People v. Myers

2020 IL App (4th) 180383-U

Opinion

NOTICE FILED This order was filed under Supreme August 18, 2020 Court Rule 23 and may not be cited 2020 IL App (4th) 180383-U Carla Bender as precedent by any party except in 4th District Appellate the limited circumstances allowed NO. 4-18-0383 under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Vermilion County MICHAEL R. MYERS, ) No. 07CF455 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Nancy S. Fahey, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Steigmann and Justice Holder White concurred in the judgment.

ORDER ¶1 Held: Given defendant’s criminal history, the maximum consecutive prison sentences the circuit court imposed on him are not an abuse of discretion.

¶2 The circuit court of Vermilion County denied a motion by defendant, Michael R.

Myers, to reduce his prison terms for aggravated robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-5(a) (West 2006)) and

to make the prison terms concurrent instead of consecutive. He appeals. We affirm the judgment

because we find no abuse of discretion in the sentences.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 A. The Guilty Pleas

¶5 On November 13, 2007, defendant offered to enter blind guilty pleas to two counts

of aggravated robbery. In the guilty-plea hearing, the circuit court informed defendant that he had

been charged with two counts of aggravated robbery, a Class 1 felony, which carried a possible sentence of 4 to 15 years in prison, followed by 2 years of mandatory supervised release. The

prosecutor remarked that, although defendant was ineligible for extended-term sentences, he was

subject to consecutive sentences because there were “[t]wo different incidences.” Because the

parties had not agreed to a sentence, the court noted that it could impose any sentence within the

applicable range. Defendant acknowledged that he understood this. The court admonished him

regarding his trial rights, which he waived.

¶6 The circuit court then heard the factual basis of the guilty plea. According to the

prosecutor, Erin Kingore would testify that on July 23, 2007, defendant entered the Harper Oil gas

station in Danville, Illinois, where Kingore was working. Wearing a green hoodie and holding a

small pistol, defendant told Kingore to open the cash register. He raised the pistol and pointed it

at Kingore, and Kingore heard a click. She handed him between $65 and $68 from the cash register.

Then defendant demanded the money in her purse. Kingore told him she did not have any money.

Defendant then told her to give him cigarettes. Kingore gave him several cartons of Marlboro

cigarettes, and he left. Also, Chayce Wagner would testify that he was working at the drive-through

window of a Steak ‘n’ Shake restaurant. He received an order, and defendant, wearing the same

clothing that Kingore identified, pulled up in a van and pointed a pistol at Wagner. Defendant took

money from the cash register and left. A Danville police officer, Bruce Stark, would testify that,

after defendant waived his Miranda rights (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)), he

admitted robbing both places and that, during the robberies, he was high on medication and drugs.

Defense counsel added to the factual basis, noting that the police had recovered defendant’s van

and clothing containing defendant’s DNA on the escape route, as well as a small starter pistol,

which was what defendant had displayed in the robberies. Defense counsel explained to the court

-2- that the starter pistol was capable of discharging only powder, not a projectile. The court said it

understood.

¶7 After hearing the factual basis, the circuit court asked defendant whether he still

wished to plead guilty. The court reminded defendant that it had told him “what the possible

penalties [were] and *** [that] those would run consecutive.” Defendant inquired, “They run

consecutive or possible?” Defense counsel responded, “They will run consecutive,” and the

prosecutor agreed. Defendant said he still wanted to plead guilty. The court accepted his guilty

pleas as knowing and voluntary and set the matter for a sentencing hearing.

¶8 B. The Presentence Investigation Report, Dated December 19, 2007

¶9 1. Juvenile Offenses

¶ 10 Defendant, age 26, had the following juvenile record.

¶ 11 On March 7, 1995, in Vermilion County case No. 94-J-361, the circuit court found

that defendant had committed battery, and the court adjudicated him to be delinquent. In addition,

on April 5, 1995, defendant admitted several counts of theft from a coin-operated machine. For

those offenses, the court placed him on probation for two years.

¶ 12 On June 22, 1995, defendant admitted a petition to revoke his probation on the

grounds that he had been suspended from school twice; he had been expelled from school; and,

prior to his expulsion, he had been failing three of his classes. On August 9, 1995, the circuit court

placed him on probation, on the same terms as before.

