2026 IL App (1st) 241468-U
No. 1-24-1468
SECOND DIVISION June 9, 2026
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 23 CR 08677 ) RAUL MIRANDA, ) Honorable ) Shelley Sutker-Dermer, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
JUSTICE D.B. WALKER delivered the judgment of the court. Justice McBride and Justice Ellis concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm defendant’s robbery conviction and his sentence of three years in prison.
¶2 Defendant Raul Miranda appeals his conviction of robbery after a bench trial. On appeal,
defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred when it failed to conduct a preliminary hearing
pursuant to People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181, 189 (1984), on his posttrial allegations of ineffective
assistance of counsel; (2) the trial court failed to conduct a fitness hearing where his statements in
court demonstrated a bona fide doubt of his fitness to stand trial; and (3) his conviction should be No. 1-24-1468
reduced to theft where the evidence was insufficient to prove that he used or threatened to use
force when he took the victim’s property. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Defendant was charged with robbery, aggravated robbery, and unlawful restraint regarding
an incident that occurred on July 15, 2023 at City News Café & Bookstore in Chicago. At a pretrial
hearing on January 8, 2024, defense counsel informed the court that defendant wanted a bench
trial. After the trial court inquired about the mental health unit evaluation ordered by counsel,
counsel responded that defendant “refused to participate,” so it was withdrawn.
¶5 On February 15, 2024, defense counsel requested a conference pursuant to Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 402 (eff. July 1, 2012). The trial court explained that it would consider the facts of the
case, defendant’s background and other information that may not be admissible at trial before
making an offer to defendant. He would then be free to accept or reject the offer. When asked if
he understood, defendant answered, “Yes, I do, your Honor.” When asked if he would like the
conference that morning, defendant responded, “Yes.”
¶6 At the next hearing, defense counsel informed the court that defendant refused to
participate in the mental health unit eligibility screening. The trial court had required the evaluation
before it would consider probation. Counsel requested that the 402 conference continue. After the
trial court admonished defendant regarding the conference, the following exchange occurred:
“THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. I didn’t agree to any of this 402 stuff. I was just asking
if I had time to serve, and then they offered a counteroffer. And, you know, I already turned
down the first 402 conference.
THE COURT: You already what? I didn’t hear that”
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THE DEFENDANT: Turned down the first 402 conference. And I didn’t want that
either. And it keeps getting served to me.
THE COURT: So you want to go to trial on your case. *** There was an agreement
to have a conference in front of the Court, for me to decide what the offer would be. If you
don’t want that, that’s totally fine. *** We’re still in the process of conferencing the case.
But if you don’t want one, the option is to set it for a bench or jury trial.
THE DEFENDANT: Right. I don’t want a conference.
THE COURT: You don’t want a conference.
THE DEFENDANT: I don’t want a conference.
THE COURT: Do you want a bench or a jury trial, Counsel?
THE DEFENDANT: A bench trial.
***
THE DEFENDANT: I was wondering about the time serving.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, when I was speaking to him this morning before
this case was called, we were anticipating a possible plea and calculating his time. So this
is new news to me. But I’m happy to set it for a bench trial.
THE COURT: Do you want me to pass it for you to talk to him in more detail so that
he understands the –
THE DEFENDANT: That’s not worth anything now, the time served?
THE COURT: That’s not how this works. *** I would make an offer. Your lawyer
asked me to consider a mental health option, probation. That’s obviously something you
were not interested in participating in. *** But I’m totally fine with setting it for trial. I just
want you to understand. We’re going to set it for a bench trial. And it’ll be continued until
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there’s an available date to go to trial. Do you need to talk to your lawyer or do you wish
for me to continue it for trial?
THE DEFENDANT: I don’t need to talk to my lawyer, no.
THE COURT: Ok.”
¶7 Defendant’s trial commenced on April 17, 2024. At trial, Danuta Kosiba testified that she
was the morning shift manager at City News Café. She had worked at the café for the past nine
years and was familiar with defendant because she had encountered him “hundreds of times, if not
thousands,” over the course of her employment. She stated that defendant had been “harassing”
the neighborhood businesses “for a long time.”
