NO. 4-04-1055 Filed: 12/12/06
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Woodford County DAVID L. NEFF, ) No. 03CF207 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) John B. Huschen, ) Judge Presiding. _________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of
the court:
Following a November 2004 stipulated bench trial, the
trial court convicted defendant, David L. Neff, of possession of
a controlled substance (15 grams or more but less than 100 grams
of a substance containing methamphetamine) (720 ILCS
570/402(a)(6.5) (West 2002)) (count I) and possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (15 grams or more but
less than 100 grams of a substance containing methamphetamine)
(720 ILCS 570/401(a)(6.5)(A) (West 2002)) (count II). The court
later sentenced him to 10 years in prison on the possession-with-
intent-to-deliver conviction and imposed fines totaling $10,577. (The court did not enter judgment on the other conviction, having
determined that it merged into defendant's conviction for posses-
sion with intent to deliver.)
Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court
erred by denying his motion to suppress the items seized from his
car following his arrest for driving with a suspended driver's license and (2) he is entitled to a $200 credit against his
fines, pursuant to section 110-14 of the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/110-14 (West 2002)). Because we agree
only with defendant's second argument, we affirm as modified and
remand with directions.
I. BACKGROUND
Following defendant's January 2004 indictment on the
two drug charges, he filed a motion to suppress the evidence
seized from his car following his arrest. At an April 2004
hearing on that motion, the only witness was El Paso police
officer Joseph Holt, who testified that on the morning of Decem-
ber 31, 2003, he was driving his police car in El Paso when he
saw defendant driving a car. Holt recognized defendant because
two days earlier he had responded to a domestic call that in-
volved defendant and his girlfriend. Holt knew that defendant's
driver's license was suspended. When defendant pulled his car
into a parking space at a local park, Holt followed and activated
his overhead lights. Defendant got out of his car, but Holt directed him to return, and defendant complied.
Holt explained to defendant why Holt had followed him
and that Holt was going to confirm the status of defendant's
driver's license. After confirming that defendant's driver's
license was suspended, Holt placed defendant under arrest.
Before placing defendant in handcuffs, Holt allowed him to get
out of his car and throw a donut wrapper away in a garbage can
located a few feet from the squad car. When defendant did so,
- 2 - Holt noticed that he also pulled something out of his pocket and
threw it away with the donut wrapper.
Holt then placed defendant in handcuffs and asked him
to sit in the squad car. Holt informed defendant that he would
be conducting a search of defendant's car, and when he did so, he
found drug paraphernalia in the front passenger compartment.
Holt then went to the garbage can and retrieved the item defen-
dant had thrown in there, along with the donut wrapper. That
item was a Ziploc Baggie, which contained a small white rock.
The garbage can was otherwise empty. The white rock field-tested
positive for methamphetamine.
Holt then asked defendant if there was anything else in
his car that Holt should know about, and defendant replied that,
"[i]f there was anything else in the car, it would be in the
black bag in the back." Holt returned to defendant's car and
found a gym bag in the backseat. The bag contained several large
Ziploc Baggies with white residue, several hypodermic needles, a
digital scale, pipes, and other miscellaneous items. The residue field-tested positive for methamphetamine.
The parties later submitted written arguments to the
trial court in support of their respective positions regarding
defendant's motion to suppress evidence. Defendant argued that
the search was unreasonable and in violation of the fourth
amendment because it was conducted pursuant to the El Paso police
department's inventory policy, which did not pass constitutional
muster. The State argued that the search of the car's passenger
- 3 - compartment was lawful as incident to defendant's arrest. In a
June 2004 written order, the trial court agreed with the State
that Holt had authority to search defendant's car incident to
defendant's arrest. In view of that ruling, the court declined
to address defendant's inventory-policy arguments.
In reaching its decision, the trial court discussed the
then-recent opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois in People v.
Stehman, 203 Ill. 2d 26, 783 N.E.2d 1 (2002), as follows:
"Where the officer initiates contact with the
defendant either by actually confronting the
defendant or by signaling confrontation with
the defendant while the defendant is still in
the automobile and the officer subsequently
arrests the defendant (regardless of whether
the defendant has been removed from or has
exited the vehicle) a subsequent search of
the automobile's passenger compartment falls
within the scope of [New York v. Belton, 453
U.S. 454, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768, 101 S. Ct. 2860
(1981),] and will be upheld as reasonable.
