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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM
2 THE PEOPLE OF GUAM, )
3 ) CRIMINAL CASE NO. CM0921-l2 4 vs. )
) DECISION AND ORDER 5 MIYUNMOON, )
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6 Defendant. )
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8 INTRODUCTION
9 This matter came before the Honorable James L. Canto II on Defendant's motion to 10 suppress, filed May 30, 2013. Oral arguments were heard on August 26, 2013. Assistant II Attorney General James L.G. Stake appeared on behalf of the Government and Assistant Public 12 Defender Suresh Sampath represented Defendant. Having considered the parties' briefs, oral 13 arguments, and the applicable law, the Court now issues the following Decision and Order.
14 BACKGROUND
15 Defendant is charged with driving under the influence (hereinafter "DUI") of alcohol 16 upon the following alleged events. It is undisputed that on October 19, 2012 at approximately 17 12:50 a.m., Guam Police Officer J.G. Gamboa stopped Defendant's vehicle and arrested 18 Defendant for DUI. Defendant was transported to the Hagatfia precinct, where she was 19 interviewed by Guam Police Officer Glen C. Ogo. (Testimony of Glen C. Ogo, Record Log at 20 2:54, Aug. 26, 2013). At the motion hearing, Officer Ogo testified to the following: He asked 21 questions in English and Defendant responded in English. !d. Defendant appeared to have no 22 trouble responding to his questions in English. Id. Officer Ogo read to the Defendant a form 23 titled: "Implied Consent Form for DUI." !d. Defendant did not ask any questions about the 24 form. !d. Defendant then signed next to the line "I AGREE TO TAKE A BREATH TEST(S)"
25 on the form. !d. Officer Ogo did not pressure the Defendant to sign the form by threatening to 26 incarcerate her if she did not cooperate or promise to release her if she signed the form. !d.
27 At the August 26, 2013 hearing, Defendant testified to the following: She did not 28
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understand Officer Ogo's questions or the content of the form she signed. (Testimony ofMiyun 2 Moon, Record Log at 3:09 & 3:12, Aug. 26, 2013). Defendant did not tell the Officers that she 3 did not understand the form. !d. Defendant testified she was told that she would have to sign 4 the form to be released because a Korean interpreter would not be available until the following 5 Monday. !d. Defendant further testified she was also told that she would have to stay in jail if 6 she did not understand the form. !d. Defendant signed the form thereafter. !d. 7 Defendant first came to Guam two and one half years ago. (Testimony of Miyun Moon, 8 Record Log at 3:14, Aug. 26, 2013). She is currently studying English at E.R.L, a language
9 school on Guam. !d. 10 On May 30, 2013, Defendant moved to suppress the breath test on the basis that 11 Defendant did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver when she signed the implied consent 12 form because of: 1) a language barrier; and 2) the officer made improper threats and promises 13 which deviated from the statutory implied warnings. The Government contends that the breath 14 test should not be suppressed because Defendant reviewed the implied consent form and then 15 consented to the breath test. 16 DISCUSSION 17 In Rasauo, 2011 Guam 1, the Guam Supreme Court noted that constitutional "[d]ue 18 process does not necessarily require that drivers be meaningfully advised of the implied consent 19 rights in language they can understand." !d. at ~ 44. Furthermore, the statutory right to an 20 implied consent warning is generally "a matter of legislative grace and not a right of 21 constitutional dimension." !d. at ~ 45 (citing South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 565 22 (1983); Rodriguez v. State, 565 S.E.2d 458, 462 n. 24 (Ga. 2002)). The Supreme Court 23 questioned the relevance of comparable but distinctive implied consent statutes and declined to 24 address whether, under Guam statutes, due process requires suppression of the evidence if a 25 defendant does not understand the consent form. !d. at~~ 47-48. The present case involves this
26 issue left unaddressed by Rasauo. 27 Under Guam law, if a person appears to operate a motor vehicle under the influence of 28 alc9hol, that person "shall have the option of using a blood or urine, or breath test for the purpose of determining the alcohol or controlled substance content of that person's blood or 2 urine." 16 GCA § 18201 (c). This statute "requires the police to give a person the option of 3 using a blood or breath test." Rasauo, 2011 Guam 1 ~ 47. The blood, urine or breath test shall 4 only be administered after: "(1) a lawful arrest, and (2) the person has been informed by a peace 5 officer of the sanctions that may result from his or her refusal to be tested." 16 GCA § 18201 (b) 6 (emphasis added). An arresting officer must also warn the person of the consequences of any 7 refusal to submit to testing. 