People v. Morris

2020 IL App (4th) 180262-U

Opinion

NOTICE 2020 IL App (4th) 180262-U FILED This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited August 4, 2020 as precedent by any party except in NO. 4-18-0262 Carla Bender the limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Livingston County MAURICE MORRIS, ) No. 17CF252 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Jennifer Hartmann Bauknecht, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Knecht and DeArmond concurred in the judgment.

ORDER ¶1 Held: (1) The evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find defendant guilty of domestic battery beyond a reasonable doubt.

(2) The trial court did not violate Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012) in admonishing the jury.

¶2 In February 2018, the trial court conducted a jury trial on the State’s two domestic

battery charges filed against defendant, Maurice Morris. The State presented evidence that

defendant shoved cake in the victim’s face and then forcefully held her around her neck against a

wall. The jury found defendant guilty of both counts.

¶3 Defendant filed this direct appeal, raising two claims of error. First, he argues the

evidence was insufficient to convict him when the victim’s testimony was so inconsistent and

improbable that no reasonable jury could have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Second, defendant claims the trial court violated Rule 431(b) when it failed to properly admonish each potential juror during voir dire of the four constitutional principles essential to a fair trial.

After our review of the issues presented, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶4 I. BACKGROUND

¶5 A. The Charges

¶6 In August 2017, the State filed a three-count information against defendant,

alleging he committed the following offenses after having two previous convictions of domestic

battery: (1) domestic battery in violation of section 12-3.2(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 2012

(Criminal Code) (720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(1) (West 2016)), a Class 4 felony, for knowingly causing

bodily harm to Bobbie Jo Rodrick Woods, a household member, by choking her (count I);

(2) domestic battery in violation of section 12-3.2(a)(2) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS

5/12-3.2(a)(2) (West 2016)), a Class 4 felony, for knowingly making physical contact of an

insulting or provoking nature with Woods by striking her with cake (count II); and (3) unlawful

interference with reporting of domestic violence in violation of section 12-3.5 of the Criminal

Code (720 ILCS 5/12-3.5 (West 2016)), a Class A misdemeanor, for attempting to prevent Woods

from calling the police after committing an act of domestic violence (count III).

¶7 B. Admonitions and Questions to Prospective Jurors

¶8 On February 16, 2018, the parties selected a jury.

¶9 The trial court admonished 18 of the prospective jurors about “certain propositions

of law that [they] must be willing to follow.” The court said: “It’s very important that you

understand these principles of law and that you are willing to accept them and follow them.” The

court admonished the prospective jurors that (1) defendant was presumed innocent, (2) the State

must prove defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, (3) defendant does not have to prove his

-2- innocence, and (4) defendant does not have to present any evidence or testify. The following

exchange occurred:

“THE COURT: So, by a show of hands, do each of you understand these

principles of law? If so, please [raise] your hands.

PROSPECTIVE JURORS: (All raise hands.)

THE COURT: And do each of you accept these principles of law?

THE COURT: Everybody understands and accepts.”

¶ 10 C. The Jury Trial

¶ 11 1. Testimony of Bobbie Jo Rodrick Woods

¶ 12 The State first called the victim, Bobbie Jo Rodrick Woods, who testified as

follows. She and defendant, who she identified in court, had been in a relationship for two years

and were engaged to be married. Woods explained she had only 20% hearing in both ears, so she

generally wore hearing aids. In August 2017, the couple lived together in a two-bedroom home in

Dwight, Illinois.

¶ 13 During the overnight hours on August 6, 2017, and the early morning hours of

August 7, 2017, Woods got out of bed around midnight to use the restroom without wearing her

hearing aids. She then got some of her daughter’s birthday cake and went into the living room.

Defendant came into the living room. Woods could tell he was upset and was talking, but she could

not hear what he was saying. Because she could not hear him, Woods did not respond. Defendant

walked over to her and shoved the plate of cake into her face. Woods stood up. She said she “was

furious.” Defendant pushed her into the wall and placed his hand on her throat. He held her for

-3- less than a minute. When he let go, she “was still furious.” She told defendant she was calling the

police. She walked to the bedroom to get her hearing aids and collected her belongings to leave.

