2020 IL App (1st) 190252-U
THIRD DIVISION December 9, 2020
No. 1-19-0252
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 17 CR 12579 ) JEREMY MUDD, ) Honorable ) Charles P. Burns, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE HOWSE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices McBride and Ellis concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed; the prosecutor did not misstate the evidence or shift the burden of proof to defendant when they argued defendant could have requested forensic testing of firearm recovered from the possession of a convicted felon.
¶2 Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County defendant, Jeremy Mudd, was
convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF) and was sentenced to five years and
six months’ imprisonment. Defendant appeals his conviction on the ground the State committed
misconduct during rebuttal closing argument by misstating the evidence and shifting the burden
of proof to the defense. Defendant argues the trial court’s error in permitting this misconduct
was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and that his conviction should be reversed because
the State’s misconduct resulted in unfair prejudice. 1-19-0252
¶3 For the following reasons, we affirm defendant’s conviction.
¶4 BACKGROUND
¶5 Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction.
Therefore, we will recount it only summarily to provide the appropriate context for our
disposition.
¶6 In August 2017 police responded to a large group in a park. When police arrived they
observed 40 to 50 people in the park drinking and playing loud music. Officer Garcia testified at
defendant’s trial he observed a man later identified as defendant grabbing at the area of a bulge
in his waistband. Officer Garcia’s partner, Officer Rice, testified he saw a bulge on defendant’s
right side, an object sticking out of defendant’s shirt, and that defendant was holding his
waistband. Garcia saw defendant exit the park and he followed defendant. Defendant ignored
the officers’ request to stop and continued walking away still holding his right side. Garcia
testified he observed defendant kneel near the rear driver’s side wheel of a van parked in an
alley. Rice testified he saw defendant kneel, remove an object from his waistband, and place an
object on the rear driver’s side wheel of the vehicle but he could not see what the object was.
Garcia and his partner stopped defendant at the van and Garcia recovered a handgun from the top
of the rear driver’s side tire.
¶7 In closing argument defendant’s attorney argued, in pertinent part, as follows:
“Now, let’s talk about what you don’t have. What you don’t have are
fingerprints. As far as we know, that gun was never even submitted for testing for
fingerprints.
You don’t have DNA. Why? Because as far as we know, that gun was
never even submitted for DNA.
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You don’t have gunshot residue. Why? Because they never swabbed
[defendant] for gunshot residue.
You don’t have body cameras. Why? They say they weren’t wearing
body cameras. Seven months ago. In Chicago? Police officers weren’t wearing
body cameras?
They say there’s no in-squad video. Really? In Chicago, seven months
ago, no in-car video? Why? Because they think they can just say, trust me.
Believe me. Take my word for it.
Well, you know, Ladies and Gentlemen, usually we don’t say, take my
word for it. We say, don’t take my word for it. Look at this and judge for
yourself.
The problem with the case before you there is no this. You have nothing
else. And is that really how we want to conduct the criminal justice system in this
city? Because if it is, we don’t need trials. We don’t need prosecutors, or judges,
or defense lawyers, or juries. The police can just say, we saw him do it. End of
story.
That’s not how we conduct justice in this city.
You all told us at the beginning of this case, the very beginning of this
case [the trial judge] asked all of you would you judge a police officer’s word the
same as you would any other citizen, and every one of you said, yes. Yes, I will.
They have no corroboration. The curtain has been pulled back, and all
you have are men.
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Men who didn’t tell a consistent story. Men who didn’t put important
information in their reports. Men who have nothing, nothing to back up what
they’re telling you.”
¶8 During its rebuttal closing argument, the State argued as follows:
“And it is our burden of proof, Ladies and Gentlemen. It is the State’s
burden of proof to prove the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. It’s a burden
we take on every single day.
[Defendant’s attorney]: Objection
THE COURT: To what line, overruled.
[Assistant State’s Attorney]: And we welcome that burden, Ladies and
Gentlemen. We welcome that burden.
But both sides have access to the evidence. Both sides if they wanted
testing to be done can request testing to be done. Both sides.
***
As I told you when we started, Illinois has rules and laws about who can,
who cannot possess weapons. This defendant is a convicted felon. He cannot—
[Defendant’s attorney]: Objection. I would object.
THE COURT: Objection is overruled. That’s an element of the offense.
[Assistant State’s Attorney]: He cannot own, possess, he cannot hold a
gun.”
¶9 Defendant’s attorney filed a posttrial motion for a new trial on the grounds the trial court
erred in overruling defense objections during closing argument and the State shifted the burden
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of proof to the defense during closing argument. The trial court denied defendant’s motion for a
new trial.
