People v. Ngirametuker

Opinion

IN·THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM c,c-••

) 23 9: OS 2 ) PEOPLE OF GUAM, CRIMINAL CASE NO. CM1116-10 ) 3 ) vs. ) 4 ) DECISION AND ORDER FRANCIS UKUS NGIRAMETUKER, ) 5 ) ) 6 Defendant. ) ) 7 ___________________________) 8 INTORDUCTION

9 This matter came before the HONORABLE VERNON P. PEREZ on July 30, 2013 at

10 Motion to Suppress Hearing. Assistant Attorney General James L.G. Stake appeared for th

11 Government ("Government"). Attorney Brian E. Kegerreis represented Defendant, Francis Uku

12 Ngirametuker ("Defendant"). Having heard the parties' arguments and considering the record

13 the Court now issues the following Decision and Order.

14 BACKGROUND

15 On July 27, 2009, Defendant was stopped at a DUI checkpoint conducted by the Gua

16 Police Department ("GPD"). He submitted to a field sobriety test and was subsequently arreste

17 for driving under the influence of alcohol. Defendant, through counsel, then brought a Motion t

18 Suppress the evidence obtained from the DUI checkpoint.

19 DISCUSSION

20 At issue is whether the DUI checkpoint in this case was lawful. Defendant cites t

21 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) and Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S.

22 444 (1990) for support. In Prouse, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "persons in automobiles o

23 public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at th

24 unbridled discretion of police officers." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979). In Sitz

25 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the use of highway sobriety checkpoints did not violate th

26 Fourth and Fourteenth amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Michigan Dept. of State Police v.

27 Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990). The facts ofthe present case are more closely akin to those in Sitz.

People v. Ngirametuker Decision and Order Criminal Case No. CMl I 16-10 -Page 1 of3- Defendant's primary argument is that the DUI checkpoint in this case did not ~ppJm;m t. 2 the guidelines and procedures set forth in GPD' s Standard Operating Procedure, which wa 3 enacted shortly after the Sitz Decision. 1 First, Defendant argues that the public was not give 4 adequate notice of the checkpoint as the GPD printout in the Pacific Daily News did not provid 5 an exact date and location. The Government argues that the public notice issued by GPD wa 6 adequate under relevant case law. The Court agrees with the Government. In People v. Squire 7 the California Court of Appeal recognized that "[l]aw enforcement will be expected to exercis 8 good judgment in giving advance publicity to the public, keeping in mind that publicity serve 9 the purposes of deterring driving after alcohol consumption, legitimizing checkpoints in th 10 minds of the public, and lessening intrusiveness by reducing surprise, fear, and inconvenience.' 11 People v. Squire, 15 Cal. App. 4th 775, 782 (1993). The court, however, declined to devise 12 specific detailed scheme regarding advance publicity. ld. The court noted that because devisin 13 such a scheme would result in a rule too "inflexible, complex and unworkable for lm 14 enforcement to implement ... [t]he reasonableness and adequacy of advance publicity wil 15 simply depend on the facts of each situation on a case-by-case basis." !d. In Squire, the notic 16 was issued the same day that the checkpoint was scheduled. The printout provided a timefram 17 but did not provide a specific location. In this case, GPD issued a statement in the Pacific Daily 18 News on Friday, December 25, 2009, which read "[p]olice will conduct DUI checkpoint 19 throughout the weekend." The Court concludes that this is sufficient advanced notice. Althoug 20 no specific time or location was provided, the public could have reasonably expected th 21 likelihood of encountering a checkpoint while driving throughout the ensuing weekend, thu 22 lessening the elements of surprise, fear, and inconvenience. 23 Furthermore, Defendant argues that suppression is warranted because GPD failed t 24 produce an After Action Report required under the TIS guidelines. Under the guidelines, 25 After Action Report is to be submitted by the Officer in Charge upon completion of th 26 checkpoint's operation. The report is to include: 1) time, date, and location of the operation· 27 1 The Standard Operating procedure can be fotmd in GPD's Traffic Investigating Section (TIS) 91-45. See. Defs. Ex. A. Defendant acknowledges that the guidelines set forth in the TIS 91-45 appear to follow the decision in Sitz. 28 See. Defs. Mot. pg. 2.

People v. Ngirametuker Decision and Order Criminal Case No. CMIII6-10 -Page 2 of3- duration of length of time it took to complete the operation; 3) weather conditions; 4) number o 2 vehicles passing through the checkpoint; 5) pre-determined order of selected motorists; 6 3 average delay to motorists; 7) number and type of arrest conducted; and 8) unusual incidents. 4 See. Defs. Ex. A. Defendant argues that without an After Action Report being prepared an 5 written down, he is unable to tell if the stop in question was without discretion or if GP 6 followed their own standard procedures. Further, Defendant argues that without the report, he i 7 unable to determine whether the checkpoint was conducted under the seventy-five minute tim 8 limit; whether there was a pre-determined order of selected motorists; or what the average dela

9 to the motorists was. 10 The Government produced sworn testimony of a veteran GPD officer who testified to th 11 validity of the December 27, 2009 DUI checkpoint. Witness Testimony on July 30, 2013 a 12 2:17p.m. The Officer testified that, with regard to the checkpoint in question: it was clearl 13 visible to motorists; every third car was stopped; and the delay to motorists was less than on 14 minute. Furthermore, the Officer testified that all checkpoints are concluded within th 15 prescribed seventy-five minute time limit, and that an After Action Report is normally compile 16 after each checkpoint. In light of the evidence presented, the Court is not convinced that the DU 17 checkpoint in question violated any of Defendant's rights. On that basis, the Court conclude 18 that the checkpoint was lawful, and that there is no rationale sufficient enough to warran

19 suppression. 20 CONCLUSION 21 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion to Suppress.

22 23 So ORDERED this 0day of September, 2013.

26 HONORABLE VERNON P. PERE JUDGE, SUPERIOR COURT OF GUA 27

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