People v. Monroe

2025 IL App (1st) 240471-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: December 19, 2025
• Docket: 1-24-0471
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2025 IL App (1st) 240471-U

FIFTH DIVISION December 19, 2025

No. 1-24-0471

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County ) v. ) No. 22CR6120 ) ANDREW MONROE, ) The Honorable ) Charles P. Burns, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE TAILOR delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Mitchell concurred in the judgment. Justice Oden Johnson dissented in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: We affirm the defendant’s sentence where he failed to show he did not receive the presentence behavior modification program credit to which he is entitled.

¶2 Defendant Andrew Monroe was convicted of vehicular hijacking and sentenced to eleven

years in the Illinois Department of Corrections. At sentencing, the trial court awarded him 710

days of presentence credit, including 55 days of credit for his participation in the Thinking for a

Change behavior modification program while he was detained pretrial. On appeal, Monroe argues No. 1-24-0471

that the trial court erred by not awarding him 105 days of credit, as he requested prior to sentencing.

We affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 Following a bench trial, defendant Andrew Monroe was found guilty of vehicular

hijacking, aggravated robbery, possession of a stolen motor vehicle, and robbery. At the sentencing

hearing, defense counsel requested that Monroe receive 105 days of credit for participating in the

Thinking for a Change program. The following exchange occurred at the hearing:

“DEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge, in terms of credit towards Mr. Monroe should he

be sentenced to the Illinois Department of Corrections again he has 655 days in custody,

he also did 105 days in Thinking [f]or [a] Change program so I believe he is entitled to 105

days—

THE COURT: 105 days?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge—

THE COURT: How is that possible?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge, it says program start date was July 19th, phase

one, and the completion date on here was October 31st.

THE COURT: But he is not in the class five days a week, it’s a couple hour class,

I can tell you what they do on the outside, on the outside it’s Tuesdays and Thursdays if

I’m not mistaken, is Adriana here? Where it’s like two hours a day.

DEFENDANT: Can I speak, sir?

THE COURT: I don’t think it’s five days a week.

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DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. Judge, Mr. Monroe is representing it was a five day

a week program so I would have to recalculate that if the court is willing to consider credit

for that program.

***

THE COURT: I’m going to sentence the defendant to 11 years in the Illinois

Department of Corrections, one year [mandatory supervised release]. It will be on the

vehicle invasion, I’m going to merge the other counts 2, 3, and 4 with the vehicular invasion

or hijacking I guess it is. I’ll give him half the credit you’re asking for his educational credit

so how many actual days in custody?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge, he has been [in] custody for 655 days.

THE COURT: And how many days credit were you asking for on the—

DEFENSE COUNSEL: 105.

THE COURT: I’ll give him 55 days on that.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: So that total would be on—

THE COURT: That would be—

DEFENSE COUNSEL: 710.

THE COURT: 710 days timed [sic] considered served, one year mandatory

supervised release.”

¶5 Monroe filed a motion to reconsider sentence, but did not include any claim of sentencing

credit error. The court denied Monroe’s motion to reconsider and he timely appealed.

¶6 II. ANALYSIS

¶7 Monroe’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred by not granting him 105

days of sentencing credit for his participation in the Thinking for a Change program and instead

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only awarding him 55 days. Monroe argues that he participated in the program for 105 days, and

pursuant to sections 5/5-4.5-100 and 5/3-6-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS

5/5-4.5-100 (c-5) (West Supp. 2025);730 ILCS 5/3-6-3 (West Supp. 2025)), he is entitled to one

day of sentence credit for each day he engaged in a qualifying program.

¶8 A. Jurisdiction

¶9 As a threshold matter, the State contends we lack jurisdiction to consider Monroe’s appeal

because he did not file a post-sentencing motion under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 472 (eff. Feb.

1, 2024) raising his sentencing credit claim. The State further contends that, if Monroe so requests,

we should remand the case to the circuit court to allow him an opportunity to file a Rule 472

motion to correct the alleged sentencing error. Whether we have jurisdiction is a question of law,

which we review de novo. People v. Tolbert, 2021 IL App (1st) 181654, ¶ 8.

¶ 10 The State’s jurisdiction argument rests on Rule 472, so we begin by reviewing its pertinent

provisions. First, it states: “In criminal cases, the circuit court retains jurisdiction to correct the

following sentencing errors at any time following judgment and after notice to the parties,

including during the pendency of an appeal, on the court’s own motion, or on motion of any party:

* * * (3) Errors in the calculation of presentence custody credit”. Ill. S. Ct. R. 472(a)(3) (eff. Feb.

1, 2024). Second, it states: “No appeal may be taken by a party from a judgment of conviction on

the ground of any sentencing error specified above unless such alleged error has first been raised

in the circuit court. When a post-judgment motion has been filed by a party pursuant to this rule,

any claim of error not raised in that motion shall be deemed forfeited.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 472(c) (eff.