¶ 10 This appeal followed.
¶ 11 ANALYSIS
¶ 12 Defendant argues that the State’s rebuttal closing argument constituted “classic burden
shifting” and also misstated the evidence when it argued the defense could have requested
forensic testing of the gun if it wanted to. Neither the prosecution or the defense presented
evidence of any forensic testing on the handgun involved in this case or asked a witness whether
such testing was available to both the prosecution and the defense. The absence of testing was
raised during the defense’s questioning of the police officers and in the parties’ closing
arguments. “The standard of review applied to a prosecutor’s closing argument is similar to the
standard used in deciding whether a prosecutor committed plain error. [Citations.] A reviewing
court will find reversible error only if the defendant demonstrates that the remarks were improper
and that they were so prejudicial that real justice was denied or the verdict resulted from the
error. [Citation.]” (Emphasis added.) People v. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 83. We also agree
with defendant that our “resolution of the prosecutorial misconduct issue should be the same
under either” a de novo standard of review or an abuse of discretion standard of review. See
People v. Rudd, 2020 IL App (1st) 182037, ¶ 83 (“when a prosecutor’s closing argument
comments are challenged, we apply an abuse of discretion standard to the trial court’s
determination regarding the propriety of the challenged comments but review whether any
improper comments were sufficiently egregious to warrant a new trial de novo.”).
¶ 13 Defendant argues the State misstated the evidence when it stated the defense could have
tested the gun because “the State objected on numerous occasions as to whether the firearm here
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was tested for fingerprints and *** chose not to question the officers about whether [defendant]
could have requested that the firearm be tested.” Defendant argues the State shifted the burden
to him to “ ‘come up with evidence to create a reasonable doubt of his guilt.’ [Citation.]” when
the State argued as follows:
“And it is our burden of proof, Ladies and Gentlemen. It is the State’s
burden of proof to prove the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. It’s a burden
we take on every single day. [Objection overruled]. And we welcome that
burden, Ladies and Gentlemen. We welcome that burden. But both sides have
access to the evidence. Both sides if they wanted testing to be done can request
testing to be done. Both sides.”
Defendant further argues the State’s misconduct was not harmless because of “discrepancies” in
the evidence as to whether he possessed the gun. Finally, defendant argues trial counsel
preserved these errors for review but if we find the error was not preserved review is warranted
based on either prong of the plain error analysis or trial counsel’s deficient performance.
¶ 14 The State responds defendant forfeited this argument by failing to object when the
prosecutor made the allegedly offending comments. Defendant asks this court to review the
alleged error for plain error or as a result of trial counsel’s ineffective assistance. The State
responds neither alternative means of reaching defendant’s argument applies because no error
occurred and, therefore, defendant suffered no prejudice. The State argues no error occurred
because the prosecutor’s statement was not a mischaracterization of the evidence but rather
“[t]he ASA’s remark about the defense’s access and ability to request testing was *** a
reasonable inference based on common sense and the evidence at trial.” Further, the State’s
comments “were provoked by and directly responsive to defense counsel’s remarks.” The State
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further argues the comments that allegedly shifted the burden of proof did not in fact do so
because “the prosecutor here merely pointed out that both parties had access to the evidence and
could request testing; but the prosecutor never stated or implied that defendant was required to
provide any evidence proving his innocence or faulted him for not doing so.” (Emphases
omitted.) Finally, the State argues “any error associated with the ASA’s remarks was de minimis
and harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” given the “clear, consistent, credible testimony that
defendant possessed a firearm, and *** that defendant was a convicted felon at the time.”
¶ 15 “A claim is forfeited unless a contemporaneous objection was made and a written
posttrial motion raised the issue, and forfeiture may be overcome under a plain-error analysis.
[Citation.] As noted above, the first step in plain-error analysis is determining whether an error
occurred at all. [Citation.]” People v. Short, 2020 IL App (1st) 162168, ¶ 79. Defendant failed
to make a contemporaneous objection to the prosecutor’s comments defendant now claims
misstated the evidence and shifted the burden of proof. Defendant argues he made an objection
during closing argument and was not required to make another objection “on identical grounds;”
he was only required to “object during and after trial” (see People v. Mohr, 228 Ill. 2d 53, 65
(2008)), which he claims he did. The “identical” objection on which defendant relies in this
case, however, was to the prosecutor’s statement that “It’s a burden we take on every single
day.” We note,
“the State always has the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, the
crime’s elements, and the State may not suggest that it has no burden of proof or
attempt to shift the burden of proof to the defendant. [Citation.] However, if
defense counsel provokes a response in closing argument, the defendant cannot
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complain that the State’s reply in rebuttal argument denied him a fair trial.
