NOTICE 2025 IL App (4th) 241216-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-24-1216 October 31, 2025 not precedent except in the Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT 4th District Appellate Court, IL OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Whiteside County MICHAEL T. MORENO, ) No. 22CF86 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Patricia Ann Senneff, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Harris and Justice Lannerd concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding (1) the evidence was sufficient for a fact finder to reasonably conclude defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of knowingly disseminating child pornography, (2) defendant forfeited his claim regarding the sufficiency of the trial court’s admonishments when accepting his waiver of a jury trial, and (3) his aggregate term of 24 years’ imprisonment was not excessive.
¶2 Defendant, Michael T. Moreno, following a bench trial, was convicted of two
counts of child pornography (720 ILCS 5/11-20.1(a)(2) (West 2020)). He was subsequently
sentenced to two consecutive 12-year terms of imprisonment. On appeal, he argues (1) the State
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt he knowingly disseminated child pornography, (2) the
trial court erred when accepting his jury waiver by failing to ensure he understood his waiver,
and (3) the court imposed an excessive sentence. We disagree and affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND ¶4 In March 2022, defendant was charged by information with two counts of child
pornography (id.) for disseminating a video file via his computer of a child he knew or
reasonably should have known to be under the age of 13.
¶5 A. Pretrial Proceedings
¶6 At a pretrial conference on July 26, 2023, the trial court stated it had been
informed defendant intended to waive his right to a jury trial. The following exchange occurred:
“THE COURT: *** You acknowledge that that’s your
signature on the document waiving your right to a jury trial; is that
correct?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.
THE COURT: Did anybody force you, threaten you or
coerce you to get you to sign this document?
THE DEFENDANT: No, ma’am.
THE COURT: Did anybody promise you anything in
exchange for signing this document?
THE COURT: Have you had a chance to discuss the
consequences of signing this document with your attorney?
THE COURT: Do you believe that you need any additional
time to have further discussion with her about that?
THE DEFENDANT: As far as I’m concerned, no, ma’am.
THE COURT: So you don’t need any additional time to
-2- discuss this further with your attorney?
THE DEFENDANT: Actually, yes, ma’am.
THE COURT: You’d like some additional time?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.”
The matter was continued.
¶7 On August 30, 2023, the parties reconvened and, again, the trial court stated
defendant intended to waive his right to a jury trial. The following exchange occurred:
“THE COURT: [Defendant], I’ve been furnished with a
document entitled Plea and Waiver indicating that you are still
pleading not guilty but waiving your right to a jury trial.
I’m going to show that document.
Is that your signature on it? (indicating)
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it is.
THE DEFENDANT: I’m sorry, could you please speak up?
THE COURT: I’m talking really loudly, but I sure will, but
I need you to also. Okay?
I’m going to show you this document entitled Plea and
Waiver.
-3- coerce you to get you to sign it?
THE COURT: Have you had a chance to discuss with your
attorney the consequences of signing this waiver?
time to have further discussions about signing the waiver with your
attorney?
THE COURT: Do you understand that if I accept this today
you can’t later come back into court and ask that your right to a
jury trial be reinstated?
THE COURT: Knowing that, do you still wish to waive
your right to a jury trial and request a bench trial?
THE COURT: I will accept this waiver as the Defendant’s
knowing and voluntary act.”
¶8 B. Bench Trial
¶9 The matter proceeded to a bench trial on December 6, 2023.
-4- ¶ 10 Joshua Heer of the Illinois State Police testified he supervised the Internet Crimes
Against Children Task Force, for which he had received additional, specialized training,
including training on BitTorrent, a peer-to-peer file sharing network, which he explained as
follows:
“It means that somebody has something that somebody else wants
and electronically it is shared from one device to another. It could
range from a picture of a turtle, it could range to schematics for
how to build a ghost gun to the latest Jennifer Lawrence movie
that’s been highjacked online to child pornography.”