16 GCA § 18201(f), (g). 8 When interpreting the meaning of a statute, a "court must look first to the language of 9 the statute itself." Sumitomo Constr. Co. v. Gov't ofGuam, 2001 Guam 23, ~ 17. "In looking at 10 the statute's language, the court's task is to determine whether or not the statutory language is 11 plain and unambiguous." Aguon v. Gutierrez, 2002 Guam 14 ~ 6 (internal quotation marks 12 omitted) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843, 846 (1997)). 13 "The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language 14 itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute 15 as a whole." !d. (quoting Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341). The Guam Supreme Court recognized 16 that "[i]t is the duty of the court to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute, 17 avoiding, if it may be, any construction which implies that the legislature was ignorant of the 18 meaning of the language it employed." People v. Taman, 2013 Guam 24 (quoting Inhabitants 19 of Montclair Twp. v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152,2 S.Ct. 391 (1883)). 20 Under the plain reading of the statute, a person must be informed by a peace officer of 21 the sanctions that may result from his or her refusal to be tested. 16 GCA § 18201 (b) (emphasis 22 added). To "inform" means "to give knowledge of something to" and "to acquaint with a fact." 23 Webster's New World Dictionary 693 (3d ed. 1991). Therefore the statute, by its own language, 24 requires more than a rote recitation of English words to a non-English speaker because 25 knowledge cannot be imparted in such a way. See State v. Marquez, 202 N.J. 485, 507 (2010). 26 In addition to considering the plain meaning of a statute, the Guam Supreme Court has 27 also considered the "pragmatic implications of a decision to the contrary" when interpreting the 28 meaning of a statute. Taman, 2013 Guam 22 ~~ 15, 28. If a rote recitation ofEnglish words to a non-English speaker were sufficient, that approach could, for example, justify reading aloud 2 the standard statement to a hearing-impaired driver who cannot read lips. See Marquez, 202 3 N.J. at 507. The Court does not believe the Legislature intended such "pragmatic quagmires 4 and absurdities." Taman, 2013 Guam 22 ~ 15. 5 On a motion to suppress, "the controlling burden of proof imposes no greater burden 6 than proofby a preponderance of the evidence." United States v. Perez, No. 11-00082-02,2012 7 WL 293557, at *4 (D.Guam July 17, 2012) (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 8 n.14 ( 1974) ). "[T]he prosecution, as the proponent of the evidence, must bear the burden of 9 proving its admissibility." ld. (citations omitted). However, in DUI cases where a defendant 10 claims that he or she did not understand the standard statement being read to him or her, or the 11 implied consent form he or she signed, "[d]efendants who claim that they do not speak or 12 understand English must bear the burden of production and persuasion on that issue." Marquez, 13 202 N.J. at 514 (citations omitted). The New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned in Marquez that 14 this information is within the possession of the defendant, not the Government, and that this 15 approach will help separate feigned claims from real ones. Id. Thus, the burden is on the 16 Defendant to show that she lacked the language capacity to understand Officer Ogo and the 17 implied consent form. 18 In this case, it is disputed whether Defendant understood the consent explanations made 19 by the Officer. Officer Ogo testified that Defendant appeared to have understood English 20 during the interview, whereas the Defendant testified that she did not. Having reviewed the 21 presented evidence, the Court is not convinced that Defendant has met her burden. Defendant 22 testified that she has lived in Guam for two and a half years, and that she is a student at an 23 English language school. Furthermore, even by Defendant's own account, Defendant was able 24 to understand Officer Ogo when he purportedly told her a Korean interpreter would not be 25 available until Monday and that not signing the form could possibly lead to her being detained 26 further. This evidences a level of comprehension of the English language that would reasonably 27 include an understanding of the implied consent form's contents. For this reason, the motion to
28 suppress the breath test shall not be granted.
Ill 2 Ill 3 CONCLUSION 4 Based upon the foregoing, Defendant's motion to suppress is hereby DENIED.
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7 SO ORDERED this J (~ 7 day of November, 2013. 8
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lO HON. JAMES L. CANTO II
11 Judge, Superior Court of Guam 12
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26 is a full true on file in the office of
Superior Court of Guam