[Citation.]” People v. Legore, 2013 IL App (2d) 111038, ¶ 55.
¶ 16 Regardless, the State’s allegedly burden-shifting comment (“But both sides have access
to the evidence. Both sides if they wanted testing to be done can request testing to be done.
Both sides.”) followed defendant’s objection to a previous statement and defendant’s trial
counsel failed to object again. Therefore, defendant’s arguments are forfeited. Short, 2020 IL
App (1st) 162168, ¶ 79.
¶ 17 Having determined that defendant forfeited this claim of error, “[w]e may consider a
forfeited claim under the plain-error doctrine, under which we consider a clear or obvious error if
either (1) the trial evidence was closely balanced or (2) the error was so serious as to deny the
defendant a fair trial and challenges the integrity of the judicial process. [Citation.] A defendant
claiming plain error has the burden of showing plain error, and the first step in plain-error
analysis is determining whether an error occurred at all. [Citation.]” Id. ¶ 66.
¶ 18 Regarding the alleged error in this case, “[p]rosecutors are afforded wide latitude in
closing argument and may properly comment on the evidence presented or reasonable inferences
drawn from that evidence, may respond to comments by defense counsel that invite response,
and may comment on witness credibility. [Citations.] A prosecutor is not allowed to misstate
the evidence, argue facts not in evidence, or attempt to shift the burden of proof to the defense.”
Id. ¶ 76. “Our review considers closing arguments in their entirety and considers remarks in
context, and improper remarks do not merit reversal unless they cause substantial prejudice to
the defendant. Id. Substantial prejudice exists when the jury could have reached a contrary
verdict had the improper remarks not been made or the reviewing court cannot say that the
prosecutor’s improper remarks did not contribute to the conviction. Id. The strength of the
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evidence against the defendant is often a decisive factor in this determination.” Id. ¶ 78. With
these standards in mind, we hold no error occurred in this case.
¶ 19 The first allegation of error, that the prosecutor misstated the evidence because there is no
evidence in the record that, in fact, defendant could have requested testing of the firearm, fails.
The State argues the statement was a “reasonable inference[] drawn from [the] evidence” (id. ¶
76). Defendant replies the fact the firearm could have been tested by him was never established
for the jury “and thus misstated the evidence and at the same time improperly shifted the burden
to [defendant.]” We agree with the State.
¶ 20 A defendant in a criminal case has a “constitutional right to conduct his own tests on
physical evidence.” People v. Beasley, 384 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 1048 (2008), citing People v.
Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d 422, 477 (1993). In Peeples, our supreme court wrote as follows:
“ ‘There can be no question that the defendant has a constitutional right to
conduct his own tests on physical evidence.’ [Citation.]
Supreme Court Rule 412 requires the State, upon written motion of
defense counsel, to disclose to defense counsel, inter alia, any tangible object the
prosecutor intends to use at trial, or which was obtained from or belongs to the
defendant. (134 Ill. 2d R. 412(a)(v).) The rule further provides that the State may
perform this obligation (1) in any manner agreed to by itself and defense counsel,
or (2) by notifying defense counsel that those objects may be tested, and making
available to defense counsel those objects ‘and suitable facilities or other
arrangements for the inspection and testing of those objects. 134 Ill. 2d R. 412(e).
The committee comments to Supreme Court Rule 412(e) explain as follows:
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‘Access to material by a defense expert must be permitted,
sufficient to allow him to reach conclusions regarding the State’s
examining or testing techniques and results. Where feasible,
defense counsel should have the opportunity to have a test made by
his chosen expert, either in the State’s laboratory or in his own
laboratory using a sufficient sample.’ 134 Ill. 2d R. 412,
Committee Comments, at 349.” Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d at 477.
¶ 21 This court has long recognized that jurors are not required to “check their common sense
at the door” to the courthouse. Long ago, our supreme court wrote that “[w]henever the subject-
matter of inquiry is of such a character that it may be presumed to lie within the common
experience of all men of common education, moving in the ordinary walks of life, *** the jury
are supposed in all such matters to be entirely competent to draw the necessary inferences from
the facts testified of by the witnesses. [Citation.]” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hellyer
v. People, 186 Ill. 550, 558 (1900), see also Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions-Criminal Intro. 1
(“We agree with those cases holding that ‘Courts are *** not required to give an instruction that
would provide the jury with no more guidance than that available to them by application of
common sense.’ People v. McClellan, 62 Ill. App. 3d 590, 595 (1978).”). Matters within the
common knowledge of jurors includes knowledge of the law and legal procedures. See, e.g.,
People v. Rave, 392 Ill. 435, 444 (1946) (common knowledge that writs of habeas corpus are
filed for persons serving life sentences); People v. Taylor, 410 Ill. 469, 474 (1951) (common
knowledge that screw drivers and pliers are “burglary tools” within meaning of statute); People
v. Barnette, 30 Ill. 2d 359, 370 (1964) (common knowledge that death is not the only penalty for
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murder). Defendant himself argued in reply that the trial court’s instruction to the jury was that
it “should consider all the evidence in the light of your own *** experience in life.”