¶ 14 Woods said she left the residence and drove to Pontiac, Illinois, where her daughter

was working. Woods told her what happened, and her daughter called the police. Woods drove to

the police station in Dwight. The police took a statement and took photos of her scratches. People’s

exhibit No. 1 was a photo of scratches on her neck. People’s exhibit No. 2 was a photo of scratches

on her chest.

¶ 15 In October 2017, Woods said she completed a complaint refusal form mentioning

that her family had a tradition of shoving cake in each other’s faces during birthday parties. Woods

acknowledged that at the time she completed the complaint-refusal form, she and defendant were

in a relationship. They reportedly have since broken up.

¶ 16 2. Testimony of Watson McKee

¶ 17 Watson McKee was a Dwight police officer and took Woods’s statement on the

night of the incident. He had taken the photos of Woods, and he identified those photos in court.

After meeting with Woods, McKee drove to defendant’s residence. Defendant told McKee “he

had put cake in [Woods’s] face.” McKee said things were “knocked over and knocked off the wall,

and there was cake smeared around on the carpet.” The State rested.

¶ 18 3. Testimony of Defendant

¶ 19 Defendant testified on his own behalf. He admitted the two argued on the night of

the incident. He said Woods has “a gambling problem,” so they were arguing over “some finances,

some money.” He said, at some point in the evening, “everybody had cake in their face,” including

him, as it was a tradition when they celebrated birthdays. During the argument, Woods flipped

over a sectional couch and “went stomping down the hall.” She gathered her belongings and left.

-4- Defendant went to bed and was eventually awoken by the police. Defendant was shown the State’s

exhibits and said the only time he saw “those marks” was in the photos.

¶ 20 4. Rebuttal Testimony of Officer McKee

¶ 21 In rebuttal, the State re-called McKee, who said he asked defendant if Woods had

hit him and defendant said no. And, defendant did not indicate he had been struck by cake. McKee

did not observe any cake on defendant, but he did observe cake on Woods. Defendant denied

Woods had been violent with him that night; and McKee did not notice any injuries on defendant.

McKee recalled defendant stating the couple was arguing over gambling. McKee saw “things

tipped over,” but he did not recall whether he asked defendant about that. He said defendant told

him “she was throwing things or knocking things over or something to that effect.”

¶ 22 5. The Jury’s Verdict

¶ 23 The State offered People’s exhibit No. 3, a certified copy of defendant’s felony

conviction for criminal damage to property. The trial court admonished the jury about the limited

use for credibility purposes only of this document. After considering the evidence and the

arguments of counsel, the jury found defendant guilty of both counts of domestic battery.

¶ 24 D. Sentencing

¶ 25 On April 4, 2018, the parties convened for sentencing. The State presented only the

presentence investigation report as evidence. Defendant testified on his own behalf. He requested

a sentence of probation and that probation be transferred to the State of Missouri for ease of

reporting, as he was employed as an over-the-road truck driver and lived with his mother in St.

Louis, Missouri. After considering the presentence investigation report, recommendations from

counsel, defendant’s testimony, defendant’s statement in allocution, and the statutory factors in

-5- aggravation and mitigation, the court sentenced defendant on count I, noting count II merged

therewith, to 24 months’ probation with a stayed sentence of 180 days in jail.

¶ 26 This appeal followed.

¶ 27 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 28 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 29 Defendant claims the State failed to prove him guilty of domestic battery beyond a

reasonable doubt. He claims Woods’s testimony was “so plagued by vagaries and riddled with

contradictions as to be wholly insufficient.”

¶ 30 “A criminal conviction will not be set aside unless the evidence is so improbable

or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.” People v. Collins, 106

Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985). It is not the reviewing court’s role to retry the defendant; instead, we must

ask whether, “ ‘after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). The

trier of fact must “resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable

inferences from the facts.” People v. Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 35. The trier of fact is best equipped

to judge the credibility of witnesses, and due consideration must be given to the fact that it was the

trial court and jury that saw and heard the witnesses. People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92, 114-15

(2007). Accordingly, a jury’s findings concerning credibility are entitled to great weight. People

v. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532, 542 (1999).