¶8 Kosiba testified that on July 15, 2023, around 9 a.m., she observed defendant standing in
the enclosed vestibule leading to the entrance of the café. The vestibule was small so that “one
person standing in there could fill it up.” Since defendant stood in the vestibule without moving, a
customer who was trying to leave the café could not do so. Kosiba twice asked defendant to leave
because the customer was afraid to leave the business. When he did not do so, Kosiba told
defendant that she was going to get her phone, take a picture of him, and call the police.
¶9 Kosiba testified that she left the vestibule to retrieve her phone, and upon returning, she
propped open the door with her leg “to make an escape for me.” As she pointed the phone at
defendant to take his picture, he “ripped the phone” from her hand in a violent manner. She reached
for her phone and yelled at defendant to give it back to her. As she tried to get her phone, defendant
grabbed her right wrist and gave it a twist. The incident lasted five to ten seconds. Defendant then
ran out the door and Kosiba attempted to grab him. Kosiba tried to chase defendant down the street,
but he ran “very fast” and she lost sight of him. She returned to the café and called the police.
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¶ 10 Kosiba testified that two days after the incident, she saw defendant twice. She did not call
police when she first observed defendant but later called police when she saw him walking towards
the café. The mailman told her that defendant was carrying a “car club,” which Kosiba described
as a device used on the steering wheel. When police arrived, Kosiba identified defendant as the
person who had taken her phone. She stated that her phone was never recovered.
¶ 11 On cross-examination, Kosiba acknowledged that although she felt pain in her wrist for
several days, she did not seek medical attention because she had work obligations. Kosiba stated
that defendant had been banned from the store, and she was not happy to see him in the vestibule.
She testified that the café had multiple cameras streaming images from different locations,
including the vestibule area, onto a large screen. She acknowledged that it would have been
possible to take a photo from the recorded images. Kosiba disagreed that her “phone was in
[defendant’s] face” when she tried to take his picture.
¶ 12 Detective Michael Duigan testified that he interviewed defendant after he was taken into
custody. Defendant admitted that he took Kosiba’s phone. He said he was upset because he was
no longer allowed in the store. He intended to sell the phone for $350. Defendant thought the police
may be tracking the phone, so he threw it into a dumpster. On cross-examination, Detective Duigan
stated that when he spoke with Kosiba, she did not tell him that a customer was trying to leave the
café while defendant stood in the vestibule.
¶ 13 The State rested and defendant moved for a directed verdict. In support, defense counsel
argued that there was no evidence of unlawful restraint where the entire incident in the vestibule
took place within “a matter of seconds.” Counsel also argued that the State did not prove
aggravated battery where the incident occurred within the vestibule of the business and not on a
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public way. Counsel concluded, “with respect to the robbery, Count 1, I have no argument.” The
trial court denied the motion.
¶ 14 The trial court asked whether defendant would testify in his defense. Defense counsel
responded that he did not wish to testify. The trial court advised defendant that he was the only
person who could waive his right to testify. The court asked defendant, “Do you wish to testify
today?” Defendant answered, “No.” The trial court asked defendant, “And that’s your choice,
correct?” He responded, “Yes.” The defense then rested without calling any witnesses.
¶ 15 In closing, the State argued that Kosiba was a credible witness, and the evidence supported
defendant’s conviction of unlawful restraint, aggravated battery and robbery. Defense counsel
argued that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to convict defendant of all charges where
the incident took place within a vestibule and not a public way, and Kosiba testified that defendant
grabbed her wrist for mere seconds before he fled. Regarding the robbery charge, defense counsel
argued that when Kosiba attempted to take a photograph of defendant inside the vestibule, “he
reacted” by taking the phone. Counsel argued that defendant did not intend to gain control over
the phone or permanently deprive Kosiba of it. Rather, he was simply attempting to stop her from
taking a photo of him.
¶ 16 The trial court found defendant guilty of robbery, but not guilty of aggravated robbery and
unlawful restraint. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied.