Feb. 1, 2024). Finally, it states: “In all criminal cases *** in which a party has attempted to raise

sentencing errors covered by this rule for the first time on appeal, the reviewing court shall remand

to the circuit court to allow the party to file a motion pursuant to this rule.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 472(e)

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(eff. Feb. 1, 2024). As neither party raises the issue, we assume, without deciding, that sentencing

credit for participation in a pretrial behavior modification program falls under the rubric of

“presentence custody credit” under Rule 472(a)(3) (Emphasis added) (eff. Feb. 1, 2024).

¶ 11 The State relies on People v. Edwards, 2020 IL App (1st) 170843, ¶ 27, where the

defendant argued for the first time on appeal that he was entitled to an additional 80 days of

sentencing credit. We found that we lacked jurisdiction because, “[b]efore a defendant may

challenge such a calculation on appeal, he must first file a motion in the trial court to allow the

court an opportunity to correct the error.” Id. Monroe, however, is not raising his sentencing credit

issue for the first time on appeal as did the defendant in Edwards; rather, he raised the issue with

the trial court when he argued at the sentencing hearing that he was entitled to 105 days of credit.

Rule 472 merely requires that the alleged error be raised in the circuit court in the first instance,

which Monroe did here, and nothing therein deprives us of jurisdiction to consider his claim on

appeal. Cf. People v. Eason, 2020 IL App (3d) 180296, ¶ 13 (dismissing the appeal and remanding

to the circuit court because the defendant failed to raise the sentencing issue there in the first

instance, but suggesting such a result would not be warranted in “a scenario in which an issue is

fully raised before the circuit court *** despite not being included in a postjudgment motion. For

example, consider a sentencing hearing at which the street value fine is the central issue, complete

with witnesses and robust argument from the parties. In that situation, it would be difficult to find

that the issue had not been ‘raised,’ or that the circuit court had not already considered the issue.”).

Thus, Edwards neither deprives us of jurisdiction nor compels that we remand. To the extent

Monroe forfeited the sentencing credit issue by not raising it in his motion to reconsider, the State

has not advanced the argument that the motion to reconsider was itself a postjudgment motion

under Rule 472, resulting in forfeiture of the forfeiture argument. Ill. S. Ct. R. 472(c) (eff. Feb. 1,

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2024); see People v. Jackson, 2023 IL App (1st) 180672-UB, ¶ 58 (“Well-settled law provides that

the State may forfeit a forfeiture argument by failing to argue it timely.”). Instead, the State merely

argues this court “lacks jurisdiction” because Monroe “fail[ed] to file a Rule 472” motion with the

trial court.

¶ 12 B. Sentencing Credit

¶ 13 Turning to the merits, we review whether a defendant received appropriate pretrial custody

credit de novo. People v. Clark, 2014 IL App (4th) 130331, ¶ 16. Under section 3-6-3(a)(4)(A) of

the Code, “any prisoner who is engaged full-time in *** educational programs, *** behavior

modification programs, [or other qualifying programs] *** and satisfactorily completes the

assigned program as determined by the standards of the Department, shall receive one day of

sentence credit for each day in which that prisoner is engaged in the activities described in this

paragraph.” (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(4)(A) (West Supp. 2025). See also People v.

Williamson, 2024 IL App (3d) 220501, ¶ 17 (Defendant was not entitled to an award of sentencing

credit for the completion of behavior modification and substance abuse programs while in custody

awaiting trial because the record did not provide sufficient evidence to establish that the programs

qualified as full-time and there was no evidence presented to indicate the number of days or hours

devoted to each program); People v. Montalvo, 2016 IL App (2d) 140905 ¶¶ 22, 29 (Defendant

was entitled to six additional days’ credit when there was no dispute as to the exact number of days

and hours that he participated in a section 3-6-3(a)(4)(A) program.). The calculation of program

credit “shall be done at sentencing as provided in Section 5-4.5-100 of this Code and shall be

included in the sentencing order.” 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(4)(A) (West Supp. 2025). Section

5-4.5-100(c-5) in turn points back to “the rate specified in Section 3-6-3,” that is, one day of

sentence credit for each day the prisoner participates full-time in the program.

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¶ 14 The parties do not dispute that Thinking for a Change is a qualifying behavior modification

program as required by section 3-6-3(a)(4)(A). See In re A.J., 2021 IL App (5th) 210164-U, ¶ 16

(describing “Thinking for a Change” as “a behavior modification program that teaches social skills

and how to handle conflict resolution”). The crux of the dispute is whether the program is a full

time program, as was argued at the sentencing hearing, or a “couple hour class” offered two days

per week, as the trial court determined after taking judicial notice of the class schedule based on

its previous experience with defendants who participated in the program.