¶ 13 On April 17, 1996, defendant admitted having violated his probation by committing

the offense of unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia. After committing defendant to the

Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division, for a 60-day evaluation, the circuit court vacated

the order of commitment and placed him on probation for two years.

-3- ¶ 14 On March 6, 1997, in Vermilion County case No. 97-JD-22, defendant admitted a

petition for the adjudication of wardship, which alleged that he had committed burglary. On April

9, 1997, after revoking probation, the circuit court committed defendant to the Juvenile Division.

¶ 15 On January 5, 1998, defendant was paroled from the Juvenile Division.

¶ 16 2. Adult Offenses

¶ 17 On March 22, 1999, in Vermilion County case No. 98-CF-606, defendant entered

negotiated guilty pleas to robbery and aggravated battery. On May 4, 1999, the circuit court

sentenced him to probation for four years, with the initial first year to be served under intensive

probation supervision. The court also ordered defendant to pay restitution, the balance of which

was, the report noted, $12,729.55.

¶ 18 On May 6, 2003, defendant admitted having tested positive for cannabis and

methamphetamine, a violation of a condition of his probation.

¶ 19 On July 1, 2003, the circuit court resentenced defendant as follows: seven years’

imprisonment for count I, robbery, in Vermilion County case No. 98-CF-606; a concurrent term

of seven years’ imprisonment for count II, robbery; and a concurrent term of five years’

imprisonment for count III, aggravated battery.

¶ 20 On October 3, 2007, defendant entered a negotiated guilty plea to theft, a Class A

misdemeanor. The circuit court sentenced him to one year of conditional discharge and 47 days of

time served.

¶ 21 3. Physical and Psychological Conditions

¶ 22 According to defendant, he suffered from no physical disabilities. While defendant

was confined, however, in the Illinois Youth Center in Harrisburg, Illinois, a physician named Dr.

Levin diagnosed him as having attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, paranoid schizophrenia,

-4- and agoraphobia. Dr. Levin prescribed Klonopin and Sinequan. From 2000 to 2003, defendant

received mental-health treatment and anger management services at Crosspoint Human Services.

He had to discontinue the treatment, however, because he was unable to afford it.

¶ 23 4. Education

¶ 24 Defendant attended Danville High School until the 10th grade. Afterward, he

earned a general education degree (GED) from the Illinois Youth Center.

¶ 25 5. Employment

¶ 26 As of the time of the interview for the presentence investigation report, defendant

was unemployed. The interviewer asked him what jobs he had held during the previous five years.

Defendant answered that he had worked for Campbell’s Disposal in Catlin, Illinois, for about a

year, until the owner fired him so that the owner could hire his own stepson. The interviewer noted

that it had requested employment verification but had received none.

¶ 27 6. Alcohol and Drug Usage

¶ 28 a. Alcohol

¶ 29 Defendant reported that he began drinking at the age of 14 and that, until about four

months prior to the interview, he had been consuming a 6- to 12-pack of beer a day, along with 1

to 2 pints of vodka. He recognized that he had a problem with alcohol.

¶ 30 b. Drugs

¶ 31 Defendant reported that he first smoked marijuana when he was eight or nine. He

smoked between a half-ounce and a whole ounce of marijuana per day and, in addition, consumed

a fourth of an ounce of cocaine per day. “Cocaine ha[s] ruined [his] life,” he remarked.

¶ 32 Defendant also reported that, in the past, he had used “acid,” heroin, and

mushrooms.

-5- ¶ 33 The interviewer noted that, according to a presentence investigation report of June

19, 2003, defendant said he had used lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) over 800 times in his life

and that, for the four years preceding the interview for that report, he mainly used marijuana,

cocaine, and methamphetamine.

¶ 34 C. The Sentencing Hearing

¶ 35 On December 26, 2007, the circuit court held a sentencing hearing.

¶ 36 The State first called Chase Wagner. He testified that he was 18 years old and that

he was attending Westville High School. Also, he had a job at Steak ‘n’ Shake. At 2 a.m. on July

24, 2007, he opened the sliding window to receive defendant’s payment for a drive-through order.

Wagner testified: “And then he pulled around, I went around to the computer, punched in the

numbers, and turned around to the window, opened it up, and he had a gun in my face, and he told

me to get down, and I ducked down, ran around the corner, and told another employee that there

was a man in the drive-thru with a gun, and she called 911.” Then “there was a lot of banging on

the door,” and “some money [was] missing.”

