People v. Mitchell

249 A.D.2d 110, 670 N.Y.S.2d 108, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4067

Opinion

—Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Howard Bell, J.), rendered March 30, 1995, convicting defendant, after a nonjury trial, of absconding from temporary release in the first degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to a term of IV2 to 3 years, unanimously affirmed.

Defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment claiming a statutory speedy trial violation was properly denied. This action was commenced by the filing of the indictment for absconding from a work release facility and not by the detainer warrant that was lodged almost five months earlier (CPL 1.20 [17]; 100.05, 100.10; People v Lomax, 50 NY2d 351, 356). We see no reason to go beyond the explicit statutory language defining commencement of an action. Defendant’s constitutional speedy trial claim, based largely on the above-mentioned five-month delay, is without merit. The factors set forth in People v Taranovich (37 NY2d 442) weigh overwhelmingly in favor of the People. Concur — Milonas, J. P., Nardelli, Wallach and Andrias, JJ.