People v. Morales

2025 IL App (4th) 250655-U

Opinion

2025 IL App (4th) 250655-U NOTICE FILED This Order was filed under September 25, 2025 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-25-0655 Carla Bender not precedent except in the IN THE APPELLATE COURT 4th District Appellate limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Winnebago County TYLER W. MORALES, ) No. 25CF1273 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Philip J. Nicolosi, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Zenoff and Vancil concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The appellate court reversed, finding the trial court erred when finding no conditions of pretrial release could mitigate any dangers posed by defendant based on the specific articulable facts of the case.

¶2 Defendant, Tyler W. Morales, appeals the trial court’s order denying his motion

for relief from pretrial detention pursuant to the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code)

(725 ILCS 5/110 et seq.) (West 2024)). On appeal, defendant argues the court erred when finding

he committed a detainable offense and no conditions of pretrial release would mitigate any threat

he posed. We reverse.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 In May 2025, defendant was charged by information with the following offenses,

alleged to have occurred as a result of a November 13, 2024, vehicular accident: (1) aggravated

driving under the influence of a drug resulting in death (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(4) (West 2024)); (2) reckless homicide (720 ILCS 5/9-3(a) (West 2024)); (3) aggravated driving under the

influence of drugs or a combination of drugs resulting in great bodily harm (625 ILCS 5/11-

501(a)(4) (West 2024)); (4) aggravated use of a communication device resulting in death (id.

§ 12-610.2(b-5)); (5) aggravated use of a communication device resulting in great bodily harm

(id.); and (6) aggravated reckless driving (id. § 11-503(a)(1), (c)). The State filed a petition to

deny defendant’s pretrial release, which was heard on May 15, 2025.

¶5 At the hearing, Detective Brad Kaiser of the Winnebago County Sheriff’s Office

testified he had downloaded onto a universal serial bus (USB) drive various data, photographs,

and videos from defendant’s phone, defendant’s dash camera, and defendant’s girlfriend’s

phone. The USB drive was admitted into evidence. The first video played for the trial court was

from October 29, 2024. Kaiser described defendant’s driving in that video as “in excess of the

flow of traffic, using turn lanes to overtake other vehicles.” The video from defendant’s dash

camera, recorded at the time of the accident, showed defendant was driving on a road with a

posted speed limit of 40 miles per hour. The dash camera recorded until the moment of impact.

Kaiser stated, at the time of the accident, defendant was using his cell phone on a FaceTime call

with his girlfriend. He said the call lasted approximately “41 seconds.” Following the accident,

defendant called 911. The court also admitted photographic evidence of injuries to the deceased

minor, R.S.

¶6 On cross-examination, Kaiser admitted the recording from defendant’s dash

camera does not show who was driving. He also noted you could not hear defendant speaking or

any of his FaceTime conversation because his phone was playing music loudly through a

Bluetooth connection.

¶7 The State, by way of proffer, alleged suspected cannabis and

-2- tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) gummies were recovered from defendant’s vehicle following the

accident. When interviewed by the police, defendant denied using his cell phone and stated his

“brakes went out.” Defendant admitted to smoking cannabis earlier in the day. His vehicle was

seized and taken to an automotive repair shop, where the brakes were found to be in “working

order.” The State informed the trial court R.S. died from a skull fracture and brain laceration.

¶8 Defendant proffered this was the first time he had ever been arrested. He stated he

turned himself in when he learned about the warrant for his arrest. He also stated he was

currently employed. He said he was not using his phone at the time of the accident and any “calls

were [made] after the accident.”