¶ 37 The State next called Erin Kingore, who testified that on July 23, 2007, she was

working at Harper Oil. She was alone in the gas station when, at 10:33 p.m., “the door opened,

[and] there was a guy walking in with a gun, and that’s never happened before.” He demanded that

she give him the cash in the cash register. She did so: it was “about $64.” Then the man “wanted

what was in [her] purse.” She “told him [she] didn’t have any, and he asked for it again, and [she]

told him [she] didn’t have any money in it.” Then the man “said he wanted cigarettes.” She handed

him “about six or seven cartons of Newports.” The man then “put them in his arms and told [her]

to be good,” and he “walked out the door.” Kingore “hit the panic button under the counter, locked

both doors, and called the cops.” She did not work at Harper Oil any longer.

-6- ¶ 38 The prosecutor stated he had no further evidence to offer. The circuit court asked

the public defender if he had any evidence to offer. He replied: “Judge, we’d offer for the [c]ourt’s

consideration a parole violation report regarding [defendant], and essentially, what the—it’s his

parole officer’s report concerning this offense, which is of course also a violation of his previous

parole.”

¶ 39 Defendant then made a statement in allocution. He wanted to apologize to Wagner

and Kingore, but they already had left the courtroom. He explained that, “as a normal person,” he

would not have committed these robberies but that he had “a real bad drug problem.” It was “still

[his] fault,” he hastened to add. “[He] did it.” But he had “a bad mental problem.” He should have

“[gone] and got the proper help at the mental places that [he] had been [to] before, but [he] didn’t.”

Instead, he “turned to drugs, and it showed [him] what drugs showed [him] the last time, that it’s

the wrong way to go.” In sum, he “just wanted to say [he was] sorry, and sorry for being [t]here.”

¶ 40 During the prosecutor’s sentencing argument, the circuit court asked the

prosecutor:

“How much will he really serve if I sentence him to 15?

MR. MILLS [(PROSECUTOR)]: If you do 15, he’ll do seven or a little

more. He’s got 147 in, so he’ll do maybe six and a half to seven. ***

THE COURT: If it’s consecutive, will the total be seven years? Or will that

be seven on each, basically?

MR. MILLS: Seven on each.

THE COURT: I’m trying to envision how long he will be locked up for the

safety of the public.

-7- MR. MILLS: If sentenced to the maximum, 15 and 15, consecutive, with

good time, he will most likely do 14 add a half real years.

THE COURT: Thank you. I always need—I always try to get a grasp on

real time. Okay. Is it mandatory consecutive?

MR. MILLS: No. It’s discretionary. They are separate offenses.”

¶ 41 After the attorneys made their arguments, the circuit court summed up:

“Well, I guess one thing you could say for [defendant] is he’s consistent going back

to his juvenile court days, which is somewhat relevant, because of the age of the

[d]efendant is 26, being born in May of 1981. So, what we have here is a story from

the [c]ourt, at least, that begins as far as we know, in 1994. There, he’s charged

with battery. Ultimately, another supplemental petition is filed that alleges theft

from a coin-operated machine. These offenses are being addressed at that time. He

ultimately ends up in the Juvenile Department of Corrections, which is referred to

by Mr. Mills. Then in ’97, he was charged with burglary, and was committed to the

Department of Corrections in April of ’97, paroled in January of ’98. I point that

out just for the length of time, which wasn’t much.

Then when he hits his adulthood, at least as far as adulthood under the law,

he is charged with robbery and aggravated battery. He gets by at first with a

probation order, which is not working. That’s violated for drug use, if I’m reading

this correctly. That’s when he caught the sentence to the Department of Corrections

for seven years. I guess the icing on the cake, as far as the spree of theft-type crimes,

theft-related, whatever they might be; robbery, burglary, theft of a person,

whatever. It’s all the same. In other words, the nature. *** I think what’s worth the

-8- attention is the consistency of the criminality by [defendant], and his choices, which

are your choices.

I note in the presentence report, ‘Cocaine ruined by life,’ is one of the quotes

in there. I’ve never seen cocaine walking around on the streets ruining people’s

lives. What I have seen is people using cocaine. That’s you. It makes me sick to my

stomach seeing some teenage kid pulling open the window and asking, ‘May I help

you?’ and having a gun shoved in their face. That freaks me out. I can’t imagine it.