¶ 17 A sentencing hearing was held on January 6, 2025. The State argued in aggravation that
although this was defendant’s first felony conviction, he had seven prior misdemeanor convictions
that were “assault and battery related, and they took place in the same community where this
robbery took place.” In mitigation, defense counsel argued that this was defendant’s first felony
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conviction and he has spent 365 days in custody. Counsel argued that defendant’s life
circumstances contributed to his being homeless, which led to this “unfortunate incident.”
¶ 18 In allocution, defendant stated:
“Well, in the neighborhood when I was a teenager, my brother was involved in a
homicide and guns were involved and I wasn’t able to testify as a character witness, and
he was found guilty and sentenced to 12 1/2 years in jail. I was found a danger to self or
others by the Social Security Administration after the encounter with DCFS and having
some emotional problems. Because of that, I wasn’t able to even be questioned as to
represent my brother at the trial. And when my brother was asked to lift his shirt up, it
covered his birth defects and revealed gang signs all over his chest and they found him
guilty, giving that the court allowed a gangbanger to testify being they were involved in a
crime and then they saw my brother’s gang signs on his chest and the jury felt
uncomfortable that gangbangers trying to get away with something where they allowed a
gangbanger to testify and was witness to the trial. And since I wasn’t there and under some
money exchange in a DCFS case, that, you know, that I got emotionally sequestered by,
and all this came about all at once, it turned into a big debacle and I got busy with a job
and I kept getting laid off in the suburbs and find my way back into Chicago and tried to
restart. And every time I restart, I run back into where I left off growing up in Chicago, the
same people.”
¶ 19 Defense counsel informed the court that defendant indicated he had $650 in his commissary
account. He wanted to use the funds to reimburse the café for the new phone it had purchased for
Kosiba. The trial court appreciated the gesture as one indicating defendant’s “remorse for what
happened to [Kosiba’s] phone.” After considering the presentence report and the evidence in
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aggravation and mitigation, the trial court sentenced defendant to three years in the Illinois
Department of Corrections on the robbery conviction, which was the minimum sentence it could
impose. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-35(a) (West 2024). The court stated that it would “recommend a
facility with mental health treatment.” It also ordered that defendant serve one year of mandatory
supervised release.
¶ 20 At the end of the hearing, defendant spoke to the court:
“THE DEFENDANT: I have one more question. I was sent from one courtroom in
criminal court over here. There was a change in venue in my name. When I got here, you
stated in my name in my favor not guilty and then the public defender stated I’m not
contesting the robbery because I pled the fifth amendment and was found guilty. Those are
none of my choices.
THE COURT: I’m not sure what you’re asking me. We had a trial. I did find you not
guilty of the agg batt public way and the unlawful restraint. I found you guilty of the
robbery at trial.
THE DEFENDANT: My understanding is that in the criminal court, I was seen by a
judge in criminal court first and then there was change in venue made in my name and
when I got in this courtroom, bench plea in my favor of not guilty and then the public
defender not contesting the robbery as I pled the fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination and was found guilty with no testimony and a bench plea of not guilty and a
change in venue to this courtroom.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, I’ll have a conversation with Mr. Miranda in the
lock up. I have a transcript of the trial and we can go over the fact that we did contest all
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of the charges since he had pled not guilty. Again, I’ll also explain the process whereby the
cases that come to us here, don’t necessarily start here. They start elsewhere.
THE COURT: Right. They started somewhere else. They came here, they went to
26th Street and then it was assigned here. But once it became a felony charge, it’s been in
front of me since August 24, 2023, and I’m the judge that’s heard everything on the case
and I’m the judge that found you guilty.
THE DEFENDANT: There was a judge that filed a motion for discovery before this
judge.
THE COURT: You might have been in another courtroom, in courtroom 105 where
they found probable cause.
THE DEFENDANT: It was in criminal court at 26th and California.
THE COURT: And then you went to 26th Street for assignment.
THE DEFENDANT: That’s where I went first.