¶9 The trial court noted it had reviewed a factual summary of the accident, which

stated defendant was driving 55 to 56 miles per hour on a roadway with a 40 miles-per-hour

posted speed limit. According to the summary, defendant failed to stop and struck the rear end of

another vehicle, whose passengers included E.S. (born October 2018) and R.S. (born December

2022). As a result of the accident, E.S. “sustained torn ligaments to his neck,” and R.S.

subsequently died from his injuries. Investigators later learned defendant, while driving, was

“actively using ‘FaceTime’ ” at the time of impact. Defendant’s blood and urine samples

revealed he had “3.8 [nanograms per milliliter] of Delta-9-THC and 41 [nanograms per milliliter]

of THC-COOH” in his system. The court stated it had also reviewed the pretrial services report,

which showed defendant reported consuming cannabis “once or twice a week.” The report

indicated defendant’s risk factors included he was unemployed at the time of the accident and

had a history of drug abuse. Defendant was categorized as a level 2 out of 6 on Virginia Pretrial

Risk Assessment Instrument-Revised (VPRAI-R) by pretrial services. He was 19 years old at the

time of the accident, and his criminal history included only one conviction, for speeding, in

-3- 2023.

¶ 10 After considering the video and documentary evidence, along with the State’s

proffer and live testimony, the trial court found the State had proven by clear and convincing

evidence the proof was evident and presumption great defendant had committed a detainable

offense. The court found defendant posed a real and present danger to the community and cited

the statutory factors listed in section 6.1(g) of the Code. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g) (West 2024).

The court noted the circumstances of the alleged offenses; defendant’s prior speeding citation,

noting he was going 25 miles per hour over the speed limit; the age of the victims; evidence

showing defendant “passing other vehicles at what appeared to be a high rate of speed”; and that

defendant was only 19, which was under the legal age to consume cannabis. The court

recognized defendant’s low VPRAI-R score and his minimal criminal history and found

defendant did not have a propensity for any violent, abusive, or assaultive behavior.

¶ 11 However, the trial court, citing People v. Bishop, 2025 IL App (5th) 241326-U, in

support, found there were no conditions of pretrial release that would mitigate the danger

defendant posed. The court stated defendant’s criminal history included speeding “70 in a 45 at

10:30 at night on a well-traveled roadway” and noted “approximately 13 months later,” he was

involved in the current matter, again driving at a “high rate of speed at a busy time of day on a

busy roadway while FaceTiming.” The court stated, “there [was] no indication that he [had]

learned from the speeding ticket,” despite only scoring a level 2 on the VPRAI-R. The court

stated defendant likely minimized his use of cannabis and ultimately showed he was not

“following the law.” The court considered a secure continuous remote alcohol monitor

(SCRAM) device but stated it would not detect cannabis use. The court also considered a curfew,

noting defendant’s prior speeding incident and that the current matter occurred at night. The

-4- court noted the nature and circumstances of the offense involved multiple victims. The court

concluded the State had sufficiently shown no conditions of pretrial release would mitigate the

danger defendant posed. The court granted the State’s petition to deny defendant pretrial release.

¶ 12 On May 23, 2025, defendant filed a motion to reconsider his pretrial detention. In

his motion, defendant argued the State had failed to prove he committed a detainable offense and

noted his THC level was below the statutory limit for presumption of impairment. He also noted

one of the deputies, who had interacted with him at the time of the accident, had not observed

any indications he was under the influence. Defendant denied using FaceTime at the time of the

accident. He contended the time stamp on the vehicle’s dash camera video and his phone were

one hour apart. He claimed he called his girlfriend via Facetime only after the incident. Lastly,

he argued there were available conditions of pretrial release the trial court could impose to

mitigate any danger he posed. A hearing on defendant’s motion was held on June 12, 2025.

¶ 13 At the hearing, defendant offered the testimony of his girlfriend to support his

argument he was not using FaceTime at the time of the accident. He also contended the evidence

from the original detention hearing showed he was playing music via Bluetooth from his phone

through his vehicle. He argued he could not have been playing music and using FaceTime on his

phone simultaneously. Defendant also argued Bishop was distinguishable because the defendant

in Bishop was also under the influence of methamphetamine.

¶ 14 The trial court reiterated its findings from the original detention hearing and again

relied on Bishop as analogous. The court denied defendant’s motion.

¶ 15 This appeal followed.

¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 17 On appeal, defendant argues the trial court errantly concluded (1) he was using

-5- FaceTime at the time of the accident and (2) he was under the influence of cannabis based on his

blood test result of 3.8 nanograms per milliliter of THC. He also argues the court (1) failed to

properly distinguish the facts of this case from Bishop and (2) erred when finding no conditions

of pretrial release could mitigate any danger he posed. We address each claim in turn.

¶ 18 Under the Code, it is presumed all criminal defendants are entitled to pretrial

release, subject to certain conditions. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a) (West 2024). The Code requires the

State to prove by clear and convincing evidence “the defendant poses a real and present threat to

the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of

the case,” and “no condition or combination of conditions set forth in subsection (b) of Section

110-10 of this Article can mitigate (i) the real and present threat to the safety of any person or

persons or the community.” Id. § 110-6.1(e)(2), (3)(i). Additionally, section 110-6.1(g) requires

the trial court to consider “the specific articulable facts of the case” and provides nine factors the

court can also consider when assessing the real and present threat allegation. Id. § 110-6.1(g).

¶ 19 When the trial court, presiding over a detention hearing, is presented with live

witness testimony, we review the court’s decision under the manifest weight of the evidence

standard. People v. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 54. When the parties proceed solely by proffer at

the detention hearing, we review the court’s decision de novo. Id.

¶ 20 Defendant first argues the trial court erred when concluding he was using

FaceTime at the time of the accident. He specifically notes Kaiser’s testimony showing the time

on defendant’s phone and his dash camera were not synchronized. He argues it would not have

been possible for him to play music through his phone and use FaceTime simultaneously. Lastly,

he notes he denied using FaceTime at the time of the accident and his girlfriend also denied

communicating with him via FaceTime at the time of the accident.

-6- ¶ 21 We are unpersuaded by defendant’s argument regarding whether he was utilizing

FaceTime on his phone at the time of the accident. Even if we assume, arguendo, he was not

using FaceTime at the time of the accident, it would only remove the charged offenses of

aggravated use of a communication device; it would not remove any of the other detention-

eligible offenses, such as aggravated driving under the influence. Thus, it would not change his

pretrial detention outcome.

¶ 22 Defendant next argues the trial court errantly concluded he was under the

influence of cannabis based on his blood test result of 3.8 nanograms per milliliter at the time of

the accident. He contends the statutory limit creating a presumption of impairment is five

nanograms per milliliter. See 625 ILCS 5/11-501.2(b-5)(1) (West 2024). He also contends the

court in Bishop found that the defendant was over the legal limit, referring to methamphetamine,

which is prohibited in any amount under the Illinois Vehicle Code and the Methamphetamine

Control and Community Protection Act. See id. § 11-501(a)(6); 720 ILCS 646/5 et seq. (West

2024).

¶ 23 Again, we are unpersuaded by defendant’s arguments here. First, the Vehicle

Code only creates a statutory presumption for impairment. It does not create an inverse

presumption for blood test results under the statutory threshold. Second, the Vehicle Code

permits the prosecution of driving under the influence where the use of any drug “renders the

person incapable of safely driving.” 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(4) (West 2024). This was the statute

under which defendant was charged. Finally, section 1-5(a) of the Cannabis Regulation and Tax

Act (410 ILCS 705/1-5(a) (West 2024)), which legalized recreational cannabis use in Illinois,

prohibits the use of cannabis for persons, such as defendant, under the age of 21. We are

reviewing whether the trial court erred in determining the evidence showed the proof was evident

-7- and presumption great defendant was driving under the influence, not whether he was guilty of

said offense. Based on our review of the evidence presented to the court, we find the evidence

was sufficient to show he committed a detainable offense.

¶ 24 Defendant next argues the trial court failed to properly distinguish his case from

that of Bishop. He contends there were two very significant distinguishing factors: (1) the

defendant in Bishop failed field sobriety testing and (2) the defendant had methamphetamine in

his system. He notes one of the deputies on the scene documented in his report there was no

indication defendant was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. He also argues there was no

evidence he was under the influence of methamphetamine.