Then this little girl working in a gas station alone and you walking in there and

threatening her. Murderers are made of that. We are lucky, really, that we’re not

sitting here at a sentencing for some sort of murder charge, so lucky. Those kids

are so lucky. That’s such an aggravating factor as far as I’m concerned. You have

no respect, none, for anybody’s property. What I see here is that you have no respect

for people, for the persons who work and live in the world around you. You are not

someone who is socially fit to live in society. You have proved that over and over

again.

I think it’s most appropriate that the State asked me for 15 years on each

count, and I think it’s most appropriate that those run consecutively, and that is the

order of the [c]ourt today.”

¶ 42 Defendant never filed a timely motion to reduce the sentences.

¶ 43 D. The Pro Se Petition for Postconviction Relief and the Summary Dismissal of the Petition

¶ 44 On July 25, 2008, defendant, pro se, filed a document titled “Petition for

Post-Conviction Relief.” In the petition, he accused his defense counsel of having rendered

ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion to reduce the sentences. Attached to the petition

-9- was an affidavit by defense counsel, in which defense counsel admitted that, “[t]hrough mistake

and inadvertence,” he had omitted to file a postsentencing motion even though he had promised

defendant that he would file a presentencing motion.

¶ 45 On July 31, 2008, using a fill-in-the-blank form titled “Order,” the circuit court

ruled as follows: “The motion, complaint[,] or request filed on July 25, 2008[,] in this case is

hereby DENIED for the reason that the relief requested is not properly granted in a proceeding

under Habeas Corpus and there is no proper basis or jurisdiction to grant the relief requested.”

¶ 46 E. The Agreed-Upon Order

¶ 47 On January 4, 2018, the parties agreed to the entry of an order. The order, signed

by the circuit court and the prosecutor, provided as follows:

“1. That by agreement the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed July 28

[sic], 2007[,] is allowed and [d]efendant *** shall be allowed hearing on a Motion

for Reconsideration of Sentence.

2. Defendant shall file his Motion to Reconsider within forty-five (45) days

and the State shall file any response within forty-five (45) days thereafter.

3. A hearing on the Motion to Reconsider shall be set by agreement, and the

parties shall set this matter for status in forty-five (45) days. The Defendant shall

not be w[r]itted back for the status.”

¶ 48 F. The Motion for Reconsideration of the Sentences

¶ 49 On March 19, 2018, defendant, through new appointed defense counsel, moved for

reconsideration of the sentences. The motion raised the following points:

- 10 - “4. In this case, through argument and testimony, the court was made aware

that the Defendant was armed with only a starter pistol, and no person was harmed

by his actions.

5. [The circuit court] did not make a finding that consecutive terms [were]

required to protect the public from further criminal conduct by the Defendant, nor

was any basis set forth in the record as required by statute.

6. [S]entencing the Defendant to consecutive sentence of 15 years is harsh

and would not be in the best interest of Defendant or society and that the same

would be detrimental to all.”

¶ 50 On May 31, 2018, the circuit court denied the postsentencing motion.

¶ 51 On June 1, 2018, defendant appealed the denial.

¶ 52 On June 3, 2018, defense counsel filed a certificate pursuant to Illinois Supreme

Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017), in which he certified that he had “[c]onsulted with Defendant

both by mail and in person to ascertain Defendant’s contentions of error in the sentence or the

entry of the plea of guilty, ha[d] examined the Trial Court file and report of proceedings, and ha[d]

made any amendments to the Motion necessary for adequate presentation of any defects in those

proceedings.”

¶ 53 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 54 Essentially, the State conceded defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance, and

defendant received part of the relief he had requested in his postconviction petition: “a hearing to

determine post-sentencing relief for Defendant.” (In his petition, he also requested that his

sentences be reduced and made concurrent.) Now we are reviewing the denial of defendant’s

motion to reduce the sentences.

- 11 - ¶ 55 We review the denial for an abuse of discretion. See People v. Reyes, 338 Ill. App.

3d 619, 621 (2003). For 10 reasons, defendant contends that the consecutive 15-year prison terms

were an abuse of discretion.

¶ 56 First, defendant represents that he “never threatened to shoot or otherwise harm the

victims, and, importantly, no one was harmed in either incident.” But this is a minimization.