¶ 15 At sentencing, defense counsel represented to the court that Monroe was in the program

for 105 days, between July 19 and October 31, 2023. However, the record is devoid of any

evidence to show the specific number of hours and days Monroe participated in program. Without

offering any evidence, Monroe cannot meet his burden to show that the circuit court erred in

determining the appropriate amount of program participation credit. Williamson, 2024 IL App (3d)

220501, ¶ 17.

¶ 16 Monroe nevertheless asks us to take judicial notice of information found on the National

Institute of Corrections’ website, which describes the Thinking for a Change program as a

“cognitive behavioral change program”, but the website doesn’t support his position either. See

Thinking for a Change, National Institute of Corrections, https://perma.cc/9PWY-LBM4 (last

visited October 30, 2025); People v. Vara, 2016 IL App (2d) 140849, ¶ 37 n.3 (taking judicial

notice of information on a federal government website). The website states that the Thinking for a

Change program “typically spans 30 sessions, each lasting 1-2 hours, ideally conducted twice

weekly but is adaptable to other schedules.” This is consistent with the trial court’s observation

about the length and frequency of program sessions, and there is nothing in the website that

supports Monroe’s claim that he is entitled to 105 days of credit.

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¶ 17 Finally, we reject Monroe’s request for a remand. When a “defendant was provided ample

opportunity to provide the requisite evidence [of participation in a section 3-6-3(a)(4)(A) program]

and failed to do so, he is not entitled to remand” for the purpose of submitting missing evidence.

Williamson, 2024 IL App (3d) 220501, ¶ 17. Monroe had the opportunity to present evidence at

his sentencing hearing, and he also had the opportunity to file a motion to reconsider regarding his

program credit, but did neither. The only evidence Monroe points to on appeal is the Thinking for

a Change website, which does not support his claim. Additionally, as previously discussed,

because the sentencing credit issue was raised below, nothing in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 472

(eff. Feb. 1, 2024) requires that we remand to allow Monroe an opportunity to raise it again.

¶ 18 Reviewing the record de novo, Monroe has not met his burden to show that the trial court

erred in calculating his presentence credit. The record is devoid of any evidence regarding the

number of days and hours Monroe attended the Thinking for a Change behavior modification

program. Given this record, Monroe failed to meet his burden to show the circuit court erred in

awarding him 55 days of credit for participation in the Thinking for a Change program.

¶ 19 We respectfully disagree with the dissent’s reasoning. First, contrary to the dissent’s

contention, the State only argued we lack jurisdiction, not that Monroe forfeited his sentencing

error claim. Second, the dissent misinterprets subsection (e) of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 472

(eff. Feb. 1, 2024) to mean, “what happens when forfeiture occurs, namely, remand.” However,

subsection (e) provides for remand only when the defendant raises a sentencing error for the first

time on appeal (Ill. S. Ct. R. 472(e) (eff. Feb. 1, 2024)), whereas here Monroe raised his sentencing

credit issue at trial and does so again on appeal. Third, regarding the dissent’s observation that the

State offered no evidence to rebut Monroe’s attorney’s proffer at the sentencing hearing, a proffer

is not evidence so the State had nothing to rebut. See Williamson, 2024 IL App (3d)

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220501, ¶¶ 16-17 (trial court did not err in declining to award sentencing credit for defendant’s

completion of behavior modification programs where defendant filed program completion

certificates but provided no evidence of the total number of days or hours completed). Finally,

while we agree with the dissent that sentencing credit “is not, and should not be, random”, here

the circuit court calculated Monroe’s sentencing credit by taking judicial notice that the program

meets twice a week for two hours a day, which is consistent with the information on the Thinking

for a Change website that Monroe directs us to on appeal. In the absence of any evidence submitted

by Monroe, the court could have denied him educational credit altogether, but instead awarded

him 55 days of credit based on its experience with defendants who participated in the program,

which would be more than he was entitled for a program that met twice a week for two hours a

day from July 19, 2023 to October 31, 2023.

¶ 20 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 21 Because Monroe failed to meet his burden to show the trial court erred in awarding him

sentencing credit pursuant to section 3-6-3(a)(4)(A) (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(4)(A) (West Supp.

2025)), we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 22 Affirmed.

¶ 23 JUSTICE ODEN JOHNSON, dissenting:

¶ 24 “No appeal may be taken by a party from a judgment of conviction on the ground of any

sentencing error *** unless such alleged error has first been raised in the circuit court.” Ill. S. Ct.

