People v. Morrison

2025 IL App (5th) 240429-U

Opinion

NOTICE 2025 IL App (5th) 240429-U NOTICE Decision filed 11/06/25. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-24-0429 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the

Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Franklin County. ) v. ) No. 23-CM-166 ) ROBERT E. MORRISON, ) Honorable ) Thomas J. Tedeschi, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE CATES delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Barberis and Vaughan concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The evidence was sufficient to prove the defendant guilty of resisting or obstructing a peace officer. The evidence was insufficient to prove the defendant guilty of obstructing service of process. Therefore, the judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part.

¶2 Following a jury trial, the defendant, Robert E. Morrison, was convicted of one count of

resisting or obstructing a peace officer and one count of obstructing service of process. The

defendant was sentenced to 90 days in Franklin County jail. On appeal the defendant claims that

there was insufficient evidence to find the defendant guilty of both charges.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On May 24, 2023, Paul Uraski, a deputy employed by the Franklin County Sheriff’s Office,

went to the defendant’s home in Benton, Illinois, to serve him with two “no-stalking” protective

orders. When Uraski knocked on the door, it was answered by the defendant’s fiancé, now 1 husband, Nathan Gleghorn. Uraski informed Gleghorn that he had papers for the defendant.

Gleghorn indicated he would let the defendant know. When the defendant came to the door, he

and Uraski had words, which led to an arrest, resulting in the charges against the defendant.

¶5 On June 1, 2023, the State charged the defendant by information with one count of resisting

a peace officer (count I). The State alleged that the defendant “knowingly resisted the performance

of Deputy Paul Uraski of an authorized act within his official capacity, being his arrest, knowing

Deputy Paul Uraski to be a peace officer engaged in the execution of his official duties, in that the

defendant pulled away, laid on the floor, and refused to be handcuffed,” in violation of section 31-

1(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 2022)). The State also charged the

defendant by information with one count of obstructing service of process (count II). In count II,

the State alleged that the defendant “knowingly resisted the authorized service of two Orders of

Protection, being 23-OP-191 and 23-OP-192 from the 2nd Judicial Circuit, in that Robert Morrison

screamed and cursed and refused to listed [sic] and speak with Deputy Paul Uraski, while walking

away after being told several time [sic] to not walk away or shut the door on his mobile home,

knowing Deputy Paul Uraski was there to serve him with the Orders of Protection, while Deputy

Paul Uraski was engaged in the execution of his Official Duties” in violation of section 31-3 of

the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/31-3 (West 2022)).

¶6 On January 9, 2024, a jury trial was held. At trial, Deputy Uraski was called as the State’s

first witness. Uraski gave an account of the events that took place on May 24, 2023. While on duty,

Uraski went to the defendant’s house to serve him with two “no stalking” orders. When the

defendant came to the door, he began to scream and curse. Uraski said that the defendant “just

wasn’t having any part of it.” The defendant tried to shut the door on Uraski and Uraski put out

his hand to stop the door. The defendant tried to shut the door on Uraski again. Uraski pushed

2 himself through the door into the defendant’s mobile home. Uraski told the defendant that he was

going to be placed under arrest for obstructing. The defendant positioned himself over the arm of

a couch with his hands tucked towards his chest. When Uraski went to handcuff the defendant, the

defendant pulled his arm away from Uraski, resulting in a brief 20 to 30 second struggle. After

placing the defendant in handcuffs, Uraski called for assistance. As a result of the struggle, the

defendant was lying on the floor and refused to get up. Uraski needed help escorting the defendant

to the patrol vehicle. The defendant was also claiming that he was handicapped and disabled.

Uraski thought that it would be best to not do anything else and wait for assistance. Uraski testified

that he let “someone else” escort the defendant to the patrol vehicle, so that the situation would

not escalate any further. During the time Uraski was waiting for backup, the defendant was not

fighting or resisting. The defendant was “mumbling, carrying on a little bit.”

¶7 On cross-examination Uraski testified that Gleghorn had originally answered the door.

Uraski explained that he could not leave the protective orders with Gleghorn because Uraski had

to personally serve the defendant. Uraski was asked if he could have just left the orders of

protection with the defendant and told him, “You are served.” Uraski stated that he needed to

“explain things in the order of protection” to the defendant. When Uraski was asked if he was

required by law to serve orders of protection in that way, Uraski responded that it was the way he

was taught. Uraski was asked additional questions regarding the arrest. Uraski testified that the

defendant had started to walk away while Uraski was explaining the orders of protection. Uraski

then instructed the defendant not to turn away from him. When the defendant continued to walk

away, Uraski placed him under arrest. After the defendant was placed in handcuffs, he was lying

on the ground and refused to get up. Uraski was asked whether the defendant had a cigarette in his

3 hand that interfered with handcuffing the defendant. Uraski stated that he did not remember the

defendant having a cigarette during the altercation, but it was possible.