THE COURT: I’m not sure, but I’ll let your lawyer look that over and show you the
transcript. As I’ve said, you can appeal this.”
¶ 21 Defendant filed this appeal.
¶ 22 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 23 Defendant first contends that he raised a posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
at the sentencing hearing, but the trial court failed to conduct a preliminary inquiry into his claim
as required under Krankel. He argues that the matter should be remanded to the trial court for the
purpose of conducting that inquiry.
¶ 24 Krankel’s procedure is triggered when a defendant raises a pro se posttrial claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 11. When the claim is made,
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the trial court should conduct a preliminary inquiry into the factual basis of the claim. People v.
Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68, 77-78 (2003). If the claim lacks merit or pertains only to matters of trial
strategy, the court may deny the pro se motion. People v. Jolly, 2014 IL 117142, ¶ 29. However,
if defendant’s claim indicates possible neglect of the case, new counsel should be appointed. Id.
This process “serves the narrow purpose of allowing the trial court to decide whether to appoint
independent counsel to argue a defendant’s pro se posttrial ineffective assistance claims.” People
v. Patrick, 2011 IL 111666, ¶ 39.
¶ 25 To initiate Krankel’s procedure, defendant need only bring his ineffective assistance claim
to the trial court’s attention, and he “may raise the issue orally.” Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 11.
Where a defendant expressly asserts a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, that alone is
sufficient to trigger a preliminary inquiry under Krankel. Id. ¶ 18. In this case, however, where no
express claim of ineffective assistance was raised, a Krankel inquiry may be required if defendant’s
statements indicated his dissatisfaction with counsel’s performance. People v. Taylor, 237 Ill. 2d
68, 77 (2010); see also People v. Lobdell, 2017 IL App (3d) 150074, ¶ 37 (finding the assertion
that defendant did not understand trial counsel’s failure to challenge the violation of his
constitutional rights was sufficient to trigger a Krankel inquiry).
¶ 26 Here, defendant addressed the trial court after the sentencing hearing, and he appeared to
raise two issues: (1) his confusion over the fact that his case began in one courtroom and “there
was a change in venue” to another courtroom, and (2) “the public defender not contesting the
robbery as I pled the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination and was found guilty with
no testimony.” Although defendant did not raise an express claim of ineffective assistance, he did
question his counsel’s performance in contesting the robbery charge where defendant had invoked
his fifth amendment right not to testify, and thus, he “was found guilty with no testimony.”
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¶ 27 We find that defendant’s statements were sufficient to trigger a preliminary inquiry under
Krankel. Defendant contends that the trial court did not conduct a preliminary inquiry. However,
a review of the record shows that the court did inquire into defendant’s claims. “The operative
concern for the reviewing court is whether the trial court conducted an adequate inquiry into the
defendant’s pro se allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Emphasis added.) Moore, 207
Ill. 2d at 78. Even if the preliminary inquiry was conducted in an improper manner, the error may
be deemed harmless if it produced a neutral and objective record with which a reviewing court can
assess defendant’s claims. People v. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶¶ 126-27. Whether the trial court
conducted a proper preliminary inquiry is a legal question that we review de novo. Id. ¶ 98.
¶ 28 Some type of exchange between the trial court and defense counsel regarding the
circumstances of counsel’s representation is “usually necessary” to assess whether further action
is warranted on defendant’s claim. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 78. During the exchange, counsel “ may
simply answer questions and explain the facts and circumstances surrounding the [ ] allegations.”
Id. That is precisely what occurred here.
¶ 29 After defendant expressed his concerns at the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that
it was “not sure what you’re asking me.” Defendant repeated his claims, and defense counsel
responded, “I’ll have a conversation with Mr. Miranda in the lock up. I have a transcript of the
trial and we can go over the fact that we did contest all of the charges since he had pled not guilty.”