Where the defendant has voluntarily exited
the automobile before the officer initiated contact with him, the facts do not fit within
[Belton's] bright[-]line rule. [The defendant
in Stehman] had voluntarily exited his auto-
mobile prior to the police confrontation and
- 4 - as a result, the Supreme Court of Illinois
found the subsequent search of the passenger
area of [the defendant's] vehicle to be un-
reasonable.
The facts here are distinguishable from
Stehman. A routine traffic stop was con-
ducted by Officer Holt upon seeing an indi-
vidual he knew to [have a] suspended [li-
cense]. Based on the suspended driving priv-
ileges of the defendant, he was placed under
arrest and removed from his vehicle to be
transported to the jail. Although the police
officer allowed the defendant to freely move
about and around his vehicle, he was always
under the control of the officer. The search
[of] the passenger area of defendant's vehi-
cle incident to his arrest was therefore
reasonable." (Emphases in original.)
In November 2004, defendant waived his right to a jury
trial, and the parties proceeded to a stipulated bench trial.
The stipulated testimony consisted of the following: (1) the
transcript of Holt's testimony from the hearing on the motion to
suppress, (2) a laboratory report regarding the items seized
following defendant's arrest, which indicated that the substance
seized weighed 19.6 grams and tested positive for methamphet-
amine, (3) Holt's testimony that in a postarrest interview,
- 5 - defendant admitted that he had sold methamphetamine, and (4) an
El Paso police officer's testimony regarding the chain of custody
as to the items seized from defendant's car. The trial court
accepted the stipulation, found defendant guilty, and sentenced
him as earlier stated.
This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. The Search of Defendant's Car Incident to His Arrest
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by
denying his motion to suppress the items seized from his car.
Specifically, he contends that (1) the search incident to arrest
in this case did not possess the necessary strict spatial and
temporal limitations in relation to the arrest that allegedly
justified the search and (2) the court erred by determining that
Stehman was distinguishable.
1. Standard of Review
"Review of a motion to suppress presents both questions
of law and fact." In re Christopher K., 217 Ill. 2d 348, 373,
841 N.E.2d 945, 960 (2005). A trial court's credibility determi-
nations and factual findings will be upheld unless they are
against the manifest weight of the evidence. Christopher K., 217 Ill. 2d at 373, 841 N.E.2d at 960. "However, the ultimate legal
question of whether the evidence should be suppressed is reviewed
de novo." Christopher K., 217 Ill. 2d at 373, 841 N.E.2d at 960.
"The defendant bears the burden of proof at a hearing on a motion
to suppress." People v. Gipson, 203 Ill. 2d 298, 306, 786 N.E.2d
- 6 - 540, 545 (2003).
2. "Temporal and Spatial Concerns" in This Case
The record makes clear that defendant's claimed "tempo-
ral and spatial concerns" have no basis. All of the events Holt
testified about happened during an otherwise routine traffic stop
during which defendant's car was not moved. Further, the record
suggests that the entire interaction between defendant and Holt
lasted only a matter of minutes. We are not sure at what point a
search that is otherwise lawful as incident to a defendant's
arrest becomes unlawful due to the passage of time, but whatever
time limit may exist, it was not close to being met under the
circumstances of this case.
3. The Supreme Court of Illinois Decision in Stehman
In its thoughtful written opinion, the trial court
discussed the supreme court's decision in Stehman at length.
Because we believe that Stehman may no longer be good authority,
we provide the following analysis.
Stehman, a 2002 opinion, is the most recent decision of
the Supreme Court of Illinois to address the search of a vehicle
incident to the driver's arrest. The Stehman court wrote, in pertinent part, the following:
"In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460, 69
L. Ed. 2d 768, 775, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2864
(1981), the Court addressed the applicability
of [the search-incident-to-arrest] doctrine
to searches of automobiles, holding that
- 7 - 'when a policeman has made a lawful custodial
arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he
may, as a contemporaneous incident of that
arrest, search the passenger compartment of
that automobile.'