¶8 Sarah Parke, a sergeant with the West City Police Department, was the State’s next

witness. Parke testified that she was on patrol on May 24, 2023. While on patrol she received a

call requesting assistance. When Parke arrived at the scene, she saw that Uraski had the defendant

in handcuffs, and that they were preparing to come outside. Parke was one of the officers that

helped escort the defendant to Uraski’s patrol vehicle. Parke recalled that the defendant was not

complying, and that he was “yelling, and he was dragging his feet, putting his feet underneath him

so he didn’t have to walk down the stairs.” On cross-examination, Parke acknowledged that the

defendant told her that he had a physical disability. Parke further acknowledged that it was possible

that the defendant could have had trouble walking and was not actually resisting.

¶9 At the conclusion of Parke’s testimony, the State rested. The defense then moved for a

directed verdict outside of the jury’s presence. After hearing arguments from the State and defense

counsel, the court denied the motion.

¶ 10 The defendant called Nathan Gleghorn as his first witness. Gleghorn recounted the

interaction between the defendant and Uraksi on May 24, 2023. Gleghorn recalled that he initially

answered the door and encountered Deputy Uraski. Uraski advised that he had orders of protection

for the defendant that were related to stalking. The defendant then came to the door. At that point,

Uraski indicated he had papers to serve on the defendant. Uraski began reading from them. As he

was attempting to read from the paperwork, Uraski was informed by the defendant that he needed

to sit down. Gleghorn explained that the defendant started to lose his balance because he had metal

plates in his feet and legs. Gleghorn also stated that the defendant had “a couple of cysts on his

bottom.” Uraksi told the defendant to sit on a bar stool, but the defendant said that he could not sit

4 on the barstool “because it hurt his bottom due to the cysts.” The defendant went to sit on the couch

that was approximately one foot to three feet away from where the barstool was located. At that

point, Uraski “went after him, pulling him down like a rag doll off the couch.” Gleghorn testified

that the defendant was smoking a cigarette and that Uraski burned the defendant’s arm when he

was trying to place handcuffs on the defendant. Gleghorn yelled at Uraski and the defendant to

stop fighting. After the arrest, Gleghorn also indicated that the defendant did not pull away from

the officers as they escorted the defendant to the patrol car. On cross-examination, Gleghorn said

that he had to remove the cigarette from the defendant’s hand after the defendant’s arm was burnt.

Gleghorn also stood on the front porch, and he watched the defendant when he was escorted to the

patrol car.

¶ 11 The defendant testified on his own behalf. He recounted the events leading to his arrest.

The defendant stated that after Uraski finished reading the first order of protection, he told Uraski

that he needed to sit down because he was going to fall. The defendant walked over to the recliner

to sit down. Uraski then grabbed the defendant and tried to put handcuffs on him, which resulted

in the defendant getting burned by his cigarette. The defendant testified that he was “only resisting

to get that cigarette to stop burning.” The defendant stated that he could not walk or hold his

balance without a cane. He also denied pulling away from anybody. At the conclusion of the

defendant’s testimony, the defense rested.

¶ 12 Following closing arguments from the State and defense counsel, the case was given to the

jury. The jury deliberated and returned a guilty verdict on both counts. At sentencing, defense

counsel asked for time served, a fine, and conditional discharge. The State asked for 5 days in the

county jail for each count to run concurrently, 24 months of conditional discharge, and fines that

the court would deem appropriate. After considering the evidence in mitigation and factors in

5 aggravation, the court sentenced the defendant to a fine of $75 plus assessments, and 90 days in

the county jail. This appeal followed.

¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 14 On appeal, the defendant claims that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the offense of obstructing service of

process and the offense of resisting or obstructing a peace officer. In response, the State claims

that the evidence was sufficient to prove that the defendant was guilty of both counts beyond a

reasonable doubt.

¶ 15 When reviewing a claim that the State’s evidence was insufficient to support a conviction,

“the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond

a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis in original.) Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). “Under

this standard, the reviewing court does not retry the defendant, and the trier of fact remains

responsible for making determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be

given their testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.” People v.

Ross, 229 Ill. 2d 255, 272 (2008). However, “merely because the trier of fact accepted certain

testimony or made certain inferences based on the evidence does not guarantee the reasonableness

of its decision.” Ross, 229 Ill. 2d at 272. A conviction will be reversed where the evidence is “so

unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory” that there remains a reasonable doubt about the

defendant’s guilt. Ross, 229 Ill. 2d at 272.

¶ 16 A. Obstruction of Service of Process

¶ 17 In the case at bar, the defendant initially claims that the evidence was not sufficient to find

that the defendant obstructed service of process. The defendant argues that there was no evidence

6 to establish that Uraski ever tried to hand the defendant the protective orders and no evidence to

establish that the defendant prevented him from doing so. The defendant further argues that under

Illinois law, service of process does not require orders to be read aloud to the party that is being

served. Thus, the defendant concludes that he did not interfere with service of process.

