People v. Montecastro CA4/2
This text of People v. Montecastro CA4/2 (People v. Montecastro CA4/2) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Filed 5/11/22 P. v. Montecastro CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E076584
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF153306)
HENDRIX MORENO MONTECASTRO, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Steven G. Counelis,
Judge. Dismissed.
Hendrix M. Montecastro in pro. per.; Dawn S. Mortazavi, under appointment by
the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Hendrix Moreno Montecastro appeals the Riverside
County Superior Court’s denial of his motion to correct errors in his sentence. We
dismiss.
1 BACKGROUND
1. The circumstances leading to defendant’s conviction
For two years, defendant and his partner ran a Ponzi scheme that stole
approximately $30 million from would-be investors.
A jury convicted defendant of 304 counts involving 27 victims. The counts
covered a wide range of violations such as grant theft by false pretenses, securities fraud,
acting as a broker-dealer, as well as 93 enhancements relating to the taking of property.
In January 2014, the court sentenced him to a total of 81 years and 8 months in prison.
Defendant was also required to pay restitution in the amount of $6,041,800.18 as well as
court operations and facilities assessment fees. Defendant appealed.
On appeal, we agreed with defendant’s claim of insufficient evidence of the sale or
offer to sell a commodity to support seven counts of commodity fraud and reversed the
convictions on those counts. (People v. Montecastro (Oct 7, 2015, E060533) [nonpub.
opn.] pp. 2, 39 (“Montecastro I.).) Those reversals did not affect defendant’s aggregate
sentence but did entitle him to reduction in the court assessments fees, which are
calculated on a per-count basis. (Id., at p. 28.) We also agreed some errors were made in
calculating direct victim restitution, and corrected them to reflect the amount owed as
$5,905,539.11. (Id., at pp. 32-36.) The judgment as modified was affirmed and the clerk
of the superior court was directed to amend the sentencing minute order and abstract of
judgment, and to furnish the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation with a
certified copy of the amended abstract. (Id., at p. 39.)
2 On remand, the trial court dismissed the reversed counts and, in March 2016,
resentenced appellant without changing his term imprisonment.
2. Defendant’s motion to correct his sentence
In December 2020, defendant filed a motion in the trial court seeking correction of
his sentence. The trial court summarily denied the motion. Defendant appealed.
DISCUSSION
Defendant’s counsel has filed a “no-issues” brief under the authority of People v.
Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S 738 setting forth
statements of the case and facts. Counsel suggests one potentially arguable issue:
whether the trial court erred when it sentenced defendant to consecutive terms of one year
for commodities fraud in violation of Corporations Code section 29536 as to victim
Christopher Breen (count 33), and eight months for identity theft in violation of Penal
Code section 530.5 as to victim Pacific Wealth Management, LLC (count 210), although
the court stayed the sentences pursuant to section 654 for those offenses as to defendant’s
other victims.1
We offered defendant an opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, which
he has done. In addition to the potentially arguable issue raised by his counsel, defendant
claims his sentence is illegal in each of the following respects:
1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
3 (i) The court was required to establish an aggregate loss amount to impose the
section 186.11 aggravated white collar crime enhancement, and it necessarily could not
have complied with that directive because all the grand theft counts were stayed and the
court could not properly use his violations of Corporations Code section 25401 to
establish the amount;
(ii) The court violated Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, Cunningham
v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, and related cases when it imposed the upper terms for
Corporations Code section 25401securities fraud (count 5) and the section 186.11
aggravated white collar crime enhancement to the violation of Corporations Code section
29536 (count 317) without a jury’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt of a factual basis
for the increased penalties;
(iii) It was error for the court to impose the sentencing triad set forth in
Corporations Code section 25540 for defendant’s violation of section 25401 of that code
because the sentencing statute was not alleged in the charging document and because the
court should have employed the sentencing scheme set forth in section 1170, which
would have been required to be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable
doubt, and which defendant posits would have resulted in a prison term of 48 instead of
75 years;
(iv) Defendant’s sentence is cruel and unusual punishment because it is
disproportional to sentences imposed for more serious crimes;
4 (v) The court doubled the restitution fine under section 186.11, which is
disproportional and, therefore, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
We do not consider issues raised in an appeal from the trial court’s denial of a
post-judgment motion unless the defendant’s substantial rights have been affected by the
denial of the motion. (§ 1237, subd. (b).) It is well-settled that a defendant’s substantial
rights are not affected by the denial if the issues raised could have been presented in a
timely appeal from the judgment. (People v. Smith (1933) 218 Cal. 484, 487 [a
defendant’s substantial rights do not encompass justiciable questions which have been
raised in a prior appeal]; People v. Howerton (1953) 40 Cal.2d 217, 220 [substantial
rights of a defendant do not include matter which could have been reviewed on timely
appeal from the judgment].)
Here, defendant’s challenges to his sentence could have been raised in his appeal
from the judgment. (Montecastro I., supra.) Accordingly, we will not address the merits
of his claims of error.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS RAMIREZ P. J. We concur:
CODRINGTON J.
SLOUGH J.
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