People v. Muir

174 N.Y.S.3d 867, 2022 NY Slip Op 05546

• Court: Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
• Decided: October 5, 2022
• Docket: Ind. No. 1865/15
• Status: Published

Opinion

People v Muir (2022 NY Slip Op 05546)

People v Muir

2022 NY Slip Op 05546

Decided on October 5, 2022

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on October 5, 2022 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department
BETSY BARROS, J.P.
ROBERT J. MILLER
LARA J. GENOVESI
HELEN VOUTSINAS, JJ.

2016-04579
(Ind. No. 1865/15)

[*1]The People of the State of New York, respondent,

v

Noel Muir, appellant.

Patricia Pazner, New York, NY (Benjamin Welikson of counsel), for appellant.

Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY (Leonard Joblove and Marie John-Drigo of counsel), for respondent.

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Ruth Shillingford, J.), rendered April 4, 2016, convicting him of grand larceny in the second degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant entered a plea of guilty to one count of grand larceny in the second degree. Prior to sentencing, he moved to withdraw his plea of guilty. The Supreme Court denied the motion without a hearing and imposed sentence. The defendant appeals.

"The decision to permit a defendant to withdraw a previously entered plea of guilty rests within the sound discretion of the court and generally will not be disturbed absent an improvident exercise of [that] discretion" (People v Jamison, 197 AD3d 569, 570 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see CPL 220.60[3]; People v Torres, 192 AD3d 831, 832). "In general, 'such a motion must be premised upon some evidence of possible innocence or of fraud, mistake, coercion or involuntariness in the taking of the plea'" (People v Hollmond, 191 AD3d 120, 136, quoting People v De Jesus, 199 AD2d 529, 530). "When a defendant moves to withdraw a guilty plea, the nature and extent of the fact-finding inquiry 'rest[s] largely in the discretion of the Judge to whom the motion is made' and a hearing will be granted only in rare instances" (People v Brown, 14 NY3d 113, 116, quoting People v Tinsley, 35 NY2d 926, 927; see People v Hollman, 197 AD3d 484, 484).

Here, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying, without a hearing, the defendant's motion to withdraw his plea of guilty. Reviewing the record as a whole and the circumstances surrounding the entry of the plea (see People v Sougou, 26 NY3d 1052, 1055), we conclude that the defendant's plea of guilty was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made (see People v Hollman, 197 AD3d at 484-485; People v Duart, 144 AD3d 1173, 1175). The defendant's assertions in support of his motion to withdraw his plea of guilty were unsubstantiated and contradicted by the record of the plea proceeding (see People v Haffiz, 19 NY3d 883, 884; People v Turner, 195 AD3d 953, 954; People v Abreu, 184 AD3d 656, 656).

BARROS, J.P., MILLER, GENOVESI and VOUTSINAS, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Maria T. Fasulo

Clerk of the Court