¶ 18 Generally, “service of summons upon an individual defendant shall be made (1) by leaving

a copy of the summons with the defendant personally, [or] (2) by leaving a copy at the defendant’s

usual place of abode, with some person of the family or a person residing there, of the age of 13

years or upwards.” 735 ILCS 5/2-203(a) (West 2022). For a “no contact stalking order” service of

process requires “the petitioner has made all reasonable efforts to accomplish actual service of

process personally upon the respondent.” 740 ILCS 21/60(c) (West 2020). Under Illinois law

obstructing service of process occurs when someone “knowingly resists or obstructs the authorized

service or execution of any civil or criminal process or order of any court.” 720 ILCS 5/31-3 (West

2022). Obstruct means “to be or come in the way of.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People

v. Raby, 40 Ill. 2d 392, 399 (1968). “Given a reasonable and natural construction, these terms do

not proscribe mere argument with a policeman about the validity of an arrest or other police action,

but proscribe only some physical act which imposes an obstacle which may impede, hinder,

interrupt, prevent or delay the performance of the officer’s duties.” Raby, 40 Ill. 2d at 399.

¶ 19 As stated previously, when evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, this court must determine if “any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis in original.)

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. While this court will not retry the defendant, on review this court may

determine the reasonableness of the trier of fact’s decision based on the evidence. Ross, 229 Ill. 2d

at 272.

7 ¶ 20 In this case, the evidence shows that Uraksi went to the defendant’s home to serve two “no

stalking” orders of protection. Uraski testified that he tried to read and explain the “no stalking”

orders to the defendant, and that the defendant got upset and “wasn’t having any of it.” Under

Illinois law, however, there is no requirement that orders of protection be read aloud to a defendant.

Here, Uraski could have handed the orders of protection to the defendant. The evidence indicates

that Uraski never attempted to hand the papers to the defendant. While Uraski may have been

trained to explain the contents of an order of protection before serving it, the law does not require

it. Thus, the defendant’s refusal to listen to the explanation by Uraski does not rise to the level of

obstructing service of process. The State argues that the defendant tried shutting the door in the

face of Uraski which along with the whole conduct by the defendant rises to the level of

obstruction. However, the evidence indicates that Uraski chose to attempt an explanation of the

order’s contents at the outset of the interaction between himself and the defendant. Thus, the

defendant’s subsequent conduct regarding the service of process of the “no stalking” orders did

not interfere with Uraski’s official duties. Therefore, we find that the evidence was insufficient to

support the defendant’s conviction for obstruction of service of process. Therefore, the defendant’s

conviction for obstruction of service of process must be reversed.

¶ 21 B. Obstruction of a Peace Officer

¶ 22 The defendant claims that the State failed to prove the defendant guilty of resisting or

obstructing a peace officer because the arresting officer admitted that it was possible that the

defendant was being burned by a cigarette on his arm when he was being handcuffed. The

defendant also claims that the officer escorting him to the patrol vehicle admitted that the defendant

may not have been resisting but instead had trouble walking. Essentially, the defendant challenges

the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for resisting or obstructing a peace officer.

8 The defendant claims that the State’s evidence was equivocal, and thus there was insufficient

evidence to support the defendant’s guilty conviction.

¶ 23 Under Illinois law, obstruction of a peace officer occurs when “[a] person *** knowingly:

(1) resists arrest, or (2) obstructs the performance by one known to the person to be a peace officer,

firefighter, or correctional institution employee of any authorized act within his or her official

capacity.” 720 ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 2022). Obstruct means “to be or come in the way of.”

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Raby, 40 Ill. 2d at 399. “Given a reasonable and natural

construction, these terms do not proscribe mere argument with a policeman about the validity of

an arrest or other police action, but proscribe only some physical act which imposes an obstacle

which may impede, hinder, interrupt, prevent or delay the performance of the officer’s duties.”

Raby, 40 Ill. 2d at 399. This court must determine if upon viewing the evidence in a light most

favorable to the State, “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis in original.) Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. Again, the

reviewing court will not retry the defendant, but it will determine the reasonableness of the trier of

fact’s decision based on the evidence presented. See Ross, 229 Ill. 2d at 272.

¶ 24 In this case, the evidence presented at trial shows that when Uraski attempted to handcuff

the defendant, he pulled away. Uraski testified that the defendant laid on the couch and refused to

allow Uraski to place handcuffs on him. There was also evidence that following the defendant’s

arrest, the defendant refused to get up from the floor and then dragged his feet and needed to be

carried to the patrol vehicle. The defendant and Gleghorn testified as to possible explanations for

the defendant’s behavior. These explanations included a cigarette that was burning the defendant’s

arm when he was being handcuffed and that the defendant’s physical disability prevented him from

walking normally to the patrol car. The defendant’s claim that the State’s evidence was equivocal

9 was a question for the jury. The jury had the opportunity to listen to all of the testimony and judge

the credibility of the witnesses. The jury ultimately found that the defendant was guilty of

obstruction of a peace officer. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find

there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conviction of resisting or obstructing a

peace officer, and the conviction is affirmed.

¶ 25 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 26 For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s conviction for obstruction of a peace officer is

affirmed, and the defendant’s conviction for obstruction of service of process is reversed.

¶ 27 Affirmed in part and reversed in part.