¶ 31 A reviewing court will not replace the trier of fact’s judgment with its own

regarding the weight of the evidence or witnesses’ credibility. Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 35. “A

conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence ***.” People v. Huff, 29 Ill. 2d 315, 320

-6- (1963). A single witness’s testimony, if positive and credible, is sufficient to support a conviction.

People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213, 228 (2009). “A conviction will not be reversed simply

because the evidence is contradictory or because the defendant claims that a witness was not

credible.” Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 36. The trier of fact need not “search out a series of potential

explanations compatible with innocence, and elevate them to the status of a reasonable doubt.”

People v. Russell, 17 Ill. 2d 328, 331 (1959).

¶ 32 “A person commits domestic battery if he or she knowingly without legal

justification by any means: (1) [c]auses bodily harm to any family or household member; [or]

(2) [m]akes physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with any family or household

member.” 720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a) (West 2016). A person acts knowingly regarding “[t]he nature or

attendant circumstances of his or her conduct *** when he or she is consciously aware that his or

her conduct is of that nature or that those circumstances exist.” 720 ILCS 5/4-5(a) (West 2016). A

person acts knowingly regarding “[t]he result of his or her conduct *** when he or she is

consciously aware that that result is practically certain to be caused by his conduct.” 720 ILCS

5/4-5(b) (West 2016). “Knowledge may be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case.”

People v. Holt, 271 Ill. App. 3d 1016, 1025 (1995).

¶ 33 1. Bodily Harm

¶ 34 Domestic battery by bodily harm has four elements: The State must prove

defendant (1) intentionally or knowingly, (2) and without legal justification, (3) caused bodily

harm, (4) to any family or household member. 720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(1) (West 2016). Defendant

does not dispute Woods was a “household member,” but he denies the evidence demonstrated he

caused the scratches on her neck and chest as depicted in the State’s exhibits. He claims Woods’s

testimony was inconsistent and insufficient to support a guilty verdict. We disagree.

-7- ¶ 35 Woods testified she could tell defendant “was upset” when he entered the living

room where she was sitting on the couch. After the cake incident, she said she “stood up” and

defendant “was standing by [her].” The prosecutor asked Woods the following:

“Q. And did he make any other physical contact with you when you stood

up?

A. He did. He pushed me to the wall and had his hand on my throat.

Q. And when you say he had his hand on your throat, was his hand grabbing

your throat?

A. I’m sorry?

Q. Was his hand grabbing your throat?

A. Well, I mean, he had his hand on my throat. He had me against the wall.

Q. Was he holding you against the wall with his hand on your throat?

A. Just with his hand. Yes.”

¶ 36 Based on this testimony, a reasonable jury could have found defendant caused the

scratch marks on Woods’s neck and chest when he “pushed [her] to the wall and had his hand on

[her] throat.” Woods’s uncertainty about when or even if she sustained the scratches during this

incident would not serve to destroy her credibility. The jury was satisfied with her testimony that

defendant pushed her to the wall and held her with his hand around her neck. Under this described

scenario, it was reasonable to infer the scratches depicted in the photos taken immediately

following the incident were the result of defendant’s conduct. Accordingly, it was reasonable for

the jury to find defendant caused bodily harm to Woods beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 37 2. Insulting or Provoking Contact

-8- ¶ 38 Domestic battery by insulting or provoking contact has four elements: the State

must prove “that the defendant (1) intentionally or knowingly, (2) without legal justification,

(3) made physical contact of an insulting [or provoking] nature, (4) with a family or household

member.” People v. Pickens, 354 Ill. App. 3d 904, 914 (2004). Defendant claims that Woods

“getting birthday cake on her did not rise to the level of insult or provocation as contemplated by

the domestic battery statute.” We disagree with defendant’s statement, not only with his

characterization of the incident but his conclusion as well.