He agreed peer-to-peer file sharing permits the “sharing of a computer file among computers or
devices that are capable of connecting to the Internet.” Heer specifically described BitTorrent as
a “program that people use to share data,” and other programs may be used to access the
BitTorrent network, including BitTorrent, Libtorrent, and uTorrent.
¶ 11 Heer explained that, as part of utilizing the BitTorrent software, the user must
agree to transfer files on the user’s computer to other BitTorrent software users. He stated that
without the user agreeing to transfer files, the software would not work. Heer stated a “file hash”
is a unique identifier for torrents and analogized it to human DNA. He noted the National Center
for Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC) catalogs and stores file hashes for law enforcement
investigators such as Heer to compare known images.
¶ 12 Heer stated when investigating users sharing child pornography, he uses
proprietary software technology on his investigative computer. He explained the software looks
for “Internet protocol [(IP)] addresses *** that are in the State of Illinois that are sharing files
that are known to, by NCMEC through the hash value, contain child pornography.”
-5- ¶ 13 Once he has the IP address, Heer uses different proprietary software to get an
approximate location of where the IP address was located. He explained that individual Internet
users have a unique IP address assigned to them by their Internet service provider.
¶ 14 Heer’s investigative computer identified an IP address transmitting child
pornography on December 31, 2021. The IP address traced back to Sterling, Illinois. Using
different proprietary software, he identified the IP address as belonging to the Internet service
provider Comcast. Heer described the child pornography his computer was able to download as
depicting a girl under the age of 13 “that exposes her anus to the camera and turns around and
exposes her vagina to the camera.” He said, “[I]t is clear that the focal point of the video is the
child’s sex organs.”
¶ 15 Heer’s investigative computer identified an IP address transmitting child
pornography on January 18, 2022. He stated it was the same IP address that transmitted child
pornography on December 31. He described the child pornography file from January 18 as
depicting “an adult male sexually assaulting a child.”
¶ 16 After Heer identified the child pornography and the approximate location where
the file had been disseminated from, he sent the information to Sergeant Nate Macklin of the
Illinois State Police, who also investigated instances of child pornography within the Sterling
region. Heer identified an exhibit as a DVD containing the child pornography he described that
his investigative computer had downloaded from BitTorrent.
¶ 17 On cross-examination, Heer stated BitTorrent is legal. He disagreed an individual
sending files through BitTorrent would not know they are sending files by stating, “[W]hen they
put the application on their phone they agreed to that and that is exactly how that works. You are
getting, and you are giving to make somebody else’s packet complete as well.” Regarding
-6- whether users can choose not to share files, Herr explained:
“You can exit the application, your computer would not
share. While you are in the application, and if those files are still in
and on your BitTorrent, it is going to share. That’s the agreement
that the user has.
If you are downloading something yourself and you are
looking for something, you are also sharing that thing in which you
are obtaining from other people as well.”
¶ 18 Brett Mango, a computer forensic analyst for the United States Department of
Homeland Security, testified that on March 16, 2022, he assisted with a search warrant
performed on an ASUS laptop located in defendant’s home. The laptop was named “Michael,”
which was assigned by its owner. Mango used proprietary software to determine the laptop was
running an application called uTorrent. He also explained uTorrent was a file sharing program.
He noted several files of interest on the laptop that were consistent with child pornography.
¶ 19 Matthew Kipping of the Illinois State Police testified he executed a search warrant
on March 16, 2022, at a home in Sterling where defendant resided with his sister and mother. He
participated in the interview of defendant outside his residence in Sergeant Macklin’s vehicle. He
stated defendant was read his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), after
which defendant agreed to speak with him and Sergeant Macklin. He denied any force or threats
were used to coerce defendant into waiving his Miranda rights. Kipping identified a DVD
exhibit of the interview conducted with defendant.
¶ 20 Sergeant Macklin testified he requested a subpoena for the subscriber of the IP
address identified during Heer’s investigation. From the information obtained by the subpoena,
-7- Macklin obtained a search warrant of defendant’s home. As a result of the search warrant, an
ASUS laptop and external hard drive were recovered from defendant’s bedroom. During the
execution of the search warrant, Macklin interviewed defendant, with Kipping present. The
interview was audio recorded and admitted into evidence without objection and played for the
trial court. A synopsis of the recorded interview is as follows: defendant confirmed that the only
electronic device he used was an ASUS laptop. Defendant denied using a virtual private network.