¶ 22 This court addressed a defendant’s similar argument “that the State improperly
commented on [the] defendant’s failure to list [a] home on a MLS where no testimony was
introduced regarding listing services.” People v. Jackson, 391 Ill. App. 3d 11, 42 (2009). This
court rejected the defendant’s argument that the prosecutor’s remarks were not supported by
facts reasoning that “[t]he prosecution’s argument was based upon common sense and life
experience, factors which the jury was instructed to keep in mind when considering the evidence.
See People v. Beard, 356 Ill. App. 3d 236, 241 (2005) (found no error in the prosecution’s
argument that a particular individual simply would not have the strength to have caused the
victim’s injuries and noted that the prosecution is permitted to discuss subjects of general
knowledge, common experience, or common sense).” Jackson, 391 Ill. App. 3d at 42-43.
¶ 23 We reach a similar conclusion here. We believe the fact a defendant has access to
evidence to be used against him “to have a test made by his chosen expert” is a matter of
“general knowledge, common experience, or common sense.” Id. The State’s argument was not
improper. Id. Additionally, the jury could reasonably infer the gun was available for defendant
to test and that he could have requested such testing, from the testimony police recovered and
inventoried the gun. See Short, 2020 IL App (1st) 162168, ¶ 76 (prosecutors may properly
comment on the evidence or reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence). Defendant’s
argument the prosecution misstated the evidence fails.
¶ 24 The second allegation of error, that the State improperly shifted the burden of proof, also
fails. Defense counsel based closing argument on the absence of forensic testing of the gun in
this case. In response, the prosecution argued, correctly, that defendant could have requested
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forensic testing of the gun if he wanted it. The defense argument provoked a response in rebuttal
and, therefore, “defendant cannot complain that the State’s reply in rebuttal argument denied him
a fair trial.” Legore, 2012 IL App (2d) 111038, ¶ 56.
“Additionally, while the prosecution is generally not allowed to comment
on a defendant’s failure to produce evidence, such comments are acceptable if a
defendant with equal access to that evidence assails the prosecution’s failure to
produce it. [Citation.] Thus, as the defense argued that the State could have
introduced [certain] evidence, it was not error for the State to argue that defendant
also did not introduce the [evidence.] Cf. People v. Nowicki, 385 Ill. App. 3d 53,
91 (2008) (it was proper for prosecutor to point out that the defendant could have
subpoenaed police officers, in response to the defense’s highlighting that the State
had not called officers as witnesses); People v. Baugh, 358 Ill. App. 3d 718, 741-
42 (2005) (prosecutor’s argument that the defendant could have produced
telephone records was not improper where defense counsel had argued that the
State could have produced such records but had chosen not to).” Legore, 2013 IL
App (2d) 111038, ¶ 57.
¶ 25 Finally, we find that the prosecutor did not “imply that defendant was required to present
evidence; rather, the State [at most implied] that no evidence existed in this case to support
defendant’s theory” that his fingerprints were not on the gun because he did not place it where
police recovered it or that the State failed to prove that he did place it there beyond a reasonable
doubt. See People v. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d 173, 212 (2009). The prosecutor commits misconduct
and their comments are “improper [if they] suggest[] that defendant was required to present
evidence tending to prove his innocence.” Id. Here, as in Glasper, “[t]he State’s comments ***
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made no such suggestion, were invited by defense counsel’s argument, and were reasonable in
light of the facts presented in this case.” Id. We find no error in the prosecutor’s rebuttal.
¶ 26 Having found “no clear or obvious error in the complained-of remarks by the prosecutor,
the doctrine of plain error provides no relief from the forfeiture.” People v. Jones, 2020 IL App
(4th) 190909, ¶ 4. Further, “[f]rom our finding of no clear or obvious error, it follows that
omitting to object fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. ¶ 5.
“[T]he failure of a defendant to show that error occurred at all defeats both an ineffective
assistance claim and a claim of error under either prong of the plain error doctrine.” People v.
Hensley, 2014 IL App (1st) 120802, ¶ 47. Accordingly, defendant’s arguments both fail and the
judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.
¶ 27 CONCLUSION
¶ 28 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.
¶ 29 Affirmed.
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