Counsel would also explain that cases can start in a different courtroom than the room where the
trial takes place. After defendant stated that a different judge heard a pretrial motion in his case,
the trial court responded, “I’m not sure, but I’ll let your lawyer look that over and show you the
¶ 30 Although the exchange between defendant, the trial court, and defense counsel was brief,
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a preliminary Krankel hearing need not be lengthy. See People v. Banks, 237 Ill. 2d 154, 215
(2010) (finding that two exchanges between the defendant and the trial court were sufficient to
assess the basis of his claim where the court was familiar with the substance of the claim).
¶ 31 Moreover, during a preliminary inquiry, the trial court may assess defendant’s
ineffectiveness claims “based on its knowledge of defense counsel’s performance at trial and the
insufficiency of the defendant’s allegations.” Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 12. The trial court below
presided over defendant’s trial and most of the pretrial proceedings. The record shows that
although defense counsel did not present witnesses on defendant’s behalf, counsel thoroughly
cross-examined Kosiba regarding the incident. During closing argument, counsel argued that
robbery did not occur when defendant did not intend to gain control over or permanently deprive
Kosiba of her phone. Instead, defendant was attempting to stop her from taking a photo of him.
¶ 32 Accordingly, when defendant expressed his concern that trial counsel did not contest the
robbery charge, counsel replied that she had “a transcript of the trial and we can go over the fact
that we did contest all of the charges since he had pled not guilty.” When the inquiry ended, the
trial court explained to defendant that his counsel would “show you the transcript.” It is clear from
the record that the trial court considered defendant’s claim that defense counsel failed to contest
the robbery charge and rejected it as contradicted by the record. The appointment of counsel is not
necessary if, after a preliminary inquiry, the trial court finds that defendant’s claim lacks merit.
Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 78.
¶ 33 Defendant argues that he also raised the issue of counsel’s ineffectiveness where he did not
testify at trial and it was not his choice. While defendant mentioned at the sentencing hearing that
he did not testify, it was in the context of his claim that defense counsel failed to challenge the
robbery charge. He never indicated to the court that he wanted to testify at trial. Nonetheless, the
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record positively rebuts defendant’s claim that he did not choose to exercise his right to remain
silent. When defense counsel informed the trial court that defendant did not wish to testify, the
court admonished defendant that only he could make that choice. The court then asked defendant,
“Do you wish to testify today?” He answered, “No.” The trial court confirmed, “And that’s your
choice, correct?” He responded, “Yes.” We find no error here.
¶ 34 Defendant next contends that the trial court should have sua sponte ordered a fitness
hearing where there was a bona fide doubt as to his fitness to stand trial. Defendant did not raise
this issue below in a posttrial motion. To preserve an error for review, defendant must both (1)
object to the error at trial, and (2) raise the error in a posttrial motion. People v. Sebby, 2017 IL
119445, ¶ 48. “Failure to do either results in forfeiture.” Id. However, a reviewing court may
consider an unpreserved claim if a clear or obvious error occurred and (1) the evidence was closely
balanced, or (2) the error was so serious that it affected the fairness of the trial and challenged the
integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence. People v. Piatkowski,
225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007). Since prosecuting defendant when a bona fide doubt exists as to his
fitness renders the proceeding fundamentally unfair, we may review the claim under the plain error
rule. People v. Sandham, 174 Ill. 2d 379, 382 (1996). The first step in plain-error analysis is to
determine whether any error occurred. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 49.
¶ 35 A defendant is presumed fit to stand trial. 725 ILCS 5/104-10 (West 2024). However, a
defendant may be found “unfit if, because of his mental or physical condition, he is unable to
understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense.” Id.
“Fitness speaks only to a person’s ability to function within the context of trial; it does not refer to
sanity or competence in other areas.” People v. Coleman, 168 Ill.2d 509, 524 (1995).
¶ 36 A bona fide doubt as to defendant’s fitness exists if there is a “real, substantial and
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legitimate doubt” assessed against an objective standard. People v. Eddmonds, 143 Ill.2d 501, 518
(1991). A court may consider defendant’s irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior
medical opinion on his competence. People v. Harris, 206 Ill. 2d 293, 304 (2002). There are no
fixed or immutable signs that invariably indicate the need for further inquiry. Id. at 305. Once facts
that raise a bona fide doubt of defendant’s fitness are brought to the trial court’s attention, it has a
duty to order a fitness hearing sua sponte. People v. McCallister, 193 Ill. 2d 63, 110–11 (2000).