He said it had been a long time since he had used BitTorrent. He denied his mother and sister
used BitTorrent. He claimed he was unaware files on his computer were shared on BitTorrent.
When confronted with the uTorrent licensing agreement and privacy policy requiring his
agreement to share files, he stated, “Hmm, well, now I know.” Defendant initially claimed to
only use BitTorrent for downloading music, but when he was confronted with sexually graphic
files he downloaded, he admitted to occasionally downloading adult pornography. He denied
possessing a terabyte’s worth of child pornography but conceded to having some child
pornography images and videos. He did not know how the files ended up on an external hard
drive found in his bedroom. He claimed he was “revolted” by child pornography, and it was an
“accidental mishap” that he discovered while searching the Internet. However, he admitted to
masturbating to the child pornography files he had downloaded and learned how to search for it
on an Internet forum. He recalled becoming interested in child pornography in the last year.
¶ 21 Following the interview, Macklin stated defendant was taken to the Illinois State
Police’s district headquarters wherein he was shown an image “taken from one of the original
torrents.” Defendant told Macklin he recognized the image. Macklin had defendant sign and date
the image. The image was admitted into evidence without objection. The image depicted a minor
girl with a sexually explicit phrase written across the image. The image showed it was signed by
-8- defendant and dated March 16, 2022.
¶ 22 Macklin stated the uTorrent licensing agreement and privacy policy advises users
“that once they sign up for uTorrent that they are going to simultaneously share their own files.”
Macklin stated he downloaded uTorrent version 3.5.5 specifically during the investigation to
read the licensing agreement because it was the version of uTorrent defendant had been using. A
screenshot of the licensing agreement and privacy policy where it specifically discussed file
sharing was admitted into evidence without objection. A highlighted portion of the exhibit stated,
“Your use of the BitTorrent Applications to download files will, in turn, enable other users to
download pieces of those files from you.”
¶ 23 An exhibit containing the sexually explicit file names and torrent files
downloaded from defendant’s IP address was played for the trial court. Macklin stated he had
reviewed the files, which depicted two girls who appeared to be under the age of 13.
¶ 24 Macklin confirmed the only devices that were recovered during the search
warrant with evidence of interest to his investigation were the ASUS laptop and hard drive
recovered from defendant’s bedroom.
¶ 25 The State rested.
¶ 26 Defendant moved for a directed verdict, arguing specifically that the State had
failed to show he disseminated any child pornography. The trial court denied defendant’s
motion.
¶ 27 Defendant did not present any evidence.
¶ 28 The trial court found the State had met its burden and found defendant guilty on
both counts. The court noted the only real issue of contention was whether he knowingly
disseminated the child pornography he downloaded from BitTorrent. The court pointed to the
-9- licensing agreement and privacy policy that required users to consent to file sharing to utilize the
application. Additionally, the court stated defendant’s recorded interview showed he “seemed to
be particularly savvy about many of these terms and the use of this application.”
¶ 29 C. Posttrial Proceedings
¶ 30 On January 5, 2024, defendant filed a motion for a new trial, arguing the State had
failed to prove each element of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. At the hearing,
defendant additionally contended the police tampered with the video evidence by altering it and
lied during their testimony. He also argued he deserved a new trial because he did not personally
receive all of the discovery. The trial court denied defendant’s motion.
¶ 31 The matter immediately proceeded to sentencing. A presentence investigation
report (PSI) was admitted into evidence. Defendant contended the only error was an incorrect
phone number for his mother and that, despite information received by court services stating he
was never an employee of “P & P Industries and Manpower,” he maintained he did work for that
company for a short period of time. The PSI showed defendant had no criminal history. He
reported he was sexually abused by a “male that [his] mom had brought around the family” when
he was “11/12” years old. He informed his mother about the incident, but “she could not afford
counseling for him.” He denied any alcohol or substance abuse issues. He was a high school
graduate, single, and had no children. He reported caring for his mother, who was disabled. He
did not have a relationship with his father, who had died three or four years earlier.