R. 472 (c) (eff. Feb. 1, 2024). The majority posits that the word “raised” as used in this sentence

is not relegated to the posttrial motion and that arguing the error orally at the hearing alone could

avoid forfeiture pursuant to the subsection. However, the very next sentence of the two-sentence

subsection or couplet states that, “[w]hen” -- not “if” -- a postjudgment motion is filed pursuant to

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this rule, any claim of error not raised in that motion shall be deemed forfeited. Ill. S. Ct. R. 472

(c) (eff. Feb. 1, 2024) (“When a post-judgment motion has been filed by a party pursuant to this

rule, any claim of error not raised in that motion shall be deemed forfeited.”). This concluding

sentence of the couplet, thus, anticipates that the issue would be raised in a filed postjudgment

motion, and not just argued orally.

¶ 25 The majority writes that the State did not make the forfeiture argument, so therefore the

majority need not consider that part of the rule. Supra ¶ 11. First, it was not the State’s right to

forfeit. When, and if a defendant fails to make the appropriate motion, the rule requires the

appellate court to remand to allow for a fact-based resolution in the trial court--which did not

happen in this case. Ill. S. Ct. R. 472(e) (eff. Feb. 1, 2024).

¶ 26 Second, the majority writes that the State had not sought forfeiture on the ground that

defendant had failed to file a postjudgment motion on the issue. However, that is the exact

statutory subsection that the State cited in seeking a remand--the one that says that if the defendant

fails to file a postjudgment motion on the issue, it is forfeited. To make this clear, I provide the

quotes from the majority, the rule and the State’s brief. The majority writes: “To the extent

Monroe forfeited the sentencing credit issue by not raising it in his motion to reconsider ***, the

State has not advanced [that] argument.” Supra ¶ 11 (Emphasis added.) However, the State does

argue in its appellate brief that the issue was forfeited for our review. Illinois Supreme Court Rule

472(c) (eff. Feb. 1, 2024) provides, in relevant part: “When a postjudgment motion has been filed

by a party pursuant to this rule, any claim of error not raised in that motion shall be deemed

forfeited.” (Emphasis added.) The State’s brief argues: “defendant failed to include this claim in

a postsentencing motion as required by Rule 472(c). Accordingly, this Court should dismiss this

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appeal[.]” (Emphasis added.) The State’s brief could not be more clear. Thus, I must dissent from

the majority’s order which mistakenly found forfeiture by the State.

¶ 27 Turning to the merits, at the sentencing hearing below, defense counsel proffered to the

trial court that defendant was entitled to 105 days, based on defendant’s representation. The State

offered no evidence whatsoever to rebut the defendant’s proffer. Nonetheless, the trial court

picked a random number out of the air, cutting the requested time approximately in half, and

thereby picking a number that no one argued was accurate. On appeal, the State acknowledges that

the number was random, where it says that, even if defendant was entitled to day-for-day credit

during the cited time period, at five days per week, it should have been 75 days, not the 55 that the

trial court awarded.

¶ 28 The majority writes that the “crux of the dispute” is whether the program that defendant

attended was a full-time program or whether the trial court was permitted to determine based on

its own “experience” with the program that the program was only two days per week. Supra ¶ 14.

However, although the trial judge spoke of his personal experience with the program, the trial court

apparently did not rely on its own personal knowledge and, instead, simply cut the proverbial baby

in approximately half. Between July 19, and October 31, 2023, there were approximately 15

weeks. Fifteen times two (days a week) would have yielded a credit of approximately 30 days.

But the trial court did not award 30 days and simply split defendant’s number in approximately

half (half of 105 would have been 52.5) for a completely random result.

¶ 29 Contrary to the majority’s interpretation (supra ¶¶ 10-11), subsection (c) of Illinois

Supreme Court Rule 472 (eff. Feb. 1, 2024) must be interpreted as a whole. The first sentence

demands that the issue must “first” be raised in the trial court. Ill. S. Ct. R. 472(c) (eff. Feb. 1,

2024). The second sentence indicates what it takes to sufficiently raise the issue, namely, a

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postjudgment motion, and what happens when that does not happen, namely, forfeiture.

Subsection (e) then explains what happens when forfeiture occurs, namely, remand. Ill. S. Ct. R.

472(e) (eff. Feb. 1, 2024). Further, the issue was sufficiently important that the supreme court

waived all filing fees for these motions. Ill. S. Ct. R. 472(f) (eff. Feb. 1, 2024).

¶ 30 Sentencing credit is not, and should not be, random; otherwise, it fails to provide the

incentives that it was designed to promote, i.e. participation in rehabilitative programs to combat

recidivism. This principle was sufficiently important that our supreme court provided for an

automatic and mandatory remand. Ill. S. Ct. R. 472(e) (“the reviewing court shall remand”).

Despite the clear “shall” language of our supreme court, the majority chooses instead to affirm an

obviously random action by a trial court that both parties oppose. I cannot condone or concur in

this action and therefore would remand for a correct calculation as mandated by the legislature.

Therefore, I must respectfully dissent.