Whether a bona fide doubt has arisen is generally a matter within the trial court’s discretion.
Sandham, 174 Ill. 2d at 382.
¶ 37 Defendant argues that a bona fide doubt existed where both the trial court and defense
counsel commented on the “necessity” of mental health evaluations during the proceedings, and
defendant’s statements showed “disorganized thinking” and an “inability to adequately understand
the proceedings.” Defendant specifically points to the discussion regarding the 402 conference
which, he argues, reflected his inability to follow the proceedings. He also points to his statement
in allocution at the sentencing hearing which referred to his brother’s trial and did not relate to his
case. Defendant cites Sandham as support.
¶ 38 In Sandham, the following episodes and testimony occurred: (1) defense counsel made a
pretrial motion to obtain a psychiatric evaluation of the defendant to determine his fitness; (2) prior
to trial, the defendant was unable to cooperate with his counsel without difficulty and he was
committed to a psychiatric ward; (3) the defendant sent two letters to the court that were hostile
and, at times, nonsensical; (4) the defendant made threatening phone calls to the trial judge; (5) his
mother testified that the defendant was not “all the way there;” (6) an evaluation suggested the
defendant had a “slight chemical imbalance” and was “slightly schizophrenic;” (7) the defendant
was taking psychotropic medications around the time of trial and sentencing; and (8) an outburst
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during sentencing to “[c]ut my brain out,” and defendant’s statement that he had “three albums on
the top of the charts and comic books all over.” Id. at 388. At one point, the trial court told the
defendant, “You don’t even seem to understand what’s going on. You are making comments that
are obviously inappropriate ***.” Id. at 386.
¶ 39 Our supreme court found that “the instant events and testimony combined to raise a bona
fide doubt as to defendant’s fitness to stand trial or be sentenced.” Id. at 389. Although a bona fide
doubt arguably existed beforehand, the trial court should have conducted a fitness hearing, sua
sponte, when it questioned the defendant’s capacity to understand the proceedings. Id.
¶ 40 In this case, unlike Sandham, neither the trial court nor defense counsel expressed concern
that defendant could not understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him or assist
in his defense. It is true that counsel and the court commented on having defendant undergo a
mental health evaluation, which he ultimately refused to do. However, the purpose of that
evaluation was to assess whether probation would be an appropriate disposition in defendant’s
case. The fact that defendant may have mental health issues that should be identified for probation
purposes does not, by itself, indicate an unfitness to stand trial. See People v. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d
509, 524 (1995) (noting that “[a] person can be fit for trial although his mind may be otherwise
unsound;”) see also Eddmonds, 143 Ill. 2d at 519 (finding that fitness refers only to defendant’s
ability to function at a trial and not to his competence in other areas).
¶ 41 Moreover, defendant’s interactions with the trial court showed that he understood the
proceedings against him and could assist in his defense. Although defendant abruptly put an end
to the 402 conference, he had a reason for doing so. His discussion with the court indicated that he
was only interested in a deal if he would receive time already served. He asked, “That’s not worth
anything now, the time served?” The court responded, “That’s not how this works. *** I would
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make an offer. Your lawyer asked me to consider a mental health option, probation. That’s
obviously something you were not interested in participating in. *** But I’m totally fine with
setting it for trial.” Defendant informed the court that he wanted a bench trial. Although defense
counsel expressed surprise at defendant’s decision, defendant made a rational choice based on his
desired outcome for the proceedings.
¶ 42 Defendant’s statement in allocution, while rambling, also showed that he understood the
nature of the proceedings against him. When defendant informed the trial court of his difficulty in
dealing with his brother’s criminal trial, because he felt guilt for not being able to testify in his
brother’s defense, he understood that such information served as mitigating evidence at his
sentencing hearing. He attempted to explain how his life circumstances led him to this point.