¶ 32 Sally Moreno, defendant’s mother, testified defendant was “a good person” and
“helpful.” She noted he assisted her with various tasks and that he did not have a good
relationship with his father. She said defendant “stay[ed] out of trouble” and recalled a time
when he was homeless, which is why they moved to Sterling.
- 10 - ¶ 33 The trial court stated it had considered the evidence at trial, the PSI, the financial
impact of incarceration, and the factors in aggravation and mitigation. The court noted it was a
“plus” defendant had no prior criminal history and cared for his mother. The court stated the
“most compelling” factor in aggravation was deterrence to others. The court referenced the
“appalling” videos published at trial and noted defendant “seemed particularly savvy” with his
ability to access the videos. The court said that although the victims were unknown, what
occurred to “these young ladies [was] despicable and has really robbed them of their childhoods
and the fact that somebody would knowingly access these videos [was] an activity that certainly
need[ed] to be deterred.” The court sentenced defendant to two consecutive 12-year terms of
imprisonment.
¶ 34 On March 28, 2024, defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence. The
motion argued the court placed excessive weight on the factors in aggravation while placing
insufficient weight on the factors in mitigation. The motion further argued the sentence was
excessive and disproportionate to the nature of the offense. The trial court denied defendant’s
¶ 35 This appeal followed.
¶ 36 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 37 On appeal, defendant argues (1) the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that he knowingly disseminated child pornography, or, in the alternative, disseminated it
intentionally or recklessly; (2) the trial court erred when accepting his jury waiver by failing to
ensure he understood his waiver; and (3) the court imposed an excessive sentence. We address
each claim in turn.
¶ 38 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence Claim
- 11 - ¶ 39 When examining the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine “whether,
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis in
original and internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985).
The trier of fact has the responsibility to assess the witnesses’ credibility, weigh their testimony,
resolve inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from the
evidence. People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 242 (2006). We will not reverse a criminal
conviction based on insufficient evidence unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or
unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. People v. Murray, 2019
IL 123289, ¶ 19.
¶ 40 For child pornography as charged in the instant matter, the State had to prove
defendant, with the knowledge of the nature or content thereof, disseminated any film, videotape,
photograph, or other similar visual reproduction or depiction by computer of any child whom he
knows or reasonably should have known to be under the age of 18. 720 ILCS 5/11-20.1(a)(2)
(West 2020).
¶ 41 The legislature has defined “disseminate” as follows:
“(i) to sell, distribute, exchange or transfer possession, whether
with or without consideration or (ii) to make a depiction by
computer available for distribution or downloading through the
facilities of any telecommunications network or through any other
means of transferring computer programs or data to a computer.”
Id. § 11-20.1(f)(1).
¶ 42 Defendant only challenges whether the State had proven the requisite mental state
- 12 - for the proposition of whether he disseminated any child pornography. As an initial matter, the
parties correctly note the statute itself does not designate a particular mental state associated with
the dissemination of child pornography. The parties present various arguments for whether the
appropriate mental state is knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly. The legislature has already
addressed this issue regarding the applicable mental state:
“If the statute defining an offense prescribed a particular mental
state with respect to the offense as a whole, without distinguishing
among the elements thereof, the prescribed mental state applies to
each such element. If the statute does not prescribe a particular
mental state applicable to an element of an offense (other than an
offense which involves absolute liability), any mental state defined
in Sections 4-4, 4-5 or 4-6 [(id. §§ 4-4, 4-5, 4-6)]is applicable.” Id.
§ 4-3(b).
The charged offense in this instance only identifies one mental state at the beginning:
knowledge. As such, knowledge would apply to each subordinate element within the offense. Id.
