People v. Misodi

49 Misc. 3d 205, 10 N.Y.S.3d 416
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedJune 15, 2015
StatusPublished

This text of 49 Misc. 3d 205 (People v. Misodi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Misodi, 49 Misc. 3d 205, 10 N.Y.S.3d 416 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 2015).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Martin Marcus, J.

The prosecution of all but certain specified felonies “must be commenced within five years after the commission thereof.” (CPL 30.10 [2] [b].) However, in calculating this time limitation, “[a]ny period following the commission of the offense during which . . . (ii) the whereabouts of the defendant were continuously unknown and continuously unascertainable by the exercise of reasonable diligence” is excluded. (CPL 30.10 [4] [a].) In People v Seda (93 NY2d 307, 311 [1999]), the Court of Appeals held that the phrase “whereabouts of the defendant” includes not only a situation in which “[t]he police may be ignorant of the whereabouts of a perpetrator of a crime where they have identified the perpetrator but lack knowledge of his or her physical location,” but also one in which “they have not identified the perpetrator at all and thus cannot determine where he or she is.” This case raises the novel question whether, when a defendant is charged with a crime only after another person has been charged with the same crime and then exonerated, the time consumed by the prior prosecution should be excluded from the period in which the subsequent prosecution must be brought.

In Seda, the defendant was charged with three counts of attempted murder and related crimes arising out of three shooting incidents, two of which occurred in March 1990. In a series of letters to the New York City Police Department and the New York Post, a person identifying himself only as “The Zodiac” [207]*207had claimed responsibility. As the Court of Appeals noted, “[f]rom 1990 until 1996, the police conducted extensive investigations in an effort to find the so-called ‘Zodiac Killer.’ ” (Seda, 93 NY2d at 309.) Finally indicted on August 20, 1996, the defendant moved to dismiss the charges arising out of the March 1990 shootings, claiming that because they were brought more than six years after the shootings had occurred, they were barred by the statute of limitations.

The Court of Appeals observed that in enacting the statute of limitations, the legislature “carefully balanced the general policy in favor of avoiding prosecution of stale cases against the countervailing policy of ensuring that law enforcement officers have sufficient time to bring suspected criminals to justice by imposing important limitations on the tolling exceptions.” (Id. at 311.) Significantly, the Court noted that “[t]he ‘reasonable diligence’ requirement is certainly a deterrent to delaying an investigation, as no automatic toll is contemplated.” (Id. at 312.)

Explaining that “[t]he focus of the tolling exception rests on the difficulty of finding the defendant whether or not the police are aware of his or her identity,” the Court concluded that

“[i]n light of the extensive and prolonged police manhunts for ‘The Zodiac Killer,’ there is ample record support for the Appellate Division’s finding that, during the six-plus year period from the March 1990 shootings until defendant’s arrest in June 1996, his whereabouts were continuously unknown and continuously unascertainable by the exercise of reasonable diligence.” (Id.)

Accordingly, the Court held that pursuant to CPL 30.10 (4) (a) (ii), the statute of limitations was tolled during that period.

In this case, the defendants are charged with one count each of attempted murder in the second degree, assault in the first degree, robbery in the third degree and burglary in the third degree, and two counts each of robbery in the first and second degrees and burglary in the first degree. The charges arise out of a September 6, 2005 home invasion and robbery during which the victim, George Peseo, was shot. The above-captioned indictment was filed on October 9, 2014, more than nine years and one month later. In their omnibus motions, the defendants move to dismiss the indictment, alleging that it was filed after the statute of limitations had expired. The People oppose the defendants’ motions, asserting that the statute was tolled dur[208]*208ing the period in which two other women were prosecuted for the crimes with which they are now charged, until February of 2013, when the attorneys for those other women presented them with “compelling evidence” that they had been wrongfully convicted.

The Crime

According to Peseo’s September 17, 2014 grand jury testimony, on September 5, 2005, he met two young women on Eighth Avenue in Manhattan and brought them to his apartment, located at 964 Sherman Avenue in the Bronx. After spending some time in the apartment, the women indicated that they wanted to bring their belongings there, and Peseo drove them back to Eighth Avenue, where they got their “stuff.” The three then returned to Peseo’s apartment, where they spent the night, one on the couch and the other in his room.

The following day, Peseo dropped the women off at Harlem Hospital and drove home. After the women returned that evening, Peseo quarreled with one them, who asked him for money. One of the women borrowed Peseo’s phone and called a man, complaining to him that somebody — presumably Peseo — was trying to take advantage of them. The man asked for Peseo’s address and the woman gave it to him. Thereafter, Peseo called a friend, Frank Nti, and asked him to come over. Nti did so and gave the woman some money. Both women then left, saying they would be back.

Later that night, the women did come back, accompanied by some men. An altercation ensued in which they asked Peseo where his money was, took his phone from his pocket, and roughed him up. One of the men shot him in his abdomen. The next thing Peseo remembered, he was in the hospital. Peseo testified that he had been unconscious for two weeks or more and had been unable to walk for about a month. He later spent time in a rehabilitation facility and, as of his September 2014 grand jury appearance, remained unable to work and on disability.

The Investigation

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Related

People v. Seda
712 N.E.2d 682 (New York Court of Appeals, 1999)
People v. Kohut
282 N.E.2d 312 (New York Court of Appeals, 1972)
People v. Blyden
83 A.D.3d 542 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2011)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
49 Misc. 3d 205, 10 N.Y.S.3d 416, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-misodi-nysupct-2015.