2020). In this case, defendant does not contest that

he pushed Murrieta but asserts he did so out of necessity.

¶ 27 Under the defense of necessity, conduct that otherwise would “be an offense is justifiable

by reason of necessity if the accused was without blame in occasioning or developing the situation

and reasonably believed such conduct was necessary to avoid a public or private injury greater

than the injury which might reasonably result from his own conduct.” 720 ILCS 5/7-13 (West

2020). The person claiming the defense must show some evidence that he (1) was without blame

in occasioning or developing the situation, and (2) reasonably believed that his conduct was

necessary to avoid a greater injury than that which would arise from his conduct. People v. Guja,

2016 IL App (1st) 140046, ¶ 47.

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¶ 28 “Necessity involves a choice between two admitted evils where other optional courses of

action are unavailable.” People v. Kratovil, 351 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1034 (2004). The defense

applies “only if the conduct was the sole reasonable alternative available to the defendant under

the circumstances.” Id. The threshold to establish the affirmative defense of necessity is low, but

requires the defendant to present some evidence to raise a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Guja,

2016 IL App (1st) 140046, ¶ 46. Once the defense has been raised, the burden shifts to the State

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act out of necessity. People v.

Azizarab, 317 Ill. App. 3d 995, 999 (2000). “We will not disturb the trial court’s determination

absent a showing no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

¶ 29 In the present case, the trial court determined that defendant did not present evidence to

raise the affirmative defense of necessity such that the burden did not shift to the State to disprove

that defense. This was not error.

¶ 30 As to the first prong, the record does not show that defendant was without blame in

developing the situation. Defendant argued with Amanda loud enough to be heard from inside

Miller’s apartment, causing Murrieta and Miller to investigate. Defendant repeatedly yelled at

Murrieta and Miller, pointed in Murrieta’s face, and shoved the women. He also grabbed Amanda

and refused to let go as Murrieta and Miller attempted to help her exit the building. Murrieta and

Miller attempted to pry defendant’s hand from Amanda’s arm after he grabbed her again until he

eventually let go. Defendant admitted he was mad because Murrieta accused him of wanting to

rob and kidnap Amanda. Defendant testified that, after 15 minutes of explaining that he could not

let Amanda leave the building because she was drunk, he pushed Murrieta. We find that

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defendant’s conduct of engaging in an argument and physical struggle with the women shows that

he escalated the situation, and he therefore fails to fulfill the first prong of the necessity defense.

¶ 31 As to the second prong of the defense, defendant fails to show that his conduct was

necessary to avoid a greater injury, as reasonable alternatives to pushing Murrieta were available.

Defendant explained that he pushed Murrieta to prevent Amanda from leaving and driving drunk.

However, it was uncontested that Amanda’s sister was on her way to get Amanda. Based on her

conversation with defendant, Amanda’s sister was expected to arrive in 40 to 50 minutes.

Defendant and Amanda had already been waiting for about 40 minutes before Murrieta entered

the lobby. As a reasonable alternative to pushing Murrieta, defendant could have waited for

Amanda’s sister to arrive. He could have also let Amanda wait outside for her sister with Murrieta

and Miller. He could have further requested Amanda to give him or the women her vehicle’s key.

The record demonstrates that reasonable alternatives were available to prevent Amanda from

driving and defendant pushing Murrieta was not the sole reasonable action. Defendant therefore

also failed to satisfy the second prong of the necessity defense. Accordingly, the trial court did not

err when it found that a defense of necessity had not been established under these circumstances.

¶ 32 Nevertheless, defendant maintains that he was not to blame for occasioning or developing

the situation leading to the push and no alternative course of conduct was specified by the State or

the court. There is no requirement that the State present reasonable alternatives to defendant’s

actions where defendant had the responsibility of establishing the defense. See Guja, 2016 IL App

(1st) 140046, ¶ 49 (to establish the defense of necessity, the defendant must show that his actions

were the “sole reasonable alternative” to prevent greater harm). Moreover, the court explained

posttrial that the video clearly depicted defendant pushing Murrieta, he escalated the situation, and

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the burden to disprove the affirmative defense had not been shifted to the State. Defendant provides

no basis to overturn the court’s determination of guilt.

¶ 33 Defendant next argues, and the State concedes, that only one of his two convictions for

aggravated battery should stand under the one-act, one-crime rule. Although counsel failed to

preserve the error for appellate review, one-act, one-crime errors may be reviewed under the plain-

error doctrine “because they implicate the integrity of the judicial process.” People v. Nunez, 236

Ill. 2d 488, 493 (2010).

¶ 34 A defendant may only be convicted of one crime resulting from a single act under the one-

act, one-crime rule. People v. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d 335, 340 (2001). When a defendant is convicted

of multiple offenses predicated on the same physical act, the court must vacate the conviction for

the less serious offense. People v. Johnson, 237 Ill. 2d 81, 97 (2010). To determine which offense

is more serious, we look to the plain language of the statutes and vacate the conviction with the

lesser punishment. In re Samantha V., 234 Ill. 2d 359, 379-80 (2009). If the convictions carry the

same punishment, we look to which offense has the more culpable mental state. Id. We review

claims of one-act, one-crime violations de novo. People v. Coats, 2018 IL 121926, ¶ 12.

¶ 35 Here, defendant was convicted of aggravated battery for pushing Murrieta and causing

great bodily harm and permanent disfigurement, both brought under the same subsection of the

aggravated battery statute. 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(a)(1) (West 2020).

¶ 36 We agree that defendant’s two aggravated battery charges were predicated on the same

physical act. Defendant is also correct that the charges carried the same mental state of

“knowingly” and the same punishment. See 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(a)(1), (h) (West 2020). Where,

as here, the two convictions carry the same mental state and punishment, this court cannot

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determine which is the more serious offense, and we must remand to the trial court to make that

determination. Samantha V., 234 Ill. 2d at 379-80. We therefore remand to the trial court to

determine the more serious offense and direct the court to vacate the less serious conviction. People

v. Hatcher, 2024 IL App (1st) 220455, ¶ 69.

¶ 37 For the foregoing reasons, we remand with directions, and affirm the judgment in all other

respects.

¶ 38 Affirmed and remanded with directions.

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