Accordingly, we agree with defendant that the appropriate mens rea applicable here would be
knowledge.
¶ 43 Defendant argues the State’s central evidence he knowingly disseminated child
pornography was his acceptance of the uTorrent licensing agreement and privacy policy that
required users to agree to share portions of the files they download from the BitTorrent network.
He notes, during his interview with officers Macklin and Kipping, he did not know BitTorrent
users shared portions of the files they downloaded, and he did not know about the licensing
agreement and privacy policy statement requiring users to share files that had been downloaded.
- 13 - Additionally, he notes from Sergeant Macklin’s testimony that it was possible for a user to
access BitTorrent without reading the entirety of the licensing agreement and privacy policy,
which he argues further corroborates his contention he was unaware BitTorrent automatically
shared any files he downloaded. He cites People v. Daigle, 2024 IL App (4th) 230015, in
support.
¶ 44 In Daigle, we dealt with the same specific issue on appeal: whether the defendant
knowingly disseminated child pornography. Id. ¶ 61. In that case, we noted the defendant was
keenly aware he was using file sharing software that required the user to agree to share videos
with other users. Id. ¶ 63.
¶ 45 While the issue was less ambiguous in Daigle, we are not persuaded by
defendant’s argument Daigle is applicable here. When reviewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution to determine if any rational trier of fact could have found defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we find the evidence still supports the State’s contention that
defendant knowingly disseminated child pornography. Defendant places significant emphasis on
his declared ignorance during his interview with police of the uTorrent licensing agreement and
privacy policy, as well as his ignorance of how BitTorrent functions. However, during the
interview, defendant made several statements that he later contradicted. For example, he initially
claimed to only use BitTorrent for downloading music but later admitted to downloading
pornography. He also claimed to be revolted by child pornography, only to later admit to
downloading and masturbating to it.
¶ 46 In a light most favorable to the prosecution, defendant’s credibility is debilitated
at best. Additionally, the trial court, acting as the fact finder, found he was incredibly savvy
regarding BitTorrent. “[A] reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of
- 14 - fact on issues involving the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses.” Murray,
2019 IL 123289, ¶ 19. The court used this finding to call into question that defendant was
unaware of how BitTorrent operated or the contents of its licensing agreement. As a fact finder,
it was the court’s responsibility to “resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and
to draw reasonable inference from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 319 (1979). A defendant’s mental state is rarely proven by direct evidence, and, as such, is
generally inferred from the character of the defendant’s acts and from the circumstances
surrounding the commission of the offense. People v. Eubanks, 2019 IL 123525, ¶ 74. “[T]he
trier of fact is in the best position to determine whether a particular mental state is present.”
People v. Pollard, 2015 IL App (3d) 130467, ¶ 27.
¶ 47 After reviewing the evidence at trial and the trial court’s factual findings, we find
nothing so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory to create a reasonable doubt of
defendant’s guilt. There was evidence presented showing defendant was required to accept the
uTorrent licensing agreement to share files he downloaded and that he understood how the
BitTorrent file sharing software operated. The court, acting as a fact finder, was not required to
believe defendant did not read the licensing agreement, even though it was possible, and the
court was not required to believe defendant’s statements he was unaware BitTorrent shared files
that he downloaded. Therefore, we find a rational trier of fact could reasonably conclude beyond
a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly disseminated child pornography. Because we have
found the mental state applicable to the offense is knowledge and the evidence sufficiently
supports defendant knowingly disseminated child pornography, we need not address defendant’s
alternative arguments of whether he intentionally or recklessly disseminated child pornography.
¶ 48 B. Jury Waiver Claim
- 15 - ¶ 49 Defendant next argues the trial court failed to sufficiently ensure that he
understood he was waiving his right to a jury trial, thereby making his waiver invalid. He
concedes no contemporaneous objection was made regarding his jury waiver and the issue was
not raised in his posttrial motion. See People v. Harvey, 211 Ill. 2d 368, 385 (2004) (noting
where a defendant fails to object at trial and raise the issue in a posttrial motion, the issue is
forfeited). Therefore, he requests we review this issue under the second prong of the plain-error
doctrine.