By applying the bright-line rule that
the passenger compartment lies within the
reach of the arrested occupant, Belton sought
to avoid case-by-case evaluations of whether
the arrestee's area of control within the
automobile extended to the precise place
where the officer found the weapon or evi-
dence. [Citation.] Indeed, 'the Court in
Belton "remarked upon the desirability of a
rule under which police could in most in-
stances reach a correct determination before-
hand, and the undesirability of litigation in
every case over the existence of supporting
reasons."' [Citations.] This court [cita-
tion] adopted the bright-line rule of Belton, and the courts of this state have consis-
tently applied this bright-line principle to
analogous situations. ***
***
The issue presented in the case at bar
is whether Belton's bright-line rule extends
- 8 - to a situation where the first contact the
defendant has with the officer occurs after
exiting the vehicle." Stehman, 203 Ill. 2d
at 34-36, 783 N.E.2d at 5-6.
The supreme court ultimately held that Belton's bright-line rule
does not apply where a suspect has voluntarily exited his vehicle
and begun walking away from it before the officer initiated
contact with him. Stehman, 203 Ill. 2d at 37, 783 N.E.2d at 7.
4. The United States Supreme Court Decision in Thornton
In Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 158 L. Ed.
2d 905, 124 S. Ct. 2127 (2004), the United States Supreme Court
addressed the same issue that was raised in Stehman--namely,
whether Belton's bright-line rule extends to a situation where
the first contact a suspect has with an officer occurs after the
suspect exits his vehicle. In Thornton, the Supreme Court
answered that question "yes," explaining as follows:
"We *** held [in Belton] that 'when a police-
man has made a lawful custodial arrest of the
occupant of an automobile, he may, as a con-
temporaneous incident of that arrest, search
the passenger compartment of that automo-
bile.' [Belton, 453 U.S. at 460, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 775, 101 S. Ct. at 2864.]
In so holding, we placed no reliance on
the fact that the officer in Belton ordered
the occupants out of the vehicle, or initi-
- 9 - ated contact with them while they remained
within it. *** There is simply no basis to
conclude that the span of the area generally
within the arrestee's immediate control is
determined by whether the arrestee exited the
vehicle at the officer's direction, or
whether the officer initiated contact with
him while he remained in the car. ***
In all relevant aspects, the arrest of a
suspect who is next to a vehicle presents
identical concerns regarding officer safety
and the destruction of evidence as the arrest
of one who is inside the vehicle. An officer
may search a suspect's vehicle under Belton
only if the suspect is arrested. [Citation.]
A custodial arrest is fluid and '[t]he danger
to the police officer flows from the fact
of the arrest, and its attendant proximity,
stress, and uncertainty' [citations]. The
stress is no less merely because the arrestee
exited his car before the officer initiated
contact, nor is an arrestee less likely to
attempt to lunge for a weapon or to destroy
evidence if he is outside of, but still in
control of, the vehicle. In either case, the
officer faces a highly volatile situation.
- 10 - It would make little sense to apply two dif-
ferent rules to what is, at bottom, the same
situation.
In some circumstances it may be safer
and more effective for officers to conceal
their presence from a suspect until he has
left his vehicle. Certainly that is a judg-
ment officers should be free to make. But
under the strictures of petitioner's proposed
'contact initiation' rule, officers who do so
would be unable to search the car's passenger
compartment in the event of a custodial ar-
rest, potentially compromising their safety
and placing incriminating evidence at risk of
concealment or destruction. The Fourth
Amendment does not require such a gamble.
*** The need for a clear rule, readily understood by police officers and not depend-
ing on differing estimates of what items were
or were not within reach of an arrestee at
any particular moment, justifies the sort of
generalization which Belton enunciated. Once
an officer determines that there is probable
cause to make an arrest, it is reasonable to
allow officers to ensure their safety and to
- 11 - preserve evidence by searching the entire
passenger compartment.