¶ 39 The evidence that defendant’s contact was of an insulting or provoking nature was

overwhelming. Woods testified defendant was angry when he entered the living room as she sat

on the couch eating a piece of cake. She could not hear what he was saying, but she “could tell he

was upset.” He walked over to her, took the plate of cake, and pushed it in her face. Woods said

she “was furious.”

¶ 40 Woods admitted there was no birthday party or celebration going on in the middle

of the night when defendant shoved cake in her face. In fact, she testified defendant was visibly

upset at the time of the incident. Defendant admitted to police and at trial that he and Woods had

an argument that night. He also admitted he “put [the cake] in her face.” But, he claimed it was

during a birthday party earlier in the evening.

¶ 41 Whether defendant’s contact with Woods was of an insulting or provoking nature

was an issue of fact for the jury to decide. See People v. Rachel, 123 Ill. App. 3d 600, 608 (1984).

Shoving cake in someone’s face in anger is an unmistakable expression of contempt for that

person. Thus, not only could the jury here reasonably conclude that defendant’s contact with

Woods was insulting or provoking, such a conclusion was obvious under the circumstances to

which she testified.

-9- ¶ 42 B. The Zehr Instructions to the Potential Jurors

¶ 43 Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012), the trial court must

admonish each potential juror on four constitutional principles that are essential to a fair trial. Also,

the court must ask each potential juror if he or she understands and accepts those principles. These

are known as the Zehr admonitions and inquiries, named after People v. Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d 472

(1984). In the present case, Zehr admonitions were given, and Zehr inquiries were made. On

appeal, however, defendant asserts violations of Rule 431(b). Whether the trial court complied

with the requirements of Rule 431(b) is subject to de novo review. People v. Wrencher, 2011 IL

App (4th) 080619, ¶ 37.

¶ 44 Defendant acknowledges that, in the proceedings below, he never objected to any

noncompliance with Rule 431(b) or asserted an objection in a posttrial motion. “[B]oth a trial

objection and a written post-trial motion raising the issue are necessary to preserve an issue for

review.” People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). Nevertheless, defendant seeks to avert the

procedural forfeiture by invoking the doctrine of plain error. He relies on the first prong of the

plain-error doctrine. He maintains that, because the evidence in the trial was “closely balanced,”

the “clear or obvious” violations of Rule 431(b) “threatened to tip the scales of justice against”

him. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 51. According to

defendant, the trial court clearly or obviously violated Rule 431(b).

¶ 45 We begin our plain-error analysis by first determining whether any error occurred

at all. People v. Sargent, 239 Ill. 2d 166, 189 (2010). Defendant claims the trial court erred by

collapsing all four principles into one inquiry rather than reciting one principle at a time and asking

the potential jurors if they understood and accepted that principle. If indeed this was an error, it

was not a clear or obvious one. Nothing in the text of Rule 431(b) clearly requires delivering the

- 10 - admonitions piecemeal with the inquiries interspersed. As defendant admits, the appellate court is

divided on the question of whether it is necessary to do so. Cf. People v. Willhite, 399 Ill. App. 3d

1191, 1196-97 (2010) (this court observed that “Rule 431(b) has no requirement that the trial court

ask separate questions of the jurors about each individual principle”) and People v. Hayes, 409 Ill.

App. 3d 612, 627 (2011) (holding that the trial court’s admonishments were not compliant because

it collapsed the first three principles). Consistent with Willhite, we conclude the trial court

committed no error in reciting the Rule 431(b) principles to the venire and inquiring about its

understanding and acceptance of those principles in compound form. “Contrary to defendant’s

assertions on appeal, our rationale in Willhite was not solely reliant on an earlier, vacated version

of McCovins.” People v. Kinnerson, 2020 IL App (4th) 170650, ¶ 64 (citing People v. McCovins,

2011 IL App (1st) 081805-B). Because we have determined the trial court committed no error with

respect to its Rule 431(b) questions, we need not consider defendant’s contention under plain-error

analysis.

¶ 46 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 47 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 48 Affirmed.

- 11 -