¶ 50 The plain-error doctrine provides a “narrow and limited exception,” permitting
courts of review to address forfeited claims. People v. Reese, 2017 IL 120011, ¶ 72. Under the
plain-error doctrine, a reviewing court may disregard a defendant’s forfeiture and consider an
unpreserved claim of error where:
“ ‘(1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so
closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of
justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the
error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurred and that error is so
serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and
challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the
closeness of the evidence.’ ” People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598,
613 (2010) (quoting People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565
(2007)).
Under either prong of the plain-error doctrine, the defendant bears the burden of persuasion.
People v. Wilmington, 2013 IL 112938, ¶ 43. “The first step of plain-error review is determining
whether any error occurred.” Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d at 613.
- 16 - ¶ 51 “The right to a trial by jury is a fundamental right guaranteed by our federal and
state constitutions.” People v. Bracey, 213 Ill. 2d 265, 269 (2004). A defendant may waive the
right to a trial by jury, but a jury waiver must be knowingly and understandingly made to be
valid. Id. The question of whether a jury waiver is valid is determined by the particular facts and
circumstances of each case, and the trial court “need not impart to [a] defendant any set
admonition or advice.” Id. at 270.
¶ 52 Defendant concedes he signed a written waiver of his right to a jury trial that
specifically demanded a trial before a judge. See id. at 269-70 (stating a written jury waiver “is
not always dispositive of a valid waiver”). He argues the trial court thoroughly ascertained
whether he was voluntarily waiving his right to a jury trial but failed to explain the difference
between a jury trial and a bench trial. He contends someone with no criminal history would not
necessarily understand the difference between the two modes of trial. He notes that after the first
attempt to waive a jury trial, he requested more time to speak with trial counsel, which was
permitted by the court. He contends the record does not reveal what he discussed with counsel.
He concludes that because the court failed to explain the difference between a bench and jury
trial and that he was waiving a constitutional right, he did not understandingly waive his right to
a jury trial. We disagree.
¶ 53 The record shows defendant had initially intended on waiving his right to a jury
trial at a pretrial conference in July 2023. However, when the trial court was reviewing
defendant’s waiver, he requested more time to speak with his trial counsel. The court granted
him a continuance to discuss the matter further with his counsel. Defendant is correct that the
record does not reveal the extent of his conversation with counsel. Yet, when he returned in
August 2023, he explained to the court he had sufficiently discussed the matter with his counsel
- 17 - and subsequently waived his right to a jury trial. Defendant is also correct that the court never
explicitly discussed the differences between a bench and jury trial. As we noted earlier, there is
no set admonition a court must give a defendant when waiving a jury trial. Id. at 270. The written
waiver clearly articulates defendant was waiving a jury trial to have the matter tried before a
judge. Given defendant had requested more time to discuss his jury waiver with counsel, we find
it unlikely counsel—who had demonstrated competency in other aspects of her representation of
defendant—utterly failed to explain to defendant the difference between a bench and jury trial
prior to his jury waiver. “When a defendant waives the right to a jury trial, the pivotal knowledge
that the defendant must understand—with its attendant consequences—is that the facts of the
case will be determined by a judge and not a jury.” People v. Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d 52, 69
(2008). Defendant points to the deficiencies in the court’s admonitions but never identifies
anything other than his lack of a prior criminal history as a reason to believe he did not
understand he was waiving his constitutional right to a jury and proceeding to a bench trial. This
will not suffice to meet his burden. “A jury waiver will not be held invalid where a defendant
unambiguously chooses a bench trial with his counsel at his side unless some prejudice to the
defendant is alleged and proved.” People v. Akis, 63 Ill. 2d 296, 300 (1976). Therefore, we find
defendant has failed to show error, let alone plain error. Accordingly, we honor his forfeiture of
this issue.