Implicitly, defendant threatened to shoot the victims by pointing at them what appeared to be a

pistol. That is the very idea a pistol-wielding robber intends to convey: hand over the goods or be

shot. Because, as it turned out, the pistol was a starter pistol, defendant could not have carried

through with his implied threat—but the impossibility of carrying through with the threat did not

make it any the less a threat. The victims did not know the pistol was a fake, and defendant was

banking on their ignorance of that fact. Being terrified by the possibility of being shot is, contrary

to defendant’s belief, a harm, an emotional harm.

¶ 57 Second, in his blind guilty pleas and in his statement in allocution, defendant

accepted responsibility, and yet, the circuit court imposed upon him the maximum sentences

allowable by law. “We agree with defendant that remorse and guilty pleas can be factors in

mitigation. However, *** the existence of mitigating factors does not obligate the trial court to

reduce a sentence from the maximum allowed.” People v. Pippen, 324 Ill. App. 3d 649, 653 (2001).

¶ 58 Third, defendant complains that the maximum sentences fail to “account for the

uncontroverted significant mitigation evidence in this case, including [defendant’s] long history of

mental illness and substance abuse.” Chronic drug addiction and mental illness are “not inherently

mitigating.” People v. Richardson, 189 Ill. 2d 401, 421 (2000); People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366,

406 (1998). Those factors, rather, can be aggravating if the circuit court finds they are indicative

of future dangerousness. Richardson, 189 Ill. 2d at 421; Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 406. In his

- 12 - statement in allocution, defendant represented to the court that he had committed the robberies

because he had “a real bad drug problem” and “a bad mental problem.”

¶ 59 Fourth, defendant argues that the circuit court “failed to consider [his] potential for

rehabilitation, despite indications in the record that he was receptive to treatment and

rehabilitation.” Being, at a particular moment, receptive to treatment and rehabilitation does not

necessarily establish a potential for rehabilitation. Defendant had undergone rehabilitative

treatment in the past, apparently to no avail. He still had “a real bad drug problem” and “a bad

mental problem” that, according to him, caused him to commit the robberies.

¶ 60 Fifth, defendant criticizes the circuit court for “exaggerating the circumstances of

the offense—characterizing it as a near-murder.” But that is not what the court said. The court did

not say that defendant nearly murdered Wagner and Kingore. Instead, after deploring defendant’s

conduct of pointing a pistol at the face of a teenager who had come to the drive-through window

and at a “little girl working in a gas station alone,” the court remarked that “[m]urderers are made

of that.” In other words, the court perceived a coldblooded lack of empathy that, the court was

concerned, could express itself in a more serious crime, such as murder. Robberies can go awry

and turn into murder.

¶ 61 Sixth, defendant quotes from People v. Kosanovich, 69 Ill. App. 3d 748, 752

(1979): “long periods of confinement have little, if any, value in a rehabilitative strategy.” But

long periods of confinement can have value in protecting the public. See People v. Hernandez, 319

Ill. App. 3d 520, 529 (2001) (holding that the factors relevant to deciding a sentence include the

protection of the public).

¶ 62 Seventh, defendant observes: “[T]he record indicates that the court did not account

for any of the significant factors of mitigation in this case.” In fact, defendant points out, the court

- 13 - did not even “mention the word ‘mitigation’ or any mitigating factors at all in its lengthy statement

in support of its maximum aggregate sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment.” If the mitigating factors

were presented to the court, however, the court is presumed to have considered them. People v.

Branch, 2018 IL App (1st) 150026, ¶ 37. “To rebut this presumption, defendant must make an

affirmative showing that sentencing court did not consider the relevant factors.” (Emphasis added

and internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The sentence does not qualify as such an affirmative

showing (id.), for, again, “the existence of mitigating factors does not obligate the trial court to

reduce a sentence from the maximum allowed” (Pippen, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 653). Nor does

defendant make such an affirmative showing by noting the court’s omission of any mention of the

mitigating factors. “The trial judge is not required to detail precisely for the record the exact

process by which she determined the penalty[,] nor is she required to articulate her consideration

of mitigating factors ***.” People v. Quintana, 332 Ill. App. 3d 96, 109 (2002). “[I]t is of no

moment *** that the trial court failed to articulate its consideration of mitigating facts. [Citation.]

And because we must presume that the trial court considered all the mitigating factors before it

[citation], absent a contrary indication other than the sentence [citation], the defendant’s argument

must fail.” People v. Ramos, 353 Ill. App. 3d 133, 138 (2004).