Furthermore, defendant offered to repay the café for having to purchase a new phone for Kosiba.
The trial court appreciated the offer and imposed the minimum sentence of three years.
¶ 43 If a defendant understands the nature of the charges against him and can, in cooperation
with counsel, conduct his defense in a rational and reasonable manner, he is fit to stand trial even
if his mind may be otherwise unsound. Eddmonds, 143 Ill. 2d at 521. We cannot say the trial court
abused its discretion by failing to hold a hearing sua sponte into defendant’s fitness. Without error,
there can be no plain error. People v. Hood, 2016 IL 118581, ¶ 18.
¶ 44 Defendant’s final contention is that the evidence at trial was not sufficient to prove him
guilty of robbery. He therefore requests that this court reduce his conviction to theft.
¶ 45 When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, the relevant inquiry is whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Cardamone, 232
Ill. 2d 504, 511 (2009). The trier of fact is responsible for assessing the credibility of the witnesses,
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weighing the testimony, and drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence. People v. Ortiz,
196 Ill. 2d 236, 259 (2001). When considering the sufficiency of the evidence, the reviewing court
does not retry the defendant. People v. Beauchamp, 241 Ill. 2d 1, 8 (2011). Rather, we will reverse
a criminal conviction only where the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that there exists
a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt. People v. Collins, 214 Ill. 2d 206, 217 (2005).
¶ 46 A person commits the offense of robbery when he or she “knowingly takes property ***
from the person or presence of another by the use of force or by threatening the imminent use of
force.” 720 ILCS 5/18–1(a) (West 2024). The use of force or threat of force causes the victim to
part with possession or custody of property against his or her will. People v. Klebanowski, 221 Ill.
2d 538, 550 (2006). The State need not prove that force was used immediately before or during
the time of the taking. People v. Merchant, 361 Ill. App. 3d 69, 74 (2005). It is sufficient that
defendant used force as “part of a series of events that constitute a single incident or occurrence.”
People v. Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d 87, 102. The distinguishing element between robbery and theft is that
theft is a simple deprivation of property, whereas robbery is deprivation of property, plus the use
of force or the threat of force. People v. Washington, 375 Ill. App. 3d 243, 249 (2007).
¶ 47 Defendant argues that he did not use force when he snatched the phone from Kosiba’s
hand, citing People v. Patton, 76 Ill. 2d 52 (1979). In Patton, the victim testified that as the
defendant walked towards her, he swiftly grabbed her purse, throwing her arm back “a little bit.”
Id. at 48. The defendant then fled with her purse. Although he was convicted of robbery, the
appellate court reversed and remanded, with directions to the trial court to enter a judgment of
conviction for theft. Id. at 47. On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the appellate court. Id. at 52.
¶ 48 Patton is distinguishable where the victim testified that her arm was merely thrown back
“a little bit” as the defendant snatched her purse, and she never stated that she was hurt by the
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action. Also, there was no struggle between the victim and the defendant after the taking.
¶ 49 In this case, defendant exerted additional force on Kosiba after he had ripped the phone
out of her hand. As they struggled for the phone, defendant grabbed Kosiba’s right wrist and gave
it a twist before fleeing with the property. Kosiba testified that her wrist was sore for a few days.
It is well-established that when property is taken, and a struggle ensues between the victim and the
offender for possession of the property, sufficient force can exist to support a robbery conviction.
See Merchant, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 74–75 (finding that “the immediacy of the struggle following
the taking[] supports our conclusion that the crime amounted to a robbery”).
¶ 50 In finding defendant guilty of robbery, the trial court determined that the evidence showed
the use of sufficient force by defendant. The trial court, as the fact finder, is responsible for drawing
inferences from the evidence. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
we cannot say that the trial court’s determination was so improbable or unsatisfactory that there
exists a reasonable doubt that defendant committed robbery. We therefore decline to reduce
defendant’s conviction to theft.
¶ 51 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 52 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 53 Affirmed.
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