*** So long as an arrestee is the sort
of 'recent occupant' of a vehicle such as
petitioner was here, officers may search that
vehicle incident to the arrest." (Emphasis
in original.) Thornton, 541 U.S. at 620-24,
158 L. Ed. 2d at 913-15, 124 S. Ct. at 2130-
32.
5. Current Illinois Law
Given the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in Thornton, the question arises as to the current state of
Illinois law regarding the search of a suspect's vehicle incident
to his arrest. In other words, does Stehman remain good law
after the Thornton decision?
In People v. Dieppa, 357 Ill. App. 3d 847, 852, 830
N.E.2d 870, 874-75 (2005), the Second District Appellate Court
addressed this issue and wrote the following:
"Stehman predates Thornton, and, argu- ably, the cases conflict. The issue, as
framed by the Stehman court, was 'whether Belton's bright-line rule extends to a situa-
tion where the first contact the defendant
has with the officer occurs after exiting the
vehicle.' Stehman, 203 Ill. 2d at 36[, 783
N.E.2d at 6]. The court found that Belton
- 12 - did not apply in such circumstances, but
qualified its rule, noting that the occupants
of a vehicle cannot avoid a Belton search by
merely stepping outside a vehicle as officers
approach but that, on the other hand, the
police may not artificially create a situa-
tion as a pretext for a search. Stehman, 203
Ill. 2d at 39, 41[, 783 N.E.2d at 9]. Thorn-
ton flatly held that Belton governs even when
an officer does not make contact until the
person arrested has left the vehicle. Argu-
ably, then, given our supreme court's adher-
ence to the lockstep doctrine [citation],
Stehman is no longer good law in the wake of
Thornton.
However, given the details of the su-
preme court's opinion in Stehman, it appears
that the supreme court may very well decide
to interpret our state constitution more
broadly [than the United States Supreme Court
interpreted the federal constitution in
Thornton]." Since Dieppa was decided, the Supreme Court of Illinois
has addressed whether it would continue to adhere to the lockstep
doctrine, in which the supreme court interprets and applies the
search and seizure provision of article I, section 6, of the
- 13 - Illinois Constitution of 1970 in lockstep with the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation and application of the search and
seizure clause of the fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution. In People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282, 316-17,
851 N.E.2d 26, 46 (2006), the supreme court stated its continued
adherence to that doctrine, which it referred to as the "limited
lockstep approach," explaining as follows:
"We conclude that the search and seizure
clause of article I, section 6, of the state
constitution, as construed under our limited
lockstep approach, strikes the proper balance
between protecting the people from unreason-
able intrusion by the state and providing the
people with effective law enforcement. We
will not depart from the intent of the fram-
ers of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 or
the understanding of voters who adopted it--
to the extent we are able to discern it from
the language used, the committee comments,
and the debate--to tip the balance in favor
of expanding the scope of the right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures
that is already guaranteed by the fourth
amendment. The expansion of the protections
guaranteed by the state constitution can be
brought about by amending the constitution or
- 14 - by the enactment of statutes by the General
Assembly. Such expansion of rights, however,
is not the function of this court."
Based upon the supreme court's decision in Caballes, we
disagree with Dieppa that the Supreme Court of Illinois may very
well choose to interpret our state constitution more broadly
regarding the search of a suspect's vehicle incident to his
arrest than the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the
federal constitution. For the reasons expressed by the Supreme
Court of Illinois in Caballes, we believe that our supreme court
will apply the limited lockstep doctrine, and adopt the reasoning
and holding of the United States Supreme Court in Thornton.
Accordingly, consistent with Thornton, we conclude that the trial
court did not err by denying defendant's motion to suppress the
items seized from his car incident to his arrest.
B. Credit Against Fines
Defendant also argues that he is entitled to a $200
credit against his fines based upon the 40 days he spent in jail
before sentencing. See 725 ILCS 5/110-14 (West 2002). The State
concedes this argument, and we accept the State's concession.
Accordingly, we affirm defendant's conviction and remand with
directions to the trial court to correct the sentencing order to
give defendant credit against his fines.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's
judgment as modified and remand with directions.
- 15 - Affirmed as modified and remanded with directions.
APPLETON and MYERSCOUGH, JJ., concur.
- 16 -