¶ 63 Eighth, defendant argues that the maximum 30-year prison sentence is grossly

disproportionate to the circumstances of the offenses. No one was physically injured, and

defendant was armed with a starter pistol, which was incapable of firing a projectile. Case law

teaches that the seriousness of the offense is one of the most important factors in the determination

of a sentence. Quintana, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 109. The circuit court, however, disagreed with

defendant’s assessment of the seriousness of the offense. The court considered it to be “such an

aggravating factor” that, to obtain the money from a cash register and some cigarettes, defendant

- 14 - threatened deadly force against a teenager and a “little girl working in a gas station alone.” Surely,

the court had a point. And the court also had a point about defendant’s criminal history. See People

v. D’Arezzo, 229 Ill. App. 3d 428, 434 (1992). “The judge could have regarded defendant’s

troubled life, with his criminal record, as an indicator of future dangerousness.” Richardson, 189

Ill. 2d at 421.

¶ 64 Ninth, defendant maintains that the circuit court imposed upon him a double

enhancement by considering, as an aggravating factor, that he was armed with what appeared to

be a firearm. By defendant’s reasoning, his display of a starter pistol was already “a factor implicit

in the offense” (People v. Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d 1, 11 (2004)), namely, his “threaten[ing] the imminent

use of force while indicating *** by his *** actions to the victim that he *** [was] presently armed

with a firearm” (720 ILCS 5/18-5(a) (West 2006)). But defendant could have accomplished this

element—he could have “indicat[ed] *** by his *** actions to the victim that he *** [was]

presently armed with a firearm”—without sticking the apparent firearm in the victim’s face and

cocking the hammer. Id. In any event, the aggravation, in the court’s view, was not simply

defendant’s conduct of brandishing the starter pistol. It was his being unmoved by the youth of

Wagner and the vulnerability of Kingore, a “little girl working in a gas station alone.” See

D’Arezzo, 229 Ill. App. 3d at 434 (explaining that, in determining a sentence, the circuit court must

consider the defendant’s “general moral character” and “mentality”).

¶ 65 Tenth, noting that discretionary consecutive sentences should be imposed

“sparingly” (O’Neal, 125 Ill. 2d at 298) and that they are “rarely appropriate” (People v. Gray, 121

Ill. App. 3d 867, 873 (1984)), defendant maintains that the circuit court erred by ordering that the

sentences in his case run consecutively. For one thing, he argues, no one was harmed in these

offenses to which he blindly pleaded guilty, nor had he intended to harm anyone. Also, in his

- 15 - assessment, his “criminal history—consisting mostly of juvenile matters and theft-related

offenses—[was] not so significant as to justify a need to ‘protect the public’ from [him], especially

considering the [nine] years that elapsed between his adult cases.” (Emphasis in original and

quoting 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(b) (West 2006).)

¶ 66 The question for us is whether “the [circuit] court’s determination that consecutive

sentences were necessary to protect the public was arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable.” People v.

Parker, 2019 IL App (3d) 160455, ¶ 76. Members of the public need protection not only from

bodily harm but also from the unlawful deprivation of their property. Section 5-8-4(b) speaks of

protecting the public from “criminal conduct” (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(b) (West 2006)), without

specifying that such “criminal conduct” is “limited to conduct that results only in physical harm.”

People v. Buckner, 2013 IL App (2d) 130083, ¶ 41. “We cannot read into the statute a limitation

not expressed.” Id. Although there is, as defendant points out, a nine-year gap between his offenses

in the present case and his previous adult offenses, we are unable to say that the court was arbitrary,

fanciful, or unreasonable in its view that, since his early teens, defendant had been demonstrating

a criminal disregard for other people’s property. After all, he has been convicted of four separate

offenses of robbery: two robberies in Vermilion County case No. 98-CF-606 and two more

robberies in the present case. Robberies can go bad—people can get hurt—and, therefore, not only

property but other people’s physical wellbeing is at stake. “The record must show that the trial

court concluded that consecutive terms were necessary to protect the public.” Id. ¶ 36. The court

so concluded, and the record contains an arguable basis for that conclusion—which, therefore, we

cannot fairly characterize as being an abuse of discretion. See id.

¶ 67 III. CONCLUSION

- 16 - ¶ 68 Finding no abuse of discretion in the sentences, we affirm the circuit court’s

judgment.

¶ 69 Affirmed.

- 17 -