¶ 54 C. Excessive Sentence Claim
¶ 55 Finally, defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced
him to an aggregate term of 24 years in prison for the offense of what he contends amounted to
essentially the possession of child pornography. He argues the court’s rationale for imposing a
harsher sentence focused almost entirely on his possession of child pornography.
- 18 - ¶ 56 “The legislature sets forth by statute the range of permissible sentences for each
class of criminal offense.” People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 53 (1999). A reviewing court affords
great deference to a trial court’s sentencing judgment because, “having observed the defendant
and the proceedings, [it] is in a far better position to consider such factors as the defendant’s
credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, and habits than a
reviewing court, which must rely on a ‘cold’ record.” People v. Little, 2011 IL App (4th)
090787, ¶ 24. A sentence that falls within the applicable statutory limits is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. People v. Price, 2011 IL App (4th) 100311, ¶ 36. The abuse of discretion standard
is deferential to sentencing courts. People v. Fisher, 407 Ill. App. 3d 585, 589 (2011). “A
sentence within statutory limits will not be deemed excessive and an abuse of the court’s
discretion unless it is ‘greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law or manifestly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense.’ ” People v. Pina, 2019 IL App (4th) 170614, ¶ 20
(quoting Fern, 189 Ill. 2d at 54).
¶ 57 Here, defendant was found guilty of two counts of child pornography, both Class
X felonies. 720 ILCS 5/11-20.1(c) (West 2020). As such, defendant was subject to a term of
imprisonment of 6 to 30 years in prison for each offense. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(a) (West 2020).
Additionally, the trial court was required to impose the sentences consecutively, for a potential
aggregate term of 12 to 60 years in prison. Id. § 5-8-4(d)(2.5). Defendant was sentenced to 12
years’ imprisonment for each offense for an aggregate term of 24 years’ imprisonment. Because
defendant’s sentence was within the permissible range, we begin with the presumption the
sentence was proper. People v. Knox, 2014 IL App (1st) 120349, ¶ 46.
¶ 58 In this case, the trial court found a need for deterrence as a factor in aggravation.
The court also noted numerous mitigating factors in defendant’s favor, such as his lack of a prior
- 19 - criminal history and his helpful conduct in caring for his disabled mother. However, the fact that
mitigating factors existed in defendant’s case does not outweigh the aggravating factor the trial
court noted in its decision. A trial court is not required to afford greater weight to mitigating
factors than to the severity of the offense. People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 214 (2010); see
People v. Quintana, 332 Ill. App. 3d 96, 109 (2002) (noting the seriousness of the offense is the
most important sentencing factor). While defendant contends he was merely guilty of possessing
child pornography, the conviction and sentence imposed reflect he was found guilty of
disseminating child pornography. The trial court was correct to note the appalling nature of the
videos defendant possessed and disseminated. The court was also correct to note that while the
victims were unknown, the young girls depicted were deprived of a suitable childhood.
Defendant’s attempts to minimize the offense to mere possession of child pornography fail
because his downloading of such content remains a very serious offense that fuels the need for a
black market of such content. His possession and subsequent dissemination of child pornography
is even graver by contributing to the supply of such heinous content.
¶ 59 The record shows the trial court considered the mitigating factors present in this
case. However, as stated, the presence of mitigating factors does not require a minimum
sentence. People v. Jones, 2014 IL App (1st) 120927, ¶ 55. Ultimately, the court was in a better
position to observe defendant’s conduct and weigh the need for a sentence beyond the minimum
statutory requirement. We reiterate defendant faced an aggregate sentencing range of 12 to 60
years in prison. The imposed sentence of 24 aggregate years’ imprisonment was middling and
not devoid of reasons, as explained by the trial court. “[A]n abuse of discretion occurs where the
trial court’s decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable to the degree that no reasonable
person would agree with it.” People v. McDonald, 2016 IL 118882, ¶ 32. Nothing from this
- 20 - record suggests the court’s sentencing determination was arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable.
Accordingly, we find no reason to conclude the court’s sentence was disproportionate to the
nature of the offense.
¶ 60 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 61 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 62 Affirmed.
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