People v. Navarro-Rodriguez CA2/6

Opinion

Filed 8/18/26 P. v. Navarro-Rodriguez CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No.B343844 (Super. Ct. No. 23CR00930)

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Santa Barbara County)

v.

JOSE RAMON NAVARRO- RODRIGUEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

Appellant Jose Ramon Navarro-Rodriguez was found guilty of corporal injury to a dating partner (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a))1 and dissuading a witness from reporting a crime (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1)). The trial court placed him on formal supervised probation for 36 months, one condition of which was that he submit all of his “personal electronic devices” to warrantless searches for “electronic communication information.” Appellant appeals the search condition, arguing that it is unreasonable to

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

impose such a term under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent) because he did not use an electronic device to commit the charged offenses. We disagree and will affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On the evening of February 7, 2023, deputies from the Santa Barbara County Sheriff’s Department responded to a domestic disturbance at a house in Goleta. Outside the house deputies encountered Rene and Jessica Mireles, the occupants of the home, and appellant. Mr. and Mrs. Mireles informed the deputies that a woman inside the house had come to them that evening seeking help. One deputy waited outside with appellant while the other entered the Mireles’s house.

Inside, the deputy contacted victim Y.R., who appeared to have been crying. Y.R. had two prominent cuts on her face, one above the right side of her upper lip, the other on the left side of her chin. The cuts were still bleeding.

Y.R. stated that she and appellant were dating partners, and that they were staying at a nearby house they were remodeling. The couple had argued throughout the day as they ran errands, and the argument escalated when they returned to the house. During the argument appellant grabbed Y.R.’s face, clawing her skin with his fingernails and inflicting the two cuts.

Y.R. stated that she then entered the kitchen, and appellant followed her, crying and apologizing. Y.R. took out her phone and told appellant that she intended to call the police. Appellant told her not to and snatched the phone out of her hands. Afraid that appellant would resort to further violence, Y.R. ran out of the house and down the street.

Mrs. Mireles saw Y.R. standing in the street and offered help. A few minutes later, appellant arrived in his truck. After

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deputies arrived and spoke with all parties at the scene, they arrested appellant.

Y.R. was not available to testify against appellant at trial.

The People called another former girlfriend, D.I., to testify about appellant’s acts of domestic violence against her. D.I. also testified that appellant called her twice before trial—including that morning—to ask if she wanted to go to court with him.

The jury convicted appellant of corporal injury to a dating partner (§ 273.5, subd. (a)) and dissuading a witness from reporting a crime (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1)). The court sentenced appellant to three years of formal supervised probation. One of the conditions of probation was an electronic search term subjecting appellant to warrantless “search and seizure of all personal electronic devices for electronic communication.” All the electronic devices named in the probation order were electronics capable of either making calls or sending and storing messages, including “computers, hard drives, . . . smart phones, i-Pads, Notebooks, Chromebooks, electronic gaming consoles, and any other electronic devices and the like . . . .”

A further condition of probation was that appellant not molest, annoy, threaten, or harass Y.R. To that end, the court entered a criminal protective order.

DISCUSSION

Probation is “‘an act of clemency,’” different in kind from traditional forms of punishment such as fines or imprisonment. (People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 402.) “Probation is not a right, but a privilege.” (People v. Bravo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 600, 608.) “Section 1203.1, subdivision (j) authorizes the trial court to impose conditions of probation to achieve a variety of goals, including reforming and rehabilitating the probationer and

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protecting public safety.” (People v. Bryant (2021) 11 Cal.5th 976, 983.) Trial courts have broad discretion to fashion “reasonable conditions [on probation], as it may determine are fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done.” (§ 1203.1, subd. (j).) We review conditions for abuse of discretion and will only strike a condition that is arbitrary and capricious. (Moran, at p. 403.)

Lent articulates a three-prong test for striking a condition of probation: (1) the condition must have “no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted,” (2) it must relate to “conduct which is not in itself criminal,” and (3) it must require or forbid “conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality.” (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) Lent’s three- prong test is conjunctive. A reviewing court should strike a probation term only if each prong is met. (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379.)

The parties agree Lent’s second prong is not at issue. We focus on the first and third prongs for this reason.

Lent Prong 1: Relation to Crime Appellant contends there is no relationship between the ability for probation officers to search appellant’s devices and his underlying conduct of taking Y.R.’s phone to prevent her from calling police. Lent’s requirement that the condition relate to the underlying crime is a broad standard reflecting the court’s ample discretion to craft terms of probation. (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) That a defendant could use an electronic device to commit a future crime does not justify an electronics search condition where the defendant did not use a device to commit the charged crime. (See In re Erica R. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 907, 912 [electronics search condition stricken in drug case where nothing in record “connect[ed the defendant]’s use of electronic

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devices or social media to her possession of any illegal substance”].)

People v. Ebertowski upheld a similar search condition after the defendant pleaded no contest to resisting and threatening a police officer. (People v. Ebertowski (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1173-1174.) The defendant had identified himself as a gang member to intimidate the officer and prevent his arrest. (Id., at p. 1173.) Although the defendant used no electronic devices to commit the offense, Ebertowski concluded the condition satisfied Lent because the defendant communicated his threats for the benefit of the gang, and because he had previously promoted his gang on social media. (Id., at pp. 1176-1177; compare with In re J.B. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 749, 754, [electronics search condition not related to petty theft in which defendant acted alone].)

The search conditions here relate even more closely to appellant’s crime of dissuading a witness. The actus reus was a communicative act threatening the victim. Appellant told Y.R. not to call the police after committing domestic violence. He then physically prevented her from doing so by taking her phone.

Lent Prong 3: Relation to Future Criminality Lent’s third prong requires “a degree of proportionality”

between the burden on the offender and the legitimate interests the condition serves. (In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1122.) The connection between a condition and future criminality must be more concrete than “just an abstract or hypothetical relationship.” (Id. at p. 1121.) A condition cannot be justified merely on the grounds that it enhances the government’s ability to supervise a probationer. (Id. at pp. 1122, 1125.) This heightened standard is met where “the probationer’s offense or

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personal history” provides a “sufficient factual basis . . . [to] determine that an electronics search condition is a proportional means of deterring the probationer from future criminality.” (Id. at pp. 1128-1129.)

The standard is met here. D.I. testified that appellant twice called her about attending trial together. That he would call a former girlfriend under these circumstances shows there is more than an “abstract or hypothetical” possibility he will violate the protective order by contacting Y.R. by phone. The search condition is a reasonable means to ensure he obeys the order.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

CODY, P. J.

We concur:

YEGAN, J.

BALTODANO, J.

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Michael J. Carrozzo, Judge Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

______________________________

Joshua Peter Visco, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and David F. Glassman, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.