¶ 25 In Bishop, the defendant was involved in a single-vehicle accident wherein the

passenger was ejected from the vehicle and later died from her injuries. Bishop, 2025 IL App

(5th) 241326-U, ¶¶ 8-11. Field sobriety testing performed on the defendant showed signs of

impairment. Id. ¶ 10. Subsequent blood testing revealed the presence of amphetamine and

methamphetamine, as well as a THC level of 2.1 nanograms per milliliter. Id. ¶ 12. The

defendant had “no criminal history and scored a 0 on the Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment tool.”

Id. ¶ 15. The trial court granted the State’s petition to deny the defendant pretrial release. Id.

¶ 18. On appeal, the appellate court stated:

“In the present matter, the defendant was charged with

aggravating driving under the influence which resulted in a death.

The defendant is facing a very serious charge, and if convicted, is

facing mandatory time in the Illinois Department of Corrections.

The weight of the proffer against the defendant is strong given his

admission to the responding officer, which is recorded on the

-8- officer’s body-worn camera, that he was driving. If released, the

defendant’s ability to continue to operate a motor vehicle on public

roadways while impaired is a serious and real threat to other

persons of the community. The defendant’s history and

characteristics are also considered; however, they do not overcome

the threat to the public.” Id. ¶ 31.

¶ 26 The court in Bishop concluded, without any explanation, there were no conditions

of pretrial release that could ensure the safety of the public and affirmed the denial of the

defendant’s pretrial release. Id. ¶ 32.

¶ 27 While we agree with defendant that the instant case and Bishop do have some

significant distinctions, we do not agree with him that the trial court’s failure to properly

distinguish them constitutes reversible error. Defendant’s arguments here go to a factual issue as

to whether he committed the offense of aggravated driving under the influence—a question that

will need to be decided at trial. As we noted earlier, we find the evidence was sufficient to show

defendant committed a detainable offense for the purposes of pretrial detention, which is a lower

standard of proof than that applied during the guilt phase at trial.

¶ 28 Lastly, defendant argues the trial court erred when finding there were no

conditions of pretrial release that would reasonably ensure the safety of the community.

Defendant notes his criminal history included one speeding ticket from 2023 and there was an

approximate six-month gap between when the offenses at issue were alleged to have occurred

and when he was charged. He argues the court could have imposed conditions of pretrial release,

including random drug testing and electronic home monitoring.

¶ 29 As we stated earlier, all defendants shall be presumed eligible for pretrial release.

-9- 720 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West 2024). Relevant to defendant’s argument here, the State bears the

burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that “no condition or combination of

conditions set forth in subsection (b) of Section 110-10 of this Article can mitigate (i) the real

and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific

articulable facts of the case.” Id. § 110-6.1(e)(3).

¶ 30 The trial court found Bishop persuasive when concluding there were no

conditions of pretrial release that could mitigate the dangerousness defendant posed. However,

the Bishop court never gave any reasons for why any conditions of pretrial release would be

futile for the defendant in that case. The court here relied on defendant’s speeding ticket from 13

months earlier and his illegal use of cannabis to show he likely would not follow the law.

However, the court’s findings were directly juxtaposed with the fact that six months had passed

between the date of the alleged offenses and the detention hearing. The Code contemplates the

imposition of conditions of pretrial release to mitigate the dangerousness a defendant poses. Yet,

the Code itself only permits pretrial detention for a maximum of 90 days, or three months,

excluding any delays occasioned by a defendant, before pretrial release must be granted. id.

§ 110-6.1(i). Based on the specific articulable facts of this case, defendant had already seemingly

gone six months without imperiling the community absent the imposition of any conditions of

pretrial release.

¶ 31 Accordingly, we find the trial court’s determination there were no conditions of

pretrial release that could mitigate the danger defendant posed was unsupported by the evidence,

and, thus, against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 32 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 33 For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for a

- 10 - determination of the appropriate conditions of release, as contemplated by subsection 110-10(b)

(id. § 11-10(b)).

¶ 34 Reversed and remanded.

- 11 -